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ABSTRACT
One of the biggest challenges of the study and practice of ethics is that of the moral dilemma, e.g. how should a compassionate person deal with injustice? This paper attempts to resolve this thorny issue from the perspective of Buddhist philosophy. I firstly introduce the 14th Dalai Lama’s distinction between act and actor and suggest a way to denounce wrongful acts without harboring hatred towards the perpetrator. Secondly, I argue that the philosophical grounds of this distinction can be traced back to ancient Buddhist texts on Non-Self and Emptiness, which take all things as being in a constant state of change. Thirdly, I point out that a unique feature of the ‘empty ethics’ of Buddhism is that it inspires a middle way approach which allows for congruity between justice and compassion, between the realistic and the idealistic, and between rationality and sentimentality. Based on this, I suggest that it has much to contribute to contemporary ethics.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. As a significant figure in contemporary Buddhist thought, the 14th Dalai Lama offers valuable insights into our present ethical landscape. Thus, I will commence this discussion from his perspective, drawing upon his widely recognized and universally relevant teachings that render Buddhist principles accessible to a wider audience beyond the confines of Buddhist circles. However, in Section 3, I will augment his viewpoint with textual evidence, particularly emphasizing the distinction between actor and action.
2. On the distinction between the actor and the action, the Dalai Lama (Citation2012, pp. 64–65) also notes the following: ‘The important point about the principle of compassion, as a basis for the exercise of justice, is that it is directed not toward actions, but toward the actor. Compassion demands that we condemn wrong actions and oppose them with all means necessary, while at the same time forgiving and maintaining an attitude of kindness toward the perpetrators of those actions. Just as, in theistic terms, God forbids sin while still loving the sinner, so we too should forcefully oppose wrong while maintaining concern for the wrongdoer. It is right to do this because, again, all human beings are capable of change’. See the Dalai Lama (Citation1999, p. 106) for more on this distinction.
3. See Lin (Citation2021) for more on the Dalai Lama’s interpretation of forgiveness.
4. The Dalai Lama (Citation1999, p. 109) suggests that our real-life experience illustrate the fact of changeability: soldiers battling each other in wartime may become amicable in peacetime, and a bad experience upon first meeting someone in the past could later turn out to be much more pleasant. The Dalai Lama (Citation2012, pp. 64–65) offers another example from history by pointing out how the ancient Indian Emperor Ashoka and the Christian Saint Paul led reckless lives in their youth but became responsible as they gained in maturity and experience. The Dalai Lama (Citation2004, p. 112.) thus believes that although the Chinese may be the enemy today, there is always the possibility of becoming friendly with the Tibetans in future.
5. See Siderits (Citation2003), Hamilton (Citation1996, Citation2000), and Davis (Citation2018) for discussions on the Buddhist theory of non-self or personal identity. One could argue that the non-self theory in Buddhism might be too abstract to be applied to our conventional ethics; however, I contend that Buddhist ethics is intricately linked to its metaphysics. This paper aims to imbue the abstract concept of non-self with practical significance within our ethical discourse. It advocates for a perspective on wrongdoing that eschews the notion of a distinct wrongdoer, aligning with Buddhist teachings on emptiness and compassion.
6. As the Buddha noted in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 22.102, ‘Bhikkhus, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for existence, it eliminates all ignorance, it uproots all conceit of “I am”’ (Bodhi, Citation2000, p. 961).
7. Karma refers to ‘action’, or any deed we perform. According to Buddhism, the effects of our actions are not confined to the present but may last a long time, even into our future lives. Seeing as there are right and wrong actions, karma could carry moral import which is independent of any particular religious ideology. To accept that there is morality between human beings, is to more or less presume that there is karmic function in this world, even if the auxiliary idea of rebirth may be dubious to non-Buddhists. Dale Wright (Citation2005) thus employs a naturalized concept of karma in ethical discussions as a promising concept—that is, a concept of karma disconnected from the presumption of rebirth.
8. 有業報而無作者you yebao er wu zuozhe (CBETA Citation2022, T02, no. 99, p. 92c18) Such a version of morality without self may re-examine the appropriateness of self as a common ontological assumption in ethics; the thinking would be like ethics without ontology as Putnam (Citation2005) suggests.
9. (CBETA Citation2022, T25, no. 1509, p. 96, b5–24).
10. (CBETA Citation2022, T25, no. 1509, p. 165a22-b6).
11. The Buddha imparted the Dharma on two levels: worldly convention and ultimate reality. These two levels of ethical reasoning could also be applied to the distinction between act and actor: conventionally, there are right and wrong behaviors, but ultimately, there is no absolutely good or bad person. The Two-Truths theory considers the phenomenal world in terms of provisional existence; ultimately all phenomena are empty (Skr. śūnya) without a constant self or essence but rather existing dependently (Skr. pratītyasamutpāda). See Thakchoe (Citation2017) for an introduction to the Buddhist theory of the Two-Truths.
