Re-politicising Philosophy of Science: A Continuing Challenge for Social Epistemology

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate how we can reunite social philosophy and philosophy of science to address problems in science and technology. First, referring to Don Howard’s, George Reisch’s, and Philip Mirowski’s works, I shall briefly explain how philosophy of science was depoliticised during the cold war. Second, I shall examine Steve Fuller’s criticism of Thomas Kuhn. Third, I shall scrutinise Philip Kitcher’s view of well-ordered science. Fourth, I shall emphasise the importance of autonomy and argue that philosophy of science needs to cultivate a critical attitude towards authority. Fifth, drawing upon Ian Jarvie’s social reading of Karl Popper, I shall argue that Popper’s philosophy can be a model for reuniting social philosophy and philosophy of science.

Keywords:

• Cold War
• Depoliticisation
• Philosophy of Science
• Social Philosophy
• Specialisation

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at “The Republic of Science: A Conference in Honour of Ian Jarvie” (York University, Toronto, December 2003) and the 39th annual meeting of Philosophy of Science Society, Japan (Hokkaido University, Sapporo, October 2006). I would like to thank their participants.

[1] In this article, I shall use logical empiricism as a broad term including logical positivism.

[2] The list continues as follows: “Olaf Helmer, Carl Hempel, Paul Oppenheim, Alfred Tarski, Willard Quine, John Kemeny, J. C. C. McKinsey, Patrick Suppes, Donald Davidson, Nicholas Rescher, Leonard Savage, and Rudolf Carnap” (Mirowski 2004, 310).