Coerced migration: mobility under siege in Gaza

ABSTRACT

This article, based on field research conducted between 2018 and 2019 centres the role of Israeli state coercion in the migration of young Palestinians from Gaza. In recent years, migration from Gaza has been described by journalists and policy analysts as an ‘emerging phenomenon’, with many Palestinians leaving with the intention to seek asylum in Europe and beyond. In this article, I map existing data on international migration from Gaza, which has been under siege since 2007. I then draw from qualitative data gathered during fieldwork in Gaza to explain how migration in a context of a siege can best be understood. I apply a framework of coercion to explain the migration decisions of young people in Gaza, arguing that the siege has created an environment so coercive that it forces them to leave, while limiting them primarily to dangerous routes in doing so. Circumstances for leaving remain key to accessing international protection regimes. This article therefore contributes to the current debate of definitions and ways of understanding migration, in the context of Gaza.

KEYWORDS:

• Coercion
• forced migration
• youth
• Gaza

Acknowledgements

This article was finalised at a time of absolute horror in Gaza, and for Palestine. All those involved in this research who I have been able to maintain contact with have been forcibly displaced, and at least two have been killed. I am profoundly grateful to all of the individuals in Gaza who gave up their time to speak with me. May their voices and experiences contribute to the documentation of the histories that some seek to erase. For their generosity and support, I would like in particular to thank Rana Ibrahim, Mohammad Abu-Daya, Sana Qurmush and the Mashharawi family. The detailed and constructive feedback of both reviewers of this article was immensely helpful. I would also like to thank Tamara Aburamadan, and members of the Migration Policy Centre Seminar at EUI for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Ethical approval

Ethics approval for field research in Palestine was obtained and updated by the University of Oxford CUREC/2 (approval number: SSH_C2_15_022). There are no competing interests to declare.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 All individuals mentioned in this article have been anonymized with any identifying characteristics changed.

2 Interview with author, Gaza city, February 2019.

3 Interview with author, Gaza city, February 2019.

4 For examples, see ‘I want to get the hell out of here: thousands of Palestinians are leaving Gaza’ NPR 04.06.2019 [https://www.npr.org/2019/07/04/733487137/i-want-to-get-the-hell-out-of-here-thousands-of-palestinians-are-leaving-gaza?t=1645551128146]; ‘By 2020 the UN said Gaza would be unlivable. Did it turn out that way?’ The Guardian 28.12.2019; ‘Israel actively pushing Palestinian emigration from Gaza’, Times of Israel 19.08.2019 [https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-actively-pushing-palestinian-emigration-from-gaza-official-says/]; ‘Israel pushing Gazans to migrate to change demographics’ The Arab Weekly 19.10.2019 [https://thearabweekly.com/israel-pushing-gazans-migrate-change-demographics];

5 Egypt has been complicit in the conditions facing Palestinians in Gaza for the past 16 years, working with the Israel to seal the air, land and sea borders around Gaza. Egypt closed its border with Gaza in 2007, when Hamas came to power. Despite both domestic and regional moral and political outrage over the blockade, successive Egyptian governments have cited security threats and concerns over the precedent that Hamas’ political electoral success in Gaza could set. They have systematically chosen to prioritise relationships with Israel and the US over Palestine, and indeed there has long been heavy suppression of pro-Palestinian activism, or any activism specifically against the blockade in Egypt. Most importantly, Egypt has long signaled that they have no interest in being seen as a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of Gaza, something which has been contemplated by Israeli strategists for decades. Around 15,500 Palestinians fled to Egypt during the 1948 Nakba (Brand 1988, 46). They were never recognized as refugees, and instead under Gemal Abdel Nasser’s rule they came to be treated on a par with Egyptian citizens, receiving basic rights, access to property and public sector employment without the need for work permits. The signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 signaled an abrupt change to this treatment of Palestinians in Egypt. These rights were revoked, and ever since they have been assigned the category of ‘foreigner’ (for a detailed history, see El-Abed 2009, 536–543).

6 International Court of Justice Press Release, December 29th 2023: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-southafrica-israel-genocide-29dec2023/

7 For a critical overview of a wide body of work on settler colonialism in Israel and Palestine, see Salamanca et al. (2012).

8 I have worked with the same research assistant on a number of different studies since 2017. The safe conduct of all of this work would have been impossible without this individual, who has requested to remain anonymous.

