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ABSTRACT
Contemporary research has shown that authoritarian regimes are not static. At the same time, gradual changes are often difficult to detect and the literature has not yet developed convincing tools to identify autocracy-to-autocracy transitions outside the visible ruptures of coups, power transfers, and opposition victories. Building on fieldwork in Tanzania, we show that patterns of rule shifted significantly under Magufuli. Once the model case of a party-based system in Africa, we argue that Tanzania should be reclassified as a party-personalist regime for the time of his presidency. The basis for his success lies in the increasing factional tensions within the CCM which gave him the power to act as the arbiter and to manipulate party institutions and nominations to his favour. Beyond providing a thick description of a single case, we address the theoretical and empirical challenges of correctly classifying authoritarian regimes.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 On elite defections in Tanzania and Cameroon in comparative perspective, see Morse, How Autocrats Compete.
2 Collord, “Wealth, Power and Institutional Change in Tanzania’s Parliament”.
3 Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”
4 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions.”
5 Ibid.
6 Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”.
7 Ibid., 122.
8 Smith, “Life of the Party.”
9 Lachapelle et al., “Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability.”
10 Huang-Ting, “Does the Constitution Matter?”
11 Panta, “The Stubbornness of Authoritarianism,” 153; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited”; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions.”
12 Panta, “The Stubbornness of Authoritarianism.”
13 Ibid., 153; Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions,” 325f.
14 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 313.
15 Lührmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here,” 1108.
16 Grundholm, “Taking It Personal?” 16; Fumagalli, “Social Contention, Authoritarian Resilience, and Political Change,” 1221; Hill, “Authoritarian Resilience and Regime Cohesion.”
17 Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi, “How is Power Shared in Africa?”
18 Slater, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist.”
19 Ibid., 82.
20 Ibid., 96.
21 Bayulgen et al., “Elite Survival Strategies and Authoritarian Reversal”; Yilmaz et al., “How an Islamist Party.”
22 Baturo and Elkink, “Dynamics of Regime Personalization.”
23 Shirk, “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’.”
24 Morgenbesser, “Misclassification on the Mekong.”
25 Geddes et al., “A Measure of Personalism in Dictatorships.”
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Morgenbesser, “Misclassification on the Mekong,” 193.
30 Casal Bértoa, “Political Parties or Party Systems?” 410.
31 Magaloni and Kricheli, “Political Order and One-Party Rule”; Reuter and Turovsky, “Dominant Party Rule”.
32 Brownlee, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies”.
33 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy.
34 Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage.”
35 Ibid.
36 Masiya and Maringira, “The Use of Heroism.”
37 Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage,” 872.
38 Khisa, “Managing Elite Defection.”
39 Andrews and Honig, “Elite Defection.”
40 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, 33.
41 Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism.”
42 The work of Loxton and LeBas also points in that direction. While Loxton and Levitsky explore the relationship between charismatic leaders and parties in Latin America, LeBas argues that personalism could stabilize authoritarian successor parties after defeat. Although she does not develop this in detail, personalism might also stabilize parties in crisis or prevent a mounting crisis.
43 See, among others, Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship.
44 Brunkert and von Soest, “Praising the Leader”.
45 For a critique of this conflation see Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa”.
46 Grundholm, “Taking It Personal?”; Brunkert and von Soest, “Praising the Leader”.
47 Cheeseman, Matfess, and Amani, “Tanzania.”
48 Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik, “Legislatures and Legislative Politics without Democracy”; Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt.
49 Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage”.
50 Sulley, “Democracy within Parties”.
51 Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism”.
52 Gray, “The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania”.
53 Geddes et al., “A Measure of Personalism in Dictatorships,” 2.
54 Two items regarding the security apparatus are collapsed into one. The item whether the ruler created a new political party was dropped. We are looking at the gradual shift from a party-based to a personalist system. Magufuli came to power thanks to the CCM, it is therefore more reasonable to turn the existing party into a more personalized vehicle of power than to form a new party from scratch.
55 While Geddes’ indicators are developed to be applicable for a large range of countries, we rename them to reflect what exactly our data contain. Our approach is thus similar to that of Morgenbesser’s 2018 study. The general content of the indicators is maintained, but we achieve greater precision for our single case study.
56 Geddes et al., “How Dictatorships Work,” 81.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 81.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 80.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 81.
63 Ibid., 82.
64 Ibid.
65 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “A Measure of Personalism in Dictatorships,” 2.
66 Geddes et al., “How Dictatorships Work,” 82.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 93.
69 Kendall-Taylor et al., “The Global Rise of Personalized Politics,” 10.
70 Geddes et al., “How Dictatorships Work,” 93.
71 Ibid., 85.
72 Ibid.
73 Geddes, “What Do We Know,” 124.
74 O’Gorman, “Why the CCM Won’t Lose,” 313.
75 Whitehead, “Historical Legacies,” 1087.
76 Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, 71; Morse, How Autocrats Compete, 103.
