The Church and the World: Are There Theological Resources for a Common Conversation?

Abstract

Abortion is an especially salient issue for considering the general problematic of religiously based conversation in the public square. It remains deeply divisive, fully thirty-four years after Roe v. Wade. Such divisiveness cannot be interpreted as merely an expression of profound differences between “secular” and “religious” voices, because differences also emerge among Christian denominations, reflecting different sources of moral authority, different accounts of moral discernment, and different judgments about the appropriate relations between law and morality in the context of pluralism. As this paper explores, however, despite those differences, a generally identifiable “Christian” position concerning the moral status of abortion can be distinguished from secular philosophical judgments on the issue, which is important for Christian engagement with public policy debate.

Keywords:

• abortion
• public policy
• Roe v. Wade

Notes

1. Tolerance, however, is classically interpreted in two quite different versions, associated respectively with the arguments of John Locke and John Stuart Mill. For Locke, tolerance is a necessary requirement of political life in order to prevent the violation of rights of individuals and communities; in effect, tolerance is the necessary lubricant of political accommodation of different worldviews and understandings of the good, but essentially a “negative” virtue protective of the possibility of civil society. Alternatively, John Stuart Mill celebrated tolerance in quite positive terms. In the judgment of one commentator, for Mill, “Tolerance now becomes the virtue of open-minded individuals who are willing to suspend judgment and belief, in order to further pluralistic, dialogical communities” (Khushf, 1994, p. 172). On Mill's reading, diverse opinions are welcome, in effect “the more the merrier,” because ever greater approximations of truth, both political and moral, result from the free exchange of ideas and arguments offered from different individuals and communities.

2. At the same time, though too often underemphasized in Catholic moral theology, special revelation (Scripture and Church tradition) functions crucially in two respects: first, to illuminate and empower human beings to know and to realize their supernatural ends (beatitudo, or final union with God) and to bring greater clarity to the conclusions of “natural” moral knowledge that, although in principle available to moral reason, may be distorted by sin.

3. Summa Theologica I–II, q. 94, art. 2: “There is an order of precepts of natural law corresponding to the order of natural inclinations. First, there is an inclination in man towards the good corresponding to what he has in common with all individual beings, the desire to continue in existence in accordance with their nature. In accordance with this inclination, those matters which conserve man's life or are contrary to it are governed by natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to some more specific objects in accordance with the nature which he has in common with other animals. According to this, those matters are said to be of natural law ‘which nature has taught all animals,’ such as the union of male and female, the bringing up of children, and the like. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to do good according to the nature of reason which is peculiar to him. He has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. Accordingly, those matters which concern this inclination are matter for natural law, such as that a man avoid ignorance, that he not offend others with whom he should have converse, and other matters relating to this.”

4. David Kelly: “… personalism refers to that modality of application of theological principles whereby an emphasis is placed on the entire personal complexus of the act in its human dimensions, circumstances, and consequences … personalism does not limit its scope to the physical or biological qualities of the action, but rather extends its purview to psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions” (Kelly, 1979, p. 419; quoted in Mackler, 2003, p. 40).

5. In this context, for Luther, the law has only two functions: an “elenctic” or judging function, which offers a mirror to our depravity in failing to heed God's command; and a civil use, as a dike against the effects of sin through what Luther called the “orders of nature,” including the function of government in maintaining public order. For John Calvin, law also has a third or spiritual use, whereby the law can school believers in the path of sanctification and spur them to holiness.

6. Absent a magisterium on the Orthodox side, alternative interpretations of that tradition by respected Orthodox authorities should be, if not welcomed by this journal, at least considered seriously (though whether in an ecumenical or non-ecumenical spirit will, I suppose, depend on one's predetermined commitments).

7. Much depends here on a further matter; viz., need the bleak vision of incommensurability between various communities of discourse be accepted, despite the currency of postmodernism? Or are there indeed theological resources in Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Christianity that suggest possibilities for meaningful though limited cooperation between the church and secular society? Here I am struck by a peculiar feature of moral theory (and moral theorists) seldom acknowledged. If, as recent theories of knowledge suggest, there are no uncontextualized facts, there are, then, no univocally objective accounts of moral experience. As a result, apparent “descriptions” of the nature and scope of moral pluralism combine elements of “data gathering” and of framing. I have long noticed how much one's respective commitments—either to radical incommensurability among communities of discourse or to the possibilities for agreement—depends on what one is predisposed to look for. Those seeking endless and irresolvable differences will be predisposed to find them. Those seeking degrees of commonality will be equally predisposed to find them. While that may seem an ad hominem point (depending on which allegiance one pledges), it is, I think, an obvious implication of recent turns in theories of knowledge, and of human psychology more broadly.

John Paul II. (1993). ‘Veritatis Splendor,’ Origins, 23 (October 14).