Epistemic Smothering is Not a Form of Epistemic Paternalism

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that epistemic smothering is not a form of epistemic paternalism. In this sense, it refutes the claim recently made by Valerie Chock and Jonathan Matheson, who defend epistemic smothering as epistemically permissible form of epistemic paternalism. After an outline of what is meant by epistemic paternalism and epistemic smothering, based on the work by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Kristie Dotson on these topics, the paper argues against the identification of epistemic smothering as a form of epistemic paternalism. In the conclusion, it also calls for a reconsideration of how exactly to conceive of epistemic paternalism.

KEYWORDS:

• Epistemic paternalism
• epistemic smothering
• epistemic violence
• epistemic improvement

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Louis Caruana, SJ, Christopher Staab, SJ, Kevin Flannery, SJ and an anonymous referee of Social Epistemology for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. The list corresponds to the summary given by Ahlstrom-Vij (2013, 61) at the conclusion of his second chapter.

2. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013, 43, note 12) seems to attribute this claim to Arneson (1980).

3. Here, and in what follows, ‘testimony’ is taken in the wide, natural sense, not necessarily limited to formal contexts.

4. Dotson refers to Crenshaw (1991) and White (2001).

5. Dotson refers to Sue, Capodilupo and Holder (2008). Such racial micro-aggressions are everyday aggressive behaviours against members of a social group based on widespread stereotypes and cultivated through repeated practice.

6. Chock and Matheson (2020, 227) speak about the person’s having both epistemic and moral reasons. Concerning the latter reasons, I agree, but, as I have argued, the former ones are not present in any case of epistemic smothering.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Johannes Stoffers

Johannes Stoffers, SJ, is Professor of Epistemology at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome (Italy). From 2016 to 2019, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Munich School of Philosophy. He specializes in Philosophy of Religion, Natural Theology and Epistemology. He holds a Doctorate in Philosophy (Tübingen 2012) and received the University Habilitation for Philosophy (Augsburg 2021). He is the author of a number of articles and monographs: Die Befreiung vom Bösen und der Aufstieg zum Absoluten: Fichte, Schelling und der Gedanke göttlicher Gnade (LIT, 2011), Eine lebendige Einheit des Vielen: Das Bemühen Fichtes und Schellings um die Lehre vom Absoluten (Frommann-Holzboog, 2013), Gott und Welt ins Verhältnis gesetzt: Prozeßphilosophischer Panentheismus und die Konzeptionen des Thomas von Aquin und des Nikolaus von Kues (Aschendorff, 2022), Istituzioni di Epistemologia Sociale (Edizioni Studium, 2023). Together with Georg Sans, he edited Religionsphilosophie nach Fichte: Das Absolute im Endlichen (Metzler, 2022).