German–Polish Transfers on Eastern Policy? Research Deficits, Europeanisation Inputs, Empirical Testing

Abstract

This article calls for more studies concerning German-Polish Eastern policy cooperation. Existing literature does not explain in detail whether German-Polish rapprochement on their Eastern policies resulted from their mutual concessions rather than simply from their similar assessments of certain Eastern European developments. However, the literature highlighs the countries’ individual interests and complementary influences within the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This can potentially explain their bilateral policy transfers. Therefore, to design studies of such cross-transfers, the article re-discusses the under-researched model of Europeanisation through cross-loading. It theorises that even member states with divergent foreign interests can, paradoxically, engage in tactical coalition- and consensus-building. Here, the states recognise each other’s complementary coalition-building skills among their different allies as to help them broaden support for their own positions within the CFSP. Consequently, the article’s case study analyses German-Polish compromise-building behind their similar positions towards the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions from 2014. It argues that mainly Poland transferred from Germany’s milder approach towards the sanctions, thus recognising Germany’s stronger influence over this EU policy. However, also Germany adopted some Polish Russo-sceptical positions because it recognised Polish expertise in the context of the dominant CFSP-level critique of Russia.

Introduction

This article calls for more in-depth analyses concerning Germany’s role in influencing Polish foreign policy and vice-versa. It addresses a gap in previous studies that indicate German-Polish rapprochement on, for example, their Eastern policies without explaining in detail whether this rapprochement resulted from the countries’ bilateral compromise-building rather simply from their similar assessments of developments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these studies confirm Germany and Poland pursue their divergent interests towards Eastern Europe, also jointly through the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This suggests EU-induced German-Polish compromises. Therefore, this article offers insights into the reasons for the German-Polish interactions in the broader setting of the EU, as well as into the effectiveness of EU foreign policy-making in the context of member states’ divergent interests.

Theoretically, the paper develops the under-researched Europeanisation model of cross-loading as a policy transfer occurring horizontally but also resulting from vertical (and well-researched) processes of uploading and downloading. It thus conceptualises compromises between member states who seek to influence CFSP policies and, therefore, adopt consensus-oriented negotiation strategies. The article also re-discusses a rational institutionalist perspective on this cross-loading and draws on the politics of scale model to theorise coalition- and consensus-building taking place even in spite of member states’ discrepant interests and thanks to their complementary influences within the CFSP. Consequently, the article re-designs the popular independent and intermediating variables of Europeanisation and determines them not as EU-level but as national-level determinants of national changes within the EU.

Empirically, this paper explains the political potential for EU-induced German-Polish compromises as well as the deficits and potentials of existing empirical literature. It also conducts a case study of German-Polish compromise-building on the EU sanctions policies towards the recent Ukraine-Russia crisis. This study argues that Germany and Poland accepted each other’s positions, but only to some extent – since both states had been similarly interested in the EU sanctions in overall, and in an asymmetric way – with Poland making more concessions to Germany’s stronger political weight in the EU. Finally, the article suggests a number of similar case studies that can potentially allow us to generalise the circumstances of successful policy transfers over time and to other policy issues. Structurally, this article is divided into three main sections, including political and research potential, the theoretical Europeanisation framework and the case study.

Empirical Relevance: Why German-Polish Cross-Transfers?

The idea of examining German-Polish Eastern policy transfers draws on the countries’ mainly cooperative bilateral foreign policy strategies within the EU and, simultaneously, their divergent strategic interests towards Eastern Europe. Here, existing literature admittedly indicates German-Polish rapprochement on their Eastern policies within the EU, however, it does not explain whether and why the countries engaged in their compromises.

European Cooperation Versus Divergent Eastern Interests

Germany and Poland generally attain their foreign interests through the EU and through cooperating bilaterally within the EU. Post-WWII (West) Germany pushed a pro-European foreign policy strategy to regain its independence and rebuild its economy (Kronenberg 2009, 16–20; Lemke 2011, 110–114). Since the 1990s, Germany advocated for EU Eastern enlargement to encourage Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries, including Poland, to cooperate (Lämmer 2002, 49–50; Kempe 2006, 6) and to counteract their fears of German dominance (Koszel 2008, 10–11; Malinowski 2015, 45, 76). Meanwhile, Poland endeavoured to gain independence from the Soviet bloc, then to access the EU and, since 2004, to approach the EU decision-making centre. It expected German support in doing this on account of the FRG’s geo-political position (Kerski 2004, 57; Kornat 2009, 229–231) and also on account of Germany’s influence within the EU (Malinowski 2015, 21–30; Bingen 2016, 7–9).

