Abstract
This article explores ways to find a balance in the asymmetry reflected in ROK–U.S. security relations. For a bilateral alliance to be developed into a healthy strategic partnership, reciprocity should be applied. From the outset, however, the ROK–U.S. alliance was born out of an imbalance, and this character still persists. With no substantial change in the North's threats and geopolitical settings of the Korean peninsula, the gravity of the alliance will continue to lean toward the United States. However, turning to the global dimension, there is room for balancing the relationship on the part of the ROK. It is to take part in the U.S.-led Multinational Peace Operations. After 9/11, the United States has badly needed assistance from its allies, engaging in a tough war on terrorism. So far the ROK has deployed troops several times as part of the U.S.-led Multinational Forces (MNF) missions. Yet, except for fighting in the Vietnam War, South Korea's troop deployment appears relatively limited, thus having a limited effect on the bilateral relationship. Hence, it is necessary for the ROK to participate in peace operations in a more proactive manner. In tandem, the asymmetry on the Peninsula could be balanced to some extent in the global dimension.
Notes
1. For the United States too, the ROK–U.S. alliance, along with the Japan–U.S. alliance, is a valuable strategic asset that can protect America's vital interests in Northeast Asia and thus contribute to its global management. In particular, the presence of the USFK on the Peninsula is a strategic linchpin, not only to deter North Korea's armed provocations but also to contain the rise of potential foes in the region, working as a regional balancer and stabilizer. Hence, it is hard to compare the security advantages that the two allies can gain respectively through the bilateral alliance.
2. Among the casualties, 36,940 were killed in action, 92,134 were wounded, 3,737 were missing in action, and 4,439 were POWs. Ministry of National Defense (MND), ROK–US Alliance and USFK (Seoul: MND, 2004), 8.
3. From 1950 to 1981, U.S. military aid to the ROK amounted to US$6,436 million in grants plus $8.83 billion in loans, Ibid, 40; Jae-ok Paek et al., Appraisal of Economic Role of the ROK–U.S. Alliance and Policy Directions, (Seoul: KIDA, 2005), 61.
4. As of 2009, the ROK's GDP ranks 13th and the ROK's military troops (687,000) ranks sixth in the world. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010), 462–8.
5. For details, see Yong-ho Choi, The Vietnam War and the ROK Troops: the Statistics (Seoul: Institute for Military History Compilation, 2007), 39–40.
6. For 1965–1973, the U.S. military grant to the ROK totaled US$3.72 billion, comprising about 40 percent of the defense budgets of the ROK. In addition, the United States supported $1 billion for the operation and maintenance of the ROK forces in Vietnam, $1 billion for the modernization of the ROK military, and $65.3 million in compensation for those killed or injured in action. Also, the ROK earned $1,021 million in non-military sectors associated with the Vietnam War, which equaled 2.1 percent of the country's GDP, 24.3 percent of its exports, and 29.5 percent of its foreign reserves. Choi, The Vietnam War, 148–57; Paek et al., Appraisal of Economic Role, 61–3, 70–1.
7. After the withdrawal of the Dongeui-Dasan Units in December 2007, only 25 members of the Korean Medical and Vocational Training Team (KMVTT) remained in Afghanistan. However, in response to the U.S. request, the ROK has dispatched a team composed of 90 civilians, 40 police troops, and 320 military troops.
8. In the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the ROK and the United States adopted in June 2009, the two countries agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust, aiming at ensuring a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. In addition to close collaboration for a robust defensive posture and a durable peace on the Peninsula, they agreed to work closely to address the global challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, piracy, and so forth. The joint vision also called for close coordination on peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and development assistance, as being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Joint Vision for the Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America (Washington, D.C., June 16, 2009).
9. Tae-young Kwon and Hoon Noh, Revolution in Military Affairs and Future Warfare (Seoul: Bobmoonsa, 2008), 101.
10. Cited in Chosun Ilbo, January 7, 2010, A6.
11. It also appeared that the friendliness of the Afghanistan people toward the United States had dropped from 83 percent in 2005 to 47 percent by 2009. Gary Langer, ‘‘Frustration with War, Problems in Daily Life Send Afghans’ Support for U.S. Efforts Tumbling,’’ ABC News, February 9, 2009. For more details, see ABC News/BBC/ARD poll, ‘‘Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,’’ http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf.
12. Chosun Ilbo, January 7, 2010, A6.
13. Dong-hyun Shim, ROK Army Colonel, former Assistant Chief of Civil Military Operation in the Zaytun Division, “Achievements of Zaytun's Peace-building and Reconstruction Activities,” Mimeo, December 8, 2008.
14. The programs to cultivate the self-help capabilities of the locals include vocational training, technical education, illiteracy eradication, overseas training in Korea, and the Korean version of the New Village Movement. See Jae-won Goh, “Achievements of the ROK's Troop Deployment and Korean Businesses in Iraq” (paper presented at the MND-hosted PKO Workshop, MND Club, Seoul, September 24, 2008).
15. For example, East Timoreans dubbed the ROK troops of the Sangroksu Unit “Malai Mutin (the King) of MNF.” Afghans call the Dongeui Unit “another God-sent gift,” only second to the local war hero General Ahmad Shah Masoud. Iraqi Kurds say, “The troops of Zaytun are a part of our community and our real friends who helped us to have dreams and hopes for a better future.” And, Iraqi religious leaders call them “the best gift God gave us.” See Seung-ho Wee, ‘‘Peacekeeping Operations,’’ in Young-koo Cha and Byungmu Whang, eds., Theory and Practice of National Defense Policy (Seoul: Orm Publishing Co. 2004), 603; Yonhap News, July 21, 2007; Shim, ‘‘Achievements of Zaytun's Peace-building,’’, 10.
