Smart Environments

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes epistemic environmentalism as a novel framework for accounting for the contribution of the environment – broadly construed – to epistemic standings and which can be used to improve or protect epistemic environments. The contribution of the environment to epistemic standings is explained through recent developments in epistemology and cognitive science, including embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition and distributed cognition. The paper examines how these developments support epistemic environmentalism, as well as contributes theoretical resources to make epistemic assessments of dynamic environments. The epistemic environmentalist procedure from the assessment of an individual environment to changes made to that environment based on promoting the attainment of epistemic goods is also discussed.

KEYWORDS:

• Social epistemology
• applied epistemology
• extended and distributed cognition

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. There can be various ways (with varying strengths) in which this epistemically anti-individualist thesis can be true. For some examples and/or relevant discussions, see (Carter et al. 2018a, 2018b; Kallestrup and Pritchard 2012, 2017; Palermos 2016b; Palermos 2022; Palermos and Pritchard 2016).

2. John Greco (2021) provides his own account of social epistemic dependence and of correctly sorting individualist and anti-individualist epistemologies, while offering criticism of Goldberg’s work.

3. In reaction to such thought experiments, the epistemological approach of virtue reliabilism (e.g. Greco 2010, 77) points out that the possession of epistemic abilities depends on the agent’s environment as well as the specific conditions in which these are situated.

4. We take physical and social to cover the virtual.

5. See Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) and Auvray and Farina (2017) for recent reviews on sensory substitution devices.

6. Clark and Chalmers (1998) further introduce the Extended Mind Thesis, according to which, in addition to cognitive processes, mental states, such as beliefs and desires, can be extended too. We will not here discuss this additional hypothesis, which has been traditionally assumed to be more provocative and controversial than HEC.

7. Thaler (2008, 37–39) provide the example as one that supports libertarian paternalism (or ‘nudge theory’), rather than one that promotes an epistemic good.

8. It should be here also noted that, given how embedded cognition functions, there is also reason to worry that such alterations of agents’ environments may ultimately lead to bad epistemic results. Indeed, similar illusions are being introduced elsewhere, though their outcome may be questionable. One relevant popular design is the 3-D pedestrian crossing, which is designed to slow motorists down by producing the illusion of objects on the road as they approach the crossing (B.B.C. 2017). The worry is that knowledge of various manipulations in traffic environments may lead drivers to mistrusting their sense perception in those environments. Similarly, drivers may mistakenly believe there are illusions where there are none. Designs which cause drivers to second guess their responses to what they see could have disastrous consequences for road safety. Thus, the discovery of the manipulation may ultimately lead to increased accidents overall. At the very least, the effects of such epistemic manipulations on overall road safety (and on safety in general) requires thorough study, and each case should be separately analysed, taking into careful consideration the various risks involved.

9. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (2006) offered a rebuttal (available here: https://corporate.britannica.com/britannica_nature_response.pdf), to which Nature (2006) provided a counter response (https://www.nature.com/articles/440582b).

10. See (Levy et al. 2023) at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Encyclopaedia-Britannica-English-language-reference-work. (Accessed 18/10/23)

11. Although we focus on cognitive environmentalism in this paper, there are other features that are relevant for the design of environments, such as weaknesses of mind and will. Of course, Sunstein and Thaler (2003) use research on those weaknesses to motivate their own (nudge) applications.

12. Some of the concerns and sensitivities epistemic environmentalism encourages are in line with some localised engineering concerns. The design of safety-critical systems, such as nuclear reactor control systems and human spaceflight vehicles, is an example in which considerable attention is given to physical, technological and social factors that bear on information presentation and flow. Of course, work on safety-critical systems continues to develop as environments change. In Nancy Leveson’s (2016) influential work she argues that increased complexity in human-automation relationships leads to new types of human errors and is one reason for an updated approach to safety-critical systems. She writes that ‘ … operators in high-tech systems are often at the mercy of the design of the automation they use or the social and organizational environment in which they work. Many recent accidents that have been blamed on operator error could more accurately be labeled as resulting from flaws in the environment in which they operate’ (Leveson 2016, 5). While safety-critical systems offer interesting areas of examination for the epistemic environmentalist, the latter’s concern for epistemic environments is broader than those particular high-stakes environments, and the normative dimension of epistemic environmentalism – that epistemic environments should be protected or improved – may be less familiar to those working in engineering (outside the design of safety-critical systems).

13. We thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shane Ryan

Shane Ryan received his PhD from the University of Edinburgh and is currently Assistant Professor at City University of Hong Kong. His research engages with a variety of topics in epistemology, ethics and social philosophy, including epistemic environmentalism, wisdom and paternalism.

S. Orestis Palermos

Orestis Palermos is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ioannina, Greece. His research, which is at the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, epistemology, philosophy of technology and philosophy of science, focuses on the epistemological and (lately also) ethical ramifications of emerging technologies.

Mirko Farina

Mirko Farina is a Professor (Senior Researcher) and Head of the Human-Machine Interaction Lab at the Institute for Digital Economy and Artificial Systems [IDEAS] established in Xiamen (People's Republic of China), by Xiamen University [XMU], Lomonosov Moscow State University [MSU] and Xiamen Municipal People's Government.