‘He is living Israeli flag’: The Right and the Presidency in Israel under Chaim Weizmann, 1948–1952

Abstract

The relationship between Chaim Weizmann and Ze’ev Jabotinsky is discussed widely. But research concerning the relationship between Jabotinsky’s successors, especially during Weizmann’s tenure as president of Israel, is scarce. Weizmann’s relationship with the Revisionists and the Herut Movement’s tension throughout the early days of Israel State is a fascinating topic. On the one hand, a superpatriotic notion puts considerable value on the content of the state and its institutions. And on the other, there is pungent antagonism toward people in official positions and their political parties. Questions such as how this contradiction resonates with Herut and Weizmann and the effect of this notion on the party’s perception of the presidency are raised. The study attempts to fill these gaps and outlines Weizmann’s relationship with the right wing during his tenure as President. It also completes a chapter on Herut’s attitude toward democracy and the state in Israel’s early years.

Keywords:

• Herut Movement
• Chaim Weizmann
• Israeli presidency
• politics

Dr. Chaim Weizmann’s election to President of the State of Israel was a natural and necessary act. For many years, Weizmann was at the heart of the Zionist movement and headed its institutions. During these years, there was much debate between Weizmann and Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his followers, although they did share quite a few similarities. That debate was renowned and did not end upon Jabotinsky’s demise but rather was handed down to his successors.

Despite the vast literature about Weizmann and his relationship with Jabotinsky, researchers barely dwelled upon his relationship with Jabotinsky’s successors and, even less, during his presidency. Although this period was marginal in his personal career, it rooted his position in the national pantheon.¹ Moreover, historical analyses of the Herut Movement refer sparingly to the Movement’s attitude toward the presidency, certainly at the Movement’s beginning, when its influence was limited.² However, an examination of this period may challenge some conventions about these two subjects, the institution of the presidency during the Weizmann era and the Herut in the early days of the state.

The period of Weizmann’s presidency is framed in historiography as his twilight period, ‘The prisoner of Rehovot’, as Richard Crossman and Norman Rose termed it.³ These descriptions testify about Weizmann’s mental state together with his political status. With other sayings of Weizmann’s, such as the famous one about the handkerchief to which he is allowed to shove his nose, the public image of the presidency was shaped. However, I wish to analyze in this study the relationship between Weizmann and the revisionist movement, and especially Herut – the main opposition – which will point to a unifying power that exists in the presidential institution. The analysis here shows the importance of the presidential institution to overcome ideological differences, especially in a period of fierce political tension, and to create a sense of political identification in a polarized society. Another field that this study explores is the attitude of the right-wing opposition to the presidency institution in its early days. Examining the attitude of Herut toward the institution of the presidency is an interesting case for an examination given the tension that arises from the historical analysis of the Herut movement: their attitude to the government was perceived as partisan and as an expression of national sovereignty that must be praised. Furthermore, an analysis of their attitude will indicate a certain way in which Herut created an identification with the state in a period of political isolation and elaborated Herut’s attitude toward democracy and the state in Israel’s early years.⁴

A chronological presentation of the relationship between right-wing circles and President Weizmann will show a gap between the two periods. The first period was during his term as president of the Provisional State Council, in which the attitude of the revisionist currents toward Weizmann was troublesome. It was based on the enmity of the past and the differences in perceptions between the two. The second period, his tenure as president of the state, was characterized by optimal relations between the currents. Although these relations were not without conflicts, Herut’s attitude toward Weizmann was one of respect. The gap between the periods deserves examination, and from this explanation, a broader concept of Herut toward the presidency in the state’s early days will emerge. I suggest that in the first period the internal revisionist struggle contributed to increasing the enmity toward Weizmann and the worsening of the rhetoric against him, intending to gain the trust of the revisionist audience. Second, the uncertainty about the presidency and its role in Israeli politics led to a murky attitude. Herut’s victory over the Revisionist party, along with the forming of the presidency as symbolic, and the removal of Weizmann from positions of political influence, contributed to lowering enmity between them. That is what this study attempts to clarify based on documentary material and journalistic documents, gathered from archives in Israel, that have not hitherto been addressed in academic writing. This study concludes an important historiographic chapter of the Israeli right wing in the early years of independence.

Weizmann and Revisionists during the Provisional State Council

The political and organizational institutions of Israel are the legacy of pre-state, Zionist and Yishuv institutions, alongside the development and growth of new ones, like the Provisional State Council.⁵ The latter began to take shape as early as February 1948, given the desire to create a successful system that would support the transition to the state. The aspiration was to produce a joint framework to include the management of the National Committee, the Jewish Agency and non-represented parties among them including the revisionists who received three representatives.⁶

The presidential role, at the early stages of a new political framework, started to take shape and were made to measure for Weizmann.⁷ Despite the great tension between David Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, the latter’s diplomatic activities with the United Nations and American government officials inevitably crossed paths. Weizmann contributed considerably to the leadership in Israel in preparations for the establishment of the state.⁸ Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion sought to tie Weizmann’s hands and prevent him from actual political involvement, expressed symbolically and politically. Despite the respect and prestige Weizmann received in his emerging role, Ben-Gurion verified that Weizmann would play second fiddle to him: ‘Had he left some space for my signature, after his long “N” that takes the entire page, it would have been more convenient,’ this quote is given as an example of Weizmann’s disappointments.⁹ In the political aspects, Weizmann did not pose a real threat because of his organizational weakness. Yet Ben-Gurion’s fear gave him an incentive to provide Weizmann with formal ‘employment’, so he created a position devoid of any functional powers. ‘I am nothing but a symbol, playing the cymbals,’ Weizmann commented, expressing his lack of power.¹⁰

