Budgeting for the human-made disaster of war: US aid to Ukraine

IMPACT

This article examines the USA’s efforts to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. The USA’s ex ante mitigation efforts were insufficient to prevent the invasion but likely enabled Ukraine to survive the initial attack. Preparation efforts produced large amounts of weapons stocks that could be sent to Ukraine once the war began. Ex post response efforts provided Ukraine with the means to continue defending itself, although the sustainability of such efforts is questionable. The authors’ findings indicate that more effective deterrence measures, such as a defence pact, may have discouraged the invasion, while building weapons stocks during times of peace are essential given that dollars cannot be converted quickly into the means of war.

ABSTRACT

The war in Ukraine is a man-made disaster. The USA engaged in both ex ante and ex post budgeting to support Ukraine. The authors examined the scholarly literature related to budgeting for disasters, combining the literature regarding general disaster budgeting with relevant literature on foreign aid. The authors assessed how well the USA’s budgeting matched the prescriptions of the disaster budgeting literature. They conclude that the USA fell short in terms of its mitigation efforts but performed well regarding its response efforts. Additionally, the USA garnered important benefits from its spending. Sustaining the effort, however, may prove problematic politically with public support declining and donor fatigue setting in, as well as pressures from newer conflicts.

KEYWORDS:

• Deterrence
• disaster budgeting
• donor benefits
• emergency
• emergency mitigation
• emergency response
• military aid
• sustainability
• War in Ukraine

Introduction

In 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum, promising to respect the independence and borders of Ukraine (see https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb). It violated the agreement when it invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014 and supported separatist movements in Donbas. A low-level war ensued in Donbas until Russia escalated the conflict on 24 February 2022, with a large-scale invasion. While the Western response to the Crimean invasion and subsequent fighting in Donbas was limited, Western countries reacted strongly to the all-out invasion of Ukraine with large-scale sanctions and billions of dollars/euros in military, financial and humanitarian support (Szőke & Kusica, 2023). The USA alone has budgeted over $113 billion to support Ukraine (Trebesch et al., 2023).

War is a man-made disaster that is different in many ways from natural disasters such as earthquakes and weather events. Budgeting (in terms of strategies, techniques and outcomes) to sustain an ally during war is therefore likely different than budgeting for other types of disasters. The purpose of this article is to assess the budget strategies used to support Ukraine during this man-made disaster. Specifically, we examine how the USA budgeted for this disaster. In doing so, we consider three main questions:

• Were the budget strategies used appropriate given the US federal government’s fiscal governance structure?

• Is the effort sustainable?

• Has the response been effective in terms of benefits versus costs?

The article proceeds as follows. We examine the scholarly literature related to budgeting for disasters, where we combine the literature regarding general disaster budgeting with relevant literature on foreign aid. We then discuss the USA’s budgeting behaviour both prior to the war and in response to it. Next, we assess if the USA received any benefits from its spending to support Ukraine’s defence. Finally, we conclude by discussing how our work adds to our understanding of disaster budgeting.

Budgeting for disasters

Disasters are sudden events that produce ‘extensive damage and destruction’ (Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). They can result from either natural (for example earthquakes or weather events) or human-made causes (for example armed conflicts, industrial accidents or riots) (Smith, 2006a). In general, disasters are difficult to predict, occur infrequently and vary in the amount of damage they cause. These qualities ‘leave governments in a quandary about whether, when and what action to take to manage them’ (Donahue & Joyce, 2001, p. 729). Budgeting for disasters involves important decisions about whether to allocate scarce resources given the opportunity costs of not preparing and responding to disasters.

When budgeting for disasters, governments can appropriate money for four types of activities: mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Smith, 2006a). Mitigation seeks to prevent and/or reduce the damage that would likely result from potential disasters. A levee system might be constructed to prevent and reduce the impacts of floods, whereas defence build ups might be undertaken in order to deter and reduce the damage from armed conflicts. Preparedness involves expenditures for actions that enhance a jurisdiction’s readiness to respond effectively to disasters. This may include purchasing emergency response equipment (for example fire trucks, anti-aircraft systems) and hiring and training personnel. Response activities are those that are undertaken when a disaster is underway or in its immediate aftermath. This involves deploying personnel and other resources. Finally, recovery involves efforts to repair damage and restore the well-being of victims and communities.