Nevertheless, Germany’s Ostpolitik traditionally presents a ‘Russia first’ approach (Kempe 2006, 12), relying on its strong economic interests and its security perception assuming Russia’s rapprochement with Western Europe (Brandt 1968; Ochmann 2010, 2–4 and 2012). In turn, Poland’s Polityka Wschodnia prioritises cooperation with its Eastern neighbours, other than Russia, due to its geopolitical security considerations oriented on pushing back Russian influences (Dębski 2006; Kornat 2009, 226–235). Therefore, whether co-operative German-Polish foreign policy approaches within the EU helped them to overcome their divergent Eastern policy concerns is of interest.

It is also noteworthy that Germany’s Eastern policy is heterogenous and does not exclusively involve its pro-Russian interests. Since 2005, Chancellor Merkel departed (to some degree) from her predecessors’ (Kempe 2007, 3) and even her foreign ministers’ focus on Russia (Ochmann 2012; Forsberg 2016, 25–27), and she gave more attention to values, such as democracy, rather than (only) interests with Russia (Gutschker 2006, 11; Buras 2013, 32–33; Böttger 2016, 410). Particularly in reaction to the crisis from 2013/14, many German policy-makers intensified cooperation with Ukraine (Bußmann 2015, 58) and openly criticised Russia for exerting pressure on Ukraine (Patecka-Frauenfelder 2016, 134). Meanwhile, Polish positions towards their Eastern neighbours enjoys strong internal consensus (Ochmann 2010, 6), with differences relating mainly to how far these interests should be pursued through the EU or individually (Cianciara 2008, 8–11). Hence, in spite of their divergent strategic interests, Germany approached Poland in its reactions to the recent Ukraine-Russia crisis (for their positions on anti-Russian sanctions themselves, see the case study below). Yet we do not know whether both states thus engaged in bilateral compromise-building, and whether they did so in the context of European policy-formulation towards the crisis.

German-Polish Rapprochement, but through a Compromise?

A few long studies (e.g. Buras 2007 and 2013; Koszel 2008; Kaca and Łada 2011; Łada 2012 and 2014; Malinowski 2015) and many short academic contributions (Malinowski 2006; Ochmann 2007; Lang 2008 and 2015; Cziomer 2008 and 2013; Czachur and Wóycicki 2009; Meister 2011; Patecka-Frauenfelder 2016) discuss German-Polish rapprochement on their foreign/Eastern policies without explaining in detail whether the countries’ rapprochement resulted from their bilateral compromise-building. Nevertheless, some studies present the countries’ similar (overall) interests and complementary foreign policy capacities within EU Eastern policy, which may have led to, and can thus explain, their compromises.

More specifically, the literature argues that Germany and Poland are similarly interested in a stable, peaceful, law-oriented and democratic Eastern Europe (Ochmann 2007, 6; Buras 2013, 23), and in the involvement of Eastern Europe in international conflict management (Lang 2008, 129–130). Here, the EU provides a common ‘reference point’ in formulating Polish and German Eastern policies (Meister 2011), and it even pushes these states to jointly face EU’s geopolitical challenges (Buras 2013, 23–24). The literature also calls for a Polish-German ‘community for the future’ as to allow both states to jointly enhance their foreign policies through the EU (Chromiec 2018). It assesses the perspectives for a Polish-German partnership (Ochmann 2010; Łada 2012), their tandem (Turkowski 2011) and their common driving force of EU Eastern policy (Lang 2008, 123).

Moreover, the literature generally argues that such German-Polish cooperation may imply bilateral compromises. Namely, to integrate their interests into EU Eastern policy-making, both states need their bilateral reconciliation (Bingen 2016, 2, 7), common language on Eastern issues (Buras 2013, 23) and, in particular, their allies within the EU (Kempe 2006, 15–16; Kaminska 2014, 138). Such alliance-building can be seen as a logic according to which Germany and Poland pursue their Eastern interests through the EU engaged in bilateral compromises.

Compromise-Building, but on which Logics?

