The Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy: Introduction to Special Issue

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on the philosophy of epistemic autonomy. In addition to giving some background on various conceptions of epistemic autonomy it provides brief summaries of the articles in the special issue.

KEYWORDS:

• Epistemic autonomy
• intellectual virtue
• epistemic paternalism

Do your own research. Think for yourself. Don’t be a sheep. These prescriptions have become commonplace in our contemporary discourse. Each of these directives can be seen as expressing the value of epistemic autonomy. Of course, there is nothing new about valuing autonomous thinking. The value of autonomous thinking was centerpiece in the Enlightenment, and it played a significant role in philosophical debates prior to that.¹

But what is epistemic autonomy? A good place to start is by thinking about autonomy more generally. Joseph Raz (1988) has claimed that the autonomous person is someone who determines the course of their life for themselves (407). So understood, being autonomous precludes being coerced, being manipulated and other ways in which your will may be subjected to the will of someone else. Autonomy is thus often associated with freedom, independence and authenticity. Its value has been seen as so significant that it has been viewed as the foundation of morality and as a cornerstone of social and political philosophy.

For instance, in On Liberty Mill stresses the value of autonomy as follows:

a person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam engine has a character. (Mill 1956, 73)

Epistemic autonomy takes this idea of self-governance into the intellectual realm. Broadly speaking, epistemically autonomous people are those who determine the course of their intellectual lives for themselves. Of course, there are several ways in which one might be able to do so. This leaves room for several distinct conceptions of epistemic autonomy. In what follows, I will briefly lay out two distinct conceptions of epistemic autonomy, each of which is properly deserving of the name. But before looking what epistemic autonomy could be, we need to first set aside a common misconception.²

Like with autonomy more generally, many have equated epistemic autonomy with a kind of independence and individualism.³ For instance, Hardwig (1985) has claimed the following:

but if I were to pursue epistemic autonomy across the board, I would succeed only in holding relatively uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore irrational beliefs. If I would be rational, I can never avoid some epistemic dependence on experts, owing to the fact that I believe more than I can become fully informed about. (340)

Here, epistemic autonomy is equated with a kind of intellectual independence where the autonomous thinker does not depend on anyone else in their inquiry.⁴

The supposed connection between autonomy and individualism has not gone unquestioned or uncriticized. Feminist philosophers have critiqued overly individualistic conceptions of autonomy, offering the concept of relational autonomy in its place. As MacKenzie and Stoljar (2000) describe it, relational autonomy is,

premised on a shared conviction that persons are socially embedded, that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity. (4)

On this picture, individualistic conceptions of autonomy as self-reliance simply do not fit the kind of creatures that we are. However, once autonomy is understood as relational autonomy, it conflicts with heteronomy, not with dependence.⁵ The heteronomous individual is subjected to the rule of someone else, they are dominated, not merely dependent.

Why opt for a relational conception of autonomy? When understood as individualistic self-reliance, the hermit is the paradigm of autonomy. The hermit does not rely on anyone else for food, shelter or clothing; they do it all on their own. Few of us see the hermit as an ideal. Our socially embedded, interdependent lives enhance, rather than detract from, our autonomy. We are afforded a greater degree of control over our lives when we are able to also rely on each other.

That’s a good thing since our intellectual lives are inherently dependent on others. Hardwig was right to note that we can accomplish very little on our own. Without the help of others, we would know very little and the support for our beliefs would be quite flimsy. We rely on others to make discoveries, to collect evidence for us, to train us in our abilities to process evidence and think critically and even to see ourselves as answerable to with respect to our beliefs.⁶ We can’t help but intellectually rely on others. King (2021, 88) nicely applies this insight to autonomy in claiming that epistemic autonomy requires thinking for yourself, not thinking by yourself. Intellectual individualism does not lead to intellectual flourishing, and it is something that is simply not in the cards for social creatures like ourselves.

So, we should resist thinking about epistemic autonomy as intellectual individualism. Our intellectual self-direction does not preclude us from taking advantage of the vast intellectual resources afforded to us by others. But if epistemic autonomy is not intellectual individualism, then what is it? Plausibly there is no one thing that is epistemic autonomy. In what follows I will briefly lay out two distinct accounts of epistemic autonomy that each have a plausible claim to the title, both of which involve a kind of self-direction.