Governments budget for these activities both ex ante and ex post (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Smith, 2006a, 2006b; Phaup & Kirschner, 2010; Anessi-Pessina et al., 2020). The disaster budgeting literature generally argues that governments should engage in ex ante budgeting as much as possible in order to reduce the impact of disaster shocks on both their communities and their fiscal well-being (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Smith, 2006a; Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). This can involve funding mitigation and preparedness activities in annual budgets in order to reduce the magnitude of the damage caused by disasters. It can also involve appropriating money in annual budgets that equal estimated average disaster-related costs and/or establishing contingency reserve funds to ensure that sufficient money is available to finance response and recovery activities. Another strategy used by subnational governments are mutual aid pacts for localized regions which often incentivize governments to increase their response capacities to meet the specified obligations (Smith, 2006b).

The challenge with ex ante budgeting is that there is a great degree of uncertainty surrounding both the probability of disasters occurring and the magnitude of the resulting damage. Elected officials do not like to spend ex ante because doing so diverts resources from other priorities (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Phaup & Kirschner, 2010). Indeed, the US federal government often eschewed ex ante spending for disasters because concerns over the size of the deficit (see Douglas & Raudla, 2020) and self-imposed rules such as caps on discretionary spending (Donahue & Joyce, 2001) create a zero-sum environment that discourages expenditures on disaster-related activities.

Once disasters occur, governments generally rely on ex post budgeting to deal with them. As Smith (2006a, 11) explains, ‘Historically, when disaster strikes, all levels of government do what is necessary and worry about paying for it later’. This entails reprogramming money previously appropriated for other purposes, drawing down reserves and/or passing supplemental appropriations to finance disaster response and recovery activities. These actions can result in service disruptions for programmes that are cut, tax increases and higher debt burdens. In fact, national governments tend to fund the bulk of their disaster responses with deficit-financed supplemental appropriations (Fielding, 2014), which was the case for many countries (including the USA) during the Covid 19 crisis (see Heald & Hodges, 2020; Joyce & Prabowo, 2020; Raudla & Douglas, 2020).

While the US federal government has an annual budget to respond to international disasters (Margesson, 2015), the amounts are insufficient to meet large-scale events—necessitating a reliance on supplemental appropriations when financing disaster response and recovery efforts. Typically, all foreign assistance amounts to less than 1% of the US federal budget. This has been the case, with few exceptions, since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Within the federal allocation for foreign aid, only a very small portion is dedicated to ex ante disaster assistance. The agency co-ordinating the federal government's efforts in overseas disaster response is USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The OFDA annually receives around 0.05% of the federal budget (USAID, 2019). By comparison, 0.32% of the federal budget was allocated for assistance to Ukraine in 2022. In addition to OFDA, smaller allocations are appropriated to the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, and the Department of Defense (DoD). As with general budgeting for disasters, the relatively small allocations for foreign disaster assistance are not sufficient in the event of large-scale disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. During that crisis, Congress approved $656 million in additional direct relief for countries impacted by the tsunami (Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005). Thus, international and defence-related crises have often been financed via supplementals (Banks & Straussman, 1999; McCaffery, 2007; Margesson, 2015). Fortunately, the USA has a large capacity to deficit-finance to meet its disaster-related needs (Douglas & Raudla, 2020), so it does not need to build up reserves to ensure that it has adequate revenues during crises.

Disasters, particularly international crises, have the potential to last for years. Thus, donor fatigue is a possible threat to continued funding (Fielding, 2014), making sustainability an important consideration for effective disaster responses. One important factor in determining a government’s willingness to sustain aid over time is the funding behaviour of other countries. Fielding (2014) found that countries, including the USA, were more willing to continue providing resources for international disasters when other countries were also donating resources. Citizen support is another important variable for democratic governments to consider. Heinrich et al. (2018) found that governments respond to citizen preferences concerning international aid when they believe that voters will hold them responsible for their funding decisions. One relevant attitude is citizens’ negative feelings towards corrupt regimes. Bauhr et al. (2013) found that citizens’ support for aid to a country declines if they perceive that nation to be corrupt, although this attitude is less severe when they believe the aid serves the donor country’s national interest. In the USA, ideology also plays an important role, with conservatives traditionally being more supportive of defence spending (Eichenberg & Stoll, 2017) and providing military aid to other countries (Milner & Tingley, 2010). Thus, decisions by governments about whether to continue budgeting for a particular disaster in another country could change over time depending upon the actions of other governments and the shifting attitudes of citizens.

Budgeting for the war in Ukraine: Aid from the USA

In this section we discuss the USA’s mitigation, preparation and response efforts. Recovery efforts are not discussed because the war is still ongoing and the current budget priority is response.

