Advocates, Implementers or Allies? NGOs between Humanitarian Borderwork and Migration Management in Libya

ABSTRACT

This article explores the complex terrain non-government organisations (NGOs) navigate when working in humanitarian borderwork on migration management programs in transit sites. Drawing on the example of Libya it shows the scope and challenges for NGOs working in transit sites and aims to advance understanding of what it means to work within migration management structures. International and local NGOs and CSOs are deeply involved in migration management programs often as implementing partners to UN agencies and in receipt of sizeable grants. This article illustrates how NGOs in Libya, one of the most prominent transit sites, navigate their dual roles as migration managers and humanitarian actors. It draws on desk-based research, policy analysis and interviews conducted with Libyans actors working on migration alongside observations from the author based on their first-hand field experience in Libya that demonstrates the in-between relationship that has resulted in NGOs becoming advocates, implementers and allies. It highlights a gap in research about the intersection between humanitarian borderwork and migration management in transit sites, the importance of understanding the particularity of the transit context and the implications of this work for NGOs in general given the growing demands to work in transit sites within migration management schemes.

KEYWORDS:

• Libya
• migration management
• NGOs
• irregular migration
• central Mediterranean
• humanitarianism

Introduction

Alongside the growing attention toward people moving irregularly there has been a demand on international actors to respond in what are increasingly complex sites as both traditional humanitarian actors and also migration managers. One such site is that of the transit country, which is increasingly expected to serve as gate keepers of irregular migration and may be subject to multiple arrangements with governments and international organisations to achieve goals of externalisation policies (Phillips and Missbach 2017; Missbach and Phillips 2020; Cuttitta 2022). Libya is arguably the country that is most synonymous with irregular migration that stems from its long-held position as a key transit country and main embarkation point for sea crossings to Europe although it also serves as a host country of migrants and refugees, as will be discussed later (Achtnich 2022). As a result of this externally ascribed label, Libya and Libyans have been the site for, and subject of, decades of intervention related to migration. This includes a multitude of programmes, initiatives and activities that are almost wholly funded by European donors and conducted on the ground by United Nations (UN) agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups largely around the theme of migration management and to some extent protection and humanitarian assistance. This article considers the position of NGOs specifically, and the in-between relationship they have as migration managers and humanitarian actors. It builds on existing work that problematises the incoherence of migrant management approaches in transit states but goes further to focus on NGOs as a key actor in this regime and queries the role they have carved out, what they do and why, noting that their move into a new sector of operations is not without criticism. Through further consideration of the processes within transit states it highlights the in-between space NGOs occupy as migration managers and humanitarian actors and exposes how this incoherence operates in practice in ways not yet accounted for in the literature.

The article starts by examining what is meant by migration management, next it considers humanitarian borderwork and positions NGOs at the nexus between migration management and humanitarian borderwork to consider the effects and implications on programmes with the analysis drawing on testimony from Libyan nationals working in the migration management sector. This approach, focusing on a specific program of work in one country as opposed to focusing on a particular NGO, queries the salience of the current trajectory on migration management and the role of NGOs in this sector with so little space opening up for migrants and refugees in Libya over the last decade of humanitarian action. It also offers a new perspective on NGO operations and Libyan community perceptions of migration work. The findings presented in this article add to knowledge about the complex role NGOs play in contemporary migration and border regimes at the nexus between migration management and humanitarian borderwork.

For the purpose of this article, following Geiger and Pecoud, migration management is an umbrella term used to describe a range of initiatives related to international migration and human mobility (Pécoud and Geiger 2012; see also Geiger and Pécoud 2010; Andersson 2016; McNevin et al. 2016). It is a technocratic and managerial approach that, as Cuttitta observes “presents itself as pragmatic, realistic, humane, and benefiting all parties involved—countries of origin, countries of destination, and migrants alike” (Cuttitta 2020: 6). It is offered to stakeholders as a mid-way, consensus approach that attends to concerns related to migration, brings in multiple relevant actors and can offer a response to the need for international governance of migration (Pécoud and Geiger 2012). This has become a growing space for NGOs, which in an era of outsourcing, have become implementers of funded programs that articulate migration management policies (Vandevoordt 2017). Partly this is a consequence of organisational innovation, a global phenomenon of “significant expansion and deepening complexity of subcontracting arrangements, auditing techniques, partnership frameworks and global compacts linking metropolitan states, multilateral agencies, NGOs and private companies” (Duffield 2001: 310). As Missbach and Phillips (2020) have argued, in a transit state, the issue of migration management can become even more heightened and politicised. Transit sites are growing as sites of action for NGOs, whereby transit is “understood as a space that is both constructed and contested” that reflects the reality for many migrants and refugees who are often themselves in transit (Phillips and Missbach 2017: 114). Transit has also become a policy category and transit state is used here to explain how Libya is viewed both by external actors who remain concerned about people using the country as a departure point for Europe, and by Libyans themselves who would rather see migration as a temporary phenomenon. The next section interrogates the role of NGOs as actors within migration management work specifically at the borderlands.

