Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?

Abstract

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they ‘work’ by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure.

Key Words:

• Preventive war
• Counterproliferation
• Nuclear proliferation
• Iran

Acknowledgments

We thank Avner Cohen, Alexander Downes, Bryan Early, Michael Horowitz, Matthew Kroenig, Austin Long, Sean Lynn-Jones, Martin Malin, Alexander Montgomery-Amo, Thomas Nichols, Bennett Ramberg, Etel Solingen, Leonard Spector, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and criticisms. Participants at the Center for Security Studies' workshop ‘Uncovering the Sources of Nuclear Proliferation,’ in Zurich, Switzerland and a research seminar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC also provided valuable feedback. Any remaining errors are our own.

Notes

¹Ian Black and Simon Tisdall, ‘Saudi Arabia Urges US Attack on Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme,’ The Guardian, 28 Nov. 2010.

²See, for example, Dan Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the “Success” at Osiraq,’ Nonproliferation Review, 12 (July 2005), 355–371; Dan Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs: The Track Record,’ in William Walton Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell (eds), Hitting First, Preventive Force in US Security Strategy (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh UP 2006); Richard K. Betts, ‘The Osirak Fallacy,’ The National Interest 83 (2006), 22–5; Bennett Ramberg, ‘Preemption Paradox,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jul./Aug. 2006, 48–56.

³We define attacks against nuclear programs as the state-sanctioned use of force against facilities related to a nuclear weapons program that has the intention of delaying a country's acquisition of nuclear bombs. For further details, see Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, ‘Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941–2000,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 54/6 (2010), 831–59.

⁴As Reiter notes, ‘intrawar cases are important, both because they offer lessons … and because intrawar preventive strikes against [nuclear, biological, or chemical] programs are possible in the future’. See Reiter ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs,’ 29.

⁵Dan Reiter, Preventive War and its Alternatives: The Lessons of History (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2006), 2.

⁶Scott Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb,’ International Security 21/3 (1996/97), 85.

⁷See, for example, Sagan ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’; Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, ‘The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/6 (2004), 859–95; Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, ‘The Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007), 167–94; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2007).

⁸See especially Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,’ International Security 34/1 (2009), 7–41; Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (2009), 181–208; Matthew Kroenig, ‘Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (2009), 161–180.

⁹Jo and Gartzke, ‘The Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation’.

¹⁰See Gary Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer (London: Lynne Rienner 1994), 16–17.

¹¹Some scholars do not classify reactors as sensitive nuclear technology. We include it on our list since reactors produce plutonium in spent nuclear fuel that could be reprocessed into bomb grade material. See M.D. Zentner et al., Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis, 2005 (Richland, WA: United States Department of Energy, Pacific Northwest National Lab 2005).

¹²For a similar discussion, see Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs.’

¹³See M.D. Zentner et al., Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Programs.’

¹⁶Jeremy Tamsett, ‘The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered: Successful Counterproliferation?’ The Nonproliferation Review, 11/3 (2004), 70–85.

¹⁷Zentner et al., Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹See, for example, Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: U of Toronto P 2006).

²⁰See, for example, Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton 2002); Fuhrmann and Kreps, ‘Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace.’

²¹Fuhrmann, ‘Spreading Temptation.’

²²David Albright and Kevin O'Neill (eds), Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington DC: Inst for Science and International Security 2000).

²³Amos Perlmutter et al., Two Minutes over Baghdad (London: Routledge 2003).

²⁴Schlomo Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb (New York: Summit Books 1987); Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb (New York: Broadway 2004).

²⁵Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs,’ 358.

²⁶Reiter, Preventive War.

²⁷Tamsett, ‘The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered’, 71–72.

²⁸Shai Feldman, ‘The Bombing of Osiraq – Revisited,’ International Security 7/2 (Autumn 1982), 126; Whitney Raas and Austin Long, ‘Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,’ International Security, 31/4 (2007), 10–11; Tim Keeley, ‘Angry French Contend Osirak Couldn't Have Served Weapons Purposes,’ Nucleonics Week, 18 June 1981, 3.

