https://orcid.org/0009-0006-4244-8091
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ABSTRACT
Democracy aid has been a major foreign policy instrument over the past 30 years. However, it is not clear whether such aid has any meaningful effect on democratic development in recipient countries, as previous studies have yielded somewhat contradictory results. We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of democracy aid by arguing that recipient countries’ history of conflict constitutes an important moderator in the relationship between democracy aid and democratic development. Specifically, we develop a theoretical framework which examines the effects of two different types of democracy aid – top-down and bottom-up assistance – on democratic development in post-conflict recipient countries. Analysing data on 147 recipients over a period of 19 years (2002–2020), we find that while neither type has a significant general effect on democracy levels in recipient countries, bottom-up democracy assistance does have a positive and significant effect in post-conflict contexts, which suggests that post-conflict periods pose an opportunity for domestic pro-democracy actors and their international supporters to nudge their countries towards democratic development. These findings have implications for the literatures on democracy aid and conflict as well as policymakers interested in fostering democratic development abroad.
Acknowledgements
This article is partly based on the master’s thesis of the first author. Special thanks go to Berthold Rittberger for his support and supervision in the planning and conceptualization of this master’s thesis. We are also grateful to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? 12.
2 Nowack and Leininger, “Protecting Democracy from Abroad”; European Commission, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.
3 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20; Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7.
4 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”
5 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.
6 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil.”
7 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”
8 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.
9 Strand and Hegre, Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020; Strand et al., Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2018, 1.
10 OECD, “States of Fragility 2020.”
11 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”
12 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance; Collins, “Can America Finance Freedom?”
13 Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”
14 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”
15 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.
16 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2014.
17 Hornat, Transatlantic Democracy Assistance, 7; de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 20.
18 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?”
19 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”
20 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 218.
21 Lührmann, McMann and van Ham, Democracy Aid Effectiveness, 6.
22 Hyde, “Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion,” 358.
23 Ibid.
24 Grimm and Mathis, “Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third”; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 65–76; Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion.”
25 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” 405; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 70; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
26 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy,” 113; Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 166–67; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236; Khalilpour, Western Conceptions of Democracy and the Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, 69.
27 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 234.
28 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 842; Gafuri, “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy?” 780.
29 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13; Savun and Tirone, “How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” 236.
30 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 10–13.
31 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics,” 220; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 847.
32 Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”
33 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?” 164; Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance,” 841.
34 Bosin, “Supporting Democracy in the Former Soviet Union”; Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance”; Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”
35 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics”; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003”; Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014; Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski, “The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions”; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, “Democratic Aid and the Democratization of Recipients.”
36 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”
37 Gibson et al., The Political Economy of Development Aid; Knack and Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients.”
38 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”
39 Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil”; Dunning, “Conditioning the Effects of Aid.”
40 Snider, “US Democracy Aid and the Authoritarian State.”
41 Cornell, “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?”
42 Savage, “Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.”
43 Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.
44 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities.
45 In this study, we use the terms “intrastate war” and “civil war” synonymously.
46 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 2.
47 UCDP, UCDP Definitions.
48 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization”; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization”; for an overview on the determinants of democratisation see Pérez-Liñán, “Democracies,” 91–95.
49 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 36; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’.”
50 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization.”
51 Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.
52 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States”; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy.
53 Baker, “Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance,” 760; Jarstad and Sisk, “Introduction,” 5–6.
54 Cederman, Hug and Krebs, “Democratization and Civil War”; Höglund, “Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions”; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, 5; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Snyder, Democratization and Nationalist Violence; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.
55 Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local; Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?”; Regan and Bell, “Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?”
56 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hartzell and Hoddie, “Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management,” 319; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Sisk, “Peacebuilding as Democratization,” 252.
57 Alihodžić et al., Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.
58 Grimm and Mathis, “Democratization Via Aid?”; Howard, International Media Assistance; Reilly, International Electoral Assistance; ten Hoove and Scholtbach, Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies.
59 Cf. Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.
60 Chauvet and Collier, “Preconditions for Turnarounds in Failing States”; Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies”; Donaubauer, Herzer and Nunnenkamp, “The Effectiveness of Aid under Post-Conflict Conditions”; Flores and Nooruddin, “Evaluating World Bank Post-Conflict Assistance Programs”; Garriga and Phillips, “Foreign Aid as a Signal to Investors.”
