Esteem and sociality in Pufendorf’s natural law theory

ABSTRACT

Samuel Pufendorf’s major work on natural law, De jure nature et gentium, included a long chapter on the power of the civil sovereign to determine the value of citizens. There, Pufendorf identified several forms of esteem (existimatio), according to which human beings are ranked in social life. The article argues that behind Pufendorf’s discussion of this topic was the idea that the way people esteem others and want others to esteem them has profound consequences for maintaining peaceful social life and is therefore morally regulated by the fundamental natural-law duty to maintain sociality. The article explores the key elements of Pufendorf’s multifaceted analyses of esteem, making apparent how they were connected to sociality. The article also analyses Pufendorf’s argument for the duty to esteem other humans as one’s equals by nature, questioning the view that this relied on the idea of human dignity understood as an intrinsic value of human beings. Pufendorf’s argument for this duty was a part of same project as his analyses of existimatio, namely, to define how natural law regulates the way human beings esteem each other, and it relied on his observations concerning the character of human self-esteem.

KEYWORDS:

• Esteem
• equality
• humanity
• sociability
• Pufendorf

Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) is not a thinker from whom we usually seek inspiration when we ponder moral and political dilemmas of today. Yet modern scholarship has made apparent that his works played an important role in the intellectual life of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, colonies included.¹ Pufendorf's principal works were translated into major European languages and published in numerous editions and philosophers such as John Locke, Christian Thomasius, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith read and reacted to his magnum opus on natural law, De jure naturae et gentium (1672, hereafter JNG), a work greatly inspired by, though also critical of Thomas Hobbes.² One idea Pufendorf shared with all these thinkers was that human beings are highly concerned about what other people think about them and this has profound consequences for social life. This element in Pufendorf’s theory has been observed in modern scholarship, but its significance is not so far fully appreciated. It has been noted that in chapter JNG VIII.4. Pufendorf offered perhaps the first systematic discussion of the topic in European moral and political literature (Hruschka, “Existimatio: Unbescholtenheit und Achtung”, 188–91).³ Yet the rich, though occasionally confusing exposition of various forms of esteem (existimatio) presented in this chapter is seldom analysed in any detail.⁴ Moreover, commentators have not fully apprehended the similarities between Pufendorf’s account of esteem in JNG VIII.4. and his argument for our natural law duty to esteem others as our natural equals. In this article, we will, first, identify and analyse the key elements in Pufendorf’s account of esteem in chapter VIII.4., and second, make apparent how his argument for the duty to regard others as one’s equals by nature was a part of the same enterprise to define how natural law requires human beings to esteem each other.

To reflect on the above issues, the first thing to observe is that in JNG Pufendorf put forward a demonstrative account of natural law. By natural law, he meant moral precepts which can be recognized by natural reason alone, without the supernatural revelation of the Bible, but which still receive their obligating character from the idea of being imposed by God. In Pufendorf’s view, a demonstrative presentation of natural law must rely on one normative principle, and he identified this principle to be the duty to maintain and promote peaceful sociality (socialitas) among human beings. Precepts of natural law are demonstrated by showing that they are, given human nature and condition, necessary means of maintaining and promoting sociality (JNG II.3.15). The purpose of such an intellectual exercise is not to explain the mental process through which individuals discover the moral law, as Pufendorf held that this happens through education, emulation and habituation. It is to inform an intelligent and well-educated minority, whose job it is to know about these things, how natural law precepts regulating human behaviour and institutions can be deduced from the first principles and what the boundaries of natural law are with respect to the positive divine law promulgated in the Bible and civil laws imposed by worldly authorities.⁵

Since natural law has to do with maintaining peaceful sociality, one needs to identify those elements in human behaviour which are prone to disturb or uphold peaceful social life. In Pufendorf’s view, the dominant component in all human behaviour is self-love (amor sui). By this he referred not only to the desire to protect one’s life but also to the craving to secure what one thinks is beneficial for oneself and to avoid what one believes to be harmful (JNG II.3.14). Individuals have different views about what is beneficial or harmful for them, but one thing which all human beings regard as a goal worth pursuing is the appreciation and admiration of others. Pufendorf may have exaggerated when he said that all pleasure of the soul (omnis animis voluptas) consists of “the integrity and vigour” of one’s glory and esteem (JNG III.2.7; LNN 340). Yet he made clear that when a person discovers “in himself such things as will enable him to distinguish himself above others, and to boast”, this constitutes the greatest pleasure of the soul (maxima animi voluptas). Accordingly, when a human being “fears that the estimation of his excellence is going to be lowered in the eyes of others, he experiences the deepest sadness” (JNG I.2.7; LNN 31). Moreover, human beings are inclined to esteem themselves, and their sensitive self-esteem is a potential source of strong resentment. Pufendorf did not, however, identify self-esteem (aestimatio sui) with pride (superbia), which he defined as raising oneself over others “for no reason at all, or else an insufficient one” (JNG III.2.6; LNN 339). Self-esteem is easily transformed into pride, but human beings are capable of esteeming themselves in a justifiable manner. Yet, in both cases, a person who feels that others do not esteem him as much as he esteems himself “is usually no less, but in fact often more upset than if some harm is done to his body or things” (JNG III.2.1; LNN 330). As a result, there are many “who prefer to expose their life to danger, and to break the peace with another man, rather than allow an insult to go unavenged” (JNG III.2.7; LNN 340).

