Recognition and respect in early modern philosophy

Recognition has, over the past three decades, come to occupy a central place in moral and political philosophy, and critical theory; but to the extent that scholars have exhibited an interest in tracing the historical origins of the concept, they tend to narrate a teleological story that culminates with Fichte and Hegel. Axel Honneth has contributed seminally to both developments: first, by developing a Hegel-inspired theory of recognition (Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition) and, more recently, by offering a historical study of the origins and development of the idea of recognition in which all roads seem to lead, ineluctably, to Hegel (Honneth, Recognition: A Chapter in the History). The aim of this special issue is different: rather than reading earlier philosophical discussions of recognition through a Hegelian lens, our contributors seek to reconstruct them so far as possible in their own terms. Taken together, the essays to follow provide a variety of perspectives on questions that the pervasive interest of early modern philosophers in humankind’s seemingly urgent desire for the esteem and approbation of other human beings press upon scholars of the period.

The most obvious such question is: why, between c.1650–1800, did the issue of humankind’s concern for esteem and recognition from others come to occupy such a central place in western philosophy? From this, other questions follow. What were the perceived implications and consequences, for the individual and society, of this characteristic of human nature? What was the relationship held to be between what many early modern philosophers argued were the two most important of mankind’s natural desires: the desire for self-preservation, and the desire for esteem? Is recognition a zero-sum game, and its pursuit inevitably generative of competition and conflict, inclusion and exclusion? Or are recognition and esteem open to all, and potentially generative of an abundant economy of reciprocity characterized by the exchange of benefits and gratitude? Does the pursuit of recognition need to be regulated by political authority, or does society generate its own endogenous forces that constrain individuals to exercise the self-discipline required for peaceful co-existence and mutual cooperation? If many of our actions are motivated by a desire for esteem, does this make us inherently egoistic beings whose expressions of admiration or affection for others are mere hypocrisy? Or does the desire for the approval of our neighbours have profound implications for our sense of self, as we learn to view ourselves and to evaluate our conduct and qualities through others’ eyes?

To be sure, these questions had been asked, in some form or other, for millennia; many had been mined by the ancient moralists, and with particular acuity by early Christian authors such as St. Augustine. Yet the necessity of mastering the desire for recognition came to occupy a central place in the early modern period. Thomas Hobbes’s denial of natural sociability is of obvious importance in explaining why this was the case, because it foregrounded the desire for the positional (and thus scarce) goods of honour and glory as causes of mutual distrust and enmity. Teresa Bejan’s essay analyses how Hobbes’s understanding of expressions of hatred and contempt played a fundamental role in his consideration of social hierarchies. Hobbes’s most influential critic, Samuel Pufendorf, shared Hobbes’s overriding concern with the management of esteem as a necessary precondition for sociability and political stability. Pufendorf presented possibly the first systematic discussion of the topic in European moral and social philosophy. Heikki Haara and Kari Saastamoinen explore Pufendorf’s complex analysis of various forms of esteem and their connection to the fundamental natural law duty to maintain sociality. It is widely known that pride and esteem-seeking occupied a central place in Bernard Mandeville’s moral philosophy. Robin Douglass’s article offers a new interpretation of Mandeville’s “pride-centered” theory of recognition. For all that Mandeville laboured the beneficial social and economic consequences of the desire for esteem in commercial societies, he nonetheless refused to lend it moral sanction: pride, Mandeville emphasizes, underpins our desire for recognition.

In the early modern period, as now, the concept of recognition was closely linked to prevailing assumptions regarding gender roles and stereotyping. In the case of women, the desire for recognition was recognized by certain authors to hinder autonomy, making it difficult to question other people’s evaluative perspectives and behaviour and thereby contributing to the reification of women. Martina Reuter compares Poulain de la Barre’s and Simone de Beauvoir’s views on the subjugation of women. They shared a concern that women’s emancipation requires overcoming opinions rooted in custom and prejudice. Reuter argues that, for both thinkers, mutual recognition becomes possible in the context of freedom, the search for truth, and friendship. Hannah Dawson, in turn, demonstrates that several early modern authors, in varied contexts, were questioning the worldview that some individuals were naturally inferior and subordinate. Dawson shows that widely known and more obscure authors developed arguments, not least in the context of slavery, that domination was a structural obstacle to any possibility of mutual recognition.

In the German context, Hegel and Fichte undoubtedly cast long shadows over early nineteenth-century treatments of recognition. This has sometimes led modern scholars to pay less attention to other compatriots who developed their own distinctive theories of recognition. James Clarke’s essay offers a critical reconstruction of J. B. Erhard’s account of recognition that locates it within the context of his revolutionary natural law theory. Clarke argues that Erhard’s theory of recognition offers distinctive insights that remain relevant for contemporary legal and political theory. Risto Saarinen scrutinizes Friedrich Schleiermacher’s theological works, arguing that his contribution to the conceptualization of recognition was highly novel. Schleiermacher’s theology replaces the older upward model of a servant recognizing the Lord with downward and horizontal models of religious recognition. In this sense, his model is in accordance with the pre-Hegelian interpretations of recognition developed by Fichte and sentimentalist moral theorists.

The contributors to this special issue share a conviction that recovering previously neglected accounts of recognition in the history of philosophy has relevance for contemporary social and political theory. By rejecting the teleological assumptions inherent in many historical accounts of recognition’s history, which assume that the early modern period witnessed gradual progress towards “the” theory of recognition (with Hegel), it becomes possible to situate conceptions of recognition in their intellectual contexts and to appreciate their significance to present-day debates on the morality and politics of recognition. We hope this volume stimulates further historical studies that, by recovering the rich and diverse ways in which the desire for esteem and its implications were understood in the past, aid our own attempts to determine the possibilities and limits of mutual recognition in the present.

Most of the papers to follow were initially delivered, in draft form, at a conference held at the University of York in July 2019. This event was generously supported by Risto Saarinen’s “Reason and Religious Recognition” project (2014–2019), funded by the Academy of Finland; Tim Stanton’s “Rethinking Civil Society: History, Theory, Critique” project (2018–2023), funded by the Leverhulme Trust; the British Society for the History of Philosophy, and the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of York. We are also very grateful to colleagues who participated at the conference, but whose work does not appear in this special issue: Anna Becker, Béatrice Guion, Kinch Hoekstra, Axel Honneth, Daniel Luban, Jared Holley, and Christian Maurer.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Academy of Finland; Leverhulme Trust [grant number: RL-2016-044].