Should refugees govern refugee camps?

ABSTRACT

Should refugees govern refugee camps? This paper argues that they should. It draws on normative political thought in consulting the all-subjected principle and an instrumental defense of democratic rule. The former holds that all those subjected to rule in a political unit should have a say in such rule. Through analyzing the conditions that pertain in refugee camps, the paper demonstrates that the all-subjected principle applies there, too. Refugee camps have developed as near distinct entities from their host states. They have formed their own economic, legal and even political systems within which refugees are subjected to political rule. The paper then demonstrates that democratic rule should be preferred over any other decision-making procedure. No amount of experts can replace the institutions that would lead to the accountability of decision-makers and to the incorporation of refugees as situated and epistemically diverse knowers of the problems they face and the solutions that would work best.

KEYWORDS:

• Refugees
• refugee camps
• democracy
• all-subjected principle

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Not all refugees outside of liberal democracies remain in camps. UNHCR estimates that about 60% live elsewhere (not counting millions of Palestinians living in camps).

2. See: https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/10-infographics-that-show-the-insane-scale-of-the-global-displacement-crisis/ Last accessed: 4.3.2019.

3. For the benefits and why states often prefer camps as a form of sanctuary in the global south: (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998; Bakewell, 2014, p. 134; Holzer, 2013), 846; For arguments against refugee camps: (Black, 1998; Harrell-Bond, 1998; Kaiser, 2006).

4. Some authors may interpret the all-subjected principle to also justify the value of democracy. Here I take the more minimal approach in defending that the principle only justifies who should be democratically included where. It is important to note that the alternative view on the principle does not undermine the argument of the paper but would provide an alternative route to justifying democratically governed refugee camps.

5. For the difficulties obtaining travel documents and the impact on economic performance in refugee camps: (Werker, 2007), 464–65.

6. For trade and other forms of capital generation to satisfy traditional diets in camps in Kenya: (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000), 212, 216–17; For an overview of livelihood activities in Kakuma, see (Omata, 2016), 15–16. For economic activity in Dadaab, Horst (2007, pp. 85–86).

7. See especially scholarship that operates with the concept of ‘bare life’, suggesting that de facto no law applies in refugee camps (Agamben, 1998, pp. 168 et. seqq.)

8. Some even argue that the humanitarian government possesses resorts akin to government ministries (Agier, 2011, pp. 81, 201). That it is mainly UNHCR de facto governing refugee camps (where it is deployed) is a little disputed fact amongst scholars in refugee studies (Harrell-Bond, 2002, p. 59; Janmyr, 2016, p. 414; Jansen, 2013, p. 116; Wilde, 1998, p. 107).

9. Note that even if decisions taken within refugee camps affect neighboring communities, these are only affected by and not subjected to rule. While this may trigger a duty to take their interests into consideration or lead to host states limiting the governance of camps, it does not trigger a right to participation (Owen, 2012, p. 146).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Felix Bender

Felix Bender is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen, Germany. His work focuses on the political philosophy and ethics on refugees. In the past, he has written on the normative foundations of refugeehood as well as on the democratic inclusion of refugees.