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ABSTRACT
Much contemporary scholarship on ziran and wuwei views these concepts, which are often coupled, as being 1) anti-intention, effort, purpose, and self-consciousness; 2) indicative of a distinct type of ethics and/or morality; and 3) a rejection of following custom and convention. This paper will draw largely on the philosophy of Guo Xiang to demonstrate that these widely agreed upon avenues of interpretation are limited and run contrary to other more nuanced readings of ziran and wuwei. I argue that ziran and wuwei are better appreciated as speaking to attitudes, that they should be understood in terms of degrees rather than categories, and that the Laozi and Zhuangzi offer them as advice for ways of reflecting—they are not standardizable ethical rules. In this way, we can see how ziran and wuwei include intention and effort, are anti (most forms of) ethics and morality, and are inherently intertwined with customs and convention.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. In their respective works, Chen 陳鼓應 (Citation2020), Wang 王中江 (Citation2015), Hans-Georg Moeller (Citation2006), Lai (Citation2007), Shi 釋德清 (Citation2019), and Bruya (Citation2022) (just to name a few) all note differences between ziran and wuwei, but also say they more or less can be used interchangeably. The differences they note in their respective works are not identical, but further discussion of this falls outside the scope of this article. Readers interested in these issues should refer to their works.
2. Nearly since the inception of these texts, calling a reading of a thinker, text, school, or tradition ‘thorough’ or tong has been high praise. A tong reading is one which cuts through different concepts, passages, and other highly regarded interpretations.
3. These terms are all subject to a broad range of interpretations and are interchangeable only in the most general or even colloquial senses. Since they have been used in various ways by different scholars, and the goal here is simply to note the basic similarities, we will not seek to further define them.
4. The ‘ethical’ reading of ziran and wuwei—but ziran in particular—is a complex issue. We can read Wang Bi as already arguing that ziran is ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ (for example, see Tang, Citation1957). However, Wang’s idea of ethics or morality is quite different from the way contemporary scholars have discussed them in relation to ziran (and wuwei) (For more on this see D’Ambrosio, Citation2019, Citation2022b)). For this reason, we can say that reading ziran and wuwei as ethical is potentially misleading, i.e. ‘ethics’ might be understood as exactly what Wang thinks that ziran and wuwei oppose. For a more detailed account of various ethical approaches to the Laozi, see D’Ambrosio (Citation2022a).
5. Of course, we can identify some rather obviously problematic intentions and purposes, such as stealing just because one covets what another has. But the Laozi and Zhuangzi provide far more nuanced philosophical appreciations, so focusing on these types of issues does not help us better what ziran-wuwei mean.
6. Some of my colleagues do not like this way of doing philosophy. They say things like ‘There is no reason to believe Guo has a better understanding of the Zhuangzi than Professor X’. Sure, we can always start afresh when doing philosophy, but I do not find this an attractive way to work or see how one could have so much interest in the Zhuangzi but such little interest in the commentators that closely followed. In any case, finding a balance between developing new ideas and making ‘original contributions’ and appreciating traditional texts and scholarship is not an easy task. For those who do not think it is relevant to draw on Guo to respond to contemporary thinkers, I suggest not reading this paper.
7. Some might argue that in traditional Chinese literature we find similar ‘anti-intention’ discussions. This is true, but they are, as will be demonstrated below, much more nuanced than much of what we find today. And more importantly, we also find many great ziran-wuwei inspired thinkers speaking very positively about intention/purpose related notions such as zhi 志 and yi 意 (Ruan Ji 阮籍, d. 263, is a great example).
8. Two major challenges from the Laozi and Zhuangzi are Laozi Chapter 2 and Zhuangzi 10.1. Chapter 2 of the Laozi begins ‘All under heaven know beautiful as beautiful, then there is already the ugly; all know good as good, then there is already not good’. The chapter goes on to show how various opposites construct one another—implying that good and not good constitute one another, or noticing the one highlights the other. Zhuangzi 10.1 states that ‘robbers also have a dao’. In this context, and in other places the Zhuangzi relates the specific activities of robbers to Confucian values.
9. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will just use ‘ethical’, but some scholars use ‘moral’ or make a distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’. Exploring the point in more depth is outside the scope of this paper.
10. Chan does add some nuance to this description later in his article: ‘Laozi may have been tempted to postulate a perfect dao. It would be a dao with no social contribution. So the Zhuangzi differs in this important attitude from the Laozi—we need not try to escape from social life and conventions. Conventions underlie the possibility of communication and are, thus, useful. This gives Zhuangzi’s Daoism less of the primitive thrust of the Daode Jing (the term wu-wei virtually disappears in the inner chapters) (Hansen, Citation2007, n.p.).
11. See Slingerland (Citation1998, Citation2014).
12. Slingerland describes how wuwei in a Confucian context also involves a suspicion of conventions (Citation1998, pp. 49, 132, 177, 220).