Admittedly, the literature primarily argues in favour of German and Polish influences (consensus-building skills) as their individual assets within EU Eastern policy. It says that Germany is a ‘centre of gravity’ in this EU policy because the state borders on both CEE and Western European countries and, thus, can promote different strategic alliances (Kempe 2006, 5–7, 14-16). Germany is particularly recognised as Russia’s strategic partner or even Russia’s advocate within Europe (Forsberg 2016, 21–22; Kowalczyk 2015, 7–8). In turn, the Polish perception of Russian security threats are traditionally shared by many CEE countries (Kempe 2006, 12–13; Kaminska 2014, 106). Similarly, the Polish veto against the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia (in 2006) was met with understanding in Czechia, Slovakia and the Baltic States (Kaminska 2014, 126–131). The Polish orientation towards the parallel Eastern Partnership (EaP) enjoys strong support in CEE and Scandinavia (Cianciara 2008, 10–11; Pomorska 2008, 159–160).

However, the literature is less developed in analysing whether Germany and Poland recognised each other’s influences as their complementary assets. It merely mentions that both states bear the greatest potential to jointly develop EU Eastern policy because they comprise inputs from both CEE and Western European countries (Kempe 2006, 15) and because they represent here broader (different) European interests (Lämmer 2002, 51). Further, the literature says that Germany and Poland can bilaterally ‘distribute tasks’ in EU Eastern policy (Ochmann 2010, 3); that Poland gives credibility to German politics within the EU (Buras 2013, 3); and that Germany is the only Western European state that is interested in the ‘Polish’ EaP (Buras 2013, 23), to refute Polish charges of its ‘too pro-Russian’ Eastern policy (Ochmann 2012; Böttger 2016, 409). The above arguments suggest questions as to whether Germany and Poland present their stronger orientations on Russia and their Eastern neighbours (e.g. Ukraine), respectively, expected each other’s influences as to convince their different allies of a European consensus. For such reasons they may also have sought compromises bilaterally.

Theoretical Framework: German-Polish Contribution to Europeanisation Studies

Europeanisation Studies offer us a research framework for the above-suggested German-Polish compromise-building. However, when addressing the above empirical gaps, these studies should be developed further, with regard to conceptualising, theorising and designing EU-induced interstate policy transfers.

Europeanisation through Cross-Loading

Broad European Studies have evolved towards a stronger focus on explaining how the EU shapes national developments. Admittedly, theories of EU integration, including the neofunctionalist focus on supranational dynamics (Jensen 2016) and the intergovernmentalist state-centric perspective (Moravcsik 1993), have been followed by Europeanisation Studies framing causal relationships between EU-level and national-level processes (Börzel and Risse 2000, 3–4; Ladrech 2002, 391–393).¹ However, in popular Europeanisation models of uploading and downloading, national preferences are projected into EU-level negotiations (De Flers and Müller 2012, 22; Tonra 2013, 5), while national policies or structures adopt EU policies or practices (Radaelli 2004, 3; De De Flers and Müller 2012, 22–23), respectively. In these models, national systems primarily seek compliance with EU directives (see, e.g. the overviews of empirical studies in Vink and Graziano 2007, 4) rather than adopt each other’s national policies.

Europeanisation has further evolved towards a horizontal dimension, including the third and less popular model of cross-loading. In horizontal Europeanisation, the EU frames or facilitates integration through exerting indirect impact. It offers best practices of problem-solving (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, 2–5, 11-14) and leads domestic actors to intensify cooperation (Vink and Graziano 2007, 10) without enforcing national compliance with EU directives (Ladrech 2010, 14). Horizontal Europeanisation also means that member states themselves share good practice (Bulmer 2007, 51), exchange information (Vink and Graziano 2007, 10) or even take on the others’ ideas (Howell 2002, 12; Ladrech 2010, 14). Similarly, cross-loading presents ‘the exchange of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing” things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene’ (Major and Pomorska 2005, 1). It depicts a political change that comes from between member states and occurs only within, rather than due to, Europe (Major and Pomorska 2005, 1–3; and Major 2008, 30).

However, as a model of Europeanisation, cross-loading needs to be clearly integrated with the models of uploading and downloading, and to better explain how the EU leads to interstate compromises. Here, a broad Europeanisation process leads from (vertical) uploading to (vertical) downloading and, further, to (horizontal) cross-loading, and it involves the three models’ mechanisms of strategic socialisation, experiential learning and policy transfer, respectively. Accordingly, domestic actors pursuing their interests through the CFSP undergo strategic socialisation, where they enhance their reputation through adopting broadly accepted CFSP-level practices of consultations and consensus-building (Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 4–10). Consequently, the actors engage in experiential learning, meaning that under new conditions they optimise their strategies (Levy 1994, 283–284) and, within the CFSP, intensify informal meetings and raise consensual ideas (Pomorska 2015, 60–63).