77 Van Donge and Liviga, “Tanzanian Political Culture and the Cabinet,” 636.
78 Ibid.
79 Thompson, African Democracy, 301.
80 Shivji, “Nationalism and pan-Africanism,” 110.
81 Thompson, African Democracy, 339.
82 Mmuya, Tanzania: Political Reform in Eclipse, 15–16.
83 Collord, The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa, 113.
84 Hyden, “Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania,” 144.
85 Collord, The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa, 115.
86 Makulilo, “Authoritarian Stability across Space,” 177.
87 Tsubura, “Umoja ni Ushindi,” 68.
88 Ibid.
89 Makulilo, Populism and Democracy in Africa, 179.
90 Kelsall, “Shop Windows and Smoke-filled Rooms,” 612–613.
91 Ibid.
92 Tanzania: Political Reform in Eclipse, 71.
93 Tsubura, “Umoja ni Ushindi,” 67.
94 Morse, How Autocrats Compete, 138. Ibid.
95 Collord, The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa, 174.
96 Ibid., 180.
97 Collord, The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa, 177. Tsubura, “Umoja ni Ushindi,” 70.
98 Paget, “The Authoritarian Origins of Well-organized Opposition Parties,” 704.
99 Collord, The Political Economy of Institutions in Africa, 174.
100 Ibid., 126.
101 Tsubura, “Umoja ni Ushindi,” 73.
102 Ibid.
103 Paget, “Tanzania”; Pallotti, “Lost in Transition?”
104 Africa Confidential, “Laying Down the Law”; Paget, “Tanzania,” 156; Jacob and Pedersen, “New Resource Nationalism?” 291.
105 Andreoni, “Anti-Corruption in Tanzania.”
106 Kimboy, “Kinana, Makamba and Membe to be Grilled by CCM Disciplinary Committee”; Yamola, “Membe: What Tanzania Needs for Elections to be Truly Free, Fair”.
107 Morse, “Electoral Authoritarianism and Weak States in Africa”; Collord, “Wealth, Power and Institutional Change.”
108 Paget, “Again, Making Tanzania Great.”
109 Magufuli, “Hotuba ya Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Mheshimiwa Dkt. John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, akifungua rasmi Bunge jipya la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Dodoma”.
110 Andreoni, “Anti-Corruption in Tanzania,” 33.
111 Mtulya, “Magufuli’s Cabinet Leanest in 20yrs, 7 JK Ministers Back.”
112 Paget, “Again, Making Tanzania Great.”
113 Kwayu, “Tanzania’s COVID-19 Response.”
114 El-Noshokaty, “Präsident Magufuli Macht Sich Feinde.”
116 The Citizen Reporter, “Who’s Next in Magufuli’s Crosshairs?”
117 El-Noshokaty, “Präsident Magufuli Macht Sich Feinde.”
118 Ibid.
119 The Citizen Reporter, “Mixed Reactions Greet Appointment of New Tanzania Controller and Auditor General.”
120 The Citzien, “Missing Finance Ministry Director Found Dead.”
121 Africa Confidential, “The Magufuli Experiment.”
122 Ibid.
123 Andreoni, “Anti-Corruption in Tanzania.”
124 Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Katiba Ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
125 Ibid.
126 The Citizen, “The Spotlight Now Turns on CCM’s New Strategist.”
127 The Citizen, “CCM National Delegates Conference in Dodoma.”
128 Therkildsen and Bak, Democratisation in Tanzania, 12.
129 The Citizen, “Phillip Mangula Makes First Public Appearance Months After Poisoning Claims.”
130 Ibid.
131 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Country Report Tanzania, 2020.
132 Masare, “President Magufuli Takes a Breather from Campaigns.”
133 Abrahams, The Peoples of Greater Unyamwezi; Babeiya, “Multiparty Elections and Party Support in Tanzania,” 92.
134 The Citizen Reporter, “JPM Picks Key Confidant Treasury PS.”
135 Ibid.
136 Anonymous Author, “Tanzania Search for Missing Millions Raises Questions Over $1 Billion.”
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Anja Osei
Anja Osei is a professor of comparative political science with a special focus on Africa at Freie Universität Berlin. Her research interest is in the field of democratization, authoritarianism, political elites and political institutions.
Elisabeth Bruhn
Elisabeth Bruhn holds a Master's degree in Politics and Public Administration with a specialization in International Administration and Conflict Management. She works as a Policy Officer at the Federal Statistical Office of Germany.