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Abstract
The military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021 unleashed massive popular uprising against military rule, which was met with heavy handed military violence. Less than a month after the coup the first soldiers joined the civil disobedience movement (CDM) along with many civil servants who refused to work under the military. The resistance to the military was soon named the Spring Revolution, with calls for pervasive transformation of Myanmar’s political structures and security forces. Military defections gradually developed into a “revolutionary strategy.” This article explores how this development evolved and how defectors were transformed into “revolutionary actors” during the ongoing revolutionary situation. The analysis is based on the personal narratives and collective activities of those soldiers who became active in the CDM. Applying a conversion narrative approach, the article traces the processes of defection from individual disaffection with military violence to the formation of CDM soldier groups and the personal transformation of soldiers. Adding to existing literature on military defections during popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes, the article demonstrates that defection holds significance not only for the outcomes of revolutions, but also for the shaping of revolutionary ideas and practices during revolutionary situations.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Watermelon Buffet debate for CDM soldiers, September 12, 2021, attended by the second author. The debate was not posted online.
2 The figures provided for defectors are based on estimates and numbers shared by the oppositional government, the National Unity Government (NUG), which since late 2021 has registered CDM soldiers and police. In addition to soldiers, the NUG had registered around 9,000 police officers as defectors by February 2023. Other soldiers and police have deserted without registering with the NUG, but this figure is unknown. Between October 2023 and January 2024 around 5,000 soldiers, including higher ranking officers, surrendered in battles with the resistance forces, but it is unclear to what extent some of these have registered as defectors.
3 Defection implies that soldiers and other military personnel change sides and join the “enemy” or the other side of a war or conflict, which can be distinguished from desertions, implying that soldiers simply leave the army – that is, they “go home” or go into hiding.
4 The actual size of the military across its various sectors is unknown and has always been secret. Estimates at the time of the 2021 coup by various analysts ranged from 300,000 to 400,000 members, but according to Ye Myo Hein (Citation2023) these were likely exaggerated and not based on reliable evidence. Drawing on internal military documents and interviews with ex-soldiers, he estimates that the size was by 2023 closer to 150,000.
5 Communication in Burmese was translated into English by the second author to be able to use quotations in English. Language nuances are lost in these translations, since for instance there is no commonly used word for defections in Burmese (see note 8) but efforts have been made to represent the Burmese language as accurately as possible. The names of defectors are those that the defectors chose to use in public online fora and may or may not be their real names. Names like Master Black for instance, are considered by defectors as their revolutionary names.
6 Watermelon Buffet debate for CDM soldiers (see note 1).
7 For a detailed account of how these obstacles need to be understood against the background of the military’s strong internal system of hierarchical control and insular culture, which over the course of the long history of military rule has been sustained by a mixture of fear mongering, patron–client relations, and pervasive ideological indoctrination, see Kyed and Ah Lynn (Citation2021). For studies on the Myanmar military, see, for example, Callahan (Citation2003); Nakanishi (Citation2013); and Selth (Citation2021).
8 The historical narrative around soldiers leaving the military is also reflected in the Burmese language. There is no commonly used word equivalent to the English term “defection,” and only after the coup has it been translated to pat pyang lar thu. More common is the word tat pyay which is equivalent to the English word “deserter.”
9 These different quotations are sourced from Nyi Thuta’s Facebook page by the authors during April and early May 2021: https://www.facebook.com/nyithuta07.
10 See www.peoplesoldier.org (now changed to People’s Goal). The text was accessed from the old website on May 28, 2021.
11 It is possible to be a CDM soldier while still inside the military. These insiders are commonly called watermelons – green on the outside, in soldier uniform, but red on the inside, signalling the colour of the revolution (see Kyed and Ah Lynn Citation2021, 32).
12 These comments are drawn from a version of “A Glimpse of a Revolution” (Part 6), a video interview with defectors, made in August 2021. Since it was first posted, the video has been shortened, so the details of Tun Myat Aung’s statement are missing. From the current Facebook post (https://fb.watch/7E4vTcb4WR/), accessed October 21, 2021.
13 The State Administrative Council (SAC) is the official name that the military junta adopted after the coup.