![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
All of us agree that a civilian population is inevitably and profoundly affected by a war, regardless of where this population stands in the scheme of things. A civilian population is hostage to the forces at work, not only physically, economically and socially, but also intimately, emotionally, psychologically and spiritually. In fact, everyone involved in a conflict has to deal with the chaos in his or her own mind and in his or her own environment. The formulation of international humanitarian law (IHL) was influenced by a socially oriented intellectual culture that has often failed to address the inner workings of the individual consciousness. Buddhism’s contribution here may be just that: its insistence on the process of cognition as the ground for both the creation of and the liberation from suffering. More specifically, this paper focuses on the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (DDV), an ancient North Indian Buddhist text. The premise is that many such ancient texts have something important to contribute to our contemporary world, by offering some insight into ‘universal principles’ in the workings of the mind and in human interactions. The question then is: how can these ideas contribute to the development of individual willingness to care and embody ethical conduct even during armed conflicts?
Disclosure statement
This article has been supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Notes
1. This paper has greatly benefitted from Kate Crosby, Andrew Bartles-Smith and Peter Harvey’s bright and insightful comments and from Charby Slemin’s close reading. My sincere gratitude goes to all of them.
2. The full Sanskrit original of this text has not been found; only fragments remain. There are several Tibetan editions of the entire text of both prose (DDV) and versified versions (DDVK-kārikā); there are very recent Chinese translations based on Tibetan editions. In this paper, I offer an original translation of some stanzas of a Derge Tibetan versified version (DDVK) often used in the Kagyu lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. In its original form, the DDV is quite technical and so I have chosen to adapt the language for our purpose. Faithful translations of the stanzas are offered in the notes.
3. The term ‘phenomena’ here is a translation of the Sanskrit term dharma. For more information on this term, see, amongst others, the works of Geiger and Geiger (Citation[1920] 1973), Stcherbatsky (Citation1923), Carter (Citation1976, Citation1978), Cox (Citation2004), Gethin (Citation2004) and, more recently, Denis (Citation2017).
4. Although the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga is most often associated with the Yogācāra school, I find that it is best to see it as belonging to the general Mahāyāna literature closely linked to the Prajñāpāramitā literature, and more specifically to chapters one and two of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra: the 8000 lines. The connection is made through the notion of reliance (see my forthcoming article on the structure of the DDV); hence the main question of this article: ‘What can one rely on during times of conflict?’.
5. Philosophy in this Buddhist context is seen as an operative device, meaning that a conception of the world has an inevitable consequence for individual experience.
6. Sk. prajñā; Tib. shes rab. In its usage, this term has two aspects: initially it is conceptual (based on scriptures and reasoning); when perfected, it is non-conceptual and non-dual.
7. Sk. karuṇā; Tib. snying rje. The Sanskrit term relates to the root kṛ (to do); the Tibetan term refers to an excellence of the heart.
8. Sk. āśraya, sthāna; Tib. gnas, rten. In this intellectual tradition, as Nance (Citation2007, 149–150) notes, in traditions of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism one is often instructed to check one’s understanding against ‘scripture and reasoning’ (respectively, Skt. āgama, yukti; Tib. lung, rigs pa) in order to determine whether one has comprehended a particular point. Typically, this injunction is invoked in the course of advocating a particular interpretation of Buddhist doctrinal claims …. In Sanskrit texts, the terms are typically found juxtaposed as a dvandva compound, voiced in the dual. Āgama and yukti are thus to be distinguished from one another and are portrayed as constituting two separable interpretive tools and/or warrants. Noting this distinction, recent scholars have sometimes formulated it in terms of the distinction between ‘dogma’, on the one hand, and ‘nonpartisan logic’, on the other.
9. Sk. nirvikalpa-jñāna; Tib. rnam par mi rtog pa ye shes. Although the term ‘intelligence’ is often considered an active changing process, here it is used to translate nirvikalpajñāna, meaning ‘inherent non-conceptual non-dual wisdom’.
10. Considering that IHL evolved from general concerns for humans in relation to the military requirements during armed conflict, it may be important to remind ourselves of the basic rules implied under such a law. These can be summed up in four precepts according to David (Citation2002, 921–922): do not attack non-combatants; attack combatants only by legal means; treat persons in your power humanely; and protect the victims. David’s book is cited in Sassòli et al. (Citation2020, I.921–922).
11. In Buddhist context in general, one speaks of five sensory consciousnesses, plus one mental consciousness. In texts like the DDV, one adds to these six capacities to be aware, the all-base consciousness seen as responsible for the dynamic of conditioning, plus what is called kleśa-mind or afflictive-mind: a way Buddhist thinkers have found to identify the dynamic of the sense of ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’ – henceforth, ‘we’, ’us’, ‘our’.