The life of human beings is, thus, strongly affected by ambition (ambitio). Whilst Pufendorf admitted that “ambition stirs more mightily the breasts of kings” and other powerful men, he insisted that even “the minds of shepherds and tillers of the field are not entirely free from its evil influence” (JNG VII.1.7; LNN 960). Struggle over honour and dignity is a constant source of envy, rivalry, and hatred among human beings, and Pufendorf identified ambition as one the main causes for strife between them (JNG VII.1.4; VII.2.4). Already the murder among the first brothers was “caused by ambition, as Cain was angered when his brother was held more worthy in the eyes of God”, and conflicts caused by ambition were also been one of the main reasons for establishing civil societies (JNG VII.1.7; LNN 960). Moreover, even though Pufendorf most often mentioned the desire for appreciation and ambition as sources of conflicts, he made clear that they can also motivate human beings to obey moral norms and offer an incentive for praiseworthy deeds.⁶ Actions in conformity with the law of nature tend to preserve and promote the honour, esteem and dignity of a human being (JNG II.3.10), and a truly good person “takes the greatest delight in distinguishing himself among his fellows by worthy deeds” (JNG II.3.15; LNN 209).

Esteem as a moral quantity

Given that the way people esteem others and want others to esteem them strongly affects the preservation of sociality, it is no wonder that Pufendorf includes the notion of esteem into his theory of moral entities (entia moralia). This postulates a distinction between moral entities and physical ones. By physical entities Pufendorf refers to natural things (res naturales) which God has endowed with their material characteristics and those inner features which produce their aptitudes and motions. In the case of human beings, these inner features include their passions and faculties of understanding and will. Physical entities as such have no moral characteristics, morality being introduced into the world by moral entities. Intelligent beings impose these onto physical entities to direct and judge voluntary acts of human beings. As we cannot assume that God did not want human beings to live like beasts but wanted them to obey a law, we must regard God as the first author of moral entities. Most of them have, however, been added by human beings themselves in the purpose of establishing an ordered social life (JNG I.1.3-4; JNG II.1.1). As we will see, Pufendorf sometimes says that nature has given human beings some of their moral attributes. With such remarks he is not flatly contradicting the doctrine of moral entities but expressing the idea that natural law, understood as a divinely imposed moral norm, adds these moral attributes to human beings and their actions prior to any human imposition.

When conceived as modes or attributes, moral entities consist of moral qualities, most importantly power (potestas), right, and obligation, and moral quantities such as price (pretium) and esteem (JNG I.1.17). However, Pufendorf inspires scholarly imagination by noting that since the intellect of his readers is “immersed in consideration of physical entities”, he needs to present moral entities by analogy with space and substance. And so, he introduces the partly overlapping notions of moral state and moral person (JNG I.1.5-6; PW 101). Here, it is enough to mention that by moral persons he means either individual human beings or individuals joined together with a moral bond, when these are considered with respect to their status or function in communal life (JNG I.1.12). One individual can simultaneously carry several moral persons, being for example a father, a husband, a master, and a civil officer (JNG I.1.14). The status of individuals consists of the esteem imposed on them by others either due to their merits and accomplishments or due to the powers and rights which constitute their moral persons.

Like price, esteem is a ranking moral entity. It is “the value of persons in communal life according to which they can be equated or compared with others and ranked before or after them” (JNG VIII.4.1; PW 253). While the purpose of price is to make possible the comparison of things in exchange, esteem “has served the end of enabling men to be compared with one another by reason of that value, as it were, so that a seemly order can be established among them” (JNG VIII.4.1; PW 253). In chapter JNG VIII.4., Pufendorf’s main purpose is to make two things clear. The first is to clarify when we are entitled to demand esteem from others and when we need to be satisfied with how others are willing to esteem us. The second thing is to what extent civil sovereigns are entitled and able to control the value of their subjects. Yet he uses the chapter as an opportunity to present the nature of “all the distinctions among men based on esteem” (JNG VIII.4.1; PW 253).

Pufendorf identifies two types of esteem which establish such distinctions: intensive (intensiva) and simple (simplex). The former refers to the pre-eminence due to which one person is ranked over another, whereas the latter indicates the reputation of being a decent law-obeying individual. Intensive esteem is, by definition, unevenly distributed among individuals, whereas simple esteem can in principle be shared in a similar manner by everyone. Yet simple esteem can be diminished or completely lost, and so it also establishes distinctions among human beings. Furthermore, these two types of esteem are either natural or civil. Pufendorf explains that natural esteem prevails among people “who live in natural liberty”, whereas civil esteem is to be found in members of one state (JNG VIII.4.1). Here, his choice of words is slightly deceptive, as his examples of natural esteem refer mainly to esteem which takes place within civil societies. A more accurate way of describing these two forms is to say that natural esteem exists among all human beings independently of local political institutions, whereas civil esteem denotes moral quantities which assume civil sovereignty and, in some cases, local customs.