Finally, the actors can learn through policy transfer, so they seek to solve their problems within common organisations by adopting other’s problem-solving (Walker, 1969, p.889). Particularly within the consensus-oriented CFSP, they can transnationally adopt each other’s consensual policies or practices (De Flers and Müller 2012, 29–30) and make mutual concessions oriented on benefits in the long term (De Flers and Müller 2010, 17) or in more important issues (Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 7–10). All above mechanisms can determine cross-loading. This means, national actors seeking to attain their interests through the CFSP adopt from the CFSP the consensus-oriented negotiation strategies. They can therefore engage, not just multilaterally within CFSP institutions but also bilaterally, in intense consultations and in working out common positions. As a result, they can adopt each other’s national, rather than only the CFSP’s, policies or practices.

Tactical Coalition-Building between Discrepant Interests

Rational institutionalism helps us better explain such EU-induced compromise-building as it theorises material factors and logics of national policy-making within the EU. However again, it primarily explains the models of uploading and downloading, focusing rather on single member states. Here, the concept of strategic usage says that states attain their interests by promoting them at EU level (Jacquot and Woll 2003, 4–7; De De Flers and Müller 2012, 22–23) or by adapting themselves to EU policies and structures (Tonra 2013, 5). Differential empowerment points to the states’ resulting – internal rather than cross-border – redistribution of power capabilities, for example their enhanced institutional cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2000, 6–7; Hix and Goetz 2000, 19–20; Radaelli 2004, 7). Although the literature has also theorised states’ collective, coordinated and efficiency-maximising policy-making within the EU, such as tactical coalition- and consensus-building (March and Olsen 1998, 949–951; Tonra 2013, 5), these processes occur mainly among states with similar interests, so among so-called like-minders (Aggestam and Bicchi 2019, 519–521). These theoretical perspectives can merely explain the above strategic socialisation into CFSP negotiation strategies and – only limited – experiential learning occurring through coalition-formation among like-minders.

Therefore, we should additionally draw on the model of the politics of scale and theorise tactical coalition-formation even between discrepant interests. In this model, actors enhance their pursuit of interests by accessing higher levels of policy-making (Cidell 2006, 196–197). Meanwhile, to co-shape Europe’s foreign policies, member states combine their national inputs (Ginsberg 1989), such as their interests, expertise (Panke 2011, 128–135) and coalition-building skills (Börzel 2002, 199–200; Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 6). This suggests that member states pursuing their own interests through the CFSP may recognise each other’s, presumably stronger than their own, coalition-building skills within CFSP-level negotiations. They can thus also seek to convince an opposing group of interests, so another group of like-minders, to support a common European position and a broad consensus. Therefore, unlike in traditional bargaining, the states who promote their interests can abandon their positions and make concessions, at least in the short term or in single or less relevant issues.

Consequently, the states can engage in policy transfers even when pursuing discrepant interests. Within common institutions, interest-driven actors namely achieve gains from exchange but do not fully maximise their attainment (Hall and Taylor 1996, 945). Similarly in the EU, to maintain their cohesion (consensus), even like-minders informally shape each other’s policies (Aggestam and Bicchi 2019, 520). Hence, it is even more likely that one state who expects support from another state and its traditional allies – representing different interests than its own – can seek consensus and cross-transfer even from the other state’s discrepant position.

How to Design Studies of Cross-Transfers?

Empirical testing of cross-loading has also been limited. For example, Wong (2006, 69–70) only mentions that France’s initiatives tried ‘copying’ a successful ‘German model’ of de-politicised economic relations with China. Similarly, Vink (2002, 11–13) notes that Denmark adopted European regulations on immigration policy in reaction to similar changes in Germany. Nevertheless, both Wong and Vink focus on European factors shaping individual French and Dutch developments, respectively, rather than their bilateral interactions. Even in analysing German-Polish relations, Zaborowski (2005) draws upon top-down ‘EU-isation’ (p.7) and analyses the adaptation of European norms into bilateral cooperation. Kaczmarek (2014), in turn, studies ‘bilateral Europeanisation’ by applying an uploading-based ‘transformation model’ (pp.15-18). She proves a shift from competition towards cooperation, again neglecting policy transfers between both states.