Ex ante mitigation and preparedness

Wars can be expensive endeavours. Countries therefore have an incentive to seek methods that can either prevent conflicts or reduce the damage done by potential adversaries if a war were to occur. Thus, countries may invest resources to prevent, mitigate and prepare for conflicts. While the USA spends a considerable amount of money on an annual basis on what could be considered mitigation efforts, its investments did not prevent the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, preparation efforts likely enabled Ukraine to survive the initial Russian assault. This section discusses a number of mitigation and preparation options available to the USA (and its NATO allies).

Annual defence spending: One method countries use to try to mitigate conflicts is building up their military capabilities. As the old adage goes: ‘To secure peace is to prepare for war’. Doing so increases the potential costs to adversaries should they choose to attack and, therefore, may serve as a deterrent. Additionally, a strong military may be able to limit the damage inflicted by an enemy if a war breaks out. Of course, a strong military could induce a country to use it in an aggressive manner to achieve national goals. Indeed, the deterrence literature is mixed on whether arms build ups reduce (Kydd, 2000) or increase (Gibler et al., 2005) the probability of war.

In the context of Ukraine, the US military likely serves as a deterrent against any country considering an invasion of a US ally. The USA has the world’s largest economy, estimated to be more than 11 times the size of the Russian economy—the instigator of the Ukraine war (calculated from data provided at: https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/). The US federal budget was almost $6.3 trillion dollars in FY 2022 and $6.4 trillion in FY 2023. Its defence spending during those years was $752.1 billion in FY 2022 and approximately $800.2 billion in FY 2023. These numbers equal 3% of GDP (budget data come from the Office of Management and Budget’s Historical Tables at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/), a little more than a third of what the country spent at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s and approximately half of what it spent in the late 1980s as the Cold War wound down. While the USA does not spend at the levels it once did, it outspends the next 10 biggest defence spenders combined and accounts for approximately 40% of the world’s total defence expenditures (calculated from data provided at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/defense-spending-by-country). Thus, the USA has a tremendous capacity to provide aid to Ukraine in its efforts to stave off the Russian invasion.

One interesting aspect of budgeting for conflicts is the need to accumulate stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. Because of its high fiscal capacity, the US federal government does not need to build up financial reserves to pay its disaster-related expenses. However, dollars are not easily converted into instruments of war in the short term. Therefore, the USA purchases weapons in sufficient amounts over time to ensure it has both the materials and industrial base to support long-term conflicts. Thus, the USA has developed large military stocks—for example, prior to the Russian invasion, the USA had 6,140 main battle tanks, 15,908 armored personnel carriers (APC), 5,419 infantry-fighting vehicles (IFV), 2,538 howitzers and 635 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), as well as vast amounts of equipment and ammunition of all types (Trebesch et al., 2023). These stocks serve as a sort of rainy-day fund for weapons—instead of accumulating dollars like state and local governments often do to pay for unexpected disaster expenses (Pope & Leland, 2019), the federal government amasses military equipment and weapons in reserves so they are available for disaster response if a conflict breaks out. These reserves are readily available for use by the US military or can be provided to other countries, such as Ukraine, via presidential drawdown authority (PDA).

Direct aid: The USA has a long history of providing aid to Ukraine. The Congressional Research Service (CRS, 2021) reports that the USA provided Ukraine with $4.9 billion in aid between 1992 and 2014, approximately $213 million a year, mostly for humanitarian and development purposes. After Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas began in 2014, the USA began sending security assistance to enable Ukraine to defend itself and deter further Russian aggression (CRS, 2021; Szőke & Kusica, 2023). In FY 2016, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) was created in the DoD as a mechanism to provide security aid to Ukraine. Initial security assistance came in nonlethal forms—for example helmets, thermal imaging equipment, medical kits, Humvees, patrol boats and training. Lethal assistance began in 2018 with the delivery of 37 Javelin (anti-tank) launchers and 360 missiles, weapons that were considered defensive and therefore less likely to lead to an escalation of the conflict. As the 2022 full-scale invasion approached, additional lethal aid came in the form of small arms, heavy weapons ammunition and training (CRS, 2021; 2024; Szőke & Kusica, 2023). Overall, between 2014 and 2022, a total of $2.5 billion in security assistance and $351 million in humanitarian aid was provided to Ukraine (CRS, 2021). While the overall quantity of security aid was modest, Szőke and Kusica (2023) argue that the combined aid from the USA and other NATO countries prior to the invasion helped Ukraine stop Russia from conquering the country in its initial assault.

