The role of connective interventions in the collective management of public-bad problems: Evidence from a socio-ecological system perspective

Figures & data

Figure 1. Full framework for analyzing public-bad problems in SES, adapted from Ostrom (2007), as described in Galarza-Villamar et al. (2021). Our primary focus is on the dimensions CI, RGS, and (less) CAP, while the sub-systems PBC and LS are outside the scope of our current study.

Table 1. Public-bad governance design principles, adapted from Ostrom (1990; cited in Ostrom, 2005). Principles 4, 5, 6, and 7, marked with (*), are equal to Ostrom’s original definition. All other principles were adapted to represent governance of a public bad.

Design principles for governing sustainable resources	Design principle definition for public-bad governance
(1) Clearly defined boundaries	The boundaries of the public bad (e.g. crop diseases) and the individuals or households threatened by it are clearly defined.
(2) Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs	The rules specifying the desired actions by users for preventing and controlling a public-bad threat are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or financial inputs.
(3) Collective-choice arrangements	Many of the individuals affected by the public-bad management rules are included in the group who can modify these rules.
(4) Monitoring (*)	Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
(5) Graduated sanctions (*)	Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.
(6) Conflict-resolution mechanisms (*)	Users and their officials have easy access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.
(7) Minimal recognition of rights to organize	The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term agency rights to self-organize to prevent and control public-bad threats.
(8) Nested enterprises (*)	For public bads that are a threat for larger systems (e.g. transboundary diseases): Problem definition, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Table 2. Factors hindering coordination among direct users.

Factor	Definition
Social dilemmas	A situation where two or more individuals would be better off if all cooperate, but fail to do so because of self-seeking choices that benefit them individually (Dawes et al., 1988).
Coping capacity	This is determined by limitations in terms of access to, and mobilization of, the resources of a community or a social-ecological system to respond (lessen potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, or cope with the consequences) to an identified hazard, including pre-event, in-time, and post-event response measures (Birkmann et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2003)
Risk perception	Risk perceptions are formed by common-sense reasoning, trust, personal experiences, social communication, and cultural traditions. These are the contextual aspects that individuals consider when deciding whether or not to take a risk, and selecting reduction or prevention measures (Siegrist, 2021; Van Asselt & Renn, 2011; Wachinger et al., 2013).

Table 3. Components to describe and analyse the public-bad risk context.

Component	Definition
Public bad	The non-excludability and non-rivalry of a public bad is not necessarily the threat itself, which lies in the various direct and indirect potential socio-ecological consequences from its mismanagement (Galarza-Villamar et al., 2021).
Risk	The probability of harmful consequences or losses (physical, social, economic, environmental, cultural, or institutional) resulting from interactions between hazard and vulnerable conditions, in a given area and over a period of time (Birkmann et al., 2013; Thywissen, 2006; UNISDR, 2009).
Hazard/ Hazard potential	A physical event, phenomenon, or human activity that has potential to cause loss of life or injuries, property damage, social and economic disruption, or environmental degradation. Its hazard potential is characterized by its probability (frequency) and intensity (magnitude or severity) (Wisner et al., 1994).
Vulnerability	Vulnerability (of any system) is a function of three elements: exposure to hazard, sensitivity to that hazard, and the capacity of the system to cope, adapt, or recover from the effect of those conditions (Smit & Wandel, 2006).
Exposure	The extent to which a unit of assessment (including its physical and human attributes that are spatially bound to resources and practices that may also be exposed) falls within the geographical range of a hazard event (Birkmann et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2003).
Sensitivity/ Susceptibility	The predisposition of at-risk elements (social and ecological) to suffer harm or modifications (directly or indirectly) by a disturbance (Birkmann et al., 2013; Brooks, 2003; Reed et al., 2013).
Coping capacity/ Societal response capacity	Access to, and mobilization of, the resources of a community or a social-ecological system to respond (lessen potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, or cope with the consequences) to an identified hazard, including pre-event, in-time, and post-event response measures (Birkmann et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2003).

Table 4. EVOCA case studies included in the study.