Cross-loading therefore requires us to depart from the popular Europeanisation designs determining EU-level processes as the independent variable (Hix and Goetz 2000, 2; Ladrech 2002, 395 and 2010, 42; Jacquot and Woll 2003, 2). Since cross-loading does not set the EU as a cause but only as a context for bilateral developments, we should rather draw on a broader rationalist perspective on actors’ material – geopolitical or economic – interests (Moravcsik 1998, 24). Therefore, the case study below determines the independent variable, not as EU-level determinants of national changes, but as national interests within the EU, and it designs the intermediating variable as national calculations to upload these interests in bilateral cooperation. Finally, this case study relies upon the method of process-tracing that guidelines studies of causal chains of actions and their motivations (George and Bennett 2004, 206–208; Bennett 2010, 2–3), including Europeanisation studies of the causal importance of the EU (Haverland 2007, 62–63). Process-tracing determines how the relevant actors form their preferences, how they then choose their actions, and how those actions aggregate to produce an outcome (Schimmelfennig 2015, 105–106).

In more detail, to confirm German-Polish cross-transfers, the case study below traces a hypothesised causal process that consists of three main actions and their motivations. First, German and Polish foreign policy actors may have raised ideas or submitted initiatives – in line with their own interests – within CFSP institutions; for this reason, they may have sought consensus on their positions with other member states. Second, the German and Polish actors may have also sought bilateral compromises, expecting each other’s influence (consensus-building skills) in the context of CFSP-level configurations of interests as to reach beyond their own traditional allies and to help them broaden support for their own positions. Third, actors in one state may have thus adopted the other state’s position, potentially expecting the other state’s reciprocal support for their own interests in other or broader EU policies (for more details about the theory of cross-loading, see Czułno 2021).

Case Study: German-Polish Cross-Transfers on EU Sanctions?

The following case study traces the above-designed process of Europeanisation through cross-loading. It explains whether Poland convinced Germany of sharper sanctions, or whether Germany impacted Poland in accepting milder sanctions against Russia, in the first few years of the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Admittedly, as mentioned, the crisis itself, rather than German-Polish cooperation on it, led both countries to approach each other. Nevertheless, German-Polish Europeanisation, including the countries’ parallel uploading interests and their recognitions of each other’s influences within the CFSP, help us determine whether the countries also transferred from each other’s positions.

Parallel Uploading Interests

Germany and Poland approached each other in their support for sanctions when seeking a common EU position towards the crisis. Starting with Poland, its foreign policy makers consequently spoke in favour of adopting and later prolonging and strengthening EU sanctions, arguing for a firm EU response to Russia (Gotev and Kokoszczyński 2014; Pawlak and Baker 2014; Polish Foreign Ministry 2014; EUobserver 2015; Kowalczyk 2015, 6; Buras 2015b). Poland thus followed its traditional foreign policy interest of deterring Russia’s aggressive policy (Pełczyńska-Nałęcz 2016, 10). It perceived the crisis not only as a regional accident but as a fundamental attack on the international order (Buras 2014a), where Russia would have destabilised Ukraine (Kowalczyk 2015, 7) and revived its own imperial ideas (Godzimirski, Puka, and Stormowska 2015, 24).

Germany focused on criticising Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia’s breaches of the Minsk agreements (Kirch and Schwarzer 2015; Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Frymark 2015, 4; Bußmann 2015, 35, 63-64) and expected the EU to increase efficiency of diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis (Forsberg 2016, 22–32). Although Germany was not the first (Buras 2015a, 64), and although it was initially reluctant (Frymark and Kwiatkowska-Drożdż 2014), it supported the EU sanctions as the conflict escalated (Forsberg 2016, 29; Böttger 2016, 407). Here, Germany’s European integration may have interestingly played a crucial role. Admittedly, considering that German exports to Russia decreased by 20 per cent over 2014 (Forsberg 2016, 34), the sanctions were not in line with Germany’s strategic, economy-oriented Eastern policy interests. However, Germany may have thus implemented its self-conception as a ‘civilian power’ (Zivilmacht) oriented towards securing peace and building international connections (Lemke 2011, 111). Its support for the sanctions was therefore a ‘humanitarian mission’ (Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Frymark 2015, 4) and presented a ‘normative uploading’, where it employed the EU to manage the crisis multilaterally and by diplomatic means (Daehnhardt in Bußmann 2015, 35). In addition, since Germany recognised that Russia undermining the rule-based security architecture did not serve its own trade interests oriented on a stable Eastern neighbourhood (Kirch and Schwarzer 2015), it may have supported the sanctions, paradoxically, also in its long-term economic interests. After all, despite their different motivations, Germany and Poland became similarly interested in sanctioning Russia through the EU.