The nomination for president was shown by the Government at the Provisional State Council two days after the establishment of the state. Ben-Gurion claimed it was but gratitude to a person who made a significant contribution to the establishment of the State:

There is a man among us, although he is not here with us presently, to whom the entire Jewish people feel obliged to pay tribute. If there is a living person who deserves the right to be the president of the Jewish State, it is Dr. Chaim Weizmann.¹¹

The proposal for Weizmann’s election was approved by a majority of 13 to 2. The Hatzohar representative on the council, Herzl (Verdi) Rosenblum opposed Weizmann’s election, given the latter’s pro-British leanings. Since Weizmann is identified with a particular line of thought in Zionism, his election would force a distinct government policy, he argued. Furthermore, claiming that the very mention of Weizmann’s name as a candidate for the position would arouse mixed feelings among the public, he stated, ‘You know the feelings that prevail in the street about this issue – why provoke them?’ Rosenblum further named Weizmann’s contributions to Zionist history but noted that ‘Some say the Jewish State was created by people who are rarely heard on national radio nor do they appear in the State’s Council.’¹²

The editorial in HaMashkif (The Observer), the Hatzohar Party newspaper, did not hide the hard feelings caused by Weizmann’s election; it wrote ‘Here are few acts that have caused so much damage, whose irresponsibility is so glaring, whose provocation is so brazen.’ The article blamed Weizmann’s past and the polemic on his actions over the years, mainly among them the link of ‘our homeland to the enemy Great Britain’. The Revisionist criticism of Weizmann was a combination of accounts of the past alongside concerns about the present and the future.¹³

An analysis of the criticism among right-wing circles will bring up several different aspects. First, a fight over Weizmann’s status and his presidential role. The conflict revolving around this issue reached its peak in the discussion in the Constitution Committee of the Provisional State Council regarding the definition of the president’s role, status and the nature of its procedure. But in fact, this debate often drifted into ridiculous territory. Thus, in the right-wing’s newspapers HaMashkif and Herut, much criticism was expressed that in the Israeli and international media Weizmann was referred to as ‘The president of Israel’, even though he was not the president but the president of the Provisional State Council. The adherence to this matter indicates the desire among right-wing circles to reduce Weizmann’s symbolic status. ¹⁴

Other aspects of opposition to Weizmann related to his ‘Britishness’. Yosef Shofman wrote, two weeks after Weizmann was elected, that in this stressed political-military situation the council elected ‘a person who symbolizes our adherence to Britain and a British citizen to this day’.¹⁵ This criticism was widespread; it linked Weizmann’s British citizenship, his pro-British orientation and the war with countless victims and what the right identified as British support for the Arabs.¹⁶

The link between Weizmann and Britain, which was highly criticized among this group, directly touched upon the differences in perception between them, such as the use of force and militarism. Weizmann opposed the militant spirit that dominated the country. As Motti Golani and Jehuda Reinharz wrote, ‘Weizmann spoke from his heartfelt aspiration to be Athens, and here before his eyes, Sparta is sprouting.’¹⁷ He did not perceive using force as a valuable tool for achieving Zionist goals, which was also a part of the argument between him and Ben-Gurion several years earlier. However, during the War, right-wing circles’ criticism of Weizmann’s positions were stronger. Much criticism was directed toward Weizmann when he expressed reservations about the continuation of fighting and combat.¹⁸ Weizmann’s speech at the establishment of the settlement of Tal Shahar at the end of October 1948, in which he spoke out against the militaristic spirit in Israel, caused resentment among the revisionist camp.¹⁹ HaMashkif called Weizmann’s speech ‘an act of sabotage’, referring to it as preaching to the people ‘when seven armies of invading countries are standing within the borders of our country and attacking it with blood and fire’:

These defeatist opinions about the ‘decommissioned militarism’ and the absurdity of the war for the expansion of borders’ - are publicly voiced, and our only luck is that many people no longer pay attention to Dr Weizmann’s remarks… After all, this speech was the greatest act of sabotage amid our struggle for existence. And they are still thinking of electing this man as President of the State.²⁰

Weizmann’s view against the use of force was perceived as a lax position, along with his agreement to the division of the country, a division that was the ‘cornerstone of his political approach’, as Meir Chazan accurately expressed it.²¹ This idea led to Weizmann’s denunciation by revisionist factions. The former’s agreement to divide Jerusalem and internationalize it was an arrow in the heart of Herut’s and the Revisionists’ ethos.²² Generally speaking, one can comprehend how Jerusalem was a valuable ground for criticizing Weizmann. For example, Weizmann was censured for visiting Jerusalem as the President of the State Council only two months after he arrived in Israel,²³ which would later translate into disappointment that Weizmann did not make his home in Jerusalem but in Rehovot.