Chapter JNG VIII.4. on esteem is a complex and occasionally confusing essay where the discussion vacillates between empirical observations and normative statements, leaving it sometimes to the reader to grasp how these two are connected to each other. The starting point of Pufendorf’s analysis is the observation that esteem is always established by someone’s imposition (JNG I.1.22). No attribute of esteem lies on human individuals unless someone is esteeming them, and in the case of self-esteem, unless individuals esteem themselves. Correspondingly, when an individual esteems another this adds some attribute of esteem on the person held in esteem. The crucial thing here is that the way people esteem others and expect others to esteem them has important consequences to maintaining sociality. Therefore, these are activities regulated by natural law, and Pufendorf thinks it possible to identify a set of natural-law norms regarding esteem. This enterprise must, however, take into account that esteem is connected to human tendencies which are difficult or impossible to alter, above all the strong inclination of human beings to esteem themselves. As a result, Pufendorf’s normative account of esteem is conditioned by his observations of esteem as a psychological and social phenomenon, and sometimes he makes no clear distinction between his normative views and observations concerning prevailing habits.

Intensive esteem

The best way to analyse Pufendorf’s theory of esteem is to start with the form of esteem most familiar to his contemporaries, namely the intensive one. He defines intensive esteem as a moral quantity according to which individuals who enjoy a similar simple esteem are “preferred to one another, insofar as one of them has more of the things which the minds of others are moved to show honour” (JNG VIII.4.11; PW 255). The assumption here is that the honour “which corresponds to intensity of esteem is an indication of our judgement about another’s excellence” (JNG VIII.4.11; PW 255). The main aim of Pufendorf’s discussion of this topic is to determine when our pre-eminence gives rise to a perfect right to be honoured by others, and when it produces a mere imperfect right. A perfect right to something indicates that it can be demanded from others by force – by means of war in the state of nature and civil sanction within states – whereas an imperfect right refers to an aptitude to receive this thing but is not accompanied by a right to use force (JNG VIII.4.11; JNG I.1.19-20). In seventeenth-century Europe, the question of who should honour whom and how was of the highest importance, and Pufendorf’s message to his contemporaries is that the honour they expect to receive due to their personal merits should always be understood as dependent on the good will (humanitas) of the other party. One has a perfect right to demand others to honour oneself only when one has civil sovereignty over them, or when one’s higher status is established by civil law or a pact enforced by the sovereign (JNG VIII.4.14).

The above argument does not indicate that it would be impossible to identify as to what kind of personal pre-eminence truly deserves to be honoured. We have a proper reason to honour an individual when we hold that he or she possesses “some notable excellence and perfection’ which is ‘consistent with the end of the natural law or of states” (JNG VIII.4.12; PW 255). Relevant forms of excellence include mental and communicative abilities such as “intelligence and the capacity to improve the mind by wide observation, a judgement fitted to control affairs and to detect inconsistencies; a firm mind, undisturbed by outside influences and above enticements and threats”, and “the ability to make one’s meaning clear in choice and fluent speech”. Yet the single most important reason for honouring others are their distinguished deeds which indicate mental excellence and are legitimately conducted for a good purpose. Unsurprisingly, Pufendorf sees honour as gender-biased. While there are some foundations of esteem women share with men (Pufendorf fails to offer examples), they also have foundations of their own, namely “pre-eminence in virtues and functions which are judged to fall in a special sense to their sex”. Women also enjoy borrowed esteem “when they are said to shine from the rays of their husband” or due to “the number and excellence of their offspring” (JNG VIII.4.12; LNN 1242-5).

In Pufendorf’s view, it is ‘consistent with natural reason’ that honour is accorded to individuals who outshine others in ways described above. One can even say,’ if anyone wishes’, that to honour such persons is a precept of natural law. Yet Pufendorf insists that the above personal merits “do not in themselves produce anything but an imperfect right to be honoured and respected by others” (JNG VIII.4.14; PW 255-6). Here, his argument relies on the observation that, in matters related to esteem, human beings are not governed so much by reason but mainly by their passions. To be sure, Pufendorf rejects the claim, presented by Hobbes in Leviathan, that what instigates human beings to honour another is their opinion on that person’s power (potentia), understood as an ability to obtain what one regards as good, irrespective of whether that power is used for just or unjust purposes (JNG VIII.4.13).⁷ Pufendorf admits that the common people sometimes adore individuals who show exceptional skills in seducing women, committing robbery, excessive drinking, and the like. But, in his view, more decent people do not appreciate special skills of this type and only value the praise they receive from people who think in the same way (JNG VIII.4.12). And yet, due to their self-esteem, even the more decent ones are inclined to think that their own form of excellence, whatever this happens to be, should be honoured at least as much as those of others, if not more. Ajax was “emboldened by his physical strength”, while “Ulysses held that he himself is far to be preferred by reason of his prudence and persuasiveness” (JNG VIII.4.14; LNN 1248). For similar self-centred reasons, some hold that people should be honoured due to their old age, wisdom, or wealth, whereas others think that their youthful vigour, great learning, or admirable loyalty deserve a higher praise. As a result, it is unrealistic to assume that human beings could agree on who should be ranked over whom. Therefore, to claim that one has a perfect right to be honoured by others, due to one’s personal excellence, is a recipe for conflicts. Pufendorf is ready to say that, if we fail to honour someone who truly deserves it, we can be accused of incivility. Yet he persists; by refusing to honour others due their personal pre-eminence, we never inflict moral injury (iniuria) on them (JNG VIII.4.14; LNN 1248-9).⁸

