Conspiracy Theories and Democratic Legitimacy

ABSTRACT

Conspiracy theories are frequently described as a threat to democracy and conspiracy theorists portrayed as epistemically or morally unreasonable. If these characterizations are correct, then it may be the case that reasons stemming from conspiracy theorizing threaten the legitimizing function of democratic deliberation. In this paper, I will argue the opposite. Despite the extraordinary epistemic and morally unreasonable claims made by some conspiracy theorists, belief in conspiracy theories is guided by internal epistemic norms inherent in believing. By utilizing the insights of the Peircean epistemic defense formulated by Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, I take it that these epistemic norms implicitly commit the theorist to an open democratic society.

KEYWORDS:

• Peircean epistemic democracy
• deliberative democracy
• conspiracy theories
• democratic legitimacy

Acknowledgments

Thanks to the organizers and attendees of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories and to the members of the Conspiracy Theory Theory Social Club for their feedback on earlier versions of this work, with special thanks to M Dentith, Rico Hauswald, and Niki Pfeifer for their comments on this essay.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. See also the work of Hagen (2022a).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Will Mittendorf

Will Mittendorf is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Cerritos College. His main academic interests lie at the intersection of religion, democratic theory, and social epistemology.