9 It is estimated that three-quarters of a million Palestinians left their homes in 1948: 39% went to the West Bank; 26% to Gaza; 14% to Lebanon; 10% to Syria; 10% to the East Bank of Jordan; and 1% to Egypt (Hilal 1992, 40). This displacement lead to an increase of the West Bank population by 60%, while in Gaza the total population tripled in 1948 as a result of Palestinian refugees arriving from elsewhere in the country (Kossaifi 1980).

10 For a history of Hamas’s thirty-year transition to governance, see Baconi (2018).

11 Interviews, November 2018–August 2019.

12 See Figures 1 and 2.

13 Interviews with author, August–December 2019.

14 Interviews with author, October 2019–February 2020; presentations and discussions conducted in Jerusalem with delegates of ten EU member states in October and December 2019.

15 Multiple interviews with author, October 2018–December 2019

16 Interview with author, Gaza City, August 2019.

17 This does not account for Palestinians who migrate through other means (such as with work or student visas), nor those who travel to Europe and for a variety of reasons maintain an irregular status.

18 Reported in multiple interviews with policy analysts, academics and NGO staff with the author in 2019–2020

19 Available in paper copy only; this poll is currently unavailable via the online Al-Aqsa University Library database.

20 The methodology followed in this poll has not been made public. It should be noted while considering these results that survey research in Gaza comes under close scrutiny of the Hamas government, and many of the questions included in this survey were leading in nature.

21 For discussion of this dissuasion campaign, see https://www.knack.be/nieuws/de-block-gaat-palestijnen-ontraden-om-naar-belgie-te-komen/ and https://www.mo.be/analyse/drie-dingen-die-de-ontradingscampagne-tegen-palestijnen-ons-leert-over-asielbeleid

22 The Council for Alien Litigation Law is an independent administrative court authorized to process appeals against decisions taken by the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons and the Immigration Office.

23 App No 182.381, 16 February 2017 (Council for Alien Law Litigation) <https://www.rvv- cce.be/sites/default/files/arr/A182381.AN.pdf>; Raad voor Vreemdelingen-Betwistingen App No 190.280, 31 July 2017 (Council for Alien Law Litigation) <https://www.rvv- cce.be/sites/default/files/arr/A190280.AN.pdf>.

24 Council for Alien Law Litigation 228.889 (n 66)

25 App No 228.888, 18 November 2019 (Council for Alien Law Litigation), available via: https://www.rvv- cce.be/sites/default/files/arr/a228888.an_.pdf>.

26 This issue has endured an extensive back and forth in Belgian asylum decision-making, for details on this context see the AIDA country report available via: https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/belgium/asylum-procedure/differential-treatment-specific-nationalities-procedure/#_ftn3

27 Serin Alheto v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite. 2018. ‘A Palestinian who has refugee status from UNRWA cannot obtain refugee status in the EU while receiving effective protection or assistance from that UN agency’. Court of Justice of the European Union. Available via: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180112en.pdf.

28 Court of the Hague (unpublished), 24.08.2020. Available via the European Database on Asylum Law: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/netherlands-–-court-hague-unpublished-24-august-2020.

29 ICTY. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik. 2006. Case number IT-00-39-T. Trial Judgement. (hereafter ‘Krajisnik’). Para. 729

30 ICTY. Prosecutor v Krnojelac. 2002. Case number IT-97-25-T. Trial Judgement. Para. 475; Case number IT-97-25-A. Appeal Judgement. Para. 233

31 The Rome Statute Elements of Crimes. Article 6(e)

32 OHCHR: ‘Palestinians trapped in a coercive environment says UN rights official’, available via https://news.un.org/en/audio/2018/12/1028241

33 OCHA: ‘Coercive environment intensified on herding communities in Southern Hebron’, available via https://www.ochaopt.org/content/coercive-environment-intensified-herding-communities-southern-hebron

34 Inter alia, see 2010 International Committee of the Red Cross conclusions on the closure as a form of collective punishment, available via https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/update/palestine-update-140610.htm; 2016 UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, Michael Lynk ‘ … as a form of collective punishment imposed upon an entire population, the blockade is contrary to international law’. Report to the UN General Assembly A/71/554, 19 October 2016, para.45.

35 Article 55, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 (see: http://ihl-databases.ircr.org).

36 Interview with author, Nusierat, June 2019

37 For a detailed discussion of the use of drones in Gaza, see Abu Saif 2014.

38 Interview with author, Jabalia, May 2019

39 Interview with author, Gaza city, March 2019

40 Whatsapp communication with author, May 2021

41 Interview with author, Khan Younis, February 2019

42 Interview with author, Gaza city, Janruary 2019

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported financially by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101032492; and prior to this, by the European University Institute Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship, and the University of Oxford ESRC Doctoral Training Programme.