NGOs in the Borderlands

NGOs are deeply ingrained in ‘humanitarian borderwork’ across many sites. Humanitarian borderwork is, broadly speaking, defined as traditional humanitarian work conducted in accordance with humanitarian principles taking place in border spaces that becomes focused on relieving suffering at borders (Pallister-Wilkins 2017). Another important element of this work is that as borders are delocalised, humanitarian borderwork happens on the move, in borderscapes (Cuttitta 2018b; Pallister-Wilkins 2017). In her research drawing on the organisation Medicins sans Frontiers (MSF), Pallister-Wilkins noted the organisation’s presence across multiple sites, at differing scales and across transit routes. This has become the case for many humanitarian organisations working across highly changeable borders. A key distinction for the purposes of this article is that MSF often works independently of other actors, not taking part in UN-led protection coordination working groups for instance, and will not accept government funding. This is a unique and distinct position that sets MSF apart, with most other NGOs engaged in coordination activities and recipients of government funds.

Notwithstanding the broad and heterogenous nature of NGOs embedded in multiple local contexts working across migrant trajectories (Cuttitta 2022) this article focuses on NGOs that work inside humanitarian coordination mechanisms and may be recipients of funding from the EU or UN agencies. Following the work of Ashutosh and Mountz (2011) on the role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in migration management and critiques of NGOs involved in migration management (Markous 2019), I suggest that the work of NGOs in migration management also warrants greater exploration. The focus of critiques on IOM and its role in providing assistance to states have been centred on “who the IOM aims to protect”, an unclear protection mandate and its support of state policies due to its relationship with member states (Ashutosh and Mountz 2011: 28). Yet NGOs also benefit strategically and financially from framing themselves as protection actors in migration management to obtain legitimacy in transit sites and, as Markous has problematised in the case of IOM and UNHCR, as actors who purport to Do No Harm. As Cuttitta asks “[are] they … really serving the interests of (would-be) migrants or just supporting European governmental strategies that are aimed at containing migration in the first place” (Cuttitta 2022: 2).

The author has witnessed an exponential growth in the number of NGOs involved in this kind of humanitarian borderwork in Libya since 2013 when very few organisations were resident in the country to 2021 where 23 NGOs are members of the Libya INGO forum. Many of these INGOs are capitalising on a concern for the conditions faced by asylum seekers and refugees, are replicating work carried out in other contexts responding to a migration management agenda and operate due to the ready availability of funds from donors such as the European Union. Indeed this has arguably become a part of their core business in other transit sites especially for NGOs working in sectors of protection, child protection, food security and health with a focus on migrants (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2022). In Libya, this work is embedded in a human rights narrative and has inclusionary aspects particularly in a state where there may be little or no formal services for migrants especially in remote border locations (Cuttitta 2018a). While there are a multitude of non-government actors working inside Libya such as United Nations agencies, international and local NGOs and civil society groups, the focus of this article is on NGOs, particularly international NGOs who may be funded by international donors and are implementing partners to UN agencies.

NGOs undertake a range of activities inside Libya or operating remotely from Tunisia as registered entities entering into agreements with government counterparts and working under what is increasingly a highly bureaucratised and internationally coordinated effort. While Xiang and Lindquist (2014: 124) may characterise NGOs as part of the humanitarian dimension of migration infrastructure, they play a critical role in policy that is not benign (Cuttitta 2018a). In other contexts such as Australia and the Netherlands, it has been shown that when NGOs become government contractors they may become complicit in supporting a securitised agenda and beholden to meeting contractual obligations which is arguably at odds with their humanitarian objectives (Gerard and Weber 2019; Markous 2019). Very little connection is made between the work of NGOs in different contexts which may be contrary to humanitarian principles, take for instance NGOs that have accepted to work in offshore immigration detention centres, or the mandate of the NGO itself. This linkage between migration management and humanitarian borderwork in transit sites generally and in sites such as Libya specifically remains under-explored and is the primary focus of this article; the methodological approach employed is discussed next.