The above normative conclusion does not alter the fact that the feeling of being insufficiently honoured constitutes a permanent source of conflict among human beings. It is also one of the reasons for establishing civil society, where the sovereign has an obligation to take care that citizens do not use “private violence to take revenge for injuries which they think they have received” (JNG VII.9.8; LNN 1122). When a group of human beings establish civil sovereignty, they introduce a new foundation for intensive esteem among themselves. This follows, first, from the fact that it is “more excellent to command than to obey” and it “betokens a greater dignity to have another’s will at the service of your will, than to adapt your way of living to another’s”. But what is more important is that the end of civil society requires “that there be in me deep respect for one to whom I not only owe my protection, but who can also compel me to obey his command by a fear of punishment” (JNG VIII.4.23; PW 256). As a result, sovereigns have a perfect right to be preferred and honoured by their subjects so that even those who lack an internal feeling of honour towards them can be forced to present external signs of respect. Furthermore, sovereigns grant their subjects perfect rights to intensive civil esteem when they appoint high magistrates and give titles of honour and status of nobility to merited citizens (JNG VIII.4.23). To be sure, Pufendorf appears to think that hereditary nobility in seventeenth-century Europe does not truly deserve the honour it is entitled to demand as due their civil position (JNG VIII.4.26-31). Be that as it may, it is the duty of the sovereign to take care that differences of rank and status are not so formidable that “the more powerful can insult the weaker as they desire” (JNG VII.9.8; PW 243).

Of course, natural esteem and civil esteem are not isolated spheres without any mutual points of contact. Pufendorf emphasizes that there will always be ambitious citizens who complain that prevailing civil order does not give them the position and honour they deserve as due their personal excellence. Sovereigns can remove some of these complaints if, when appointing individuals to high positions, they consider personal excellence and merits, especially great service done on behalf of the state. This does not mean that sovereigns should constantly monitor the merits of their subjects and alter the personnel in civil offices accordingly. A precise ordering of this kind would not only be too time consuming but would also cause an abundance of bad feelings, as ambitious citizens usually compare themselves only with their superiors and pay little attention to those beneath them. The best sovereigns can do is to grant high offices to those they regard as outstanding citizens. But doing so cannot prevent situations in which some citizens are regarded as undeservedly raised above their betters (JNG VIII.4.23). Pufendorf's final advice is that if ambitious citizens openly show their dissatisfaction, they should be punished for contempt of sovereign power (JNG, 1684 edition, VIII.4.23).

Simple esteem

If Pufendorf’s account of intensive esteem refers to topics discussed already in classical literature, his notion of simple esteem is intimately connected to the idea of sociality as the fundamental principle of natural law. This is clearly stated when he explains that, while properly cultivated human beings regard reputation for pre-eminence and excellence as the most noble end in life, the most important goal for such persons is to maintain their simple esteem, which they do by observing the duties of natural law (JNG, 1684 edition, II.4.9). Like intensive esteem, simple esteem has natural and civil forms. Simple civil esteem consists of being regarded “at least as an ordinary, and so a full member of a state”. This does not refer to any rights of actively engaging in the matters of the state but to the reputation of being a law-obeying subject, whose civil standing is not corrupted by crimes. In many countries, this does not apply to slaves, from whom the state denies simple civil esteem and citizenship even when they have done nothing wrong. The noteworthy thing here is that simple civil esteem is regulated not only by civil laws but also by mores of the country. By referring to customs in this context, Pufendorf aims to explain why citizens who have not violated civil laws can still fail to possess full simple civil esteem due to their profession. In some cases, this follows from the fact that, while their line of work is not aimed at hurting other citizens, it includes practices which are regarded as vices. Pufendorf’s examples are prostitutes, procurers, and beggars. Customs also play a role when civil esteem is diminished among persons whose occupation is perfectly legitimate but is considered as one practiced only by individuals “of the vilest and meanest disposition”, which in many countries is the prevailing attitude towards executioners (JNG VIII.4.5-6; PW 254-5).