Complementary Influence Capabilities: Why Germany and Poland Need Each Other?

Germany and Poland’s influences over the EU sanctions help us assess whether the countries may have expected each other’s support when promoting their own positions. Here, Polish coalition building-skills were relatively strong but weaker than German one (below). Due to the crisis, Poland could more easily criticise pro-Russian positions (Rettman 2015), and it largely contributed to the sanctions (Emerson in Gotev and Kokoszczyński 2014). CFSP-level representatives from, for example, France, Italy, Spain and Austria had weaker arguments in favour of their traditional pro-Russian orientations. Meanwhile, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Scandinavian countries, the UK and Ireland at least ceased to strongly favour a balanced EU approach between Russia and Ukraine. Many of them argued that further support for regular cooperation with Russia would indicate acceptance of undermining the European peace architecture (interviews 34 and 38). Some recognised that Poland might have been right when warning against Russian imperialism (interviews 35 and 38).

However, Poland’s overall readiness to confront Russia impeded its influence over EU Eastern policy (Kowalczyk 2015, 7–8). Meanwhile, a majority of member states (rather than mainly Poland) kept the EU sanctions in power (interviews 34 and 38). Although from 2014 Prime Minister Tusk and Foreign Minister Sikorski held many bilateral talks to convince other EU leaders of the sanctions (Kowalczyk 2015, 6), Poland promoted harsh sanctions, both in the COEST and COREPER II (interviews 34, 35, 37 and 38) and at FAC meetings (Gotev and Kokoszczyński 2014). The sanctions were generally supported by the Baltic States, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Romania (EUobserver 2015; Kowalczyk 2015, 16), but more doubts were presented by Italy, Spain, Austria, Luxembourg, Cyprus, France and even the other Visegrád countries (Pawlak and Baker 2014; Kowalczyk 2015, 16). Over time, more voices were also calling for the abolishment or leniency of the sanctions that affect trade (Priesmeyer-Tkocz and Rydliński 2016, 6). Mainly the Southern European states increasingly criticised that the sanctions were politically insufficient and threatened economic interests with Russia, and that the Polish positions on these issues were too radical (interviews 34 and 38).

In turn, Germany’s influence over the EU sanctions was decisive (Gromadzki 2015, 26). Germany saw itself as a mediator (Emerson in Gotev and Kokoszczyński 2014) and sought a broader compromise, primarily to convince adversaries of this policy (Kwiatkowska-Drożdż and Frymark 2015, 4). German representatives to the COEST and COREPER II hesitated to openly support extensions of the sanctions and presented a moderate approach (interviews 34, 37 and 38). Also the German Foreign Office argued to the sceptical Mediterranean EU countries that the sanctions should not deteriorate Europe’s long-term economic interests but offer, in Europe’s security interest, a transient response to the Russian violations of international law (interviews 15 and 20). Indeed, some of these countries usually agreed to prolong the sanctions already when Germany expressed its own support (interview 2). For example Italy and Spain – who used to accept German leadership on EU-Russia policies to win German support for ‘their own’ Southern Dimension – would probably have opposed the sanctions without Germany’s moderate approach (interviews 34, 37 and 38). Therefore, Germany may have acted as Poland’s crucial partner in this EU policy.

Cross-Transfers: Who Impacted Whom and to What Extent?

At first glance, Berlin’s stance on the sanctions became closer to the traditional Polish rather than the German Eastern policy (Priesmeyer-Tkocz and Rydliński 2016, 5). Germany intensely consulted with (Russo-sceptical) Poland on the Ukraine-Russia crisis (Bußmann 2015, 64; Bingen 2016, 9). For example on 12 March 2014, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Tusk discussed the possibility of extending the sanctions during the upcoming European Council, arguing that Russia did not respond to previous EU proposals towards solving the crisis (Polish Prime Minister 2014). The German government recognised the growing European criticism of Russia and agreed more with Poland that Moscow may threaten the European security architecture (interviews 15 and 20). Moreover, German CFSP-level representatives recognised that their Polish counterparts had admittedly less expertise on cooperation with Russia but presented stronger connections to the other CEE views on the crisis (interviews 31 and 38).