12. (CBETA Citation2022, T25, no. 1509, p. 147b5).
13. Our attachment to the idea of a self only increases our experience of suffering, hence in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 22.1 the Buddha explains that we can be afflicted in body yet not afflicted in mind (Pali āturakāyo hoti no ca āturacitto). This is possible with the practice of detachment, so that we might still feel physical pain without experiencing the mental pain associated with a conception of self (Bodhi, , pp. 854–856).
14. A bodhisattva pursues the renunciation of the self-centered ego, this ‘non-self’ is a necessary condition for the compassion of a bodhisattva but not a sufficient one. On the other hand, an arhat, or Buddhist practitioner who has been liberated from the afflictions, realizes the wisdom of ‘non-self’ but may not dedicate himself to the practice of compassion. In this case, compassion is a sufficient condition of the training of ‘non-self’ but not a necessary one.
15. See Chapter VI, The Perfection of Patience, verses 37 to 68 for examples. Also see the Dalai Lama (Citation1997, pp. 141–142) for explanations of these verses.
16. The idea that all suffering is without ownership is frequently illustrated in the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, Chapter VIII, The Perfection of Meditation, verses 90–96 and 101–104, for instance.
17. See Lele (Citation2015) and Williams (Citation1998) for more discussions on the relation between ‘non-self’ and altruism.
18. The Mādhyamika way of thinking could perhaps be described as an ‘empty’ way of thinking. The term ‘empty’ has been employed in this sense in titles such as Empty Logic (Cheng, Citation1984) and also in discussions on how the Buddhist theories of emptiness and non-self can be applied to the field of ethics. See Cowherds (Citation2015) and Garfield (Citation2022) for more.
19. In this context, our actions indeed signify who we are. Our personality is formed by our incremental actions, or karma; conversely, our character also influences certain behavioral tendencies. This suggests a strong connection between action and actor, with a relationship that is neither identical nor disparate. Gratitude is extended to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
20. Nicholas Wolterstorff (Citation2013, p. 420) makes a similar suggestion in saying that forgiveness requires the letting go of negative feelings toward the wrongdoer but not the letting go of negative feelings toward the deed. That is, one can fully forgive the wrongdoer while continuing to resent what he did.
21. The distinction between what we do and who we are could play an important role in moral and legal judgment. In life we all play multiple roles, and our moral and legal judgments should rather be made from behind ‘a veil of ignorance’—that is, evaluated according to the deeds done without judging any particular quality we might perceive as inherent to the agent. Suppose a driver violates a traffic rule and is caught by police, the driver should be fined regardless of who he is or was, since everyone is equal before the law. Even if the driver is a great philanthropist or someone who occupies a key position in society, anyone can misbehave and should take responsibility for their actions. With an awareness of the distinction between doer and deed, any resentment we might have should be directed toward the wrongdoing rather than the particular individual.
22. The Buddhist theory of the Twelve Links of Dependent-Arising (Skr. dvādaśāṅga pratītya-samutpāda) puts forward 12 factors that condition our destiny and serve as the causes of suffering. They are: ignorance (avidyā), volitions (saṃskāra), consciousness ;(vijñāna), name and bodily-form ;(nāmarūpa), the six sense spheres ;(ṣaḍāyatana), contact ;(sparśa), feeling ;(vedanā), craving ;(tṛṣṇā), attachment ;(upādāna), continuity ;(bhava), birth ;(jāti), old age and death ;(jarāmaraṇa). Of these, ignorance is the first and is therefore taken to be the root cause of suffering.
23. Since wrongdoing comes from ignorance and involves multiple factors, and all human beings moreover have the capacity for change, the 14th Dalai Lama (Citation2012, p. 62) suggests that the death penalty should not be acceptable in Buddhism.
24. See also Sun (Citation1996) for more on this distinction.
25. There is little doubt that good and evil are closely connected to right and wrong, for example Martin Buber (Citation1953) interprets good and evil through the recordings of right and wrong in the Psalms.
26. (CBETA Citation2022, T25, no. 1509, p. 179c4, c23–24).
27. The Buddhist theory of the middle way is closely related to the teaching of emptiness. As Nāgārjuna’s explains in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK 24:18), ‘Dependent origination we declare to be emptiness. It [emptiness] is a dependent concept; just that is the middle path’. See Siderits and Katsura (Citation2013, p. 277) for a brief introduction and further discussion on this verse.
28. As stated earlier, the aim of this paper is to apply Buddhist philosophies to assist ethical discussions, particularly regarding the ethical dilemma involving compassion and justice. The paper suggests that the distinction between the act and the actor, stemming from the ‘empty ethics’ of Non-Self, could contribute meaningfully to achieving a balance when faced with dilemmas. However, this paper does not delve into the intricate debate within mainstream normative ethics, such as the clash between Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. While this complex discussion is beyond the current scope of the paper, I anticipate exploring potential connections to further enrich the understanding of ’empty ethics’ in future work. I express my gratitude to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.