Criteria for simple civil esteem vary from state to state, but in the case of natural simple esteem, they are the same everywhere. Natural simple esteem consists of being considered as a person “who is bent on accommodating himself to the laws of human sociality”, and who is consequently “prepared to observe natural law towards others inasmuch as he can” (JNG VIII.4.2; PW 253). In other words, simple esteem indicates a reputation of being a person “with whom one can deal as with a good man” (JNG VIII.4.2; PW 253). This is how natural law requires us to think about individuals with whom we are not familiar, even when they are not our compatriots, though in doing so we should remember that human beings are capable of evil deeds and should never be trusted too much (JNG VIII.4.3). When discussing the most elemental precept of natural law, the duty to abstain from hurting others, Pufendorf declares that we hurt other people when we take away or damage something that belongs to them by perfect right. And he lists the right to simple esteem, alongside rights to life, body, limbs, chastity and liberty, as one of the perfect rights “nature itself has immediately granted us” (JNG III.1.1; PW 158). By referring here to nature, Pufendorf is not saying that we should regard others as decent human beings due to some characteristics in human nature. His idea is that our perfect right to simple esteem, like other perfect rights mentioned above, is a direct corollary of our natural law duty to promote sociality. To be esteemed as a decent human being is a necessary condition for exchanging duties of sociality with other human beings. If our simple esteem is diminished, fulfilling these duties becomes difficult, and if it is completely lost, this becomes utterly impossible.⁹ Therefore, if we tarnish someone’s reputation as a decent human being without a proper reason, we inflict injury on her (JNG III.3.1-3). As mentioned above, Pufendorf holds that perfect rights can be protected by force – means of war in the state of nature and civil sanctions within states (JNG I.1.19). Yet he is reluctant to emphasize this in the case of simple esteem. In fact, in his short and non-argumentative compendium of natural law for young university students, De officio hominum et civis (1673), simple esteem is not mentioned among the things protected by the duty to abstain from hurting others (Pufendorf, De officio I.6.3). And when Pufendorf in the expanded 1684-edition of JNG comments on a situation in which our simple esteem is damaged by lies and calumnies, all he says is that we should spare no effort in restoring it. If our attempts are not successful, our solace should be “the rectitude of our conscience” and the fact “that our innocence is established in the sight of God” (JNG, 1684 edition, II.4.9; LNN 242).

Just as individuals lose their perfect right to life by committing serious crimes, they fail to keep their perfect right to be regarded as decent human beings partly or entirely by violating the laws of sociality. Natural simple esteem is diminished when a person commits such serious evil deeds that it is “unsafe for others to trust this kind of deceiver hereafter, and to have any dealings with him without solid precautions”. Natural simple esteem is entirely lost when a person adopts a “plan of life that aims directly at the indiscriminate harm of others, and at the making of one’s fortune of their manifest injuries”, as is the case among pirates, highway robbers, assassins, and the like (JNG VIII.4.5; PW 254).

At this point, Pufendorf’s account of esteem intersects with the discussion of the pirate as an enemy of humankind. In early modern Europe, this idea was used by authors such as Jean Bodin, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius to explore the dichotomy between lawful and unlawful belligerents. Pufendorf not only shares this notion but defines it with greater detail than his predecessors (Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 50–85). Here, the relevant observation is how the esteem of a pirate differs from that of a soldier. In warfare, natural law does not permit us to treat a surrendered enemy soldier “like a beast or some inanimate object, toward which we lie under no obligation” (JNG VI.3.7). But when it comes to people with a criminal way of living, the war is of a peculiar type, as they wage war “not against their special enemies” but use violence indiscriminately against all human beings outside their circle of co-criminals, “as they do against beasts”. As a result, those persons who adopt such a way of living “entirely loose that esteem by which we rank and grade all other men”, and unless they are ready to quit their violent manner of life, others should so have “no more mercy on them than on wolves and other savage animals” (JNG VIII.4.5; LNN 1232-3).¹⁰ To be sure, Pufendorf concludes his discussion of this topic by noting that even whole bands of robbers can recover their lost esteem provided they quit their criminal way of living and make necessary reparations or secure forgiveness for the injuries they have inflicted (JNG VIII.4.5). Yet, when Pufendorf explains what kind of compensations are to be required from murderers, he makes no reference to those people whose whole way of life has consisted in robbing and slaughtering others (JNG III.1.7). In any case, as long as these people continue with their violent way living, they deserve no more mercy than beasts.

Esteeming others as human beings

In the light of moral sentiments common today, the idea that human beings can lose all their esteem and be treated like beasts may appear disturbing. One may also wonder whether this position is consistent with Pufendorf’s claim that natural law requires a human being to esteem others “as his natural equals or as a man as much as himself” (JNG III.2.1; PW 159). In fact, several scholars have maintained that Pufendorf’s argument for this duty relies on the dignity of human beings understood as a value they all possess to the same extent due to their humanity, independently of how other people esteem them.¹¹ A sophisticated version of this interpretation holds that Pufendorf’s theory includes two notions of dignity signified by the terms dignitas and dignatio. When Pufendorf considers the pre-eminence of the human race with respect to other creatures that God has created, he uses the word dignitas. But when he speaks about relationships between human beings, he introduces the term dignatio, which refers to their common humanity and serves as the foundation for their natural equality (Zurbuchen, “Dignity and Equality”, 153). However, textual evidence for a conceptual distinction between diginitas and dignatio is weak. In chapter JNG VIII.4. on esteem, Pufendorf most often uses the term dignitas to denote the higher ranking of one individual over another, and yet he also speaks about a person whose dignatio surpasses others (JNG VIII.4.27). The two terms are also used interchangeably when Pufendorf explains how we know that even though God has endowed human beings with a free will, God does not want them to live without a law. Here, he first equates the dignitas of human nature with the pre-eminence due to which human beings surpass other creatures, but in the next sentence, he explains that human beings have the greatest dignatio, referring again to those features which constitute their pre-eminence with respect to other creatures (JNG II.1.5). In our view, Pufendorf uses these two words as synonyms, and when he applies them to human beings he does not attribute any intrinsic value to them; indeed, he either attributes the higher ranking of one human agent in relation to another or the higher ranking of human beings with respect to other creatures.