Treaties and alliances: Treaties and alliances can be low-cost methods for mitigating conflicts, although the budgetary costs of forming and maintaining these agreements are not easy to calculate. In 1994, the USA, UK and Russia agreed to the Budapest Memoranda, which promised that the three nations would respect the independence and borders of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. They stopped short, however, of guaranteeing these rights via military commitments. Ukraine first broached NATO membership in 2008 and has consistently pushed to enter the alliance after Russia violated the Budapest Memoranda and invaded Crimea in 2014 (Greaney, 2022). Unfortunately for Ukraine, it was unsuccessful in its bid and therefore was not a participant in any defence pacts at the time of the Russian attack in 2022.

Many scholars of deterrence and alliances would contend that the NATO alliance did not go far enough. A range of empirical findings in the literature suggest that the USA and its allies might have successfully deterred Russian aggression if Ukraine had been formally welcomed as a member. Fortna (2003) found that peace agreements (like the Budapest Memoranda) are more likely to hold when there are credible guarantees by third-party nations or the provision of peacekeeping troops. Moreover, research has generally found that defensive alliances can deter conflicts, presumably because they increase the potential costs to an aggressor nation of engaging in war (Krause, 2004; Johnson & Leeds, 2011; Wright & Rider, 2014; Leeds & Johnson, 2017; Morrow, 2017; McManus, 2018; but see Kenwick et al., 2015). Four findings are particularly relevant to the Ukraine case. First, Wright and Rider (2014) found that defence pacts are negatively associated with conflict even under the condition of territorial competition, when the stakes are especially high. Second, Morrow (2017) found that alliances make conflict less likely when a third-party nation enters into a pact with a country recently involved in a conflict with an aggressor nation. Third, Krause (2004) found that arms transfers from major powers to target nations increase the chance of conflict, except when accompanied by a defence pact with the major power, in which case the chance of conflict decreases. Finally, military alliances are most likely to deter conflict when they are populated by democratic states and when the aggregated power of the alliance dwarfs the power of the potential challenger. This is certainly the case with NATO and its preponderance of military power compared to Russia (Conrad, 2017). In another relevant study, McManus (2018) concluded that major powers can deter aggression against minor countries if they convincingly signal their intent to assist those countries if attacked.

These studies suggest that the USA and its NATO allies may have made mistakes by neglecting to enter a defensive alliance with Ukraine or, at a minimum, effectively signaling how they would respond if Russia invaded. Instead, Russia received signals that indicated a likely weak response on the part of the USA and its allies—for example Russia’s invasions of Georgia and Crimea elicited limited reactions by the West, Europe was heavily dependent upon Russian gas and oil, the USA withdrew suddenly from Afghanistan, and 20 of NATO’s 30 member states in 2021 were spending less than the 2% of GDP-guideline on defence (NATO expenditure levels come from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_184844.htm). Additionally, the arms transfers to Ukraine in the absence of a defence agreement may have increased the likelihood of war (Krause, 2004). Thus, incurring the costs of entering a defensive pact with Ukraine or posing as a credible threat to invasion may have averted the potentially higher costs of supporting Ukraine’s war effort.

While no treaties or alliances served to prevent the war, the NATO Alliance has proved to be useful to the USA in its support for Ukraine. NATO countries stockpiled military equipment over the years and provided Ukraine with €17 billion in financial assistance, mostly in the form of loans, between 2014 and 2021 (Trebesch et al., 2023). Additionally, some defensive military equipment—including portable anti-tank and air-defence systems—was delivered to Ukraine shortly before the invasion began (Szőke & Kusica, 2023). Thus, the alliance functions as a type of mutual aid agreement whereby the costs of disasters can be spread across jurisdictions—the USA does not have to incur all the costs on its own.

Ex post response

The USA responded to the Russian invasion in the way it often does when budgeting for the human-made disaster of war—it provided material assistance, passed supplemental appropriations and mobilized its allies to give additional support. As discussed, the USA has committed approximately $113 billion in funds for response efforts. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimates that Ukraine is directly receiving $76.8 billion from the USA, making it the largest donor of bilateral aid from any country. This amounts to 0.33% of GDP in the USA, which the Kiel Institute points out is lower than previous US commitments to war efforts. The USA’s aid to the UK and the Soviet Union during the Second World War equalled 3.16% and 1.4% of GDP respectively, and expenditures as a percentage of GDP for the USA’s involvement in wars has been 2.77% for Korea, 0.96% for Vietnam, 0.67% for the 2003–2010 period in Iraq, and 0.25% for the 2001–2010 period in Afghanistan (Trebesch et al., 2023). Except for the war in Afghanistan, the magnitude of the cost to the USA for aid to Ukraine is much lower than previous conflicts. These figures come from a major world war and wars where the USA was directly engaged, so it is not surprising that expenses were higher for those events. However, they do indicate that providing aid to Ukraine is less expensive to the USA than becoming an active participant in the war, which could happen if Russia defeats Ukraine and subsequently targets NATO countries.

Presidential drawdown authority (PDA): The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 gives the president the authority to send materials from military stocks to countries in immediate need of military assistance. Supplemental assistance packages can then be used to replenish stocks after they are transferred. Prior to the war, a drawdown funding cap of $100 million dollars was in place. This was raised by Congress in supplemental appropriations bills to $11 billion for FY 2022 and $14 billion for FY 2023. As of January 2024, President Biden had used the authority 54 times to transfer over $23.9 billion worth of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine. Uses of the authority are broken down by fiscal year in Table 1. There is no expiration date on this authority, so it can be utilized in FY 2024 and beyond (CRS, 2024; U.S. Department of State, 2023a).

Table 1. Presidential drawdowns.

FY	Presidential drawdown authority (PDA)#	Value
2021	1	$60 million
2022	2–21	$9.2 billion
2023	22–47	$14.6 billion
Total		$23.9 billion

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS, 2024).

PDA has been vitally important for supporting Ukraine because, unlike recent efforts to assist other countries in conflict (Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia) where training was the primary form of assistance, Ukraine is experiencing a war of mass where large volumes of equipment and ammunition are needed. Receiving large volumes is especially critical for Ukraine because it started the war severely outgunned—for example Russia began the conflict with a 12-to-1 advantage in artillery and was firing as many as 32,000 rounds per day compared to Ukraine’s average of 6,000 (Marsh, 2023). PDA also enabled the USA to adjust its weapons transfers depending upon how events change on the battlefield. As the war moved into new phases, the types of equipment provided changed—for example anti-air and missile-defence systems were provided in larger numbers when Russia began its missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, and tanks and IFVs were donated in larger numbers as Ukraine prepared for its 2023 summer counter-offensive (Marsh, 2023; Szőke & Kusica, 2023). Weapons donations have not come without problems, however. They suffer from a classic principal–agent problem because the interests of the USA and Ukraine do not always align. The USA has concerns about escalation and potentially losing high-level equipment to the Russians. As a result, the weapons provided have not always matched-up well with Ukraine’s requests and delays in receiving certain weapons systems have cost Ukraine on the battlefield (Marsh, 2023). There are also concerns that the USA’s stocks and production capacity for certain weapons and ammunition (particularly artillery shells) is insufficient to supply a long war (Kroenig & Starling, 2023; Seligman & Hudson, 2023).

Despite these concerns, the USA has provided vast quantities of military articles to Ukraine—for example nearly 1,000 armoured vehicles and howitzers, multiple missile systems and millions of rounds of ammunition (U.S. Department of State, 2023b). While concerns over ammunition shortages exist, the Kiel Institute reports that the USA’s donations of heavy equipment amount to small percentages of stocks: the US has only given approximately 1% of its battle tanks, 3% of its APCs, 4% of its IFVs, 8% of its 155mm howitzers and 6% of its MRLSs (Trebesch et al., 2023). Thus, while some reserve stocks are being strained (for example artillery rounds), others still have considerable capacity.

Supplemental appropriations: In 2022, Congress passed four emergency supplemental appropriations bills to provide support to Ukraine. These acts appropriated $113.5 billion for efforts supporting Ukraine, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. US supplemental funding for Ukraine assistance.

Act	Funding ($billion)
Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act 2022	$13.6
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act 2022	$40.15
Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act 2023	$12.35
Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act 2023	$47.37
TOTAL	$113.46

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS, 2023b).

Major funding areas included direct support to Ukraine for various activities, support of US operations in Europe, support for countries bordering Ukraine and money to replenish the USA’s military stocks (CRS, 2024, 2023a; Trebesch et al., 2023). In terms of direct aid to Ukraine, the CRS reports that $48.7 billion was appropriated for security assistance, including $25.93 billion to replenish stocks (i.e. this accounts for equipment provided via PDA), $18 billion for the USAI programme, and $4.73 billion (some of which are available to other countries affected by the war) for the Foreign Military Financing programme which can be used by countries to purchase military equipment from the USA (CRS, 2024). Another $22.9 billion was appropriated to provide Ukraine with direct financial support to enable it to pay salaries and maintain critical services, such as education, healthcare and emergency response. These funds are sent by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to Ukraine via the World Bank. The World Bank is typically used by the USA to distribute financial support to countries because it is able to consolidate aid from multiple sources and has accountability mechanisms in place (CRS, 2023a; USAID, 2023). Finally, $1.4 billion in humanitarian assistance for things like generators, emergency shelters, medicine and food; and $1.4 billion in development assistance to support economic activity and governance structures were provided (USAID, 2023).

Annual defence spending: Outside of the direct aid it is giving to Ukraine, the USA continues to spend heavily on defence. While this spending may not assist Ukraine directly, the deployment of powerful US forces across the globe likely prevents Russia from committing at least some of its forces against Ukraine as it seeks to secure its borders and challenge the USA’s power elsewhere.

Mobilize allies: The USA has not gone it alone in giving aid to Ukraine. The USA’s allies, especially NATO members, have also contributed significant amounts. The USA is a leading member of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, where 54 countries work to co-ordinate support for Ukraine. The USA hosted several meetings at its air base in Ramstein, Germany (Garamone, 2023). Members of the group pledged tens of billions of euros worth of aid to Ukraine. By 1 August 2023, other countries committed a total of €25.7 billion in financial assistance, €10.7 billion in humanitarian aid, and €47.2 billion in security support. Not surprisingly, European countries are the biggest donors from this group, committing 50% of the financial, 62% of the humanitarian, and 87% of the military aid pledged by all non-US countries. The European Peace Facility, European Investment Bank, EU Commission, EU Council, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, United Nations and the World Bank have also committed €98.6 billion in mostly financial aid to Ukraine (numbers calculated from Keil Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker Excel file, folder: Bilateral Assistance, MAIN DATA, found at Trebesch et al., 2023). Military commitments include large quantities of weapons, equipment and ammunition (numbers calculated from Ukraine Support Tracker Excel file, folder: Share, Heavy Weapons to Ukraine, found at Trebesch et al., 2023). Thus, the costs have been spread out across many jurisdictions, reducing the amount the USA has spent to support Ukraine.

Sustainability

The ability of the USA to continue to support Ukraine effectively during the war is likely dependent upon strengthening public support and increasing the productive capacity of the defence industry in key areas.

Public support: When Russia initially launched its invasion in February 2022, Americans widely supported sending aid to Ukraine. A CNN poll at the end of that month found that 62% of Americans thought the USA should do more to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine (Agiesta, 2023). A later Gallup poll (see Younis, 2023), however, showed that such support is declining, especially among Republicans. Americans are becoming increasingly leery about continuing support, with 41% of respondents saying that the USA is doing too much, up from 25% in August 2022. The partisan divide is particularly stark, with 62% of Republicans (up from 43%) and 14% of Democrats (up from 9%) agreeing that the USA is doing too much. Furthermore, 61% of respondents (81% of Republicans and 34% of Democrats) indicated that the USA should limit how much support it provides to Ukraine. Republicans in Congress have also been increasingly reluctant to support additional funding. President Biden requested an additional $24 billion for aid to Ukraine in August 2023 which House Republicans failed to act upon (Hoffman et al., 2023). In October 2023, the Administration attempted to package $61.4 billion in assistance to Ukraine within a larger package of $105 billion that would also provide funding to Israel and other security actions, and the Senate passed a $95 billion supplemental aid bill in February 2024 which provided approximately $60 billion for Ukraine. In both cases, Republicans in the House refused to provide the requested funding for Ukraine. As a result, the Administration is expressing concern that it is running out of budget authorizations with which to support Ukraine (Liebermann & Judd, 2023).