Methodology

This article uses a mixed methodology approach drawing on desk-based research, policy analysis and four interviews conducted with three representatives working in Libya on migration who were known to the author alongside observations from the author based on their first-hand field experience in Libya. The first two interviews were carried out in 2019 and a further two interviews were conducted in 2021 with one interviewee being interviewed both in 2019 and 2021. All participants were Libyan nationals working for civil society organisations (CSOs) or INGOs based in the capital Tripoli and one in Sabratha who were interviewed in English and requested to remain anonymous. The interviews were conducted remotely, via video call. The representatives were selected on the basis of their length of experience working in Libya on migration issues. The focus of the analysis was on the benefits and limitations of a migration management approach, and stakeholder and community perceptions of migration drawing on their professional expertise.

This paper also draws on the author’s position of having lived and worked in Libya between 2013 and 2014 with an international NGO working on migration and as such draws on extensive practice collaborating with other NGOs involved in coordination mechanisms and joint borderwork activities. This included direct work with migrants and refugees in Libya, as well as work in other transit locations such as Ethiopia, who were living in the community and visiting people held in immigration detention. Researcher reflexivity is increasingly being attended to in migration studies, often drawing on feminist standpoint theory and scholars who speak to the value of emotions in such a politically charged field such as migration (Gray 2008). Following Gray, I take a stance of situated reflexivity, positing that my relationality to the subject as a prior NGO employee is an essential part of my critically reflexive approach (see also Schmidt 2007). My first-hand knowledge of the inner-workings of NGOs and a deep contextual knowledge of transit sites brings a unique positionality to my research. The inclusion of Libyan interviewees in this article runs counter to the dominant approach of including stakeholders who are located outside of the country or are expatriates. This is further evidence of a consideration of reflexivity through a focus on power relations and knowledge production that requires greater attention (Dahinden et al. 2021). Migrants in Libya could not be interviewed due to limitations of access and ethical concerns that may arise from remote interviews such as privacy and security. It is noted that researchers face multiple challenges interviewing migrants in Libya and often rely on interviews conducted in neighbouring countries as well as so-called destination countries and on return to countries of origin (see for example Hamood 2016). The next section of this article reflects on the frequent framing of Libya as a country in a constant state of chaos and situates migration management work of NGOs within a broader system.

Migration in Libya

Media stories about migrants in Libya often invoke phrases such as ‘chaos’ and ‘crisis’ (see for example ‘At Least 19 migrants missing after boat capsizes off coast of Libya’ Guardian 13 March 2022; ‘Libya, Niger discuss irregular migrant crisis Middle East Monitor).¹ This language is also adopted by NGOs when calling for assistance and funding. Framing irregular migration in such a manner has become all-too convenient trope that persists after over a decade in post-Revolution Libya and is applied in multiple other contexts. Within a dynamic transit region or state such as Libya, a network of interests, authorities and associated agendas can be identified shaped by social, political, demographic and economic factors that can together be characterised as a “system” (Castles 2010; Fawcett 1989; Massey et al. 1998). The system comprises interacting elements, attributes and relationships; individual people on the move within a wider country context (Monzini 2007; Xiang and Lindquist 2014) and external stakeholders such as NGOs. Reframing a transit context such as Libya as a system, has been promoted by others and offers an objective viewpoint on a site. It also begs the question as to the benefit of a migration management approach if a country remains in a constant state of flux or chaos. In addition to views from Libyans working on migration, the later part of this article considers the ways in which international NGO work is perceived by local communities in Libya. This raises questions about the cultural differences in categories that are derived from social and cultural experiences which can in turn influence the interpretation of terms used in migration work including migration management (Aidani 2010).

