Atomised and Subordinated? Unpacking the Role of International Involvement in ‘the Local Turn’ of Peacebuilding in Nepal and Cambodia

Abstract

The local turn debate sometimes falls into the trap of romanticising the local, while vilifying international involvement in peacebuilding. Although this post-colonially informed argument makes immediate theoretical sense, there is a dearth of empirically driven comparative research which explores whether, and if so how, an international presence actually influences local peacebuilding efforts. In order to address this research gap, the present article sets out to study the execution of local peacebuilding programmes in two relatively similar cases where one (Nepal) has enjoyed little international peacebuilding presence, while the other (Cambodia) has seen a massive influx of international actors and funding in its peacebuilding endeavour. Our empirical material indicates that international support for the local peacebuilding process in Cambodia has bolstered it, while the locally owned process in Nepal has been far from successful in forging the conditions for sustainable peace. To fathom why these particular outcomes have occurred, however, the full answers are unlikely to be found by merely scrutinising whether the peacebuilding processes have been primarily internationally or locally driven. Instead, we suggest that peacebuilding outcomes are better understood by studying situated practices.

Keywords:

• peacebuilding
• the local turn
• vertical integration
• security development nexus
• Nepal
• Cambodia

Acknowledgements

We extend our gratitude to four anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. Moreover, we acknowledge the important contribution of research assistant Agnes Neu, whose extraordinarily rich fieldwork has informed the Cambodian case study.

Notes

1 Nepal did receive some international attention in the early days of its peacebuilding phase. However, since 2011, most major international actors have withdrawn or significantly scaled down.

2 Since submitting this manuscript, it has come to the authors’ attention that Nepal’s LPCs have actually received some indirect international funding through the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and the Asian Development Bank. Still, this does not invalidate the comparative premise of our article, as there is ample consensus in the literature that said international funding has been sparse, and that it has invariably been channelled through the MoPR; thus ensuring that the implementation of the LPC programme has remained firmly with domestic actors. Hence, there remains enough significant differences between the two cases to warrant the comparative framing of this article.

3 As a case in point, the former Maoist insurgency leader ‘Prachanda’ has served as the Prime Minister of Nepal twice since 2008.

4 Part of the Cambodia section is a revised version of a text appearing in an open-access report published by the Expert Group of Aid Studies in Stockholm.

5 Although not within the time frame under investigation in this paper, it should nevertheless be mentioned that politics in Cambodia took a repressive turn in the autumn of 2017, which negatively impacted on the quality of local democracy and peace.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Martin Ola Lundqvist

MARTIN LUNDQVIST is a PhD candidate at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.

Joakim Öjendal

JOAKIM ÖJENDAL is a Professor of Peace and Development Research, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.