Donor fatigue is clearly setting in and there are a number of likely factors driving this trend. First, the perception that Ukraine's war effort is effective has declined over the last two years. By the end of 2023, for instance, 64% of all US adults said that ‘neither side’ is currently winning the war. That was a seven-percentage point increase from just a few months earlier (Younis, 2023). Second, Americans have also come to see Russia's war as less of a direct threat to the USA’s interests. Only 33% of Americans viewed Russia's aggression as a major threat in December 2023. By comparison, 50% saw it as a threat when the war initially began in March 2022 (Cerda, 2023). These changes in perception are consistent with theoretical models arguing that the information gap between leaders and the public closes as a conflict drags on (Baum & Potter, 2008). This narrowing of the information gap—when the public has access to more accurate information about the conflict's progress—tends to lead to declining public support. Additionally, the scholarly literature finds that support for aid to other countries declines when the money is going to corrupt regimes (Bauhr et al., 2013) and when partner countries are providing little funding (Fielding, 2014). It is therefore possible that reports of corruption in Ukraine, as well as perceptions that the USA is providing more than its fair share towards Ukraine’s defence, are having detrimental effects on Americans’ willingness to provide additional funding. The latter is not necessarily accurate. Although (at the time of writing) the USA has provided the greatest amount of budgetary support in absolute dollars, the USA does not even rank in the top 10 as a share of GDP (Trebesch et al., 2023). The Baltic states have been especially supportive of Ukraine (Peda, 2024), providing at least three times as much support as the USA as a percentage of GDP. Nevertheless, the perception still remains that other countries are not contributing as much as the USA and this undoubtedly influences overall support for US assistance. What is particularly interesting is the low Republican support for assisting Ukraine, given that conservatives have traditionally been more supportive of defence spending and military aid to other countries than liberals (Milner & Tingley, 2010; Eichenberg & Stoll, 2017). Uncovering exactly what is driving the decline in support is likely to be crucial in determining the extent to which the USA will continue to aid Ukraine.

Weapons stocks and productive capacity: Small percentages of weapons have been given from some weapons inventories, but others are running low (Cancian, 2022). The munitions industry is having a particularly hard time keeping up with demand because Ukraine is using artillery rounds and missiles faster than they can be replaced (Cancian, 2022; Laudati, 2022; Kroenig & Starling, 2023; Seligman & Hudson, 2023). The pressure on the USA’s defence industry has also increased because of the war in Israel, which is demanding many of the same munitions needed by Ukraine (McLeary, 2023), as well as Taiwan as it tries to upgrade its capability to defend itself (Laudati, 2022) and other allies as they seek to purchase modern US weapons systems (Gould, 2023). The USA has taken steps to increase production, but significant increases in output will likely take years (Cancian, 2022; Laudati, 2022). This pressure is eased somewhat by commitments of US allies to provide weapons to Ukraine and ramp up the production of their own defence industries. Still, the supply of weapons has its limits and may become problematic if the war drags on.

Benefits of supporting Ukraine

The costs to the USA of its efforts to support Ukraine are clear. The USA has committed over $113 billion dollars and is likely to spend more. The USA also depleted some of its weapons stocks, which may stress the USA if it, or its allies, become involved in other conflicts, as is now occurring in Gaza. However, the USA benefited in several ways from its support. We briefly discuss several of the benefits in this section.

Saving Ukraine from conquest

Many pundits in the West feared that Russia would overrun Ukraine within a short period of time once it launched its invasion. Szőke and Kusica (2023) and Marsh (2023) argue that weapons provided by the USA and its Western allies have been decisive in preventing Russia from conquering Ukraine but also in enabling Ukraine to retake significant territories that Russia had captured in its initial assaults. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that were provided prior to the conflict played important roles in blunting the Russian advances on the ground and control of the skies over the battlefield. Precision artillery and MLRSs were donated in significant numbers once the war began, enabling Ukraine to disrupt Russian logistics hubs, supplies and command centers, as well as inflicting heavy casualties on Russian forces. The strengthened Ukrainian military was thus able to compel the Russians to withdraw along several fronts. More recent provisions of heavy tanks and IFVs were used by Ukraine to launch its summer offensive. Although offensive operations have been less successful than hoped, US aid to Ukraine has helped it to recapture over half of the land once occupied by the Russian army (Bundura & Timtchenko, 2023). It has also degraded Russia’s offensive capabilities (Gady & Kofman, 2023).

Damage to an adversary

The Russian military is a potential threat to the USA’s NATO allies. The war in Ukraine has seriously degraded that threat. ORYX (https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html) keeps a running tally of Russian equipment losses (destroyed, captured, abandoned and damaged). It only reports losses that it can verify via photos and videos, so the numbers it posts are likely an underestimation. It reports large losses for the Russian military, including 2,474 tanks, 3,022 IFVs, 823 artillery systems, 303 MLRSs, 132 helicopters, 94 aircraft and thousands of other vehicles of various types. While casualties for personnel are difficult to approximate, a recent scientific study estimated that, as of February 2023, Russian military casualties equalled 218,800, with 76,687 deaths (Radford et al., 2023). These losses have weakened the Russian military, making it less of threat to NATO countries in Eastern Europe. Europe is strategically important to the USA, so a Russian victory would likely mean the USA would have to invest substantially more to help defend its NATO allies (Bundura & Timtchenko, 2023), not to mention the costs it would incur if it became involved in a shooting war defending these allies. Kroenig and Starling (2023) argue that the Ukraine war has demonstrated that providing weapons to its allies in Eastern Europe is an inexpensive and effective way for the USA to protect its interests. Additionally, the war has demonstrated the strength of the NATO alliance, as its members have come together to support Ukraine and Russia has not taken military action against any NATO member despite its threats to do so.