The first sense of epistemic autonomy sees it as a kind of intellectual freedom.⁷ In this sense, autonomous thinkers are free from interference, manipulation and coercion in their intellectual projects. Such thinkers are free to pursue the intellectual projects of their choosing, and their inquiry is free from interference. As such, they determine the course of their intellectual lives for themselves. This conception of epistemic autonomy is brought out in the literature in several ways. For instance, this conception of epistemic autonomy can be found in Coady’s (2002) analysis of the concept. Coady sees epistemic autonomy as consisting of three core components: independence, self-creation and integrity. For Coady, independence is a kind of negative freedom. Independent thinkers are free from interference in their inquiry. Independent thinkers, in this sense,⁸ are free to think about what they wish and to think about it in the way that they wish; their intellectual pursuits are not compelled by others. Self-creation adds to this that individuals are free to carve out and shape their own distinctive intellectual life. Whereas independence is a kind of negative freedom from interference, self-creation is a positive freedom to prioritize and pursue one’s intellectual projects as they see fit. Integrity, the third of Coady’s conditions, consists of standing up for the truth, at least as one sees it, even in the face of contrary pressure. This is a kind of intellectual courage that prevents one’s picture of the world from contorting to external pressures. So, autonomous thinkers don’t simply conform in their beliefs.

It is this sense of epistemic autonomy that is at issue in the literature on epistemic paternalism. Epistemic paternalism involves the interference in the inquiry of another, without their consent, for their own intellectual betterment. So, there are three components of an act of epistemic paternalism. First, the inquiry of another is interfered with. This could occur by either giving or withholding information from them. Second, this interference is done without their prior consent. The inquirer was not consulted before their inquiry was interfered with. Third, and finally, the intervention was done for the intellectual betterment of the individual in question. The reason why the intervener acted as they did was to bring about epistemic goods for the inquirer (e.g. true beliefs, knowledge, etc.). For instance, jurors are not given information about the defendant (e.g. withdrawn guilty pleas, prior convictions, hearsay, etc.). The reason this information is withheld is because jurors are likely to mishandle this information. So, in withholding it, we make the jurors more likely to come to a true belief about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Such actions are thus a plausible case of epistemic paternalism.

Such acts of paternalism violate the inquirer’s epistemic autonomy (in the sense under discussion here). This interference in inquiry without consent takes away from the intellectual freedom of the inquirer. They are prevented from thinking about what they want in the way that they want. The central issue in the literature on epistemic paternalism is whether such interference is justified, either morally or epistemically. The tension is between the epistemic advantages of the interference with the infringement on the intellectual freedom of the inquirer. Settling those debates is not the project of this paper.⁹ Rather, our discussion of epistemic paternalism is simply to highlight this sense of epistemic autonomy. Having intellectual freedom is a way of determining one’s own intellectual life, and interference in inquiry affects self-governance of one’s intellectual life.

In addition, whether epistemic paternalism is permissible or not, the kind of epistemic autonomy at issue here is clearly valuable. Those who do not get to shape their intellectual lives are worse off for it. There may be cases where there are competing goods and even cases where these competing goods outweigh the value of this kind of intellectual freedom, but none of this shows that intellectual freedom is still not valuable in and of itself.

The second sense of epistemic autonomy sees it as an intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtues, like moral virtues, are particular kinds of excellences. While moral virtues make their possessor a morally good person, intellectual virtues make their possessor an epistemically good person. Both moral and intellectual virtues can be seen as complex character traits that involve cognitive and conative dispositions. For instance, generous people give to others. But the virtue of generosity also requires that one does so for the right reasons and with the right accompanying emotions. Generous people don’t give begrudgingly, and they don’t give just in order to get a tax break. Often these virtues are seen to be a mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. So, the generous person neither gives too little nor too much.