Case study	Doctoral thesis	Leading scientific disciplines
Ticks and tick-borne diseases in Kenya	Connecting divergent worlds: Social and ecological factors influence tick-borne diseases in tropical drylands (Chepkwony, 2021)	Communication science; wildlife ecology and conservation
	Tick-borne diseases and livestock-wildlife management in Kenya (Mutavi et al., 2018, 2021).
Climate variability in Ghana	Towards a new generation of climate information systems: Information systems and actionable knowledge creation for adaptive decision-making in rice farming systems in Ghana (Nyamekye, 2020).	Earth systems science; public administration and governance; water management
	Best of both worlds: Co-producing climate services that integrate scientific and indigenous weather and seasonal climate forecast for water management and food production in Ghana (Nyadzi, 2020).
Fall Armyworm in Maize in Ghana	Digitalization of smallholder value chain lending partnerships: An interplay of trust and inclusion (Agyekumhene, 2021).	Communication science; innovation studies; geo-information sciences
	Innovation intermediation in a digital age: Broadening extension service delivery in Ghana (Munthali, 2021).
Malaria in Rwanda	Citizen science for malaria control in Rwanda: Engagement, motivation, and behaviour change (Asingizwe, 2020).	Communication science; social psychology; entomology; biology
	Citizen science for malaria vector surveillance in Rwanda (Murindahabi, 2020).
Potato diseases in Ethiopia	Understanding and managing bacterial wilt and late blight of potato in Ethiopia: Combining an innovation systems approach and a collective action perspective (Tafesse, 2020).	Agronomy/crop ecology; Innovation studies; Development studies; game theory/institutional economics
	Social-institutional problem dimensions of late blight and bacterial wilt of potato in Ethiopia: The contribution of social learning and communicative interventions to collective action (Damtew, 2020).
Banana disease in Rwanda	More than what meets the eye: Factors and processes that shape the design and use of digital agricultural advisory and decision support in Africa (McCampell, 2021).	Innovation studies; crop ecology; game theory; institutional economics

Table 5. Placing selected case studies in a public-bad risk and SES context.

Case study	Livelihood units	Public-bad risk conditions (vulnerability and hazards)			Fatality/Losses	Users risk management	Connective strategy (studied in project sample)
		Public bad	Causal agent	Mechanism of spread
Ticks and tick-borne diseases in Kenya	Cattle (meat, milk as food or income)	Tick-borne diseases	Different ecto-parasites, bacteria, and protozoans	Different kinds of ticks spread the diseases	Mortality rate of up to 80% in animals susceptible to ECF	Vaccination, acaricides, grass height reduction, resistant breeds, etc.	Mixed communication mechanisms to diagnose/understand/exchange knowledge.
Climate variability in Ghana	Crop production (food and income)	Climate uncertainty and variability	N/A	N/A	Yield losses due to water mismanagement, untimed agricultural decision-making	Indigenous knowledge in weather forecasting. Scientific weather forecasting.	Second-generation climate information system that integrates indigenous and scientific knowledge.
Fall Armyworm in Maize in Ghana	Maize (food and income)	Limited access to production inputs	Insect Fall Armyworm	It produces many eggs, and it can migrate over long distances	Yield losses of 20% to 50%.	Chemical spray	Farm monitoring platform. Self-organized WhatsApp groups.
Malaria control and prevention in Rwanda	A person (labour,knowledge, etc.)	Malaria	Plasmodium parasite	Transmitted through the bite of the infected Anopheles mosquito	Over 60 deaths per 1000 cases of children aged <5 years	Removing standing water, spraying insecticide, use of bed nets	Mosquito surveillance programme through citizen science. Information sharing with [non-] volunteers.
Potato diseases in Ethiopia	Potato (ware and seed)	Potato late blight disease	Oomycete Phytophthora infestans	Air-borne spores	Yield losses up to 100%	Chemical spray	Face-to-face learning interventions combined with experiential and social learning approaches, and a social media type. Messaging platform.
		Bacterial wilt disease	Bacterium Ralstonia solanacearum	Soil-borne, seed-borne, and water-borne	Yield losses up to 100%	Roguing of diseased plants
Banana disease in Rwanda	Banana (as food or income)	BananaXanthomonas Wilt (BXW)	Bacterium Xanthomonas vasicola pv. Musacearum	Infected plant material, cutting tools, long-distance trade, soil, and vectors	Yield losses up to 100% if control is delayed	Male bud removal, tool sterilization, diseased mat uprooting, etc.	Smartphone application to diagnose, register, monitor, and exchange information about BXW.

Figure 2. Initial analysis of terms used in EVOCA case studies that align with the adapted SES framework to public bads. Results based on the exploratory coding of eight dissertations and three scientific articles. Two additional dissertations and newly published papers were added to the study at a later point in time.

Figure 3. Tick-borne diseases and livestock-wildlife management in Kenya described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 4. Connective strategies studied in the context of tick-borne diseases in Kenya’s case study.

Figure 5. Water monitoring and irrigation management for food production in Ghana described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 6. Connective interventions studied in the context of weather forecasting in Kenya’s case study.

Figure 7. Fall armyworm in maize in Ghana described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 8. Connective interventions to address Fall armyworm in maize in Ghana described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 9. Control and prevention of malaria in Rwanda described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 10. Connective citizen science intervention influencing the RGS for the malaria case in Rwanda.

Figure 11. Potato late blight and bacterial wilt disease in Ethiopia described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 12. Connective strategy influence in the RGS for the potato late blight and bacterial wilt disease in Ethiopia.

Figure 13. BXW disease in Rwanda described using the adapted SES framework.

Figure 14. Connective intervention influence in the RGS, direct users’ collective action problems, and public-bad risk context for the BXW disease management in Rwanda.

Table 6. Summary of cases study findings in terms of the contribution of connective interventions to enabling design principles for public-bad governance.

		Tick-borne diseases	Climate variability and weather forecasting	Fall Armyworm in Maize	Malaria control/prevention	Potato blight and bacterial wilt	BXW disease
1	Clearly defined boundaries	√		√	√	√	√
2	Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs	√	√	√	√	√	√
3	Collective-choice arrangements	√	√	√	√	√	√
4	Monitoring		√	√	√	√	√
5	Graduated sanctions					√
6	Conflict-resolution mechanisms		√	√
7	Minimal recognition of rights to organize
8	Nested enterprises	√	√	√

Table 7. Summary of cases study findings regarding the contributions of connective interventions on factors hindering collective action problems among direct users.

		Tick-borne diseases	Climate variability and weather forecasting	Fall Armyworm in Maize	Malaria control/prevention	Potato blight and bacterial wilt	BXW disease
1	Coping capacity		√	√	√
2	Social dilemmas			√	√	√
3	Risk perception	√	√	√	√	√	√

Figure A1. The core subsystems in a framework for analyzing a public-bad risk (e.g. BXW disease spread) threatening agricultural livelihoods based on banana production in a socio-ecological systems context from a risk and collective action problem perspective. Adapted from Ostrom (2009a). Chosen analytical path: a [connective actions]->B [risk governance system]->C [collective action problems among direct users]->D [public-bad risk context within a specific livelihood unit and assets under research]->E [socio-ecological livelihood system].

Table

Components	Description and example
SE livelihood system (ALS)	This is represented by a specific territory where diverse livelihood activities take place, involving crops, animal husbandry, and related activities and assets that provide ecosystem services to farmers and consumers.
Livelihood unit (LU)	This is a specific activity providing ecosystems services needed to make a living, e.g. cattle for milk and meat, rice production for human consumption, maize production for human or animal feed.
Livelihood assets	Human: peoples’ health and ability to work, knowledge, skills, experience; Natural: land, water, the forest, livestock; Social: trust, mutual support, reciprocity, ties of social obligations; Physical: tools and equipment, infrastructure, market facilities, water supply, health facilities; Financial: conversion of production into cash, formal or informal credit.

Table

Public-bad risk context component	Definition
Public bad	The non-excludability and non-rivalry of a public bad is not necessarily the threat itself, which lies in the various direct and indirect potential socio-ecological consequences from its mismanagement (Galarza-Villamar et al., 2021)
Risk	The probability of harmful consequences or losses (physical, social, economic, environmental, cultural, or institutional) resulting from interactions between hazard and vulnerable conditions, in a given area and over a period of time (Birkmann et al., 2013; Thywissen, 2006; UNISDR, 2009).
Hazard/ Hazard potential	A physical event, phenomenon, or human activity that has potential to cause loss of life or injuries, property damage, social and economic disruption, or environmental degradation. It potential is characterized by its probability (frequency) and intensity (magnitude or severity) (Wisner et al., 1994).
Vulnerability	Vulnerability (of any system) is in function of three elements: exposure to hazard, sensitivity to that hazard, and the capacity of the system to cope, adapt, or recover from the effect of those conditions (Smit & Wandel, 2006).
Exposure	The extent to which a unit of assessment (including its physical and human attributes that are spatially bounded to resources and practices that may also be exposed) falls within the geographical range of a hazard event (Birkmann et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2003).
Sensitivity/ Susceptibility	This describes the predisposition of at-risk elements (social and ecological) to suffer harm or modifications (directly or indirectly) by a disturbance (Birkmann et al., 2013; Brooks, 2003; Reed et al., 2013).
Coping capacity/ Societal response capacity	This is determined by limitations in terms of access to, and mobilization of, the resources of a community or a social-ecological system to respond (lessen potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, or cope with the consequences) to an identified hazard, including pre-event, in-time, and post-event response measures (Birkmann et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2003).

Table

Design principles derived from studies of long-enduring institutions for governing sustainable resources:			Adapted public-bad governance design principles:
1	Clearly defined boundaries	The boundaries of the resource system (e.g. irrigation system or fishery) and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource units are clearly defined.	The boundaries of the public bad (e.g. crop diseases) and the individuals or households threatened by it are clearly defined.
2	Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs	Rules specifying the amount of resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs.	The rules specifying the actions for preventing and controlling a public-bad threat that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs.
3	Collective-choice arrangements	Many of the individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group who can modify these rules.	Many of the individuals affected by the public-bad management rules are included in the group who can modify these rules.
4	Monitoring (*)	Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.	Monitors, who actively audit biophysical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves.
5	Graduated sanctions (*)	Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.	Users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both.
6	Conflict-resolution mechanisms (*)	Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.	Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials.
7	Minimal recognition of rights to organize	The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource.	The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, and users have long-term agency rights to self-organize to prevent and control public-bad threats.
8	Nestled enterprises (*)	For resources that are part of larger systems: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.	For public bads that are a threat for larger systems (e.g. transboundary diseases): Problem definition, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Table

Social dilemmas	Coping capacity	Risk perception
Social dilemmas define a situation where two or more individuals would be better off if all cooperate but fail to do so because of self-seeking choices that benefit them individually (Dawes et al., 1988).	Coping capacity is related to the household/community’s need for external intervention to repair any damage. See also definition in the public-bad risk context.	Risk perception is one of the leading factors in disaster risk management because it influences people’s response to threats (Shaw et al., 2014).

Table

From	To	Questions	Purpose
A [connective action]	B [risk governance system]	How do [the EVOCA proposed] connective actions influence changes in the risk governance system in place?	To answer main research question: Under what conditions can connective interventions change the collective action and decision-making to address public bads?
B [risk governance system]	C [direct users’ collective action problems]	How do such changes in the RGS contribute to solving collective action problems [faced by the direct users of the livelihood unit under focus]?
C [direct users’ collective action problems]	D [public-bad risk context-focused on a livelihood unit]	How do such changes in direct users’ capability to undertake collective actions influence their capability to manage public-bad risk [in terms of prevention, mitigation, responding, or recovering]?
D [public-bad risk context-focused on a livelihood unit]	E [livelihood system]	Reflections on how direct users’ capabilityto manage a public-bad risk through collective action [elicited by connective actions] might influence the broader livelihood system?	Discussion and further research

Ostrom, E. (2007). A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(39), 15181–15187.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Galarza-Villamar, J. A., McCampbell, M., Leeuwis, C., & Cecchi, F. (2021). Adding emergence and spatiality to a public-bad game for studying dynamics in socio-ecological systems (part I): The design of Musa-game for integrative analysis of collective action in banana disease management. Sustainability, 13(16), 9370.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton University Press.

 Google Scholar

Dawes, R. M., van de Kragt, A. J., & Orbell, J. M. (1988). Not me or thee but we: The importance of group identity in eliciting cooperation in dilemma situations: Experimental manipulations. Acta Psychologica, 68(1–3), 83–97.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Birkmann, J., Cardona, O. D., Carreño, M. L., Barbat, A. H., Pelling, M., Schneiderbauer, S., Kienberger, S., Keiler, M., Alexander, D., Zeil, P., & Welle, T. (2013). Framing vulnerability, risk and societal responses: The move framework. Natural Hazards, 67(2), 193–211.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Turner, B. L., Kasperson, R. E., Matson, P. A., McCarthy, J. J., Corell, R. W., Christensen, L., Eckley, N., Kasperson, J. X., Luers, A., Martello, M. L., Polsky, C., Pulsipher, A., & Schiller, A. (2003). A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100(14), 8074–8079.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Siegrist, M. (2021). Trust and risk perception: A critical review of the literature. Risk Analysis, 41(3), 480–490.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Van Asselt, M. B. A., & Renn, O. (2011). Risk governance. Journal of Risk Research, 14(4), 431–449.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Wachinger, G., Renn, O., Begg, C., & Kuhlicke, C. (2013). The risk perception paradox-implications for governance and communication of natural hazards. Risk Analysis, 33(6), 1049–1065.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Thywissen, K. (2006). Components of risk. A comparative glossary (2nd ed.), United Nations University. UNU-EHS, Institute for Environment and Human Security.

 Google Scholar

UNISDR. (2009). Terminology on disaster risk reduction.UNISDR.

 Google Scholar

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I. (1994). At risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Taylor & Francis.

 Google Scholar

Smit, B., & Wandel, J. (2006). Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. Global Environmental Change, 16(3), 282–292.

 Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and adaptation: A conceptual framework. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 38.

 Google Scholar

Reed, M. S., Podesta, G., Fazey, I., Geeson, N., Hessel, R., Hubacek, K., Letson, D., Nainggolan, D., Prell, C., Rickenbach, M. G., Ritsema, C., Schwilch, G., Stringer, L. C., & Thomas, A. D. (2013). Combining analytical frameworks to assess livelihood vulnerability to climate change and analyse adaptation options. Ecological Economics, 94, 66–77.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Chepkwony, R. K. (2021). Connecting divergent worlds: Social and ecological factors influence tick-borne diseases in tropical drylands. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Mutavi, F., Aarts, N., Van Paassen, A., Heitkönig, I., & Wieland, B. (2018). Techne meets Metis: Knowledge and practices for tick control in Laikipia County, Kenya. NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 86–87(1), 136–145.

 Google Scholar

Mutavi, F., Heitkönig, I., Wieland, B., Aarts, N., & van Paassen, A. (2021). Tick treatment practices in the field: Access to, knowledge about, and on-farm use of acaricides in Laikipia, Kenya. Ticks and Tick-Borne Diseases, 12(5), 101757.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Nyamekye, A. B. (2020). Towards a new generation of climate information systems : Information systems and actionable knowledge creation for adaptive decision-making in rice farming systems in Ghana. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Nyadzi, E. (2020). Best of both worlds : Co-producing climate services that integrate scientific and indigenous weather and seasonal climate forecast for water management and food production in Ghana. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Agyekumhene, C. (2021). Digitalization of smallholder value chain lending partnerships : An interplay of trust and inclusion. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Munthali, N. (2021). Innovation intermediation in a digital age : Broadening extension service delivery in Ghana. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Asingizwe, D. (2020). Citizen science for malaria control in Rwanda : Engagement, motivation, and behaviour change. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Murindahabi, M. M. (2020). Citizen science for malaria vector surveillance in Rwanda. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Tafesse, S. (2020). Understanding and managing bacterial wilt and late blight of potato in Ethiopia : Combining an innovation systems approach and a collective action perspective. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Damtew, E. (2020). Social-institutional problem dimensions of late blight and bacterial wilt of potato in Ethiopia: The contribution of social learning and communicative interventions to collective action. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

McCampell, M. (2021). More than what meets the eye : Factors and processes that shape the design and use of digital agricultural advisory and decision support in Africa. Wageningen University.

 Google Scholar

Ostrom, E. (2009a). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science, 325(5939), 419–422.

 PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar

Shaw, D., Scully, J., & Hart, T. (2014). The paradox of social resilience: How cognitive strategies and coping mechanisms attenuate and accentuate resilience. Global Environmental Change, 25(1), 194–203.

 Google Scholar