²⁹‘Warn Mitterrand about Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,’ United Press International, 18 Mar. 1982.

³⁰Tamsett, ‘The Israeli Bombing of Osiraq Reconsidered’.

³¹Keeley, ‘Angry French.’

³²David Kay, ‘Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond,’ Washington Quarterly, 18/1 (Jan. 1995), 85.

³³David Albright and Robert Kelley, ‘Massive Programs, Meager Results,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov./Dec. 1995), 56–64.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind (New York: Wiley 2004), 103.

³⁶Reiter, ‘Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs,’ 362.

³⁷Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden, 104.

³⁸Iraq Survey Group, ‘Final Report' 2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report>.

³⁹Edward Cody, ‘France Plans to Bar Weapons-Grade Fuel for Iraq's Reactor,’ Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1982.

⁴⁰Tim Keeley, ‘France Has Told Iraq it is Fully Willing to Rebuild,’ Nucleonics Week, 27 Aug. 1981, 2; Ann MacLachlan, ‘French-Iraqi Accord Makes No Provision for Rebuilding Reactor,’ Nucleonics Week, 24/35 (1983), 1.’

⁴¹Ann MacLachlan, ‘French-Iraqi Accord’.

⁴²Obeidi and Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden, 52.

⁴³Fuhrmann, ‘Taking a Walk.’

⁴⁴See, for example, IAEA Director General Sigvard Edlund's statement in ‘Peaceful Nuclear Development Must Continue,’ IAEA Bulletin 23/3 (Dec. 1981), 4–5.

⁴⁵Bill Gertz and Sara Carter, ‘US: Syria Hid N. Korea–Aided Nukes Plant,’ Washington Times, 24 Apr. 2008.

⁴⁶Leonard Spector and Avner Cohen, ‘Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime,’ Arms Control Today, 38/6 (2008), 15–21.

⁴⁷United States Director of National Intelligence, ‘Background Briefing with Senior US Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement,’ 24 Apr. 2008, <www.dni.gov/interviews/20080424_interview.pdf> .

⁴⁸David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘The Al Kibar Reactor: Extraordinary Camouflage, Troubling Implications,’ Inst. for Science and International Security, 2008.

⁴⁹Peter Crail, ‘US Shares Information on NK-Syrian Nuclear Ties,’ Arms Control Today (May 2008).

⁵⁰Zentner et al., Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis.

⁵¹Greg Miller and Paul Richter, ‘US Offers Evidence of North Korea–Syria Nuclear Plant,’ New York Times, 25 Apr. 2008; Yossi Melman, ‘IAEA Asks for Information on any Syrian Plans,’ Haaretz, 15 Oct. 2007.

⁵²Borzou Daragahi, ‘IAEA to Send Inspectors to Syria's Alleged Nuclear Site,’ Los Angeles Times, 3 June 2008.

⁵³International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (Vienna, Austria: IAEA Board of Governors 2008).

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Peter Crail, ‘IAEA Finds Uranium at Second Syrian Site,’ Arms Control Today, Jul./Aug. 2009.

⁵⁶Damien McElroy, ‘Uranium Found in Syria by UN Nuclear Inspectors,’ Telegraph, 10 Nov. 2008.

⁵⁷Joby Warrick, ‘Syrian Facility Looked like Reactor, UN Says,’ Washington Post, 20 Nov. 2008; Reuters, ‘Report: IAEA Finds Traces of Uranium at Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site,’ 10 Nov. 2008.

⁵⁸John S. Craig, Peculiar Liaisons in War, Espionage, and Terrorism in the 20th Century (New York: Algora Pub 2005); Thomas Powers, Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Penguin Books 1993).