Regarding intellectual virtues, individuals who are open-minded, intellectually courageous, curious, intellectually humble and so forth conduct their intellectual pursuits in particular ways, for particular reasons and with a particular motivation. These virtues too are often seen as lying as a mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. Epistemic autonomy has been seen to be an intellectual virtue along these same lines.¹⁰ To help hone in on the virtue, let’s first think about the relevant excess and deficiency. The intellectual maverick insists on figuring everything out for himself. He exhibits the kind of rugged intellectual self-reliance described above. As such, he neglects the insights and intellectual resources of others. Such excessive thinking for oneself fails to bring about their intellectual flourishing. On the other end of the spectrum is the intellectual co-dependent. The intellectual co-dependent refuses to think about anything for themselves. Preoccupied with their own intellectual limitations, they excessively rely on others in inquiry and fail to see what can be gained by their own intellectual involvement. Between these extremes is the virtue of epistemic autonomy. The epistemically autonomous thinker makes good decisions in inquiry. They know when to think for themselves and when to rely more heavily on the intellectual efforts of others; they think for themselves well.¹¹ This too connects back to the idea of autonomy as self-government. Individuals with the virtue of epistemic autonomy govern their intellectual lives, and they do so well.

This second sense of epistemic autonomy is also clearly valuable. Individuals who have the virtue of epistemic autonomy are good executive managers of their intellectual lives. They make good decisions in inquiry regarding when to defer and when to think for themselves. These decisions are all guided by their love of the truth and other epistemic goods. Autonomous inquirers navigate inquiry in such a way as to make themselves, and their community, epistemically better off.

What we have seen in this brief survey of the literature on epistemic autonomy is that there are different ways of understanding epistemic autonomy. While a number of philosophers have equated epistemic autonomy with a kind of intellectual individualism, we have seen reason to resist such a view of epistemic autonomy. Like autonomy more generally, epistemic autonomy is best thought of as a kind of relational autonomy that takes seriously the ways in which we are socially embedded creatures. We have also noted two distinct senses of epistemic autonomy, each of which connects to the idea of autonomy as self-governance. In the first sense, epistemic autonomy is a kind of intellectual freedom. Autonomous thinkers are free from interference and shape their own intellectual lives. In the second sense, epistemic autonomy is an intellectual virtue. Autonomous thinkers are good executive managers of their inquiry. They think for themselves well, and they think with others well. In addition to both types of accounts seeing epistemic autonomy as a kind of intellectual self-governance, both senses of epistemic autonomy also see it as something that is valuable.

However, philosophical discussions of epistemic autonomy have not received nearly the amount of attention that moral autonomy and political autonomy have received. The debates about epistemic autonomy are underdeveloped, even if though they are beginning to receive greater attention in the contemporary literature.¹² This special issue aims to further develop these philosophical debates regarding epistemic autonomy.

What follows is a brief summary of the articles contained in this special issue.

In ‘Is there a Duty to Speak Your Mind?’, Michael Hannon explores several central themes from Hrishikesh Joshi’s recent book Why It’s OK to Speak Your Mind. According to Joshi, an open exchange of ideas is central to a good life, both for individuals as well as for the society they inhabit. But are society’s epistemic goals advanced when individuals speak their mind? And is speaking your mind good for its own sake? In his essay, Hannon examines some implications for Joshi’s answers to these questions and raises some criticisms as well.

In ‘Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest’, Justin McBrayer examines an underappreciated factor in our relations of trust. While a great deal of attention has been placed on what makes someone an expert or epistemic authority, McBrayer argues that conflicts of interest actually play a much more important role in who we should trust and how much we should trust them. The essay explores the different effects incentives of various kinds can have on testifiers and how an appreciation of them ought to affect hearers.

In ‘Do Your Own Research’, Nathan Ballantyne, David Dunning and Jared Celniker examine the increasingly popular slogan DYOR (do your own research). The authors utilize resources from psychology, philosophy and history to investigate a number of questions central to this slogan. In particular, the authors unpack the meaning, history and implications for inquiry that DYOR has. The essay concludes by making some suggestions for improving lay inquiry.

In ‘Epistemic Autonomy & Intellectual Humility: Two Mutually Supporting Virtues’, Jonathan Matheson makes the case that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility are interconnected intellectual virtues that each promote each other. The essay begins by surveying the recent literature on the nature of these two virtues. Having done so, Matheson examines the ways in which possessing either of these virtues facilitates the cultivation of the other. Having addressed a challenge arising from the epistemology of disagreement, the essay concludes by pointing to future directions.