61 Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies; Call, The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence; François and Sud, “Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States”; Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 30.
62 Besley and Persson, “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development”; Wright and Winters, “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.”
63 Zulueta-Fülscher, “Democracy-Support Effectiveness in ‘Fragile States’,” 42.
64 Cf. Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 179. Lappin finds post-conflict contexts to vary with regards to the number of warring parties, their desired war outcomes, balance of military power, size of the country, number of combatants, duration of conflict, and type of peace agreement. See also Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” who find that decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, and power sharing decrease the risks of renewed violence after early post-conflict elections. On negotiated settlements and peace agreements, see Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Matanock, From Civil Conflict to Political Participation.
65 Cf. Ibid.; Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96; Licht, “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival,” 59.
66 Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Riese, Röhner and Zürcher, “External Strategies for Post-Conflict Democratization,” 266.
67 Butterfield, History and Human Relations; Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism; Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.”
68 Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, 157; Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 590.
69 Tang, “The Security Dilemma,” 588.
70 Cf. Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 830.
71 Cf. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War.” This study applies the concept of the security dilemma to negotiated settlements after intrastate conflict, such that the former belligerents refuse to disarm out of fear of the other side reneging. As a result, agreements can break down and fighting resumes. Our argument similarly applies the concept of the security dilemma to explain the behavior of former belligerents in post-civil war contexts, but in the context of external democracy assistance.
72 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.
73 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies.”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Joshi, “Post-Civil War Democratization,” 828; Lind, “Democratization and Stability in East Asia,” 10; Paris, Building Peace after Civil Conflict.
74 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 14.
75 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Fiedler et al., “Effective Support for Peace and Democracy in Conflict-Affected States,” 57; Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight; Zürcher et al., Peacebuilding and Democratization after War.
76 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”
77 de Zeeuw and Kumar, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies,” 7–9.
78 Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States,” 96–97; Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 181.
79 Lappin, “Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance,” 180; Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 134–35; Singh, Corruption in the Afghan Police Force, 47–48.
80 Cf. Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill,” 826.
81 Gershman and Allen, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance.”
82 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.
83 We chose this sample period for two reasons, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, it has been argued that the post-2001 period poses a much more difficult environment for democracy assistance than the 1990s, which is why the effectiveness of democracy aid cannot be fruitfully compared across these two periods (Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities). Empirically, missing data is a substantial problem for disbursements from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) prior to 2002; starting in 2002, data coverage increases to more than 90%.
84 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Report on Phase III Activities, 6–7.
85 Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V11, 348.
86 Ibid., 46.
87 OECD, “DAC and CRS Code Lists.”
88 Ibid.
89 Detailed information on the coding of and data sources for the control variables is available in the appendix.
90 E.g. Donno and Neureiter, “Can Human Rights Conditionality Reduce Repression?”
91 We create six region dummies, one for each of the following geographical areas: Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; Western Europe and North America; Asia and the Pacific; and Sub-Saharan Africa.
92 One should note that the type of activities supported by top-down aid tends to be more costly than the type of activities bottom-up assistance entails, which somewhat qualifies our statement that the former is a much more prominent form of democracy assistance than the latter. Still, we believe that the general sentiment holds true and that there are opportunities to shift funds to bottom-up activities in post-conflict societies.
93 Cf. Bush, The Taming of Democracy Assistance.
94 Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.
95 Ibid.
96 Altunbas and Thornton, “The (Small) Blessing of Foreign Aid”; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics.”
97 von Borzyskowski, “Resisting Democracy Assistance.”
98 Arellano and Bond, “Some Test of Specification for Panel Data.”
99 Cf. Finkel et al., Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2014.
100 Collier and Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies.”
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Leonie Reicheneder
Leonie Reicheneder is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include democratization, aid effectiveness, and post-conflict state-building.
Michael Neureiter
Michael Neureiter is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Political Science at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. His research interests include political behaviour, public opinion, and democratization. His work has been published in journals such as Political Science Research and Methods, West European Politics, and Political Psychology.