Scholars such as Paoletti have shown that even prior to its 2011 Revolution, “a sustained analysis of the migration movements evinces a pragmatic adaptability. Indeed, the shifting stance of the Libyan regime stems from a relatively shrewd calculation of costs and benefits” (Paoletti 2011: 216). This ‘pragmatic adaptability’ is displayed by government authorities at federal and local levels and by non-government actors such as militia groups (known as katibas), local tribes involved in smuggling especially at border crossings and smugglers whose profits have increased as securitisation measures have hardened (Raineri 2017). Emphasising that migration panic is an externally ascribed label, it has been noted that irregular migration is not a priority in the country by the former head of IOM Libya who stated that “migration is not even among the top ten concerns for Libyans” (cited in Howden 2017); this was also confirmed by its new Prime Minister-designate (Al Jazeera 2021). Despite the lack of local interest in migration, there are countless external multilateral and bilateral efforts by foreign governments, regional bodies and donors that have been discussed elsewhere and will not be repeated in this article (Phillips 2020). That the issue of migration is not new was detailed by one interviewee:

For example, [for] seven years we had detention centres and we still have detention centres. There is an effort to close detention centre but because of the number of people coming and number of people captured, let's see, there will be a need for detention centres so they'll reopen again. Some of the main ideas still the same, for example, UNHCR are still struggling to provide concrete assistance to refugees, asylum seekers in Libya. Libyan people still have the same fear and scepticism about migrants in general.

Further emphasising how migration panic is an externally prescribed label, one interviewee referred to what they termed a ‘European perspective’:

I think also the European perspective on how to deal with migration as one principle hasn't changed […] I think from a European perspective, the first principle for them was to stop people from going there. So they empower their Libyan coast guards to be able and capable of stopping people, intercepting people like sea. And then once they settled that they started to support the Libyan government to do more interceptions on land, which is taking place now, I think. But it's also peculiar because now […] more humanitarian assistance or more funding will be focused towards other aspects of migration management, like border control, for example, education for migrants, health services for migrants.

The European perspective was not viewed as visionary or proactive approach:

I see the differences are more like a reaction. It's not coming from a vision. It's not coming from a goal or an aim to reach or specific situation that the government will planning to do, because of the political nature of the situation now. […] It's more of remedies of what happened during the war, rebuilding the infrastructure, re-empowering institutions to provide services, rehabilitation. So the changes I think came, not in a planned way, but it's more of a reaction, it's not proactive.

This lack of consistency was confirmed by another interviewee:

I think the issue about the situation in Libya is that there is no clear strategy even with the EU. It's not a long term strategy in dealing with the partner organizations such as UNHCR and IOM. So Libya is a very changing dynamic, even in terms of mixed migration, not just about the political and the security situation. Whenever something happens each year, they just adapt their programming to further push migrants and refugees away from Europe without looking into the bigger picture. So until now, even if we look back at the past years, I don't see a consistent approach besides the key goal of keeping migrants away from Europe. But again, even in terms of the programming from UNHCR and IOM. It's changing in a way that doesn't make a lot of sense, when you look at it at a bigger scale, it doesn't add up. […] Even if the situation is challenging, they would know this is our approach with the government, this is our approach with the detention centers. But in Libya it's just coming up with any short term programs just to cover up and answer to the EU's demands or the donor demands. […] Of course there are good people who are trying to help refugees and migrants, but this is not enough, having a good heart is not enough in such a highly politicized context.

The overall representation of migration in Libya includes strong external interest from foreign governments and donors, pragmatic local interest from actors who benefit from its irregular nature and from governmental authorities with oversight for migration, and local communities with a lack of concern about migration. Since 2010 there has been a proliferation of NGOs in Libya purporting to work on migration, many of whom operate either within the country or work remotely from nearby locations – their role and work will be interrogated next by drawing on how they operate as advocates, implementers and allies.

NGOs in Libya: Working on Land and at Sea

Implementers

In general, as Duffield notes, NGOs are not an organic part of the social state (Duffield 2001: 317). This is most certainly the case for Libya where most international NGOs did not operate prior to 2011, with the exception of one or two Italian organisations, and are therefore a relatively new phenomenon. Much of the work of NGOs in the country is coordinated by the United Nations which has been criticised for its pursuit of conflicting goals and lack of local investment further complicating the opaque and complex nature of NGOs in Libya (Sayigh 2015). The United Nations Humanitarian response plan for Libya sets out a broad scope of work for NGOs working in the country. It includes plans to strengthen humanitarian action through the broader migration management, development and peace nexus through a requested $27M USD of funds to be carried out by eight partners and fifteen projects (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2022: 61). This is a modest figure given the €309M EUR allocated through the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF) to migration management projects in Libya out of a total of €700M EUR funding pledged by the EU between 2014 and 2020 (European Union 2021). While EUTF funding is broadly allocated between protection, border management and community stabilisation activities, UN funding includes protection for humanitarian activities and other programs that focus on individual and group sensitisation, the dangers and risks of irregular migration and promoting alternative pathways to migration. This is despite the fact that Libya has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and there are no national laws or administrative structures to deal with refugees and asylum-seekers. Proposals to address irregular migration range from information campaigns in countries of origin to deterrent-based punitive regulations in destination countries, such as restricting family reunion. These agendas are articulated through policies and programmes and enshrined in political processes such as the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration and 2014 EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (commonly referred to as the Khartoum Process). Much of the ‘success’ of these programs are lauded to include the number of voluntary returns which have been problematised elsewhere (see for example Koch 2014) and short-term measures such as the provision of food and shelter to people in transit.

