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Abstract
I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of the individual members of the group.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Lori Nash for constructive feedback on earlier drafts. The author also thanks the referee for Social Epistemology for pushing him to clarify his view at a few key points.
Notes
[1] Like Knorr Cetina, Lynn Hankinson Nelson (Citation1990) seems to assume that communities have knowledge in virtue of the fact that they provide individuals with the infrastructure that makes individuals’ knowing possible. Nelson claims that “what I know depends inextricably on what we know, for some we. My claims to know are subject to community criteria, public notions of what constitutes evidence, so that, in an important sense, I can know only what we know, for some we” (Citation1990, 255). But, as Giere and Moffatt (Citation2003) note, this is a non sequitur.
[2] Giere believes that “the reason for calling these systems cognitive systems … is that they produce a distinctly cognitive product, knowledge” (Citation2002a, 642).
[3] As Kuhn (Citation1996) notes, all scientific theories encounter anomalies. Hence, contrary to what Popper suggests, the existence of an anomaly, an observation that is contrary to what a theory predicts, does not warrant discarding the theory. As Kuhn note, to a large degree, the typical scientist’s job is to eliminate anomalies. That is, they aim to make the theory fit the data.
[4] Peter Barker (Citation2000) suggests that the Wittenberg Circle of astronomers were initially attracted to Copernicus’ theory because of its computational simplicity (Barker Citation2000, 67).
[5] Van Fraassen (Citation1980) also suggests that acceptance is the appropriate attitude to have toward our best theories. Laudan (Citation1977), too, suggests that belief is not always the appropriate attitude to have toward our preferred theories. He suggests that scientists sometime pursue a theory, work with it, without presuming it is true (Laudan Citation1977, 5).
[6] Margaret Gilbert is quite liberal in attributing beliefs to groups, including formally structured committees, as well as groups consisting of two people walking together. Hence, she is apt to be quite liberal in attributing the capacity for knowledge to a great range of groups. I think she is too liberal in this regard.
[7] Durkheim notes that a society can have both mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. That is, a group that is organized functionally, with different individuals fulfilling different roles, can also share the same beliefs and values. The point is that a society can have solidarity without sharing beliefs. In fact, Durkheim wants us to see that organic solidarity is a deeper form of solidarity than mere like‐mindedness.
[8] I thank the referee for Social Epistemology for urging me to discuss this point.
[9] Even as redefined above, knowledge requires justification. Consequently, no group can have knowledge unless the view they accept is justified. But, given that there is no reason to think that justification is different for groups than for individuals, I will not delve into the topic of justification.
[10] It is worth noting that journal editors do not regard co‐authorship as corporate authorship. Rather, they persist in holding the individual authors of multi‐authored papers individually responsible (see Wray Citation2006).
[11] When we do say something like “pathologists now believe that most ulcers are caused by bacteria”, we do not necessarily commit ourselves to the view that every individual pathologist believes this. Although such expressions are to be accounted for summatively, such expressions do not have precise truth conditions. Still, it would be a mistake to attribute any views to the community of pathologists that are irreducibly the views of the community. I thank the referee for Social Epistemology for urging me to clarify this point.