In ‘The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy Without Intellectual Humility’, James Beebe examines the relationship between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility through a series of empirical studies. These studies provide empirical support for the idea that intellectual humility and epistemic autonomy are mutually supporting virtues, while also revealing some dangers for pursuing epistemic autonomy without intellectual humility.

In ‘Against Intellectual Autonomy: Social Animals Need Social Virtues’, Neil Levy argues that ‘intellectual autonomy’ is a misleading label for any intellectual virtue that concerns good executive management of one’s intellectual affairs. Given the strong connections between ‘autonomy’ and individualism, Levy makes the case that ‘intellectual interdependence’ is a more suitable name for such a virtue. Given our social situatedness and our deep epistemic dependence, Levy maintains that intellectual interdependence better fills the roles that we need this virtue to play.

In ‘Defending Autonomy as a Criterion for Epistemic Virtue’, Sarah Wright further develops and defends Catherine Elgin’s claim that compatibility with autonomy is a criterion for the intellectual virtues. Sasha Mudd has recently criticized this account for being overly permissive and lacking the resources to respond to the challenges posed by relativism. In this paper, Wright takes on these challenges, while motivating an account of autonomy as playing a critical role in the development of intellectual virtues.

In ‘Epistemic Autonomy and the Shaping of our Epistemic Lives’, Jason Kawall gives a novel account of epistemic autonomy as an epistemic virtue. On Kawall’s account, the virtue of epistemic autonomy is much more wide-ranging than others in the literature have taken it to be. In fact, on this account, epistemic autonomy shapes our entire epistemic lives by concerning the topics we inquire about, how we inquire about them and the epistemic stances we take. While balancing thinking for oneself and relying on others is part of the picture, epistemic autonomy concerns much more.

In ‘Gatekeeping in Science: Lessons from the Case of Psychology and Neuro-Linguistic Programming’, Katherine Dormandy and Bruce Grimley examine a number of philosophical issues related to gatekeeping. It matters what counts as ‘good science’, yet in policing the label, scientists confront several issues. Being overly lenient and being overly strict each come with their own set of problems. While gatekeeping is necessary, it is important that it is done well. Dormandy and Grimley draw important lessons for gatekeeping from how the field of psychology has acted as gatekeepers toward neuro-linguistic programming.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation [61802].

Notes on contributors

Jonathan Matheson

Jonathan Matheson is a professor of philosophy at the University of North Florida and the Director of the Florida Blue Center for Ethics. His research interests are in epistemology, focusing on issues related to disagreement and epistemic autonomy.

Notes

1. For instance, see Adamson (2022) for an overview of how autonomy was valued in medieval philosophy. See also Matheson and Lougheed (2022).

2. What follows borrows significantly from chapter 4 of Matheson (2023). Thanks to the publishers for permission to use that content here.

3. For a thorough overview concerning autonomy more generally, see Hinchman (1996).

4. Similar views are expressed by Ahlstrom-Vij (2013, 92), Code (1991), Fricker (2006), McMyler (2011), Scanlon (1972) and Zagzebski (2007).

5. See Elgin (2013), Encabo (2008) and Grasswick (2018) for more on this point.

6. See Westlund (2012), Elgin (2013, 2021), Baier (1985) and Grasswick (2018).

7. In Matheson (2022b) I called this ‘autonomy in inquiry’.

8. This sense of intellectual independence is importantly different than the conception of intellectual independence as self-reliance that was discussed and discarded earlier.

9. Alvin Goldman, a leading figure in social epistemology, maintains that these social features of our epistemological projects make epistemic paternalism necessary and at least sometimes desirable (1991, 127). For an extended defense, see Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). See also Joly Chock and Matheson (2020) for a clear case of permissible epistemic paternalism.

10. Virtue epistemologists distinguish between faculty virtues and character virtues. Here, I am understanding intellectual virtues as character virtues.

11. Such an account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy has been developed and defended by Battaly (2021), King (2021) and Matheson (2022a, 2022b, 2023).

12. See Matheson and Lougheed (2022) and Zagzebski (2012).