Impact on the USA’s defence industrial base

The war certainly put a strain on the USA’s military stocks and production. However, this can be seen as a benefit in that it has highlighted deficiencies in the weapons procurement system. The war showed that the US industrial base does not currently have the capacity to supply a long war (Kroenig & Starling, 2023). The USA has often made poor budgetary decisions, such as cutting munitions orders as a cost-saving practice (Eaglan, 2023), and ordering weapons in a sporadic manner rather than using multi-year contracts, making it unprofitable for defence manufacturers to maintain or expand capacity (Seligman & Hudson, 2023). The resulting shortcomings have induced the USA to begin to evaluate and make corrections to its purchasing practices (Laudati, 2022; Lopez, 2022).

Providing aid also enabled the USA to test many of its weapons systems in actual combat situations (Cancian, 2022). As well, the effectiveness of US systems has encouraged other countries to place orders for their own militaries (Laudati, 2022; Gould, 2023; Bundura & Timtchenko, 2023), which contributed to a 55.9% increase in foreign military sales by the US government in FY 2023, an increase of almost $30 billion above the previous year’s sales (https://www.state.gov/fiscal-year-2023-u-s-arms-transfers-and-defense-trade/). These increased weapons sales are likely to encourage the defence industry to expand its productive capacity, which creates jobs and makes it easier for the US military to access weapons should it go to war.

Finally, another benefit of sending weapons to Ukraine is that US stocks will be replenished with newer weapons and munitions and it will no longer need to store and maintain older systems.

Conclusion

The US implemented the following budgeting strategies regarding the Ukraine war. As recommended by the disaster budgeting literature (Donahue & Joyce, 2001; Smith, 2006a; Phaup & Kirschner, 2010), it engaged in ex ante mitigation and preparation. In this regard, it built up material reserves, sent aid to Ukraine and maintained its NATO alliance. Its efforts, however, were insufficient to prevent the Russian invasion. The security aid it sent prior to 2022 was too little to convince Russia that the Ukrainian military was strong enough to resist an attack, and the deterrence literature (Krause, 2004) suggests that it may even have increased the chance of war. Additionally, the deterrence literature (Johnson & Leeds, 2011; Wright & Rider, 2014; Leeds & Johnson, 2017; Morrow, 2017) suggests further that, while the NATO Alliance helped prepare the West to aid Ukraine, the unwillingness of the USA and its allies to enter into a defensive pact with Ukraine likely increased the likelihood of conflict. Thus, the deterrence literature has important insights regarding ex ante preparations for the human-made disaster of war:

• It indicates that spending on mitigation and preparation expenses (i.e. providing weapons to a target nation prior to the onset of war) may actually be counter-productive, especially if the aggressor nation does not see the aid as a sufficient hazard.

• It signals that mutual aid pacts (i.e. alliances) are not just mechanisms for spreading the cost of a disaster across jurisdictions but can serve as an important mechanism for avoiding the disaster all together—for example no NATO member has ever been attacked by a foreign power.

The USA’s ex post response involved drawing down military stocks, passing supplemental appropriations and working with its allies. It is clear that spending to support an ally engaged in a war is less costly than entering the war as a belligerent. A key issue that is not adequately addressed in the budgeting for disasters literature is the sustainability of response efforts. Wars have the potential to go on for years, citizens’ support for wars can decline over time and dollars are not easily convertible into weapons. Thus, budgeting for the human-made disaster of war requires policy-makers to nurture public support and maintain an adequate industrial base and military stocks to supply the materials needed to address the disaster. This research demonstrates to policy-makers that providing aid to Ukraine benefits the USA. Renewing aid efforts should enable Ukraine to survive as a nation, continue to cripple a major US adversary (and may discourage China from behaving aggressively towards its neighbours), and continue to improve the US defence industry.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James W. Douglas

James W. Douglas is a Professor in the Department of Political Science & Public Administration at UNC Charlotte, USA. His main research interests are fiscal policy, public budgeting and public debt.

Justin Conrad

Justin Conrad is the Gary K. Bertsch Director of the Center for International Trade and Security and Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, USA. His main research interests include international conflict and public policy.

Joseph A. Frederick

Joseph A. Frederick is the Chair of the Military Science Department at UNC Charlotte, USA. His main research interests are in asset management and succession planning.