By attributing dignity to the human species, Pufendorf indicates that humans are ranked above other creatures due to features that other animals do not possess, such as an immortal soul, intellectual and volitional capabilities, and the ability of becoming highly skilled in many arts (JNG II.1.5). He does not assume that human individuals would be equally capable of using their unique abilities, as some of them are able “not only to look out for themselves but also to govern others”, whereas others are “too dull-witted to be able to govern themselves, except badly” (JNG III.3.8; PW 163). Nor does the dignity of the human species indicate any kind of moral autonomy, as only a small minority can reflect on moral matters independently, whereas the majority should adopt their moral views from their educators and prevailing customs (JNG I.3.5; JNG II.3.13). The conclusion Pufendorf comes to from a dignity in this sense is that since God has raised human beings above other creatures, God evidently wants them to use their unique capabilities to increase the glory of God and human felicity (JNG II.1.5). When we add to this the depravity of human beings and their inability to survive and prosper without the help of others, we can conclude that God wants human beings to obey natural law (JNG II.1.9).

As for the argument for our duty to esteem others as our natural equals, it is important to remember that in Pufendorf’s moral science individual precepts of natural law are demonstrated by showing that they are, given human nature and condition, necessary means of maintaining and promoting sociality. This method is in use when Pufendorf in chapter JNG III.1. demonstrates what he regards as the most elementary precept of natural law, the duty to abstain from hurting others. We hurt other people when we destroy or take away things they hold with a perfect right. In doing so, we seriously diminish sociality among human beings, as “nature has instilled into each person such tender love of his own self and things that he cannot but in every way repeal someone who undertakes to harm them” (JNG III.1.1). Accordingly, in the next chapter Pufendorf demonstrates our duty to esteem others as our natural equals by arguing that, due to their self-esteem, it is impossible for human beings to maintain peaceful social relations with those who do not esteem them as much as human beings themselves. He starts the argument with the following remark:

In addition to that love which man has for his own life, body, and things, and because of which he cannot avoid repelling or fleeing everything tending to their destruction, we also find embedded in his mind a very delicate self-esteem. And if anyone detracts from this in any way, he is usually no less, but in fact often more upset than if some harm is done to his body or things.

(JNG III.2.1; PW 159)

With these observations, Pufendorf already makes apparent that the duty he is discussing has something to do with pacifying human self-esteem. He continues as follows:

Although this esteem is heightened by various causes, its primary basis seems to be human nature itself. Indeed, the very word ‘man’ is thought to contain a certain dignity, and the ultimate as well as the most effective argument for deflecting others’ rude insults is taken to be: ‘Surely I am not a dog or a beast but as much a man as you.’

(JNG III.2.1; PW 159)

It is vital to understand that these comments are further observations about the character of human self-esteem, not a sudden ad hoc justification for human dignity understood as a value human beings possess due to their humanity alone, independently of how other people esteem them. Pufendorf first observes that human self-esteem “is heightened by various causes”, indicating that things such as extraordinary abilities, great achievements, high civil position and being honoured by others intensifies one’s sense of one’s own worth. Yet he insists that the primary basis of our self-esteem is “human nature itself”. In other words, what all human beings, irrespective of their abilities, merits, or civil status, cannot help strongly esteeming in themselves is their status as a human being with respect to animals. When Pufendorf in his theory of moral entities speaks about “a man’s humanity” (humanitas), he defines it as a moral condition “in which we understand him to have been constituted by his Creator, who wished him to excel all other animals” (JNG I.1.7; PW 102). In other words, humanity as a moral condition is intimately connected to the idea of having a higher ranking than other animals.

Pufendorf illustrates how important the idea of being a human being is for our self-esteem with two empirical observations. The first one is that even the “word ‘man’ is thought to contain a certain dignity” (JNG III.2.1; PW 159). This is the only time the term ‘dignity’ is mentioned in Pufendorf’s argument, and nothing gives us a reason to think that, with this short remark, he is introducing the idea of humanity as an equal intrinsic value – a notion which is not discussed in JNG. The remark makes much better sense if we assume it to mean that the common habit of associating the ranking attribute of dignity even to the word signifying a human being shows just how intensively human beings esteem their higher status with respect to other creatures. This interpretation finds further confirmation from the second observation which refers explicitly to the ranking of human beings over other animals. When human beings feel rudely insulted, their ultimate reaction is to remind their accuser that they are not animals but just as much human beings as the one insulting them. In other words, they feel that the latter has downgraded the basic element of their self-esteem: their ranking as a human being.