⁵⁹Powers, Heisenberg's War; Knut Haukelid, Skis against the Atom (London: W. Kimber 1954); Jeremy Bernstein, Hitler's Uranium Club (Woodbury, NY: American Inst. of Physics 1996).

⁶⁰Powers, Heisenberg's War.

⁶¹Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (London: Taylor and Francis 1999).

⁶²Lesley Groves, Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, New Ed. (Da Capo P 1983), 188.

⁶³Samuel Goudsmit, Alsos (American Inst of Physics 2006); Powers, Heisenberg's War.

⁶⁴Groves, Now it Can be Told; Bernstein, Hitler's Uranium Club.

⁶⁵The problem is that Germany had chosen heavy water as a moderator for its reactors in 1939, but the Norsk-Hydro plant, in occupied Norway, was the only source of heavy water for the German program. Dahl, Heavy Water.

⁶⁶‘The Ghosts that Hit Osirak,’ The Economist, 18 Oct. 1980, p.54.

⁶⁷Mark Hibbs, ‘Bushehr Construction Now Remote after Three Iraqi Air Strikes,’ Nucleonics Week, 28/48 (1987); Mark Hibbs, ‘Iraqi Attack on Bushehr Kills West German Nuclear Official,’ Nucleonics Week, 28/47 (1987); Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, ‘Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile,’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/iranrpt.pdf> .

⁶⁸Padraic Sweeney, ‘Iran Asks IAEA to Inspect Damage from Alleged Iraqi Attack on Bushehr,’ Nucleonics Week, 26/8 (1985); Associated Press, ‘Agency Iranian Complaint of Iraqi Attack on Nuclear Site,’ 30 May 1984.

⁶⁹Hibbs, ‘Bushehr Construction.’

⁷⁰Tony Walker, ‘Tehran Says 10 Die as Iraq Hits Nuclear Site,’ Financial Times, 18 Nov. 1987, 3.

⁷¹Mark Hibbs, ‘Bonn will Decline Teheran Bid to Resuscitate Bushehr Project,’ Nucleonics Week, 32/18 (1987); Nuclear News, ‘German Reactor Expert Killed in Bushehr Attack,’ Jan. 1998, 61.

⁷²Koch and Wolf, ‘Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile’.

⁷³Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen (eds), Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: USGPO 1993), 80.

⁷⁴Iraq Survey Group, ‘Final Report’, 2004.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Keaney and Cohen (eds), Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, 82.

⁷⁷Ibid., 431.

⁷⁸Ibid., 431, 434.

⁷⁹Federation of American Scientists, ‘Zaafaraniyah,’ 2000, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/zaafaraniyah.htm> .

⁸⁰Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books 2000).

⁸¹Michael S. Goodman and Wyn Q. Bowen, ‘Behind Iran's Nuclear Weapons “Halt,”’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 19 Feb. 2008.

⁸²For more on when and why states target suspected proliferators' nuclear facilities, see Fuhrmann and Kreps, ‘Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace.'

⁸³Zentner et al., Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis.

⁸⁴See, for example, Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,’ International Security, 33/1 (Summer 2008), 82–117.

⁸⁵International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/8 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA Board of Governors 27 Feb. 2006). See also Michael Eisenstadt, ‘Iran: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Military Action,’ Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1152, 25 Sept. 2006.

⁸⁶International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 16 Nov. 2009. See also, Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Iran: Nuclear Overview,’ March 2010, <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iran/Nuclear/index.html> .

⁸⁷Raas and Long, ‘Osirak Redux?’.

⁸⁸See John E. Peters et al., ‘Allied Power Projection Capabilities,’ in Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions (Arlington, VA: Rand Corp 2001), 75; Ryan Hansen, ‘JDAM Continues to be Warfighter's Weapon of Choice,’ Air Force Link, 17 Mar. 2006, <www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID = 123017613> .

⁸⁹William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson, ‘Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’ International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000/1), 54–99; Joel Wit et al., Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2005).