12. Note here that I have changed obvious sexist language in the quotation.
13. For more debates on universality, see: https://www.globalpolicy.org/home/163-general/29441.html. In a nutshell, the socially oriented critics of the notion of ‘universality’ have argued that the principles embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) are the product of Western political history. The origins of this declaration are rooted in political landmarks in Western history, such as the Magna Carta of the United Kingdom (1215), the French Revolution (1789) and the American Bill of Rights (1791). From this perspective, relativists argue that universalism, in its historical attempt to extend a Western ideal to the rest of the world, is a form of cultural imperialism. The problem is particularly obvious when looking at the establishment of post-conflict ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the International Criminal Court in 2002. As they do not involve ‘traditional’ or local approaches to justice, doing so could be more efficient in post-conflict reconciliation, therein also considering future implications.
14. For a discussion on the philosophical roots of IHL and those of the human rights law: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/S0020860400071539a.pdf.
15. See, amongst many others, Williams (Citation1980) and Dreyfus (Citation1997).
16. In this discourse there is a shift from an epistemology of domination to a more egalitarian, relational conception of knowledge production also relevant to IHL. See Roncancio et al. (Citation2019).
17. This term was popularised by Thomas Berry (1914–2009), a cultural historian and scholar of the world’s religions, especially Asian traditions. Later he studied earth history and evolution and developed ecological concerns.
18. In his book, Jones writes: ‘the sense of coercion is never far below the surface in most social sectors, in the workplace and school, on the streets, in politics, in government and the law, and in constant reminders in the new media’ (2003, 143). An armed conflict is an extension of these realities. As Jones says, a law is authoritatively efficient through compliance because those who comply assume it to be reasonable, or because of habits and conditioning, or unfortunately, at other times when people have a sense of powerlessness. However, as Jones says, a law stays superficial unless embraced with understanding (2003, 151).
19. This part of stanza 12 reads literally as follows: ‘as soon as there are [beings] who move around somewhere, the supports upon which rests the unending [cycle of suffering] are present. [In this wheel], there are [supports] that pertain to “beings” and those that pertain to the “container”’. Tib. gang zhig gang du ‘khor ba na / de ni kun tu gnas pas ste / sems can khams dang snod kyi khams / … .
20. Tib. gnas, gzhi, sten.
21. The term ‘Buddh-ism’ is a neologism, a new word created by the studies of religions. This area of studies emerged as a formal discipline during the nineteenth century. Its methods and approaches are borrowed from different disciplines. Its main task is to look at the history, origins and functions of religion. For some scholars, the notion of universality has been central to this quest; many others end up finding more differences than similarities.
22. Francisco Varela is one of the founders of the Mind and Life Institute engaged in a dialogue between science and Buddhism.
23. Individual beings (Sk. sattva-loka; Tib. sems can gyi ‘jig rten) and the environment or ‘vessel’ (Sk. bhājana-loka; Tib. snod kyi ‘jig rten).
24. This part of stanza 12 reads more literally as follows: ‘What pertains to “beings” [can be divided into] what is shared by them [i.e. what is interdependently or relationally produced], and what is not shared by them [i.e. what is intimate or personal]’. Tib. … sems can khams ni thun mong dang / yang na thun mong ma yin pa’o /.
25. In several commentaries, both Indian and Tibetan, this threefold framework is associated amongst other things with body, speech and mind; or with the five skandhas: form (body); sensation, perception, formation (speech); consciousnesses (mind). 1. The body here can refer to beings’ bodies, the environment, external circumstances, sense faculties and/or all the external objects. This idea of the world is often illustrated by the six realms of rebirth and to the specificity of the suffering that is experienced in each one. 2. Speech can refer to all types of relational activity (internal and external – including the interaction of sensations, perceptions and formations). 3. Mind refers to the capacity to experience, the capacity to perceive, the capacity to accumulate information and impressions. In its analysis, the DDV concludes that in the end, the individual process of cognition (3) is the determinant factor in the way relationships evolve and in how external circumstances are experienced.
26. Stanza 13 reads like this: ‘more precisely, what is relationally relevant is 1- the birth experience [i.e. inter-being of mother, father and baby]; 2- conventions [necessary to communication and cultures]; 3–4- help or coercion; 5–6- benefit or oppression; 7–8- and [the development of] qualities or faults, are all caused and determined in reciprocity’. Tib. de yang skye dang tha snyad dang / rjes su gzung dang tshar gcod dan / phan pa dang ni gnod pa dang / yon tan skyon ni phan tshun du / bdag po nyid kyis phan tshun rgyu / yin pa’i phir na thun mong pa’o /.