Pufendorf concludes his argument as follows:

Now since human nature belongs equally to all men, and since one cannot lead a social life with someone by whom one is not esteemed at least as a man, it follows as a precept of the natural law that ‘Everyone must esteem and treat every other man as his equal by nature, or as much as a man as he is himself.’

(JNG III.2.1; PW 159, translation modified)

Above, discussing honour founded on personal excellence, we observed that due to their self-esteem human beings want honour to be founded on features they esteem in themselves. The same psychology of self-esteem is at work here, though the conclusion is a bit different. As we saw above, Pufendorf holds that individual capabilities vary greatly. Yet “human nature belongs equally to all men”. Therefore, the idea of being a human being is the most intensive component of every individual’s self-esteem, so much so that no one can be expected to “lead a social life with someone by whom one is not esteemed at least as a man.” The conclusion Pufendorf makes from all this is that everybody must esteem others as human beings as much as himself. For him, this is tantamount to esteeming others as one’s natural equals.

When we esteem others as human beings as much as ourselves, we do not assume any similarity in mental and physical capabilities. Instead, we acknowledge that “no matter how greatly someone excels others in mental and physical endowments, he is no less bound to exercise towards them the same duties of natural law that he expects of them” (JNG III.2.2; PW 161). This assessment does not rely on any value that human beings enjoy due to their humanity but on the idea that however much we esteem our own humanity, we must, to maintain peace, esteem the humanity of others in a similar manner. This does not prevent Pufendorf from saying that human beings enjoy equal dignity as human beings, but this dignity indicates their equal ranking with respect to other animals. It is, if you like, a social construction established by the fact that human beings esteem the humanity of others as much as their own, though it is normatively founded on natural law which requires them to do so. Thus, when Pufendorf refers to behaviour which fails to esteem others as natural equals, he does not say that this violates or denies their dignity. Instead, he explains that such a behaviour diminishes (detrahere) their dignity, indicating that their dignity as human beings is dependent on how much others esteem them (JNG III.2.5).

It should be emphasized once more that Pufendorf does not assume that his demonstrative account of natural law describes how individuals discover the moral law. In fact, he seems to think that his argument for the duty to esteem others as one’s natural equals is particularly perplexing for most of his contemporaries, as he complements it by mentioning popular reasons (rationes populares) which should make this duty plausible among the common people. These reasons do not refer to self-esteem or dignity but to the fact that human beings share the same origin and are equally susceptible to wheels of fortune and death. Popular plausibility to this duty is also offered by Christian religion, when it teaches that the earthly status, power and wealth of human beings do not decide who is a friend of God and play no role at the last judgement (JNG III.2.3).

The above interpretation makes Pufendorf’s argument for the duty to esteem others as one’s equals by nature compatible with his claim that persons with a criminal lifestyle have lost all their natural simple esteem. The first thing to note here is that esteeming the humanity of others is not the same thing as their natural simple esteem. The latter indicates a reputation of being a morally decent person who is ready to observe laws of sociality (JNG VIII.4.2). When we esteem the humanity of others as much as our own, we do not make assumptions about their willingness to observe natural law. We merely acknowledge that we share the same duties and rights prior to human impositions and agreements (JNG III.2.2). The whole rationale for this duty lies in its reciprocal character. We are obliged to esteem the humanity of others as much as our own because otherwise it is impossible for others to live peacefully with us. We are, however, also entitled to expect others to esteem us in a similar manner. People with a criminal lifestyle have stepped out of this circle of mutual esteem and sociality. They have declared war against the whole of humankind and treat other people like beasts. Of course, we still regard them as human beings in the sense that they are creatures accountable for violating the law that God has imposed on the human species. Yet our duty to maintain sociality does not forbid us to treat them in same way they treat us, namely like beasts. This conclusion differs from moral sentiments common today, but it is worth noting that it is shared by Pufendorf’s contemporary and admirer John Locke. In Two Treatises of Government, Locke famously attributes natural equality to human beings, but this does not prevent him from declaring that a person who has abandoned natural law and has “no other rule, but that of force and violence” may be “treated as a beast of prey” (Two Treatises, II.16; 279).¹²

Conclusion

The fact that Pufendorf mentions the word ‘dignity’ in his argument for the duty to esteem others as one’s equals by nature has inspired commentators to compare his remarks with the idea of human dignity in Kant’s moral philosophy.¹³ In our view, Pufendorf’s philosophical aims and methods differ so much from those of Kant that it is questionable whether it is meaningful to compare them on this issue, especially since this would require one to take a stand in the continuous scholarly discussion about what Kant precisely meant by human dignity. One would need to choose, for example, between the standard interpretation, which holds that Kant attributes dignity as an intrinsic ontological value to human beings, and the revisionist account, according to which human dignity is a corollary of the fact that categorical imperative demands us to respect rational creatures.¹⁴ The latter position may have some superficial similarity with the interpretation of Pufendorf presented above. Yet, Pufendorf’s sharp distinction between his demonstrative account of the natural law written for experts and popular morality established by education, emulation, habituation and sanctions means that his theory has no place for anything resembling Kant’s noumenal moral agent.

