How Can Constitutivism Account for the Persistence of Deep Disagreements?

ABSTRACT

Exploring the metaphysics of deep disagreements, Ranalli identifies several essential features shared by all such disputes. These very features constitute a set of adequacy conditions that any satisfactory theory of deep disagreements must meet. The paper explains how Coliva’s Wittgensteinian hinge theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum. According to this condition, any appropriate theory must explain why deep disagreements tend to be persistent and thus unresolved without presupposing that they are rationally irresolvable. First, the work critically discusses how Coliva utilizes her proposed view to account for this desideratum. Second, the paper points out that Coliva’s response is partly problematic because of Ranalli’s definition of deep disagreements for Wittgensteinian hinge theories, which over-generates instances of genuine deep disagreements. Third, the work argues that Coliva’s theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum by resolving a deep disagreement between an anti-vaccination advocate and a proponent of vaccination using an expanded version of Pritchard’s side-on approach. Finally, the paper critically engages with Coliva on the solvability of deep disagreements.

KEYWORDS:

• Hinge epistemology
• deep disagreements
• persistence
• epistemic friction

Acknowledgments

I thank Jordi Fairhurst for his assistance throughout the various phases of composing this work. Additionally, I thank Stefan Rummens, Benjamin De Mesel, Bart Pattyn and the participants of the research seminar: Ethics at KU Leuven for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of my paper. Furthermore, I sincerely thank two referees for their comments. Finally, a previous version of this work was presented at the 15th Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy. I extend my gratitude to all the participants.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Those who have embraced hinge epistemology, either explicitly or under a slightly different title are, for instance: Wright (2004), Moyal-Sharrock (2005, 2016), Kusch (2016), Schönbaumsfeld (2016), Greco (2021), Pritchard (2015, 2018) and Coliva (2015).

2. On this point, see, for instance, Greco (2016, 2020), Ashton (2019), O’Hara (2018), Coliva (2019).

3. See, for example, Turner and Wright (2005), Piedrahita (2021), Pritchard (2018), Ranalli’s (2018a, 2018b).

4. See, for example, Coliva and Doulas (2022).

5. Note that, at least in the debate between the constitutivist and the Humean skeptic dating back to Coliva (2015, 128), ‘hinges’ specifically refer to those assumptions that are ‘very general and fundamental’. The matter of warranting hinges becomes more complex with the introduction of de facto empirical hinges, as we will explore in §6.

6. As one referee rightly points out, Coliva (2023) does not consider this last example as a deep disagreement. I will defer the discussion to §6, as my arguments are built upon the observations developed in this section.

7. On the resolution of deep disagreements, see also Johnson (2022) and Fairhurst (2022). I leave the possibility of applying these approaches to constitutivism open as research avenues.

8. ‘Epistemic friction’ originally refers to the idea that one way to combat the risk of epistemic subordination and the exclusion of some individuals in society is to ensure they can express their voices and perspectives. Allowing minorities to engage in mainstream discourses enables the generation of epistemic counterpoints that create dissonance with dominant and oppressive narratives (Medina 2013, 176).

9. See Kattumana (2022) for a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between trust and vaccine hesitancy during the COVID-19 Pandemic.

10. Pritchard (2018) has already advanced considerations on resolving religious disagreements, albeit, I believe, not within the context of a disagreement as a state with oneself. Also, for an overview of issues concerning religious disputes, see, for instance, Greco (2009). Finally, analogous processes seem to occur for other de facto non-empirical hinges, such as those related to the morality of abortion. Although mainly as an anecdote, given the source from which I take this testimony, consider what Sarah, a university student, says: ‘when I was in high school, I was a big believer in being pro-life. When I came to college, though, I came to see how unplanned pregnancy in and out of marriage could really throw someone’s entire life off the rails if they are not yet ready to have a child. We only have one life; we shouldn’t have to spend it always wishing we could go back in time and change things’. Epistemic friction has allowed the person to resolve a disagreement with their (former) self, having as its object conflicting de facto non-empirical hinges concerning the morality of abortion. Source: https://ourbodies.hercampus.com/16-college-women-on-why-they-changed-their-minds-about-abortion

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Enrico Galli

Enrico Galli is a graduate student at the KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy.