Better Not to Know: On the Possibility of Culpable Knowledge

ABSTRACT

Many philosophers hold there are genuine cases of culpable ignorance. This paper argues that there are conditions that can render knowledge epistemically culpable too. First, we contrast culpable ignorance with morally culpable knowledge. Second, we examine the nature of epistemically culpable knowledge using a key example. We then highlight empirical support for the claim that there are real-world conditions that make epistemically culpable knowledge possible. Next, we survey three kinds of epistemic culpability fostered by culpable knowledge. Finally, we address the benefits objection and argue that it fails.

KEYWORDS:

• Epistemic culpability
• ignorance
• epistemic injustice
• signaling

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Thanks to an anonymous referee who pressed this point.

2. The Halo Effect need not involve an epistemic agent having beliefs about the qualities of people to take effect. The effect doesn’t require that one have explicit or conscious beliefs about the qualities of the people at issue and can arise as the result of unconscious beliefs that the agent wouldn’t state explicitly when they sincerely reported their beliefs on the matter.

3. Many practices are, at least partially, explained by signaling theory, e.g. religious practices, art appreciation and even (some) moral actions (Licon 2023; Simler and Hanson 2018).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jimmy Alfonso Licon

Jimmy Alfonso Licon Assistant Teaching Professor in the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Arizona State University. He works on ethical and epistemological issues involving reputations, ignorance and signaling. He teaches classes like bioethics, theory of knowledge and philosophy of law.