All of these positions, distilling the criticism of Weizmann among the right-wing circles, arose out of the long-standing struggle between the various groups, and in Weizmann’s return to the local political map. These perceptions, as we will see later, dimmed over time, becoming more marginal.

‘There must be a candidate against Weizmann’: the 1949 presidential elections

The institution of the Presidency had already been shaped by the Constitution Committee of the Provisional State Council with the drafting of the State’s constitution, at the end of 1948 and at the beginning of the following year. The Committee assembled various proposals to put a recommendation to the Constituent Assembly, which would serve as the starting point for the Israeli constitution. The significant discussions took place in the government meetings after the elections in January 1949, in which it was concluded that the role was designed as symbolic and as lacking an executive layer.

The presidential elections were held in the early days of the parliament; thus, there was no official campaign during the run-up. Chazan found no evidence of Weizmann’s campaigning among members of the Constituent Assembly.²⁴ Indeed, it should be noted that from the end of December, excerpts from his autobiographical diary ‘Trial and Error’ (translates verbatim in Hebrew as ‘Discussion and Action’) began to appear, serving as a kind of substitute for the campaign and intended to win the public’s hearts for his election. The Herut Movement was not indifferent to this and concluded with humor:

Haaretz announces that it will begin publishing the memoirs of Dr Chaim Weizmann called ‘Discussion and Action’. The Palestine Post announces that it will begin publishing Chaim Weizmann’s memoirs called ‘Trial and Error’. For the first time, the two Weizmannist newspapers tell the honest truth: that Weizmann’s Action was… an Error.²⁵

In the run-up to the presidential elections, Herut grappled with the question of how to behave. The elections to the Assembly were held in January 1949, in which Herut became the sole representative of the revisionist ideology but won only fourteen seats and was the fourth largest party.²⁶ The faction met to discuss the matter a few days before the parliament was to convene. After a short discussion on the question of whether to stand up when Weizmann entered the plenum, which concluded with a decision to act like all other factions of the house, the discussion on their candidate for the presidency began. Two main trends were formed by Herut: one was that Herut should be engaged in politics, understand its place as a small faction and reach its objectives using politics as leverage, taking politics as the ‘Art of the Possible’. Among this group’s members, Uri Zvi Greenberg (UZG), suggested Yitzhak Ben-Zvi for President: ‘President of the National Committee and a Jerusalem devotee’, he justified his proposal, which can also be explained as a political ploy – to drive a wedge into Mapai. Eri Jabotinsky strengthened UZG’s position by stating that the presidency ‘must be handed over to a member of the ruling party’.²⁷

A second, opposite trend insisted that a governing alternative must be presented at all levels, even if it means remaining isolated. Menachem Begin was the clear representative of this doctrine, ‘the beautiful proposal of UZG must be withdrawn because we shall not suggest someone who is morally unacceptable,’ he said.²⁸ Esther Raziel-Naor concurred by stating, ‘Let us not forget who Ben-Zvi is,’ and noted his actions in the National Committee – his treatment of the detainees in Eritrea, whom he claimed were deported on account of their being terrorists. Furthermore, she added practical reasoning why the proposal would fail: ‘Ben-Zvi is bound to refuse because of the iron discipline.’ As far as her ideological orientation is concerned, her positions coincided with those of Begin: ‘The moral reasoning does not allow us to support his (Ben Zvi) candidacy, and we should avoid proposing a second version to Weizmann,’ she concluded.²⁹

It was evident Herut would not vote for Weizmann’s candidacy, but there was a debate about whether to put up an alternative candidate or vote against his candidacy. Aryeh Ben-Eliezer stated, ‘There must be a candidate against Weizmann,’ and brought up the names of Joseph Klausner, Rabbi Meir Berlin and Dr Joshua Yabiin. Similarly, Yohanan Bader mentioned the name of the Prisoners’ Fathers, Rabbi Aryeh Levin, and Menashe Meyerowitz, the last remnant of the Bilu group. Hillel Kook suggested placing a ‘Sephardi candidate’ but refrained from providing a specific name. He also mentioned as a possible candidate the ‘chief justice’, Moshe Smoira, and the name of UZG.³⁰ The meeting adjourned, concluding that the faction would try to postpone the vote on the Presidency to another date. Simultaneously, the decision was transferred to a smaller committee consisting of three people who would make decisions on behalf of the faction.³¹

