Publicly Accessible Intuitions: “Neutral Reasons” and Bioethics

Abstract

This article examines Leon Kass's contention that a choice for physician-assisted suicide is “undignified.” Although Kass is Jewish rather than Christian, he argues for positions that most Christians share, and he argues for these positions without presupposing the truth of specific religious claims. I argue that although Kass has some important intuitions, he too readily assumes that these intuitions will be shared by his audience, and that this assumption diminishes the force of his argument. An examination of the limitations of Kass's argument is helpful insofar as it illustrates the real challenge faced by religious believers who wish to defend their beliefs in the “public forum.” For it illustrates that what needs to be made “accessible” is the Judeo-Christian understanding of man and his place in the world. While I do not wish to claim that this task is impossible, I do think that it is far more difficult than most realize. Like all important tasks, however, unless we wrestle with the difficulties it raises, our arguments will strike many as unconvincing.

Keywords:

• bioethics
• moral intuitions
• neutral reasons
• christianity

Notes

1. Among those who argue that Christians need not and indeed should not attempt to find such reasons are Gilbert Meilander and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. See for example Gilbert Meilander (2005) and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (2000).

2. For an excellent discussion of this question, see Jeremy Waldron (1993).

3. See for instance Ruth Macklin (2003). Macklin argues that the term dignity is invariably reduced to either (a) autonomy or (b) respect for persons, and that when it does not reduce to either of these two terms it is used as a meaningless rhetorical slogan.

4. Scholars have proposed a variety of different names for the senses of dignity that I will distinguish in the following paragraph. The sense of dignity that I call ontological is sometimes referred to as “intrinsic” or “connatural” dignity, while the sense of dignity that I call moral is sometimes referred to as “manifested” or “existential” dignity. See for instance Patrick Lee (2001) and Luke Gormally (2004).

5. Jyl Gentzler does a nice job of pointing out that those who propose such a definition often involve themselves in contradictions, because they simultaneously assert that everyone should be able to direct their lives in any way they desire and claim that certain actions, such as smoking, are reprehensible (2003, p. 475).

6. In email correspondence, Christopher Tollefsen offered a neat formulation of this view, noting that: “‘dignity’ is a kind of summarizing term that supervenes on whatever we have to say about a) the specialness of human persons and b) whatever moral consequences that has. It's not a foundational term—it is available to any ethicist who has an account of why we are valuable, and what the consequences in some domain are of that.”

7. Thanks to Michael Gorman for offering this example.

8. Many critics argue that because Eddie Dupris tells Frankie that if Maggie were to die, she would die thinking “I done alright,” Eddie Dupris ultimately tells Frankie to kill Maggie. To say this, however, is to take the quote out of context. Eddie tells Frankie this in response to Frankie's claim that he “killed her” by allowing her to fight. Eddie, like Frankie's priest, is merely attempting to convince Frankie that Maggie's condition is not his fault. It is important to remember, moreover, that although Eddie has an inkling of what Frankie might do, Frankie does not discuss the prospect of killing Maggie with Eddie.