Therefore, when seeking Polish help in exerting an EU influence over Russian and Ukrainian policy-makers (so in the formulation of the sanctions), the German government internalised Polish knowledge about historical, social and religious aspects of the difficult Russia-Ukraine relationship (interview 14). At points the Foreign Office would have proposed less radical sanctions, had it not been confronted with Russo-sceptical voices coming from Poland (interviews 20 and 21). For example, some Polish ideas to extend the list of Russians banned from entering the EU were agreed on by Minister Steinmeier and only a few other foreign ministers but finally accepted by the FAC (interview 4).

Nevertheless, the Polish Foreign Ministry – who expected Germany to convince the Southern EU states of the sanctions and, thus, to secure their overall implementation – agreed that the sanctions could not be too maximalist (interviews 5, 6 and 12). Therefore, although Polish officials in the COEST initially raised further-reaching proposals for sanctioning Russian business and even Russian political leadership, they pushed forward only a few of these proposals to the COREPER II and FAC (interviews 34 and 38). In other words, considering Germany’s decisive and Poland’s weaker impact on the EU sanctions, Poland must have transferred more from German views, rather than the inverse. As said above, Germany adopted some Polish (tougher) proposals to extend the list of sanctioned Russians; however, it was mainly Poland who accepted the German expectations not to radicalise the sanctions.

Further Case Studies

We can conduct further research on German-Polish Eastern policy transfers to confirm the European conditions of successful policy transfers. Existing literature namely indicates more empirical gaps that correspond with the above research deficits of cross-loading (regarding the German-Polish power differentials as the logics underpinning their compromise-building within the EU). First, we can potentially explain German support for the EaP in 2009, as well as Poland’s parallel liberalised approach towards Russia, as part of their bilateral compromise-building on broad EU Eastern policy. It is worth remembering that Germany was initially reluctant about the EaP (Ochmann 2010, 2–3; Lang 2016). Considering Berlin had supported Warsaw’s claims towards the EU-Russia PCA, to convince Warsaw to unblock this PCA (Gutschker 2006, 11–12; Kaminska 2014, 122), it could also have recognised the Polish potential to block its own pro-Russian interests when it backed the ‘Polish’ EaP. For its part, Poland may have proposed a conciliatory Russia-policy, not only to reach consensus with Europe’s pro-Russian interests (Pomorska 2008, 157 and 2015, 63; Kaminska 2014, 123–131) but specifically with Germany’s dominant pro-Russian interests within the EU [this is merely mentioned in Buras (2013, 27–29, 41) and Pełczyńska-Nałęcz (2016, 9)]. Similarly, Poland may have retreated from promoting an EU enlargement to Eastern Europe, thus recognising Germany’s opposition to such EU enlargement (Kempe 2006, 9–12; Buras 2007, 28, 35) and Germany’s influence on this issue at the EU level (Pomorska 2008, 160).

Second, cross-loading, or rather its lack, can potentially help us explain German-Polish cooperation difficulties shortly after the Polish accession to the EU. For example, we do not know to what extent Germany’s initial initiatives for EU Eastern policy in 2006–07 (Gutschker 2006, 9–11; Kempe 2007, 2–3; Böttger 2010, 106) were unsuccessful because Germany did not (yet) recognise Poland’s, and its allies’, Russo-sceptical interests within the EU [again, this is only mentioned in Kempe (2006, 13) and Ochmann (2007, 4)]. It is also not very clear why Poland refused the ENP Plus, a German initiative that was far compliant with Polish interests (Buras 2007, 35; Lang 2008, 133). Considering that Poland criticised then Germany’s overall Eastern policy (Kaminska 2014, 170; Cianciara 2008, 9), this critique and the refusal of the ENP Plus may have had a strong EU context relating to Polish fears of German dominance in the Union (Cichocki 2013, 88). And this may have implied Poland’s weak expectations towards building a compromise with Germany on EU policies.

Third, further empirical tests may also verify the potential of cross-loading to explain German-Polish long-term discrepancies between their strategic interests, for example regarding the Nord Stream project (Zuba 2020). On the one hand, the above case study shows that Germany and Poland cross-transferred from each other’s positions on the sanctions because they both sought an EU involvement in the crisis in the East. On the other hand, the two countries may have failed to engage in cross-loading on the Nord Stream because they did not intend to upload their positions on this issue to the CFSP, neither they thus sought a European compromise and a bilateral recognition of each other’s coalition-building skills within the CFSP. Similarly, as regards the above Ukraine-Russia crisis, we do not know much whether Germany opted for the exclusion of Poland from the Normandy Format. It is of interest whether the fact that the format did not include EU institutions, nor any other EU states beyond Germany and France (Buras 2014b), can sufficiently explain the exclusion of Poland.