The Herut faction was not the only one to struggle with the question of an opposing candidate against Weizmann. Thus, the Communist and the Mapam factions debated because of Weizmann’s pro-Western orientation.³² The religious factions also debated naming a counter candidate, hence nominating Berlin for the position. However, opinions differ as to why this candidacy never materialized. Evidence shows that despite Mapam’s support of his candidacy and the support of the religious faction, due to Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman Maimon’s pressure, the Berlin candidacy was pulled from the agenda.³³ Other evidence shows that Berlin intended to put forward his candidacy given his opposition to Weizmann for ideological reasons. However, vote calculations led him not to do so: he figured he would not reach the necessary number of votes to be elected, which would have harmed the relationship between the religious factions and Mapai.³⁴ Herut, which was in contact with the religious factions on the matter, claimed they would support Rabbi Berlin’s candidacy. According to Herut, his candidacy was dropped due to Ben-Gurion’s involvement, who warned this would harm future coalition partnerships, hence paving the road for Klausner’s candidacy.³⁵ Although Professor Klausner was not a Herut party member but a member of the General Zionists, he was one of the intellectuals who influenced the movement and its people, so much so that he was named ‘our historian’.³⁶ His activity in the Western Wall Committee and academic enterprise concerning the history of the Second Temple period greatly influenced the revisionist camp and the Irgun. At first, Klausner refused when Herut suggested his candidacy, ‘Not the vote’s calculation is why I oppose the nomination,’ he wrote in his autobiography, and added: ‘It truly never occurred to me, that I am talented to be the president of the State of Israel.’³⁷ This is not exaggerated modesty by Klausner due to the misfit and lack of skill for the role, but an ideological misfit to the governing party along with the desire to continue doing his scientific work. After Herut appealed continuously, Klausner reconsidered and replied positively to their request: ‘I would not want that the Jewish and the general world would think that the entire world of Israeli Judaism aligned to Weizmann and Mapai’s politics’.³⁸

At 23:55 on 16 February 1949, the Knesset convened to elect the President of the State of Israel. Zalman Rubashov presented the two nominees: Professor Chaim Weizmann and Professor Joseph Klausner. Although the latter knew his chances were slim, Klausner hoped to get the votes of other factions besides Herut. He agreed to the candidacy for its historical value and significance and to prevent the optics of Weizmann being a sole candidate.³⁹ Klausner’s candidacy was presented by Ben-Eliezer, who first introduced Herut’s vision of the Presidency and the President:

Through his personality, the President of the State of Israel must symbolize the dreams of previous generations for a life of freedom and independence, the revival of freedom fighting, respect for those pioneers who led us by sheer intellect and devotion, and the honest and absolute loyalty to people and homeland.⁴⁰

Ben-Eliezer depicted Klausner as a man who ‘through his writings managed to revive the majesty of freedom-fighting from days of yore and whose books are consecrated by an entire generation of warriors and rebels’.⁴¹ Weizmann’s victory was absolute: 83 vs 15 votes. The next day, in the Inauguration Ceremony at the Jewish Agency, UZG, Raziel-Naor and Bader were absent. The latter even called the ceremony ‘a celebration of Weizmannism’.⁴² It was their symbolic protest against Weizmann. Although they did prefer another candidate, upon his inauguration, they considered Weizmann their President too. Meyer Weisgal described Begin’s reaction on attending the inauguration:

Outside the building, the masses waited to applaud the President as he left, accompanied by a guard of honor, and those who attended the inauguration inside, rushed to the roof to watch the procession from above. I also wanted to get to the roof’s edge but was stopped by Menachem Begin himself [.] ‘Do not push,’ he said. ‘He is not just your President. He is also ours.’ For a split second, it seemed like the Messiah had come.⁴³

Bader expressed a similar position after he consulted the President further to the fall of the second government in February 1950. In his autobiography, he wrote about his impression of Weizmann as ‘an old man’, yet ‘smart, sharp, and of outstanding personality’. Before the meeting, he explained to Esther Raziel-Naor, his co-partner at the meeting ‘how to dress and how to behave’, at the end of which the Cabinet Secretary told him: ‘You should know the President said you were the only delegation who knew how to behave when meeting a State’s President.’ Bader’s response highlights Herut’s attitude to the Presidency:

We fought and suffered so we would have a State and now have our own President. He is a living Israeli Flag [author’s emphasis]. If you had elected a broom for President, it would have been given the same respect Dr Chaim Weizmann received.⁴⁴

It is evident that two concepts are expressed here that are not compatible with each other. On the one hand, some of Herut’s members boycotted Weizmann’s swearing-in ceremony, on the other hand, it is the ‘Living Israel Flag’. How can these two concepts be reconciled? It seems that only a small part of the solution lies in the ability of time to forget an old enmity, but it is rooted in two ways that reinforce each other. The first, the symbolic aspect of the position, the ability of the institution of the presidency to be a national symbol and thus overcomes the partisanship of society and politics. This matter is rooted in the motivation to create an institution whose name is synonymous with respect and is thus a center of highly symbolic capital that translates into bridging social capital. Second, Herut’s activation mechanism toward politics contributed to its attitude toward the institution. Although Herut was opposed to the political figures of the time, when it came to the presidency, it made a separation between the institution and the people who held it, thus ‘resolving’ for itself the built-in tension of the presidency – the fusion between the institution and the person who sits in it. As Avner Ben-Amos shows, the position was designed as a kind of ‘constitutional-king’, a symbolic and meaningful position.⁴⁵ But Herut did not subjugate and link Weizmann and the president, or between the presidency and Weizmann, but saw them as two separate things. For a fiercely oppositional group, which had a different political culture and largely operated in a separate social group, it was a smart move to generate identification with the symbolism of the presidency, even though its occupant was not one of their own. An attitude of respect and reverence for the president alongside an attitude of contempt was sometimes demonstrated toward Weizmann as a person.

Herut’s viewpoint: between president and presidency

After Weizmann was elected, he approached the main issue on his desk: consulting the Knesset’s factions for assigning the formation of the government to one of its members. The procedure is established in the transitional law, but it was initiated for the first time and no orderly procedure was established for its management.⁴⁶ Therefore, the order in which the factions were invited was largely coincidental, and the government secretary was even present at the consultations themselves, which indicates the status of the president. The transition law, which establishes his authority to invite the factions for consultation, does not state that he must meet with all the factions, and the president interpreted this as an opening for him to express his positions and expectations. He decided to meet with the representatives of the factions that participated in the coalition of the provisional government, which indicated the direction he expected the government to take. Among the factions that didn’t accept the invitation was also Herut, which naturally caused anger. The Herut editorial stated that ‘the position of the President of the State cannot be restricted by personal or political sympathy or lack of sympathy’. They saw this as a dangerous precedent that harmed its position and this should be protested.⁴⁷ Herut exerted public pressure to receive an invitation, which finally helped.

On 23 February, the faction’s representatives, Kook and Ben-Eliezer, met him and expressed Herut’s position in its early parliamentary days.⁴⁸ Herut’s newspaper mentioned that the faction was the first ‘to discuss the assembling of the government without the need to appeal or express any specific interest’.⁴⁹ During the meeting, they raised the role Herut assumed as the opposition and its importance within any democratic regime. It was not casually mentioned but rather their hope that, given Weizmann’s ‘Britishness’, and his familiarity with a regime that included an opposition, it would help them maintain their place and prevent their political trampling. To some extent agreeing with the aforementioned, Weizmann noted that on the day of his election, he decided to keep his views to himself, and in the line of duty, he represented the entire state and had to act in the best interests of all citizens.⁵⁰

This meeting presents part of Herut’s attitude toward the Presidency within a democratic regime, an issue that must be elaborated on more systematically further in the discussion of Herut’s attitude to Weizmann. From the outset, Herut demanded a different governance structure: not a parliamentary regime but a presidential one with an executive president.⁵¹ But Herut proposed a constitution, which was also debated within the party that was pushed to the side because of the election results. We find an interesting source about Herut’s presidency’s concept in the parliamentary discussion on the ‘Transitional Law’. In the Knesset debate Begin expressed reservations about the wording of the presidential oath. He proposed that rather than stating: ‘I hereby undertake, as President of the State of Israel, to be loyal to the State of Israel and its laws’, the presidential oath should say: ‘The President of the State of Israel hereby undertakes to be loyal to the People of Israel and the State.’ Begin deemed this change vital because the object of governance in any state is the people, and therefore the president’s initial loyalty should be ‘to the people who established the state, and secondary to that, a loyalty to the state itself’.⁵² Begin distinguishes between a president’s loyalty to the state – which is the combination of all its inhabitants, and the loyalty to The Jewish People – scattered across multiple states. Hence, Begin suggested adding the words ‘to the people of Israel’ in the wording of the presidential oath, i.e., the President would be responsible to the entire Jewish People. This position is important and is a testament to the role that Herut sees in the president: a broad and influential role for the entire Jewish people. This is an aspect that is an opening to understanding Herut’s perception of the position of the presidency and the historical role of the State of Israel. Furthermore, Begin aspired to grant the President an executive role in parliament: the President should have the power to retrieve a law, on a one-time basis, for further discussion of the Knesset. Begin’s opinion was that because most parliamentary democracies are composed of two chambers while Israel was not, the State’s Legislative Authority was concentrated in one subordinating body subject to the majority rule, which may also make mistakes. Thus, Begin proposed that:

It would be politically wise to give the house additional time to discuss the same law even after it passed. For this reason, we propose that the President shall have the right to delay a law that the House approved of.⁵³

These suggestions characterized Herut’s view of the Presidency in the early days of the Knesset and the State, even when it was evident Weizmann would be elected President and no one else.

The ‘Presidential Tenure Law’ is another expression that can shed light on Herut’s perception. The law attempted to address various deficiencies in how the president was elected. First, they argued that reducing the discussion only to the question of the order of election and the length of the term of office missed the goal, the role should be more than just ceremonial. Bader argued: ‘Among all global presidents, in my opinion, it is difficult to find one with such limited powers.’⁵⁴

This argument was part of a broader claim about the presidential role that corresponds with Begin’s words that were cited earlier. The law distinguished between the length of tenure of parliament and president. Up until this correction, in the initial first months after the parliament’s formation, it was required of the same parliament to elect a new president. The cancellation of a such link between the tenures expresses a more flexible perception of the president’s tenure and his range of activities.⁵⁵ Herut was opposed to such a link and supported attaching the length of the president’s tenure to that of parliament. Herut perceived this as an expression of parliament’s supremacy and its centrality in the democratic regime. This also corresponds with Herut’s desire to ease the proposal procedure for candidates for election, and to strive for a minimum of restrictions on candidacy. Regarding the president’s place in the democratic regime, they saw the president as having a more significant role, and as a balancing factor for the government and the Knesset. At the Law Committee, Bader said:

We thought that since a president is elected, he is president, and his powers should be separated from those of the Knesset. Just as we do not want the sole rule of a president, we do not want the dictatorship of the Knesset.⁵⁶

Herut’s goal was to use the president’s power to limit the Knesset’s power because of the concern that the government – through the majority in the Knesset – would act in an unrestrained manner.⁵⁷ According to Herut, the president is a factor that has a role in democracy and is not just symbolic. But at the same time, they also aspired to strengthen its symbolic status. The Herut faction was the only one in the debates that raised the desire for the president’s seat to be in Jerusalem. As well, its attitude toward the institution was characterized by a view that saw its role as a symbol that constituted the unity of the nation and its power to generate identification with the state.