Advocates

In addition to implementing migration management activities on the ground NGOs have also played a prominent role as disruptors of migration management approaches through their work in search and rescue activities (SAR). In recent years there has been a bifurcation of international effort with EU funding directed towards support for training of coastguards, and NGOs taking a more independent stance, with many entities, including MSF to the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) and other private groups, running rescue at sea operations in international waters off the coast of Libya (Del Valle 2016; Stierl 2018). Fast-changing politics on the high seas can at times put humanitarian SAR efforts directly in conflict with other migration approaches on Libya, such as Italy’s efforts to stop irregular migration through interdiction at sea (Basaran 2014; El Zaidy 2017; Jumbert 2018). A dramatic example of this took place in 2017 when the Italian government introduced a code of conduct for rescue NGOs and the Libyan coastguard threatened to seize boats of NGOs entering its territorial waters, leading to some groups ceasing their operations (Cusumano 2017). While SAR work in the Mediterranean can be read as life saving, about border control and interception, and smugglers it reflects a “humanitarian approach to migration” and another dimension of humanitarian borderwork (Tazzioli 2016: 3).

Although NGOs involved in SAR largely work independently and outside of Libyan territorial waters, there have been tense interactions between NGO SAR boats and Libyan coastguards, with a Libyan military representative reportedly complaining: “we are fed up with these organizations. They increased the number of immigrants and empowered smugglers. Meanwhile, they criticize us for not respecting human rights” (Fox and D’Agostino 2017). The work of NGOs in migration management on land in Libya requires much more close working relationships with government and usually is predicated on official registration. Because of this NGOs cannot be disruptors in the way they may be perceived as at sea. As an interviewee noted there is also a power imbalance with NGOs reliant on donor funds and therefore not pushing back or voicing concerns about expectations placed upon them. There is often very little coordination between NGOs working at sea and on land, with the former not required to participate in coordination mechanisms and often having a strong advocacy component where they can denounce involved governments. As noted above, rescue at sea is also viewed locally in Libya as problematic, as it leaves more people stranded inside the country. This plays on fears that migrants and refugees will remain permanently in the country and draws attention to what has often been an issue in the background that is not of primary concern to authorities. Finally, a tension can also exist between activities carried out by the same NGOs on one side of the Central Mediterranean and the other; indeed it may be the case that the same NGO will be carrying out potentially contradictory activities in transit and destination states. As Freedman has noted in France, NGOs may be involved in the administration of asylum processes or management of reception centres (Freedman 2009), while in other contexts they may be involved in assisted voluntary return programmes for failed asylum seekers from destination countries such as the Netherlands (Kalir and Wissink 2016). Save the Children has also been a contractor to the Australian government as part of migration management programs in offshore detention on Nauru and Manus Island. This highlights the contradictory and complex roles that NGOs can play in migration management at humanitarian borders. In the case of NGOs at sea they risk being a spoiler that may also be at odds with the Libyan authorities who seek to implement well-funded agreements to stop migration and at the same time frustrating EU- led attempts to stop irregular migration.