13. This is a fairly widely held view. For example, Yuan Zhang and Douglas Berger write that wuwei is sometimes characterized by one who ‘does not value prevailing social standards and norms’ (Zhang & Berger, Citation2023, p. 310). And Eric Nelson contends: ‘Even if the Daodejing can be read as denying the human in rejecting conventional human attitudes and virtues and favoring nature as an impersonal and indifferent order, as in legalist interpretations of the remark about “straw dogs”, it criticizes the conventional from a concern for the relation between humans and their wider worldly context’ (Nelson, Citation2016, p. 726). Nelson also argues that we should understand ziran and wuwei as ‘ethical’. Eske Møllgaard follows suit, saying that ‘purposive action’ is the opposite of wuwei, which is ‘the highest and most ethical form of action’ (Møllgaard, Citation2003, p. 367). In addition to speaking about the various ways in which wuwei might be rendered as an ethic, Møllgaard also sees wuwei as a rejection of traditional norms.
14. This paper was motivated by discussions with Chen Guying where he described ziran-wuwei as ‘ethical’ but as more like ‘advice’ than what we might call ethics in contemporary academic philosophy. In the more colloquial sense of ‘ethics’ (using ideas like ‘be nice’), we do need intentions and we need to know customs and conventions, and we do not need much ‘ethics’ in the academic sense (personal communication, September 2017).
15. Bruya writes: ‘we can define wu wei in the following way: action that is absent of direct intentionality’ (Bruya, Citation2022, p. 4, emphasis original). He regards ziran similarly: ‘There is no directionality to it. There is no intentionality to it. And there is no subject-object dichotomy’ (Bruya, Citation2022, p. 7).
16. The original (of this translation) reads: 無意則止於分，所以為審 (24.63).
17. Again, this is a challenge that does not necessarily completely rebuke the positions of the contemporary scholars mentioned above, but their lack of engagement with this type of discussion in favor of engaging instead with conceptions like ‘flow’ or Isaiah Berlin’s notion of freedom is curious.
18. All references to the paragraph and verse numbers for the Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang’s commentary follow the versions of these texts on ctext.org.
19. In one of Guo’s most famous discussions he rejects the idea that sages are special people whose ‘skin is like ice and snow’. He writes (Zhuangzi 1.12), ‘Although a sage might be found at the imperial court, his heart-mind [xin 心] is no different than what it would be out in the midst of forests and mountains’ (Lynn, Citation2022, p. 12; translation modified)
20. The original (of this translation) reads: 彼意自然，故承而用之.
21. The original (of this translation) reads: 而乃走作驅步，求其過能之用，故有不堪而多死焉.
‘However, if when horses would walk they are forced to gallop fast, this tries to exceed the use for which they are capable, which is why it happens that, unable to bear it, many of them die’ (Lynn, Citation2022, pp. 191–2).
22. Connecting ziran-wuwei to ‘natural dispositions (xing 性)’ is standard in Zhuangzi studies. For more details, see Chen Yun 陳贇 (Chen, Citation2016, pp. 60–72).
23. Some scholars have argued that this section of the Zhuangzi expresses a ‘primitivist’ sentiment, and actually the section is arguing for letting horses be free from any human contact. Accordingly, these scholars contend that this is a point where Guo’s commentary is at odds with the Zhuangzi itself (see, for example, Feng, Citation1986, pp. 162−185; Youlan, Citation1931, pp. 146–147; Wang, Citation2015). However, even if we take this part of the Zhuangzi as the work of a primitivist brush, what Guo argues fits (or is ‘thorough’ tong 通) with most of the Zhuangzi.
24. Moreover, while one may say that with skill-based actions a person is in the ‘flow’ and less aware of what they are doing and intending, the horse training example gets us away from those more idyllic depictions. The intention and consciousness required to train horses is not some semi-mystical state of automatic responsiveness—at least for Guo. (Additionally, the focus on ‘flow’ in English language scholarship seems quite overexaggerated and has been called into question by contemporary Chinese scholars; see, e.g. Chen (Citation2016).
25. Lynn once again had filled this with ‘self-conscious’ which does not appear in the original. Doing so he makes it a polemic against ‘self-consciousness’.
26. Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 explains that wuxin, especially in the context of Guo’s philosophy, means arcanely merging with things (與物冥) (Feng, Citation1986, pp. 166–168). Chris Fraser writes, ‘Non-mindedness [wuxin] thus lies not in relinquishing agency or embracing passivity, but in action from implicit capacities of our inherent character [xing/qing 性/情] rather than explicit attitudes of the mind. Guo repeatedly emphasizes that as living creatures we should each act by what fits our inherent character and endowed allotment … ’ (Fraser, Citation2020, p. 356).
