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Abstract
For the last two centuries, great powers have fiercely competed to set the technical standards for leading technologies. By imposing their preferred standards, nations not only solve technical problems to their advantage, but also project power globally. Given the internet’s economic, political and social importance, its governance represents the regulatory battleground of the future. The internet is heavily dependent on shared standards that enable highly decentralised components developed by disparate parties to be integrated into an effective overall system. However, authoritarian regimes want the basic governing structure of the internet to be determined by states. In particular, China is now proposing a fundamental internet redesign, known as the ‘New IP’. Although the West has strenuously resisted any such transformation, the battle for the internet governance of the future will be fierce. Setting the rules is not exclusively about addressing technical issues or projecting global power. It also turns on promoting different visions of the world – a decentralised and democratic one, or a centralised and authoritarian one.
Notes
1 See, for example, John Seaman, ‘China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardization’, Notes de l’Ifri, January 2020, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/seaman_china_standardization_2020.pdf.
2 Quoted in Hermann J. Koch, Practical Guide to International Standardization for Electrical Engineers: Impact on Smart Grid and E-mobility Markets (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2016), p. xix.
3 See Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi and Harold James, ‘Beijing’s Bismarckian Ghost: How Great Powers Compete Economically’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 3, Fall 2018, pp. 161–6.
4 See Richard Mowbray Haywood, The Beginnings of Railway Development in Russia in the Reign of Nicholas I, 1835–1842 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969).
5 See William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, ‘Internet Fragmentation: An Overview’, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, World Economic Forum, January 2016, p. 2, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FII_Internet_Fragmentation_An_Overview_2016.pdf.
6 See Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? (London: Polity Press, 2017).
7 See Mark Montgomery and Theo Lebryk, ‘China’s Dystopian “New IP” Plan Shows Need for Renewed US Commitment to Internet Governance’, Just Security, 13 April 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/75741/chinas-dystopian-new-ip-plan-shows-need-for-renewed-us-commitment-to-internet-governance/.
8 G7, ‘Framework for G7 Collaboration on Digital and Technical Standards’, G7 Digital and Technology Track – Annex 1, 2021, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ict/2021-Annex_1Framework_for_G7_collaboration_on_Digital_Technical_Standards.pdf.
9 See JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy, Engineering Rules: Global Standard Setting Since 1880 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019).
10 See Philip J. Weiser, ‘Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-regulation’, Northern Kentucky Law Review, vol. 28, no. 4, 2001, pp. 822–46.
11 See Jack L. Goldsmith, ‘Against Cyberanarchy’, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 65, no. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 1,199–250.
12 See Konstantinos Karachalios and Karen McCabe, ‘Standards, Innovation and Their Role in the Context of the World Trade Organization’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, December 2013, https://issuu.com/ictsd/docs/e15_trade_and_innovation_-_karachal.
13 See Internet Society, ‘Internet Governance: Why the Multistakeholder Approach Works’, April 2016, https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IG-MultiStakeholderApproach.pdf.
14 See David C. Mowery and Timothy Simcoe, ‘Is the Internet a US Invention? An Economic and Technological History of Computer Networking’, Research Policy, vol. 31, nos 8–9, December 2002, pp. 1,369–87.
15 See Madhumita Murgia and Anna Gross, ‘Inside China’s Controversial Mission to Reinvent the Internet’, Financial Times, 27 March 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/ba94c2bc-6e27-11ea-9bca-bf503995cd6f.
16 Author conversation with Bruce Schneier, Fellow at the BerkmanKlein Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University, and Adjunct Lecturer at Harvard Kennedy School, October 2023.
17 See Rush Doshi at al., ‘China as a “Cyber Great Power”: Beijing’s Two Voices in Telecommunications’, Brookings Institution, April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/china-as-a-cyber-great-power-beijings-two-voices-in-telecommunications/.
18 See Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Rise of China as a Cybersecurity Industrial Power: Balancing National Security, Geopolitical, and Development Priorities’, Journal of Cyber Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, December 2018, pp. 306–26.
19 Quoted in Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree, ‘Technology Standards in China’, ETLA Brief 3, Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, 7 February 2013.
20 See Kristen Cordell, ‘The International Telecommunication Union: The Most Important UN Agency You Have Never Heard Of’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 December 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/international-telecommunication-union-most-important-un-agency-you-have-never-heard.
21 See Simon Sharwood, ‘UN’s ITU Election May Spell the End of Our Open Internet’, Register, 29 September 2022, https://www.theregister.com/2022/09/29/itu_plenipotentiary_open_internet_fight/.
22 ITU, ‘Member States Elect Doreen Bogdan-Martin as ITU Secretary-General’, 29 September 2022, https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2022-09-29-ITU-SG-elected-Doreen-Bogdan-Martin.aspx.
23 Author conversation with Philip Verveer, former US ambassador to the ITU.
24 Ibid.
25 World Trade Organization, ‘Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade’, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm.
26 Konstantinos Komaitis, ‘Protecting the Open Internet from China’s Latest Governance Body’, Brookings Institution, 4 August 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protecting-the-open-internet-from-chinas-latest-governance-body/.
27 See, for example, Zhe Chen et al., ‘NEW IP Framework and Protocol for Future Applications’, 2020 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium, 2020, pp. 1–5.
28 Great Britain Philatelic Society, ‘Postage of England, Scotland, and Ireland setled [sic] (1657 c.30, 9th June 1657)’, https://www.gbps.org.uk/information/sources/acts/1657-06-09_Act-1657-Commonwealth-cap-30.php.
29 See Stacie Hoffmann, Dominique Lazanski and Emily Taylor, ‘Standardising the Splinternet: How China’s Technical Standards Could Fragment the Internet’, Journal of Cyber Policy, vol. 5, no. 2, August 2020, pp. 239–64.
30 Alexandra Stevenson and Paul Mozur, ‘China Scores Businesses, and Low Grades Could Be a Tradewar Weapon’, New York Times, 22 September 2019 (updated 23 September 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/22/business/china-social-credit-business.html.
31 See James Griffiths, The Great Firewall of China: How to Build and Control an Alternative Version of the Internet (London: Zed Books, 2021). The Great Firewall is not necessarily effective if parties have access to, for example, virtual private networks.
32 For more details on China’s digital sovereignty, see Xinchuchu Gao, ‘Sovereignty and Cyberspace: China’s Ambition to Shape Cyber Norms’, LSE Blog, 18 August 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/08/18/sovereignty-and-cyberspace-chinas-ambition-to-shape-cyber-norms/.
33 See Internet Society, ‘Huawei’s “New IP” Proposal – Frequently Asked Questions’, 22 February 2022, https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2022/huaweis-new-ip-proposal-faq/.
34 See Matt Sheehan and Jacob Feldgoise, ‘What Washington Gets Wrong About China and Technical Standards’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 February 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/27/what-washington-gets-wrong-about-china-and-technical-standards-pub-89110.
35 US Department of State, ‘Declaration for the Future of the Internet’, https://www.state.gov/declaration-for-the-future-of-the-internet.
36 See ‘India Stays Out of Global Declaration on Future on Internet’, Hindu, 29 April 2022, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/white-house-60-global-partners-launch-the-declaration-of-the-future-of-the-internet-india-not-on-the-list/article65366407.ece.
37 See World Trade Organization, ‘Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Edoardo Campanella
Edoardo Campanella is a Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government and co-author of Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West (Oxford University Press, 2019).
John Haigh
John Haigh is Co-Director of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government and Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. The authors are grateful to seminar participants at the Harvard Kennedy School and other colleagues for helpful comments on previous drafts.