The Pitfalls of Epistemic Autonomy without Intellectual Humility

ABSTRACT

Individuals who possess the virtue of epistemic autonomy rely upon themselves in their reasoning, judgment and decision making in virtuous ways. Philosophers working on intellectual virtue agree that if the pursuit of epistemic autonomy is not tempered by other virtues such as intellectual humility, it can lead to vices such as extreme intellectual individualism. Virtue theorists have made a number of empirical claims about the consequences of possessing this vice – e.g. that it will lead to significantly fewer epistemic goods and a greater number of faulty beliefs. This paper reports the results of two pilot studies and initial results from a larger series of studies that attempt to shed light on some of the intellectual pitfalls of pursuing unrestricted epistemic autonomy. The studies provide empirical support for the philosophical claim that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility are mutually supporting virtues by showing that epistemic autonomy without intellectual humility leads to increased belief in misinformation, conspiracy theories and pseudoscience and decreased trust in scientific experts. They also reveal important contours of the complex and often delicate relationship between the virtue of epistemic autonomy and its more vicious cousin, strong intellectual individualism.

KEYWORDS:

• Epistemic autonomy
• intellectual humility
• intellectual individualism
• intellectual virtue

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In a similar vein, Matheson (2023) argues, ‘servile individuals are overly humble and are thus incapacitated by their focus on their intellectual limitations’.

2. For example, the Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy conference held at the University of North Florida in Oct. 2021.

3. Cronbach’s alpha: .60. Average interitem correlation: .20.

4. It should be noted that convergent and discriminant validity are ordinarily not of any real concern when dealing with a measure as short and uncomprehensive as the brief measure of epistemic autonomy employed here.

5. Gignac and Szodorai’s (2016) recommendations are based upon an analysis of the distribution of reported correlation values from more than seven hundred published meta-analyses in the individual differences literature.

6. Cf. also Matheson (2022a, 190).

7. All p values reported here are uncorrected.

8. Cronbach’s alpha: .86. Average interitem correlation: .25.

9. Cf. Bazzi et al. (2020) for an analysis of economic and political forms of rugged individualism in American history.

Additional information

Funding

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation (ID# 61802). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

Notes on contributors

James R. Beebe

James R. Beebe is Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Experimental Epistemology Research Group and member of the Center for Cognitive Science at the University at Buffalo (SUNY). His primary research interests are in epistemology and experimental philosophy. He has written about skepticism, reliabilism, a priori knowledge, folk metaethics and intellectual virtue.