27. See Sasaki (Citation1986, particularly 64 and 133–140).
28. The similarity of experiences is said to stem from the similarity of individual predispositions. Saying that there are similar predispositions at play does not mean that people agree on the content of experience; it means that there are similarities in the way the process of cognition occurs. If there were no similarities, the commonality or the conflict would not appear; it could not even take place.
29. Sk. vijñaptimātra; Tib. rnam par rig tsam.
30. Different from a Tibetan Buddhist approach, Jones’ work is influenced by the Zen tradition for which the notion of Self and the notion of one-ness is not a problem. Other Buddhist traditions would probably never explain this experience in this same way.
31. The Dharmic approach illustrated by this edict is perhaps the earliest example of the threefold framework applied in a social context.
32. Tieken (Citation2002) says that what is clearly meant here is a three-day stay of the execution. In this edict, the king is concerned with the ‘gift of life’.
33. Although I have used the translation of the edict done by E. Hultzsch and published in Inscriptions of Asoka (1925, 119), there has been a lot of discussion about the meaning of these lines; see, amongst others, Norman (Citation1975) and Herman Tieken (Citation2002). For more information on the discovery of King Aśoka’s story, see also the work of Charles Allen (Citation2014).
34. The role of volition here is fascinating. On the one hand there is the notion of motivation and intention at work in the dynamic of karma and the development on the path. Yet volition is not the only factor to have a consequence on the way things appear and evolve. The Buddhist analysis of volition is not simplistic.
35. Sk. vibhāga; Tib. rnam par ‘byed pa.
36. As Nance (Citation2007) says, it may be useful to situate the analysis (Sk. yukti; Tib. rigs pa) within the broader categories. In Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and elsewhere, analysis is portrayed as contributing to the development of what Buddhist thinkers call ‘discriminating insight caused by reflection’. This form of insight is the second step of a three-step model of wisdom acquired though listening, reflecting and meditating. According to Vasubandhu, the wisdom acquired through reflection also falls under ‘what is born from investigation by means of reasoning’ (yuktinidhyānajā). These three forms of discriminating insight are said to arise successively in meditative concentration (samādhi). So, we end up here with the idea that the three trainings in the development of wisdom are intricately connected or inseparable. This applies to life in general, as well as to the development of profound insight (vipaśyanā) during meditation.
37. Sk. yukti; Tib. rigs pa. More recently, Jay L. Garfeild (Citation2021) published a book on the intimate relationship between philosophy/wisdom and ethics from a Buddhist perspective titled Buddhist Ethics: a Philosophical Exploration.
38. Stanza 35 offers a list of ideas that need to be abandoned on the path; there are four steps. These steps are also found in the Avikalpadeśadhāraṇī. The first step consists of abandoning what is contra-productive by using remedies (e.g. addictive behaviours are abandoned by looking at the negative qualities of their objects); then one is invited to abandon these remedies by embracing suchness (e.g. in the nature of phenomena notions of good and bad are superfluous); after which one abandon suchness (e.g. when suchness is made into a thing it becomes an obstacle); and finally, one abandons all notions of realisation – all hopes and fears (e.g. in the end the idea that there is something to be realised becomes a subtle obstacle to be abandoned).
39. Closer to the Tibetan version, one reads: ‘the nature of phenomena is suchness without a separation between an object grasped and a subject grasping or [between] what is designated and the designation’. Tib. gzhan yang chos nyid mtshan nyid ni / gzung ba dang ni ‘dzin pa dang / brjod par bya dang rjod par byed / khad med de bzhin nyid yin no /.
40. In his Identités Meurtrières, an essay translated into English under the title In the Name of Identity, Violence and the Need to Belong, Amin Maalouf (Citation2000), a writer of Lebanese origin living in France whose philosophical background is not Buddhism, also sees in the separation between self and other the root of a grave confusion.
41. See also e.g. Foundation for Active Compassion – Transformational Practices for a Better World, https://foundationforactivecompassion.org/.
42. Sk. nirvikalpajñāna; Tib. rnam par mi rtog pa ye shes.
43. The term ‘emptiness’ is used in several ways in the Mahāyāna. In the Prajñāpāramitā literature it sometimes refers to the middle way, meaning ‘neither existent nor not existent’; in response to the Abhidharma literature, it sometimes means empty of intrinsic existence (svabhāva); in some Tathāgatagarbha texts, it refers to the absence of defilements in the Buddha-nature; in the DDV, if it was used, it would refer to the absence of duality, to suchness (tathatā) and to fundamental non-conceptual intelligence/wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna).
44. References to the luminosity of the mind are found in early texts, but start being clearly formulated in texts such as the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and so on.
45. The translation of stanza 33 reads as follows: ‘An access to a profound change of what one relies on occurs through considering the ground or basis, that is, through considering the fundamental non-conceptual intelligence in six ways: [the way to] orient the mind; the attributes to be abandoned; the correct practice; the characteristics of this intelligence; its benefits; and a thorough understanding [of its particularities]’. The Sanskrit fragment reads as follows: āśrayo … praveśaḥ … ṣaḍākāranirvikalpajñānapraveśāt ṣaḍākārapraveśaḥ punarālambanato nimittaparivarjanataḥ samyakprayogato lakṣaṇato ‘nuśaṃsataḥ parijñānataś ca (Saṅkṛtyāyana Citation1938, 163, note 1). The Tibetan translation reads like this: gnas sam rten la ‘jug pa ni /rnam par mi rtog ye shes la / ‘jug pa rnam pa drug gis te / dmigs dang mtshan ma spangs pa dang / yang dag pa yi sbyor ba dang / mtshan nyid dang ni phan yon dang / yongs su shes la ‘jug pas so.
46. Tib. … de gnyis khyad par mi dmigs pa/ de ni rnam par mi rtogs pa’i/ ye shes yul med dmigs med pa/ mtshan ma thams cad mi dmigs pas/ rab phye ba ni yin phyir ro /.
47. On the interchangeability of prajñā-pāramitā and upāya-kauśalya – ‘perfection of wisdom’ and ‘skill in means’ – see amongst others de Breet (Citation1992).
48. In all Buddhist trainings, three principles are necessary for the process of an exemplary conduct to develop: listening, reflecting and meditating. The training starts with the reception of ideas (i.e. listening) and goes to analysis and examination according to one’s own experience (i.e. reflection). Finally, the idea gets integrated through habituation. Meditation here is understood as a process of habituation and cultivation (i.e. repetitive exposure). For more information on this subject, see also note 36.
49. Tib. dran pa.
50. This is an adaptation of Rupert Gethin’s translation (Citation2008, 147) of this ‘Establishing Mindfulness’ Sutta (Citation2013).
51. This is an adaptation of Edward Conze’s translation (Citation1973, 97). Following Willis’ (Citation2002) reading of the word bodhisattva, I have used the feminine interchangeably with the masculine – see note 114, p. 63: ‘Bodhisattva literally means “one whose whole being (sattva)” is intent on ultimate enlightenment (bodhi). Strictly speaking, then, there is no limitation associated with the term as to the sex of such a one’.
52. See Tomlinson (Citation2018), 12.
53. Stanza 37 reads more literally as follows: ‘An access [into fundamental non-conceptual intelligence is established] through correct practice in four steps: the practice [of a specific way] to rest one’s attention [on phenomena], the practice without [an object-grasped] on which to rest one’s attention, the practice without an attention on which to rest one’s attention, [that is, without a grasping-subject], and the practice of the attention without attention, [that is, without subject and object]’. Tib. yang dag pa yi sbyor ba la / ‘jug pa yang ni rnam bzhi ste / dmigs pa yi ni sbyor ba dang / mi dmigs pa yi sbyor ba dang / dmigs pa mi dmigs sbyor ba dang / mi dmigs dmigs pa’i sbyor ba’o. The reconstitution: atha samyakprayoge’pi pravṛttis tu caturvidhā / ālambanaprayogaś ca nirālambaprayogitā // lambālambaprayogaś ca tathā nirlambayojanam / (Phuntsok Citation1990, 62).
54. There are examples of ethical military training of sorts amongst Buddhist traditions that sees itself as a non-aggressive protective force, one of which developed in the US and in Europe in the 1980s; I think here of the Kasung training associated with the Dharma Protectors of the Tibetan tradition and I quote from their website: ‘As part of their practice the Dorje Kasung wear uniforms to communicate, delight in the disciplines of egolessness [non-duality] and simplicity, service to others by being present and available to help, commitment to the continuous path of waking up, and manifesting care and dignity. The military forms used by the Dorje Kasung were chosen as a reminder that we need to transmute aggression if we are to create enlightened society, and because these forms resemble the traditional monastic Buddhist discipline’. See Dorje Kasung – Montréal Shambhala Meditation Centre: https://montreal.shambhala.org/kasung/?lang=en. The emphasis is put on training the mind – it is not clear whether the use of modern military weapons would be involved in this type of training or not.
55. See online: http://www.johnmakransky.org/summary.html. Makransky is currently developing a training of sorts based on Active Compassion.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Diane Denis
Dr. Diane Denis is an assistant professor of Buddhist studies and languages at Kathmandu University. She holds an MFA from Naropa University and a PhD in religious studies from Laval University. She is an active scholar, translator, philosopher and socially concerned individual. Her work has been reviewed and published in international journals. Her research interests are Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, in particular the works of Maitreya, and their practical application to today’s world. She has a long experience of fieldwork in Nepal, India and Tibet, and shares her actual teaching time between Nepal, France and Quebec.