27. Wang Bi makes the same point, writing: ‘he follows the natural bent of people, neither formulating nor implementing. […] [the ruler] should follow the nature of people and not try to carve them into shapes according to forms external to them’. ‘The myriad folk follow nature in forming their natures. This is why one can act in accordance with them but not act on them, can identify with them but not interfere with them’. ‘The sage thoroughly understands what human nature is by nature and allows the innate tendencies of all the myriad folk full expression. Therefore he follows and does not act, complies and does not interfere. He eliminates what leads people astray and gets rid of what confuses them. Therefore, hearts/minds freed from disorder, human nature is allowed to fulfill itself (Lynn, Citation1999, p. 100, 105). The original Chinese reads: ‘因物自然，不設不施。 … … 因物之性，不以形制物也。’ ‘萬物以自然為性，故可因而不可為也。可通而不可執也。’ ‘聖人達自然之至，暢萬物之情，故因而不為，順而不施。除其所以迷，去其所以惑，故心不亂而物性自得之也。’ (Lou, Citation1980, p. 117, 123).
28. Other scholars have made very similar arguments—see Feng (Citation1986, pp. 165–170) and Wang (Citation2015, pp. 163–170) for two examples of similar discussions.
29. 去飾任素故也.
30. Yang Lihua argues emphatically that the philosophies of the Zhuangzi and Laozi, including ziran-wuwei, are about helping the person reflect upon themselves and develop a strong sense of agency. Yang says these texts and concepts are about ‘mobilizing one’s highest level of agency 調動起自己最高的主動性’ (Yang, Citation2020, p. 18).
31. The original (of this translation) reads: 因形率情，不矯之以利也.
32. The general idea is summarized succinctly by Wang Bi in his introductory essay to the Laozi, where he writes ‘[acting for] humaneness, and thus hypocrisy and pretense are formed (為仁則偽成也)’ (Lou, Citation1980, p. 590). In Guo (Zhuangzi 8.2), we have the same idea: ‘When humaneness is the result of envying others, this humaneness is already false (慕之而仁，仁已偽矣)’. For a fuller discussion of this see Tang (Citation1957), Yu (Citation2004), Yang (Citation2009), Wang (Citation2015), and D’Ambrosio (Citation2016).
33. Indeed, this is one way Xuanxue thinkers have been read as reacting to the fall of the Han and the reason they are united in being opposed to any ethical/moral systems. For details, see the authors referenced in the previous note.
34. The scholars mentioned above are certainly aware of Xuanxue thinkers. However, in their respective works none of them critically engage with these thinkers. Research in Chinese-language scholarship is quite different, with most scholars including entire sections on commentary, with a special focus on Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.
35. The original (of this translation) reads: ‘這種意義上的’道德’絕不是現代漢語中的道德，更不是morality或virtue的對等一’.
36. The original (of this translation) reads: 被視為道德性本身[…]就失去其意義.
37. The original (of this translation) reads: 他們批評儒家仁義道德的人文主義，非難知識和技術文明，主要不在其本身，而在於這些東西往往引發出虛偽和欺騙，往往被作為道具來使用，被壞人的心靈和社會機體，導致了真實的喪失。他們要要求真實 … 是完全’自然’的。它不僅是沒有使道德與外在於道德的目的發生聯繫，而且連純道德機動也沒有.
38. Already by this time, ren-yi 仁義, translated here as ‘humaneness and duty’ became a standard term for what we might call ethics or morality. For the sake of simplicity we will refer to this as ‘ethics’ alone.
39. Again, there is significant overlap with Wang Bi’s thought. For a discussion of this, see Wang (Citation2015, pp. 163–167).
40. Chen Yun makes a similar point to explain the Zhuangzi: ‘As soon as morality is taken as something solidified in a political or social sense, then it is already not moral’ (Chen, Citation2016, p. 38).
41. The original (of this translation) reads: 取消一切道德觀念，回到無為和無欲的自然真實中去.
42. If this paper were focused only with the Zhuangzi without the use of Guo’s commentary, we could easily make basically the same argument based on this section alone.
43. Guo writes, for instance, ‘時移世異，禮亦宜變，故因物而無所繫焉，斯不勞而有功也’ (Zhuangzi 14.19). ‘As over time the whole world differs, so rituals too change accordingly, which is why one [the ruler] should just comply with the people and stay free of all bonds. In this way, he shall without toil have accomplishment’ (Lynn, Citation2022, p. 281).
44. (Zhuangzi 6.37.1) ‘He [Mengsun Cai] completely realized [jin] the principles of dealing with life and death and brought into resonance [ying] what was suitable [yi] for both beyond worldly conventions and within them. When he acted, he moved in step with Heaven [tianxing] and was not married to self-conscious understanding [zhi]’ (Lynn, Citation2022, p. 149).
45. Fu Peirong 傅佩榮 reflects on the consistent interrelation between ‘Confucian’ and ‘Daoist’ texts, noting especially how ziran-wuwei can be used to explain their similarities. See Fu (Citation2018).