Allies

As has been detailed, Libya is a region that attracts significant international attention from the media, donors and foreign governments particularly on the issue of migration. As one interviewee noted, “organisations are stuck in the middle between Libya's changing dynamics and the pressure from the government and the barriers at the same time”. Interviewees noted small positive shifts in recent times such as people being able to use their phones in detention and facilitation of releases which was largely in part due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the need to respond to the health situation of migrants although detention centre figures are notoriously unreliable (Cuttitta 2021). The political arrangements for migrants have changed in recent years with a Minister for Immigration Affairs appointed in Libya and a Committee in place to discuss migration affairs but changes are slow to be realised as one interviewee noted, “I think one of the main principles that hasn't changed over the past years is that every governing entity over the past years is afraid to make concrete changes when it comes to migration. […] it's always been difficult for any decision maker in Libya to make concrete decisions and it's all because of fear […] I can see what's going to happen in the future, it's always been people who are in favour of keeping things the same”. While the author has witnessed positive opportunities such as community release for vulnerable groups and pilot programs centred on alternatives to immigration detention, these have not resulted in widespread change.

‘Every Message is Directed Towards Donors’ – NGOs in a Contradictory and Complex Space

In taking on roles as implementers, allies and advocates NGOs can shape and be shaped by community perceptions held about migrants in the local Libyan community. With NGO operations reliant on hiring national (Libyan) staff to work on migration projects and also to negotiate improved conditions for migrants through migration management programs, the sense from interviewees was that community attitudes towards migrants remained static. As one respondent explained:

I think it's the same. I mean, you see the same mosaic of people, sympathizing [with] migrants and others who see that these people are coming here to take the jobs and people who see support giving to migrants done in a very bad way that they lead into the perspective that this is going to be all wrong and we should send them back. All these different views and they're still the same. […] The governments are measuring the people's response and they feed into each other. The governments were afraid to do anything, they will upset the people and the people are basically sometimes either when they want to help or they want to intervene. They're afraid to do something that the government will not like. So I think in a way the narrative is still the same, I've not seen anything on the media that is taking on the government saying, “Oh, we have so many migrants we need to treat right. We need to have more humanitarian concern”. So the initiative just did not happen.

Changing the narrative within the Libyan population is something that does not feature in NGO migration management work but would potentially be instrumental to success as one interviewee suggested:

It would be great. […] We don't see the Libyan population having arguments, and debates, whether to fight [sic] migrants and send them back home or allow them to do whatever they want and give them all the support they need. I think another important point of view is that, [on] support for migrants, so many people they don't think it's their responsibility, they don't think it's their job. They say, “Okay, I know these people are poor. I know these people need support, but it's not my job to do this. I mean, who asked them come country where there's no infrastructure.” I mean, we have to find people who are willing to do this.

Another interviewee also spoke to the issue of community perceptions:

I think for the past years, it has never been a priority because the country was going really through so many conflicts. Until now that it's stabilized a bit where they started thinking of more at the beginning of this year with some government officials with the new government, they started saying, “oh, we want to close all detention centers.” So they were trying to please the international community and showing them, “look, okay now we're a better government. Now we want to do this and that.” But it doesn't correspond to what the community needs. This is the issue in Libya, that the community really believes in detention as an approach for migration. They think it's not a local issue. They think this is a regional issue and Libya shouldn't be responsible on handling it. So they can just put everyone in detention. […] I see that acceptance from the community is a key factor [and for] INGOs in Libya, this was never the case. They never played on this. They don't do campaigns online. Every message is directed towards donors. So even if you check their social media, messages are directed to donors. They're not directed to their beneficiaries nor to the Libyan community.

While there are local organisations advocating on human rights issues including for migrants and refugees directly to the Libyan community they are not widespread or in partnership with international NGOs. This was a concern raised by one interviewee:

The situation of activists and Libya is very sad regarding migration. Even people who are very active with INGOs. Starting with INGO employees, even when I speak with them with issues, they don't see it as a concern. They're just doing their job. When you speak of it as national issue or a local issue in Libya they're saying, but we have other priorities in the country […] So I think there's a lack of understanding of how big the issue is from the community. Then if we come to see the role of local civil society, I think the only thing that they're doing for now is really to just get funding from INGOs, meaning that they will just follow whatever INGOs will tell them or some civil society, which are supported and directed from the government.

They will still stay in between from what the government wants and what INGOs are telling them […] So I don't see the role of civil society on migration doing anything.

Interviewees spoke about the 2021 protests by refugee groups in Tripoli outside the office of UNHCR as a shift in power dynamics with so-called ‘beneficiaries’ now taking action and being vocal in order to gain recognition. One interviewee was rather scathing of international NGO inaction at this time:

When the arrests happened in Tripoli, all INGOs posted statements saying exactly the same thing, it's just to show their stance. But in reality, they're not working towards that stance. I don't see INGOs working towards what they're saying they are working on. So they're just making it seem that Libya is a very complicated context and that the government is not allowing them to do anything. Of course, this is a reality as well, but they've been there since over more than 10 years that they've been in Libya. how come you have not been able to establish strong links with government authorities? […] Whenever there is a big issue, INGO take a step back and say, oh, it's the Libyan authorities [who are responsible].