Moreover, in Pufendorf’s demonstrative account of natural law, the theoretical status of the duty to esteem the humanity of others as much as one’s own differs significantly from the role Kant’s moral philosophy gives to the duty to respect humanity. In Pufendorf’s theory, the duty to esteem others as one’s equals by nature is a corollary of our fundamental duty to maintain and promote sociality among human beings. More precisely, it is one instance in his project of defining how human beings should esteem others and expect others to esteem them to maintain sociality. In the case of intensive esteem, Pufendorf argues that, due to human self-esteem, natural law gives no one a perfect right to expect honour from others due to their personal pre-eminence, while the end of civil society dictates that such a right belongs to those who hold civil sovereignty or enjoy high civil status authorized by the sovereign. Simple esteem indicates a reputation of being a morally decent law-abiding person, and especially its natural form is a prerequisite for exchanging the duties of sociality with others. It should, therefore, be regarded as a more important goal in life than achieving intensive esteem, and to abstain from tarnishing another person’s natural simple esteem without a proper reason is one of the most fundamental precepts of natural law. Finally, the most elemental duty connected to esteem is to esteem the humanity of others as much as one’s own one, as human beings are, again due to their self-esteem, incapable of upholding peaceful relations with those who downgrade their humanity. Of course, an analysis in terms of sociality is not all Pufendorf has to say about esteem, or any other topic for that matter. But here, as elsewhere, it provides the organizing structure for his observations.

Acknowledgements

We presented a first draft of this paper at the conference Recognition and Respect in Early Modern Philosophy (University of York, 2019). We are grateful to the organizer Tim Stuart-Buttle and participants for stimulating discussions. A second draft of the paper was discussed at the political philosophy workshop (University of Amsterdam, 2019) organized by Johan Olsthoorn and we thank participants of that event. Thanks also go to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Academy of Finland; Finnish Cultural Foundation.

Notes

1 On Pufendorf’s philosophy and its historical significance, see Seidler, “Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy”.

2 The original language edition Pufendorf, De jure naturae is separated by a semi-colon from the translation. Our policy is to use Seidler’s translation of De jure in Pufendorf, The Political Writings (hereafter, PW) whenever possible and rely on Oldfathers’ translation in Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature (hereafter, LNN) only in passages omitted by Seidler.

3 Before De jure, Pufendorf discussed existimatio shortly in his early Elementa jurisprudentiae universalis (1660) and more extensively in the dissertation De existimatione (1667). Analysis in De existimatione is largely incorporated in De jure.

4 Recent studies dealing with Pufendorf’s theory of esteem include Blank, “Pufendorf and Leibniz on Duties of Esteem”, 196–202; Haakonssen, “Natural Law and Moral Personhood”, 6–9; Haara, Pufendorf’s Theory of Sociability, 99–136; Haara and Lahdenranta, “Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated”; Seidler, “Economising Natural Law”; Zurbuchen, “Dignity and Equality”, 158–63.

5 On Pufendorf’s deduction of the fundamental principle, see Saastamoinen, “Pufendorf on the Law of Nature and the Law of sociality”. A more Hobbesian interpretation is to be found in Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes.

6 On this element in Pufendorf’s discussion of the desire for esteem, see Haara, Pufendorf’s Theory of Sociability, 120–36, and Haara and Stuart-Buttle, “Beyond Justice”, 699–723.

7 While Pufendorf finds Hobbes’s account of honour in Leviathan, chapter 10, unacceptable, he points out that in De cive, XV.9, Hobbes had described honour as an opinion of another's power joined with goodness (JNG VIII.4.13). Pufendorf finds this a more agreeable formulation but does not contemplate Hobbes’s position on the issue any further. On the role of honour in Hobbes’s earlier and later works, see Slomp, Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, 38–40, and Field, Potentia, 28–54, 80–91.

8 We inflict injury on others when we take away or damage things which belong to them with a perfect right (JNG I.7.15).

9 See Saastamoinen, “Liberty and Natural Rights in Pufendorf’s Natural Law Theory”, 239–41.

10 On pirates and robbers as common enemies of all, see also JNG III.6.11 and IV.2.8.

11 Recent studies which attribute such an idea of dignity to Pufendorf include Darwall, “Pufendorf on Morality”, 213–38, Vanda Fiorillo, “Der Andere - „ut aeque homo“”, 11–28; Kato, “The Heuristic Use of the Concept of Dignity”, 237–8.

12 For an interpretation which argues that this view is compatible with Locke’s understanding of natural equality, see Saastamoinen, “Natural Equality and Natural Law in Locke’s Two Treatises”.

13 See, Darwall, “Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability and Moral Powers”, 224; Bacin, “Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity”, 101–2; Kato, “The Heuristic Use of the Concept of Dignity”, 237–8.

14 See, Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity.