Unity among Division: Dissociative Identity Disorder and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

Abstract

Dissociative Identity Disorder is a mental disorder in which seemingly independent identities arise within the same body. It is a disorder that raises profound questions about our understandings of certain theological concepts and doctrines, especially if one can consider the different identities to be different persons. In this paper, I shall provide support for this claim by exploring the implications that Dissociative Identity Disorder can have for our understanding of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. After outlining two models of the indwelling that have been proposed in the contemporary analytic literature, I am going to explain the problem that Dissociative Identity Disorder seems to raise for these models. I will then consider various potential solutions and shall highlight which I find to be the most convincing.

Keywords:

• mental illness
• mental health
• psychiatry
• religion
• systematic theology

Disclosure statement

No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript and there are no relevant non-financial interests to disclose.

Notes

1 For excellent examples of this with regards to autism, see Leidenhag (2021b), Leidenhag (2021c) and Macaskill (2019), and for others discussing depression, see Scrutton (2018), Scrutton (2020) and Coblentz (2023).

2 To be clear, DID is not completely absent from theological discussion. This paper largely follows from my previous work on DID and its implications for the doctrines of heaven and hell in Cawdron (2023). It has also been discussed by others. See, for instance, the consideration of DID treatment from a Christian perspective and the role of the Church in helping sufferers in Rosik (2003), and the discussion of self-multiplicity and theological anthropology in Turner (2007).

3 There have been numerous studies on the philosophical implications of DID. Two of the most influential treatments of the topic are Braude (1995) and Radden (1996).

4 Although I have based my argument on the Multiple Persons thesis in this paper, one might think that this is unnecessary, and that the idea that alters are different identities or centres of consciousness is perhaps sufficient. This may be the case, but I have framed the argument this way due to the importance of personhood as an ethical category. A discussion of whether identity is sufficient shall also be complex and is beyond the constraints of this paper.

5 In using the term ‘believer’ to refer to someone with faith, I am following other key scholars in the indwelling debate such as Alston (1989) and Kroll (2019). I note, however, that whether faith entails belief in God is up for debate. For discussion, see Howard-Snyder (2016).

6 One might interpret Calvin as making this claim in his Institutes when saying that ‘faith itself is produced only by the Spirit’. See Calvin (1845), Book 3, Chapter 1.4. It is also suggested in Adams (2016), pp. 94–95.

7 The claim that the indwelling occurs after, and as a result of, someone’s coming to faith is made by key scholars in this area, including Stump (2013), p. 46. It is also discussed in Alston (1989), p. 230.

8 For a consideration of the relevance of autism to discussions of the indwelling, see Leidenhag (2021a).

9 This, and all subsequent Biblical quotes, are taken from the New International Version.

10 Indeed, Alston uses passages such as this to emphasise the need for an account of indwelling that is sufficiently internal. See Alston (1989), p. 242. More relevant passages are pointed to there.

11 A different approach is taken by Ray Yeo, who has argued instead that it is Christ’s human unitive drive that is infused in the indwelling, with the Spirit only having a mediating role. See Yeo (2014). For a critique of Yeo’s account, see Kroll (2019).

12 See Leidenhag and Mullins (2018). See Kroll (2021) for a detailed model that explains how this can be the case. There are numerous questions raised by the indwelling, including that of how we can be related to all three divine persons distinctly in sanctification. See Vidu (2020). For a discussion of the demarcation between indwelling and theōsis, see Leidenhag (2020).

13 For a critique of Alston’s model, see Adams (2016).

14 This account is developed in Stump (2013), chapters 4 and 5 of Stump (2018), and Stump (2019).

15 Quoted in Morton (2017), p. 315.

16 These theses are outlined in Kennett and Matthews (2002). Kennett and Matthews themselves opt for the Single Person thesis.

17 See Cawdron (2023).

18 The models of indwelling being discussed here focus on the indwelling in the mind of the believer. The physiological differences between alters suggest that there may be interesting implications for more embodied understandings, but since my focus is on the mental implications, such a discussion is beyond the constraints of this paper.

19 Some have attempted to measure the extent of integration in DID patients. See Barlow and Chu (2014). For examples of more fragmented alters in terms of memory, see some of the cases noted in Morton (2017). For a survey of research on memory dysfunction in DID, see Dorahy (2001).

20 For a study on the transfer of information between identities in patients with alters displaying one-way amnesia, see Peters et al. (1998). For a study of alters that are aware of each other, see Dick-Barnes et al. (1987). In the latter study, it was found that the alters studied differed in their processing of word information.

21 This is pointed out in Rovane (1998), pp. 171–172. Cases in which alters have introspective access to the mental states of other alters are also discussed in Bayne (2002), pp. 96–97 and Braude (1995), pp. 69–70. Mark Brown has argued that we can interpret such instances as a deficit in autobiographical self-consciousness and argues against the Multiple Persons thesis. See Brown (2001).

22 See Swinburne (2018), pp. 425–426, and Hasker (2013), pp. 19–25.

23 For instance, in the John Woods case, one of the alters, Ron, in an interview claimed to love John, one of the other alters, like a brother because John needs him. See Armstrong (2001), p. 212.

24 Van Inwagen (1995), p. 264.

25 This outline is drawn from Leidenhag (2021c), who is critical of the inability of this understanding to accommodate autistic persons.

26 See, for instance, the case of Eve outlined in O’Kelly and Mackless (1956), p. 27.

27 See Cawdron (2023).

28 Support for the Multiple Persons thesis is also provided in Bayne (2002).

29 Support for this point is provided in Ephesians 2:8–9: ‘For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God— not by works, so that no one can boast.’

30 I do not have time to discuss this view in detail, and recognise that affirming such a view whilst avoiding Semi-Pelagianism is no easy task. See Stump (2001) and Timpe (2014), pp. 57–65, for some proposals.

31 For an extensive outline of this case, see Armstrong (2001).

32 This argument for the potential for alters to differ as to whether they have faith is also made in Cawdron (2023).

33 The examples provided in Clark and Chalmers (1998) in their argument for the extended mind inspired this example.

34 See Sinnott-Armstrong and Behnke (2000), pp. 305–306, for these and other examples.

35 Those who have argued for the Single Person thesis include Maiese (2016), Maiese (2017), Sinnott-Armstrong and Behnke (2000), and Brown (2001).

36 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.

37 To be clear, Stump holds that all that is required for indwelling is that a person ceases to resist God’s love, which is in line with our understanding. See Stump (2018), p. 343.

38 For a study on the memories of traumatic events in DID patients, see Van der Hart et al. (2005). For a case of DID in which childhood trauma seems to play a prominent role, see the case of Sarah outlined in Rothschild (2009). Whether trauma is necessary is contested, however. For example, Maiese (2016) has argued that DID is a result of internal emotional conflict.

39 For an overview of this view and the wider debate on the afterlife, see Walls (2010).

40 For an interesting discussion of the possibility of the reordering of knowledge and altering of wills in persons post-mortem, see Davis (2021).

41 This discussion of integration draws from Bayne (2002), pp. 97–99.

42 See Rovane (1998), pp. 169–179, for a useful discussion of cooperation between alters in DID.

43 There seem to be examples of the bestowal of faith on communities in the Bible, such as the granting of faith to a household and the subsequent baptism of this household in Acts 16:29–32: ‘The jailer called for lights, rushed in and fell trembling before Paul and Silas. He then brought them out and asked, “Sirs, what must I do to be saved?” They replied, “Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved—you and your household.” Then they spoke the word of the Lord to him and to all the others in his house.’ One will note that only the belief of the jailor was demanded for faith to be bestowed to the household, indicating that faith can be bestowed on communities in virtue of the belief of some, but not all, members. There are further instances of household baptism one can draw on. In 1 Corinthians 1:16, it is said: ‘I also baptized the household of Stephanas’. One might also refer to the fact that the Nicene Creed begins with the phrase ‘We believe in one God,’ in support of this. See Cockayne (2021), for discussion.

44 This discussion is heavily influenced by the social ontology literature in analytic philosophy. I shall leave open what kind of decision-making procedure is used, as when alters interact in the way suggested, I think such a model is compatible with numerous options. Perhaps the judgements of the group are aggregated, or the alters all raise relevant points but the deliberation is done at the level of the group. See List and Pettit (2011), Rovane (1998), Rovane (2014), Collins (2019), and Cockayne (2021), for some different options. As indicated here, instances in which alters interact like this would resemble cases of group agency.

45 This point is used to respond to the problem of divine hiddenness in Blanchard (2016).

46 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.

47 Such cases would mirror cases of group non-agential moral responsibility. For models of this, see Björnsson (2020) and Schwenkenbecher (2013).

48 For more on this, see Cockayne (2018), Cockayne (2019), and chapters 1, 2, and 6 of Cockayne (2022). Cockayne uses this to develop a model of the Church as a group agent, but such matters are beyond the scope of this paper. Also, see Wolterstorff (2016) for a discussion of how one can come to know God through participating in liturgical enactments.

49 Such instances may not be as uncommon as this seems at a first glance. Non-resistant non-believers such as these are a crucial component of the hiddenness argument. See Schellenberg (2016), for an outline.

50 Again, here I am drawing on the explanation of divine hiddenness in Blanchard (2016).

51 See Baker (2003) and Fergusson (1993) for discussions of this doctrine. One’s acceptance of such a doctrine will depend on one’s stance in the free will debate. See Van Inwagen (2008) for a useful analysis.

52 I am indebted to Kim Kroll, Joanna Leidenhag, Oliver Crisp, Andrew Torrance, Chris Whyte, Aaron Davis, Jason Stigall, Parker Haratine, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.