The interviewee pointed to the active role NGO take on search and rescue operations to suggest they do not have to stay silent when beneficiaries are targeted in the community. By their presence they are also sending a message to authorities and beneficiaries. But as the interviewee concluded “I don't see them considering or reflecting on the role because they're just doing what they're told and they're just doing it on each year, yes, that's renew and then that's it”. The interviewee felt that donors also preferred the status quo because

the EU [wants] to always have partners on the ground, regardless of the impact that they're having, [because] they want to ensure that they can pass whatever message or whatever program through those partners as their own bodies because it's very clear that this is how the EU works … […] it gives them information in a way. They have an eye on the country, even if they're not there.

New Domains for Migration Management and Humanitarian Borderwork

This section has detailed further the work of NGOs implementing migration management programs and the intersections with governments, donors, the local community and NGOs who are significant actors working within and shaping migration systems in Libya and other transit sites. At local, state and regional levels NGOs may undertake direct support to migrants and refugees, advocacy, search and rescue, protection and support UN agencies under the banner of migration governance including being co-leads in coordination bodies. Such a diffuse array of activities is to be expected given the complex terrain they navigate especially in transit countries but there is obviously potential for mixed messages to government counterparts and migrants and refugees themselves. The testimony from interviewees also raises issues about accountability for NGOs in receipt of funds including why NGOs on land may be reticent to amplify beneficiary voices of protest, the ties that bind NGOs to European donors and governments, and the way in which migration management work has become a key source of funding for NGOs. This article has also spotlighted voices of local Libyan NGO workers, highlighting a potential area for further exploration. More research is also needed into how other groups, namely governmental counterparts, local residents and beneficiaries themselves view the space occupied by NGOs in the transit site of Libya. Yet what this article has shown is that NGOs walk a fine line at the intersection of migration management and humanitarian borderwork.

Conclusion

Migration management programs and humanitarian borderwork in transit sites have expanded significantly along with the growing attention on issues such as migrant deaths at border crossings and at sea as well as the situation for people subject to immigration detention. As a result of this increased interest and funding, NGOs have been expanding their profile and work at sea in the area of SAR and on land in sectors such as protection, humanitarian response, border management and community stablisation. This growth has had a number of implications for NGOs who need to work through UN coordination mechanisms, maintain good working relationships with government counterparts to ensure ongoing registration to remain in a country and continue to receive donor funds. This article has used the case study example of Libya to highlight that as NGOs have come to occupy new space in migration management as disruptors, protection actors, counterparts of UN agencies and recipients of funds that promote a highly securitised agenda framed around border control, they have moved into complex and ambiguous positions as advocates, implementers and allies. The nature of their work and the highly politicised domain of migration in a country such as Libya can put them at odds with NGOs at sea, host governments and governments of destination countries. NGOs must also navigate difficult terrain with regard to maintaining ongoing funding from donors whose objectives with regard to irregular migration may be contrary to humanitarian principles. Finally, as NGOs have stepped into more contested aspects of migration management work, such as the management of asylum centres and returns, this may present an incoherence in their work across countries of origin, transit and destination. This article has used perspectives from Libyans working in migration to draw observations about the way in which this work is perceived by a different stakeholder group. It highlights the need for research that brings forth other viewpoints such as government representatives and local communities on the role and place of NGOs in migration management at humanitarian borders. In the quest for ongoing funding and relevance, NGOs implementing migration management programs have moved into an influential sphere of humanitarian borderwork that demands renewed attention on their support for migrants and tacit approval of government policies as recipients of donor funding.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the two reviewers and fellow guest editors for their insightful review, which helped to improve the quality of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Melissa Phillips

Melissa Phillips is a Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Western Sydney University. Her research interests include migration, mobility, displacement and refugee settlement. Her latest book is Phillips, M., & Olliff, L. (eds). Understanding Diaspora Development: Lessons from Australia and the Pacific (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

Notes

1 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/12/at-least-19-migrants-missing-after-boat-capsizes-off-coast-of-libya. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210930-libya-niger-discuss-irregular-migration-crisis/.