Conclusion

This article indicated the potential for more in-depth studies concerning German-Polish policy transfers. It explained that existing literature on the countries’ Eastern policy cooperation does not explain in detail whether their national positions on single policy issues approached each other as a result of their bilateral compromise-building. The paper, however, pointed out further questions suggested by the previous studies and potentially allowing us to explore and explain such compromises in the EU context. It asked whether Germany and Poland – who presented their discrepant Eastern policy interests but also sought to attain these interests through the EU – bilaterally recognised each other’s complementary influences within EU foreign policy-making.

The article designed studies of EU-induced compromise-building between discrepant national interests. It re-discussed the under-researched Europeanisation model of cross-loading, put forward its rational institutionalist explanation and supported this theory with the politics of scale concept. The paper thus also offered a clear distinction between cross-loading and the traditional Europeanisation models of uploading and downloading. These two models alone would only allow the conceptualisations of individual German or Polish impacts on EU policies and their individual adaptations to CFSP negotiation strategies, respectively. Cross-loading, in turn, conceptualises whether Germany and Poland transferred from each other’s policies, however, as a Europeanisation model, it assumes that the policy transfers result from the traditional Europeanisation processes. This means, they ensue from the states’ orientation on CFSP consensus and their recognitions of each other’s inputs into the CFSP, such as each other’s complementary coalition-building skills among their different allies, as to help them enhance their own pursuits of interests within the EU.

In its case study, the article analysed German-Polish cross-transfers on their positions towards the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions from 2014. It argued that despite their different national motivations (ensuing from their discrepant interests towards the East), both Germany and Poland were interested in a strong EU response to Russia undermining the international law. Therefore, Germany recognised that (traditionally Russo-sceptical) Poland became more influential within (now more Russo-sceptical) CFSP and particularly among its CEE like-minders. Berlin consequently adopted Polish expertise on Russia-Ukraine relations and some Polish proposals to extend the sanctions. Meanwhile, Poland expected Germany’s stronger influence over the sanctions policy, generally within the CFSP and particularly among sceptical Mediterranean member states, therefore largely accepting the German consensual approach to the sanctions. This case study, along similar suggestions presented above, shows that the Europeanisation through cross-loading, in its design proposed in this article, can potentially underpin further research on EU-induced policy transfers. Such research, in particular, would allow us to generalise about the above EU-induced circumstances of interstate policy transfers, such as national intentions to upload their interests into EU institutions, as well as states’ recognitions of other states’ influence capabilities as complementary assets in working out common EU policies and intergovernmental compromises.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Patryk Czułno

Patryk Czulno is currently a Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Bristol. He is also a Jean Monnet Research Associate and a former postgraduate research scholarship holder at the University of Bristol. He holds a PhD from the University of Bristol and a Master's degree from the University of Vienna, and he also completed an exchange study at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Notes

1 Europeanisation may be also defined in other ways, for example, as the process of EU enlargement, an export of European norms to the international system, or building a distinct European identity (Ladrech 2010, 13).

Appendix 1:

Interviews

Table

Interview number	Interviewee’s affiliation (relevant to the interview)	Interview’s place and date
Interview 2	a Polish high-level diplomat who worked in CFSP institutions and other national capitals	Warsaw, Dec. 2016
Interview 4	a Polish high-level diplomat who worked in Polish Foreign Ministry	Warsaw, Mar. 2017
Interview 5	a high-level official in Polish Foreign Ministry	Warsaw, April 2017
Interview 6	a high-level official in Polish Foreign Ministry	Warsaw, Mar. 2017
Interview 12	an official in Polish Foreign Ministry	Warsaw, Oct. 2016
Interview 14	a German high-level diplomat who worked in German Foreign Office	Berlin, May 2017
Interview 15	a German high-level diplomat who worked in German Foreign Office	Berlin, June 2017
Interview 20	an official in German Foreign Office	Berlin, June 2017
Interview 21	an official in German Foreign Office	Berlin, June 2017
Interview 31	a national representative to CFSP institutions	Brussels, Sept. 2017
Interview 34	a national representative to CFSP institutions	Brussels, Oct. 2017
Interview 35	a national representative to CFSP institutions	Brussels, Sept. 2017
Interview 37	a national representative to CFSP institutions	Brussels, Sept. 2017
Interview 38	a national representative to CFSP institutions	Brussels, Sept. 2017