Herut knew how to make a separation between the president as an institution and Weizmann the person. In the editorial of Herut’s paper that referred to its not being invited to a factional consultation with the president, it was written about this separation: ‘As long as the president’s country continues to serve in his high office, we will not have to write about Prof. Weizmann again.’⁵⁸ Herut separated the role of president from the person of Weizmann: for them there is Weizmann the president, who is often received with royal courtesies, and Weizmann the person, who can be the object of aggressive criticism. Another expression of this matter we meet in the parliamentary debate on the ‘Weizmann Law’, which granted a stipend and an exemption from inheritance tax for his estate.⁵⁹ A look at how Herut saw this law will indicate the separation they made between Weizmann and his role as president. The Minister of Justice claimed the law intended to ‘honor the great and blessed memory of the late President of the State of Israel’.⁶⁰ Herut’s objection expressed in the Knesset’s deliberations relied upon jurisprudence; they claimed the law should not be deemed personal, but it was appropriate and just that it be general, so it did not discriminate. Therefore, Bader requested to change the name of the law from ‘President Weizmann’s Law’ to the ‘Law of the Presidents of Israel’, thus establishing a general law and not distinguishing one president from another. Bader noted that he would not say anything about Weizmann as the State’s President ‘because he was the President of all of us, and we respected him, if not more, then no less than others’.⁶¹ However, as the law expressed personal appreciation of Weizmann, Bader described his party’s disapproval of its activation and concluded: ‘I deny any moral right of the House to grant a special privilege to Dr Chaim Weizmann.’⁶² They saw fit for there to be a complete separation between the man and the institution: ‘We were Dr Weizmann’s rivals, but from sheer respect, knew to differentiate between the person and the presidency.’⁶³

The idea of separation is complex and not easily applicable. In order for the presidential institution to succeed in becoming a symbol, it is greatly required to distance itself from the political cauldron. This is a deep contradiction within Herut’s perceptions, the difficulty of holding the three vertices of the triangle together: opposition to Weizmann as a person, a view of the presidency as a symbolic institution, and a desire to provide executive content to the president.

The discussion on the president’s status and his role points to a complex perception of Herut toward democracy, and the position of the president within it. Herut’s desire to provide executive power to the president, as expressed in the bill on ‘President’s Authorities, 1952’, characterizes the role of the president as another side in the triangle of authorities. Many of the analyzes on Herut, emphasize its liberal view in which at its center stands the supremacy of law. But this analysis presents an in-depth view that sees the presidency as a solution to the separation of powers in the parliamentary regime. At the same time, there were many conflicts between Herut and Weizmann. They often saw Weizmann as a servant in the hands of Ben-Gurion, this matter stemmed from their desire for Weizmann to challenge the government’s position, but since that did not happen, they criticized him. A prominent case in which this behavior occurred is when the president decided not to entrust the formation of the government to another candidate after the fall of the second government.⁶⁴ Bader called this matter a ‘putsch’,⁶⁵ and Knesset members Jabotinsky and Kook, who left the Herut faction for a single faction in those days, even petitioned against the president to the Supreme Court.⁶⁶ Within these events, Herut’s faction was one of a few that voted against Weizmann’s reelection as president in November 1951.⁶⁷

Conclusion

On 11 December, less than a month after his re-election, the Knesset Committee announced that Weizmann would renounce his position for reasons of medical incapacity.⁶⁸ The Speaker of the Knesset served as the Acting President until Weizmann’s death, on 9 November 1952. Despite their long-standing critique of Weizmann, the Herut’s headquarters and faction participated in the family’s and the State’s grieving and sent a condolence letter to Weizmann’s wife, Vera.⁶⁹ Herut’s newspaper published Weizmann’s obituary of Jabotinsky alongside an editorial that stated: ‘Today we bow our heads and stand with the People in memory of the President of the State of Israel, who in his role embodied the Supreme Symbol of its independence.’⁷⁰ Herut did not show much affection for Weizmann the person but did show respect for Weizmann the President, and on the same note, criticized Ben-Gurion for delivering Weizmann’s eulogy wearing a blue suit rather than a black one, which symbolizes mourning, thereby hurting the President’s honor.⁷¹ At the Knesset Memorial Meeting, Raziel-Naor spoke on behalf of Herut and mentioned its attitude toward Weizmann:

Deep were the differences between us, Jabotinsky’s disciple, and Professor Weizmann, President of the Zionist Organization. Differences of opinion on values and ideas, evaluations and perceptions regarding Zionism, its essence and path, its purpose and mission, it’s the subject matter – the Jewish People – and the means to save it, as far as the redemptive and liberating ‘deeds’ are concerned. However, there were no differences of opinion between us and Professor Weizmann, the President of the State of Israel.⁷²

Raziel-Naor further noted Herut’s attitude toward the President of the State, emphasizing the party’s key ideas vs Weizmann’s:

The debate is over. And not because he had been summoned to the heavenly academy, or as Professor Weizmann put it, ‘The Journals of Hebrew History’, but since our way through ‘Hebrew History’, the way he opposed and challenged, led to the inception of the State of Israel, and the renewed presidency of Israel, and should be appointed as the first President of the State of Israel.⁷³

Although she stated the debate was over, she elevated the status of the revisionists’ actions in ushering in the establishment of the State of Israel, thanks to which Weizmann served as its President, despite his opposition to their militaristic ways and actions. In seeking to shift the debate to the critique of history, Raziel-Naor also strives to delineate its boundaries. In the aftermath of her speech, she talked about Weizmann’s term as President of the State:

Upon ascending to this lofty position, which represents everything that unites the People and the State, he knew how to rise above the prosaic routine of partisan life and assumed his position in all its glory and splendor.⁷⁴

Weizmann’s ability to position himself as an apolitical figure is due to the position’s symbolism and lack of political dimension. The contradiction is that Herut praised this positioning but demanded more than once to give an executive aspect to the presidency. This distinct lack of executive aspects enabled the existence of a symbolic status and softened the historical disputes between the currents. Herut’s stance was controversial in the right wing, the Sulam Circle, for example, showed opposition to Herut’s stance on Weizmann and presidential matters.⁷⁵

Over the years, the historical debate between the revisionists and Weizmann has received its rightful place as a historical debate, less of an actual controversy and even less so, a symbolic one. The revisionist right came to terms with Weizmann’s Zionism. Begin referred to Weizmann as one of the fathers of Zionism rather than as an oxymoron to the State.⁷⁶ In his address to the plenum during the visit of the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, Begin mentioned Weizmann’s name on the record, albeit just as a footnote, thus mirroring Jabotinsky’s absence from Weizmann’s speech at the opening of the Constituent Assembly, which upset the Revisionists. More elegantly, Begin was the one to commemorate Theodor Herzl, Weizmann and Jabotinsky at the meeting of the Cabinet in May 1979. He compared ‘Herzl, the prophet of the State, Chaim Weizmann, the first President of the State of Israel … and Ze’ev Jabotinsky – who maintained the idea of the Jewish state his whole life’. Herzl, Weizmann, Jabotinsky – in the same order and the same breath.⁷⁷

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 M. Golani and J. Reinharz, The Founding Father: Chaim Weizmann, Biography 1922–1952 (Rehovot: Yad Chaim Weizmann, 2020) [in Hebrew]; U. Cohen and M. Chazan (eds), Weizmann: The Leader of Zionism (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2016) [in Hebrew].

2 In Yechiam Weitz’s book on the Herut Movement, Herut’s attitude toward the institution of the presidency is narrowly depicted. For example, the reference to the 1949 presidential election amounts to just one page. Y. Weitz, The First Step to Power: The Herut Movement 1949–1955 (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 2007), p.29 [in Hebrew].

3 R. Crossman, ‘The Prisoner of Rehovoth’ in M. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael (eds), Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), pp.325–56; N. Rose, Chaim Weizmann: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p.447.

4 Y. Weitz, ‘The Revisionist Movement and Democracy', Journal of Modern Jewish Studies Vol. 10.2 (2011), pp.185–204; M. Mark, ‘The Road Not Taken: Menachem Begin’s Position on the Formation of A Democratic Regime for Israel’, Israel Studies Review Vol. 36.2 (2021), pp.107–23.

5 P. Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948–1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

6 The Revisionists, the Sephardim, Agudat-Yisrael, the Civil-Union and the Communists.

7 M. Chazan, Independence and Politics: Crossroads in the Shaping of Israel’s Political System (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2020), pp.76– 77 [in Hebrew].

8 M. Chazan, ‘Chaim Weizmann and the Decision to Establish the State of Israel’, Zion Vol. 71(b) (2016), pp.215–47 [in Hebrew].

9 Golani and Reinharz, Founding Father, p.724

10 Rose, Chaim Weizmann, p.261.

11 Ibid.

12 Protocol of the provisional state council, Israel State Archives (ISA), 16 May 1948

13 HaMashkif, 18 May 1948.

14 HaMashkif, 17 May 1948. HaMashkif, 25 May 1948; HaMashkif, 22 June 1948; in Herut papers the same views were pointed out: ‘President Chaim Weizmann, it is not clear whether he is the president of the Council of State or the president of the state.’ ‘Statement by Yossi Ben-Yossi and the Mapai Foreign Minister's speech’, Herut, 19 November 1948.

15 Yosef Shofman, ‘What Are We Waiting For’, HaMashkif, 4 June 1948; see also Yohanan Bader, ‘Limited Aggression’, HaMashkif, 23 July 1948.

16 Ben-Ami, ‘President that Sinned’, HaMashkif, 29 September 1948.

17 Golani and Reinharz, Founding Father, p.728.

18 ‘Weizmann and Moshe Chertok against Ben-Gurion Who Strives for Battle’, Herut, 12 November 1948.

19 ‘I forever built our hopes neither on the sword nor on war but on peace, work, and truth. I do not know when the war, which is like a horrid dream to me, will end, but it seems impossible to build a country without shedding blood, and I wish it would be kept to a minimum.’ Ephraim Talmei, ‘Moshav Hashahar – On the Way between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem’. Davar, 28 October 1948.

20 HaMashkif, 31 October 1948.

21 Chazan, Independence and Politics, p.81.

22 ‘Weizmann Indirectly Agrees to International Jerusalem’, HaMashkif, 3 October 1948; see also O. Gruweis-Kovalsky. ‘Between Ideology and Reality: The Right Wing Organizations, the Jerusalem Question, and the Role of Menachem Begin 1948–1949', Israel Studies Vol. 21.3 (2016), pp.99–125.

23 ‘The New Disappointment’, HaMashkif, 3 December 1948.

24 Chazan, Independence and Politics, p.320.

25 Herut, 29 December 1948.

26 Y. Weitz, ‘The Road to the "Upheaval”: A Capsule History of the Herut Movement, 1948–1977', Israel Studies Vol. 10.3 (2005), p.66.

27 Herut Faction in Knesset Protocol, Jabotinsky Institution Archive (JIA) H 1 – 1/2.

28 Ibid.

29 Herut First Knesset, JIA, H 2 –1/4.

30 Herut Faction in Knesset Protocol, JIA H 1 – 1/2.

31 Ibid; no documents were found on the activities of this committee.

32 ‘A Hard Run within Mapam on Elect Weizmann as President'’, Herut, 13 February 1949.

33 J. G. McDonald, Envoy to the Promise Land: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1948–1951 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), p.386.

34 Herzl Rosenblum, ‘What Preceded Weizmann’s Election?’, Yediot Aharonot, 17 February 1949.

35 Herut Knesset Faction, JIA H 2 – 1/5; HaBoker, 13 February 1949; Herut, 16 February 1949.

36 A. Ahimeir, The Reader's Eye, Stories and Books, Newspapers and Journalists (Tel Aviv: Abba Ahimeir Publishing Committee, 2003), pp.241–50 [in Hebrew].

37 J. Klausner, My Path Towards Resurrection and Redemption (Tel-Aviv: Massada, 1955) p.263 [in Hebrew].

38 Ibid.

39 Herut Knesset Faction, JIA, H 2 – 1/5.

40 The Knesset Protocols [KP], 16 February 1949, p.48.

41 Ibid.

42 Y. Bader, The Knesset and Me (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1979), p.23 [in Hebrew].

43 M. Weisgal, Meyer Weisgal … So Far; An Autobiography (Jerusalem: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p.209 [in Hebrew].

44 Bader, The Knesset and Me, p.44.

45 A. Ben-Amos, ‘Commemoration of Chaim Weizmann’, in Cohen and Chazan (eds), Weizmann: The Leader of Zionism, p.577.

46 Y. Weitz, ‘Constitution of the First Government (March 1949)’, in Bar-On and Chazan (eds), Politics in War: Studies on Civilian Society during the Israeli War of Independence (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 2014), p.134.

47 Editorial, Herut, 22 February 1949.

48 Haaretz, 24 February 1949; initially, Weizmann did not meet with Harut's representatives, but after public pressure he agreed to meet with them. Herut, 22 February 1949.

49 Herut, 24 February 1949.

50 Ibid.

51 M. Mark, ‘The Road Not Taken: Menachem Begin’s Position on the Formation of a Democratic Regime for Israel’, Israel Studies Review Vol. 36.2 (2021), pp.107–23.

52 KP, 16 February 1949, p.35.

53 Ibid., p.36.

54 KP, 3 October 1951, p.179.

55 The ‘Transitional Law’ defines the rules of electing a president, and the same goes for the length of tenure. The law stated that at the formation of each parliament, it is required to elect a president within three months. By doing so, the previous law expressed the affinity between the president and the parliamentary majority. This clause was changed in the new bill and was one of the most significant changes in this law.

56 Discussion at the law committee, 21 November 1951, Knesset Archive.

57 Ibid.

58 Editorial, Herut, 22 February 1949.

59 Herut, 27 November 1952; Herut, 10 December 1952; Herut, 27 May 1953.

60 KP, 9 December 1952, p.263.

61 KP, 26 May 1953, p.1402.

62 Ibid.

63 Herut, 19 August 1955.

64 Israel president Chaim Weizmann’s letter to speaker of the Knesset, 5 March 1951, ISA, file n-193/3.

65 KP, 26 March 1951, p.1434.

66 The petition to the High Court was made after the Knesset members’ attempts to obtain an answer from the President were answered in vain: Eri Jabotinsky's letter to the President of the State, 21 March 1951; Yigal Kimhi's letter to Eri Jabotinsky, 25 March 1951; Hillel Kook’s letter to President Chaim Weizmann, 13 April 1951; Yigal Kimhi's letter to Hillel Kook, 17 April 1951. ISA, File n-193/3.

67 KP, 19 November 1951, pp.407–08.

68 KP, 11 December 1951, p.595.

69 Herut, 10 November 1952.

70 Herut, 10 November 1952.

71 Herut, 13 November 1952.

72 KP, 26 March 1951, p.1434.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Sulam, Vol. 44, December 1952.

76 Maariv, 12 December 1975.

77 A. Naor and A. Lammfromm (eds), Menachem Begin: The Sixth Prime Minister; Selected Documents from His Life (1913–1992) (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2014), p.463; compare with Ben-Amos, pp.596–97.