Evidential Collaborations: Epistemic and Pragmatic Considerations in “Group Belief”

Abstract

This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, contrary to the implications of much of the existing discussion of group belief. I conclude by suggesting that applying social epistemological considerations to scientific collaborations could be practically beneficial, but only if an appropriately broad range of epistemic values is considered.

Keywords:

• Scientific Collaboration
• Group Belief
• Evidence
• Heterogeneous Consensus
• Particle Physics
• Experiment

Notes

[1] I will use the expression “collective belief” to refer to whatever it is that is expressed by collective belief statements (“we believe that …”, “we hold that …”, “the committee has concluded that…”, etc.), without committing to the view that these are in fact beliefs properly understood.

[2] For a defense of a strong version of this anti‐individualistic stance see Tollefsen (2002).

[3] Gilbert coined the term “rejectionist” to describe her critics. Tollefsen has introduced the correlative term “believer”.

[4] A similar shift away from the debate over the ontological status of group beliefs and toward epistemic considerations is proposed by Mathieson (2006); a further point of significant agreement between Mathieson’s argument and mine will be noted in section 3.

[5] So as not to beg the question with regard to scientific realism, all attributions of an aim of “truth” in this paper should be read weakly; that is, as expressing a disjunction such as “truth, approximate truth, or empirical adequacy”.

[6] David Hull (1988) offers an account of scientific development in which such self‐regarding and non‐truth‐related aims as self‐promotion play a significant role. My aim here is not to dispute such an approach. In so far as Hull’s account implies that truth‐seeking is not the whole story behind the epistemic success of scientific inquiry, his account is compatible with the present discussion.

[7] Bars over particle symbols indicate anti‐particles. Translation: CDF is discussing the possible production of top quark–anti‐top quark pairs resulting from the collisions of protons and anti‐protons at very high energies.

[8] CDF member Henry Frisch has argued that this policy has negative methodological consequences that outweigh its advantages. He has argued for replacing the existing rules with an “opt‐in” policy (Frisch 2004).

[9] I am assuming here for the sake of argument that there is nothing inherently problematic in the notion of two individuals sharing a belief. This is not to say that such an assumption cannot be called into question. The historian of science Mara Beller problematizes the notion of consensus, particularly in science, in her study of the Copenhagen school in the history of quantum theory (Beller 1999). Beller’s account, in which even a publication by a single author is regarded as exhibiting a polyphony of views, should give us pause before accepting uncritically that scientific consensus in the sense of shared belief is a straightforward notion. Alban Bouvier has related Beller’s work to Gilbert’s account of collective belief (Bouvier 2004).

[10] This claim requires substantiation: none of the claim statements III–V was subject to a complete consensus even among the two dozen or so CDF members I interviewed, all of whom appeared as authors on the Evidence paper (and can be regarded as participating in at least that sense), and nearly all of whom made substantive contributions to the analysis presented in that paper (and thus participated in a stronger sense as well).

[11] Mathieson (2006, 166–8) presents further reasons why a group may, while still “aiming at the truth”, adopt a view that is not shared by all of its members.

[12] Power in this sense is thus suggestive of, but clearly distinct from, power in the statistical sense. Goldman has subsequently abandoned the terms “reliability” and “power” in favor of a unified measure of veritistic value (Goldman 1999, esp. 90). However, the epistemic phenomena relevant to reliability and power continue to be reflected in veritistic value. Goldman thus continues to attribute epistemic value to the ability to answer questions of interest, and not just to the avoidance of error.

[13] Rehg and I have dubbed such assessment probation by process (Rehg and Staley 2008).

[14] The growing literature on problems of judgment aggregation and the “discursive dilemma” indicates that groups seeking to aggregate individual judgments on a set of logically related propositions must, to put it roughly, choose between (a) using a uniform method to aggregate individual judgments on each proposition, and (b) ensuring that the judgments reached in the aggregate meet the minimal rationality standard of logical consistency (see, for example, List 2006; List and Pettit 2002; Pauly and van Hees 2006; Pettit 2001). This problem alone suggests that the problem of group commitment to a proposition is one in which evidential and pragmatic problems are not so easily separated.