To What Extent Could Social Epistemology Accept the Naturalistic Motto?

Abstract

Social epistemology balances neoclassic and nonclassic, normative and descriptive, and veritistic and constructionist approaches. Among these approaches exist two terminologically different though (in fact) similar proposals: naturalization and socialization. Both proposals lead to a kind of interdisciplinary imperialism reducing epistemology to a “positive science” like sociology of knowledge, social history of science, and science and technology studies. I call this attitude the “strong version” of naturalism. How, then, can we save epistemology without indulging in purely transcendental contemplations while simultaneously securing its connections to the empirical sciences that analyze knowledge in a social context? Can social epistemology be reduced to any one or to a set of special approaches to knowledge as a completely naturalizing program? If not, is social epistemology a kind of philosophical epistemology and what is its differencia specifica? And how is the social epistemology related to special approaches to knowledge? In proposing a “weak version” of naturalism—an idea of the social epistemology based on interdisciplinary interaction—a reimagining of the concepts of “interdisciplinarity” and “context” is required.

Keywords:

• Social Epistemology
• Naturalism
• Interdisciplinarity
• Context

Notes

[1] Contextualism is broadly discussed also beyond the social epistemology in a narrow sense. Three conferences among all are worth mentioning: “Epistemological Contextualism” (2004, University of Stirling in Scotland), “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond” (2002, UMass, Amherst, published in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 119 “Issue 1–2, May 2004”), and “Contextualism” (2004, Bled, Slovenia).

[2] The definition of what the classical epistemology is represents a separate and rather complex problem, so I will simply take Kant, Engels, and Carnap as representatives of its different historical versions.