Risks on the Belt and Road in Eurasia: Local Perspectives and Options

Figures & data

Table 1. Risk and opportunity framework.

Risk/opportunity proposition	Worst-case scenario	Best-case scenario
Dependency on major power(s)	Unstable environment for “in between” countries as a result of regional and security competition between West, Russia and China	Stable regional security achieved by “in between” countries balancing and diversifying partners
BRI regional integration of transport, communications, energy	BRI replaces dependency on Russia with dependency on China	BRI diversifies trade routes, reducing dependency on Russia and increasing economic links to China, Europe, Middle East
Domestic corruption and/or other poor governance	Anti-China sentiment and poor governance leads to dysfunctional economic interdependence	National agency aligns BRI engagement with national and sustainable development goals

Table B1. Risk factors identified by interviewees.

Case study	Geopolitical	Geo-economic	Domestic
Kazakhstan	- Russian misinformation sets narrative for future intervention? (Lillis)- A potential Russian threat means Kazakhstan must manage its language and actions not to provoke (Shaimergenov)- Kazakhstan promoted Eurasia but has a different, pragmatic focus from Russia’s, which includes the BRI (Nuriddenova)- The integrationalist logic of EEU has been replaced by Russian hegemonic geopolitics, creating a dilemma for Kazakhstan (Qoraboyev)- Geopolitics of Covid, war, has reminded Kazakhstan of geopolitical risks (Qoraboyev)- The geopolitical dynamic may push Kazakhstan towards neutrality (Shengelbayev)- Tokayev understands China and will be able to win benefits and protect Kazakhstan (Kussainov; Shaimergenov)- SCO has been used to experiment in a relatively benign environment for China (Qoraboyev)- Kazakhstan plays a middle power role as friend to all (Neafie)	Importance of alternative routes to avoid Russia risks (Bektemirov) BRI take up was slow, but may speed up in particular the middle route in the new geopolitical dynamic, to avoid Russian trade routes (Kussainov; Qoraboyev) China integrated Central Asia for the first time with oil pipelines (Shaimergenov) No diversification of the economy fostered fear of Chinese investments as invasion rather than innovation (Lillis; Neafie) Most Chinese investment has been in extractive industries rather than infrastructure (Kussainov; Qoraboyev) There is more investment from the US and EU, so talk about Chinese investment exaggerated (Neafie) Academics and government support the BRI as offering opportunities for economic transformation (Nuriddenova; Shengelbayev; Shaimergenov) The EEU has brought no benefits, with no reciprocal access to Russia now likely to speed transition (Shengelbayev; Shaimergenov; Qoraboyev; Neafie) The BRI’s improved rail and road links will support export and import development (Bektemirov) New BRI routes will reduce Russia risks and support diversification (Bektemirov; Qoraboyev) Kazakhstan has rare earths and other inputs for the decarbonising economy (Bektemirov) More frequent train links, and Russian risks, attract investment in agricultural export to the Chinese market (Shaimergenov)	The Government has required BRI projects to align with the national development strategy and risks are shared (Nuriddenova; Shaimergenov) Kazakhstan has used its own resources to fund infrastructure projects, with minimal debt exposure to China, including completing road projects and fully funding all rail projects (Bektemirov; Shaimergenov; Qoraboyev) Lack of transparency about decision making inflames anti-Chinese sentiment (Lillis) Domestic corruption has burned China, such as the theft of funds that killed the airport light rail link, and Khorgos corruption on the Kazakh side embodying kleptocracy (Qoraboyev; Neafie) Lack of knowledge about China and lack of contact can result in conspiracy theories (Lillis; Nuriddenova; Neafie) Social media narratives in China and in Kazakhstan fuel populist fears and blame, and clumsy Chinese soft power initiatives have little effect (Neafie) Community anger when hear Chinese contracts require Chinese workers, when local skills available (Lillis) Historic anti-China sentiment from USSR (Lillis; Nuriddenova, Neafie) Familiarity leads to admiration, unfamiliarity with conspiracy theories (Shaimergenov) January unrest was fuelled by elite competition (Shaimergenov) Domestic unrest persistent below the surface (Lillis) Huawei has 90 per cent localised its Kazakhstan operations (Ge & Toleubayeva)
Armenia	Armenia is surrounded by unfriendly countries, with borders closed to east and west (Hayrapetyan, Atoyan) As a small country, Armenia must take care with all big powers, officially a Russian ally but seeking partnership with others (Atoyan) China may not wish to antagonise Russia by showing interest in Armenia and Armenia may not wish to antagonise Russia by showing interest in China (Hayrapetyan, Sahakyan) Geopolitical narratives around telecommunications (Chen)	Armenia’ connectivity relevance is Iran – Georgia (Hayrapetyan, Atoyan) IT industry development opportunities with China, given Western restrictions on dual use tech (Sahakyan, Atoyan) Huawei is supporting smart grid development and renewable energy rollout (Chen)	Corruption in government stymies long term planning (Hayrapetyan) Diaspora in US, Russia, France and even China (Atoyan)
Georgia	Imperative to find a place in international system, given lack of resources, small size and problematical location (Papava) Lack of support from the West, although it would be welcome, driving Georgia to pragmatic engagement with China, which is not focused on the region (Charaia, Kipiani, Avdaliani) Western pressure against Chinese participation in earlier plans for Anaklia port project (Charaia) Critical for Georgia, as European country, to build economic corridor to China to bolster security (Janelidze)	Georgia proactively lobbied to join BRI, after being first left out, joined AIIB (Papava, Janelidze) It, uniquely in its region, has free trade agreements with EU and China (Charaia) Middle corridor aligns with BRI and offers new opportunities for production trade and logistics from interdependence with economies of Eurasia, including movement of Chinese goods (Matkava, Kipiani, Janelidze) Chinese firms are bidding and winning about half of new infrastructure projects (Kipiani) Georgia is not dependent on Chinese finance (Matkava)
Mongolia	Buffer state diversifying partners but inevitably interdependent and must manage risks (Baryaraa)	Dependent on Russia for energy (Undraa) Dependent on Russia and China for transport routes (Jargal) Diversifying communications partners (Jargal, Baryaraa)	Public protest, nationalism, chaotic media (Undraa) Moderating anti-China sentiment (Undraa, Song, Erdenekhuu, Jargal) Greater transparency and pressure against corruption (Jargal)