16. In response, in 2006, the Zaytun Unit published 6,000 copies of the Zaytun CMO Handbook and distributed them to the Allied Forces in Iraq in order to introduce the philosophy, procedures, and lessons of the ROK forces’ civil–military operations.
17. For the combined peace operations to be effective as expected, however, it is necessary for the concerned authorities of the two allies to closely coordinate the strategic guidelines as well as to evaluate and share the lessons learned from field operations on a regular basis.
18. See Kathleen Stephens, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, “US–ROK Relations under the Obama Administration” (Opening Speech at the 34th KIDA Defense Forum, Hotel Silla, Seoul, April 2010).
19. See Kathleen Stephens, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, “US–ROK Relations under the Obama Administration” (Opening Speech at the 34th KIDA Defense Forum, Hotel Silla, Seoul, April 2010).
20. Gyu-duk Hong, “Measures for Activation of Integrated PKO composed of Civilians, Officials and the Military” (paper presented at the 3rd PKO Seminar hosted by the PKO Center at Joint Staff College, MND Club Seoul, October 26, 2007).
21. Nowadays trade dependence of the ROK is 75 percent and its exports rank ninth in the world. Also, about 10 million, comprising 20 percent of its total population, are abroad. Koreans and made-in-Korea products are found everywhere in the world.
22. Yet, it should be noted that the world-views and perspectives of a country, which have evolved through a long history, cannot be changed in a short period of time. Korea has a history of more than 4,000 years, and it will take a long time until its perspective can be completely aligned to that of the United States. Here, “the spirit of alliance” through which each country waits with patience and with respect for the differences of its allied partner is of great importance.
23. For the democratic peace theory, see Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205–35.
24. However, it is not an easy task to sow the seeds of democracy and cultivate it on the troubled areas in the world. The locals who are still suffering from conflicts and tyrannies do not know what democracy is or how it works. So, the task to spread democracy requires a long-term approach with a consistent policy and a sophisticated action plan. In particular, it is imperative to set up tailored measures and take a soft and prudent approach, taking into account the full spectrum of U.S. experiences.
25. The ROK forces deployed overseas as part of MNF missions include 324,864 to the Vietnam War (1964–73), 314 to the Gulf War (1991), and 24,772 to the global war on terror (2001–2010).
26. As of July 2010, the ROK troops participating in the MNF missions include 232 for PRT in Afghanistan, 306 for Maritime Security Operation in Somalia waters, and 24 as staff and coordination officers on various missions.
27. Kyu-duk Hong, “The Impact of NGOs on South Korea's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Iraq”, Journal of International and Area Studies 12, no. 2 (December 2005): 31–46; Yang-seop Shim, “Movement Against the Dispatch of ROK Troops to Iraq and the Government's Decision-making Process,” Research on the History of Dispatch of ROK Troops Overseas, no. 2 (Seoul: Institute for Military History Compilation, 2007), 26, 54.
28. In October 2007, Chung Dong-yeong, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, used the term, “mercenaries”—in an attempt to oppose the extension of the stationing period for the Zaytun Unit in Iraq—saying that “the deployment of ROK troops overseas is no more than trying to get rich by selling the blood and life of the young people.” Then, in 2009, the Democratic Labor Party portrayed the deployment of the ROK troops to Afghanistan at the request of the United States as “tributes” to curry favor with the U.S. See Munwha Ilbo, October 25, 2007; Chosun Ilbo, December 21, 2009, A39.
29. For example, with respect to the deployment of ROK troops to Iraq in 2003/2004, the opposition activists emphasized, that the ROK should not dispatch its troops to a place of death, pressured by the United States; Shin, ‘‘Movement Against Dispatch of ROK Troops,’’ 35. Afterwards, they insisted on the pullout of the troops, pointing to the worsening situation in Iraq. Likewise, when the government planned to dispatch ROK troops to Afghanistan in 2009/2010, they urged that the dispatch of ROK troops to Afghanistan would put the entire country in the middle of a conflict and make Koreans the target of kidnapping and murder by Muslim extremists. Heung-soon Park, “A Proposal for Strong PKO Power” (paper presented at the MND-hosted PKO Workshop, MND Club, Seoul, September 24, 2008). See also the National Assembly (stenographic) records discussed by the Democratic Party over the Bill on the Dispatch of ROK Troops to Afghanistan at the plenary session of the National Assembly, February 25, 2010.
30. Among the MNF missions, one exceptional case was the deployment of a navy unit to the sea off Somalia, which gained almost unanimous Aye votes of 98.5 percent in the National Assembly. This is perhaps because the mission of the Unit is to protect Korean merchant ships from the pirates while engaging in the CMF's maritime security operations.
31. At the time of the re-deployment of ROK troops to Afghanistan in 2009/2010, the hot issue was regarding the safety of the troops and the people abroad in the face of potential terrorist attacks. Faced with hot political debates and factional infighting, the bill for troop re-dispatch to Afghanistan was delayed in two and a half months in the National Assembly; the mission of ROK troops was to protect a PRT so as to minimize the chances of encountering Taliban insurgents; and the destination was designated as Farwan Province, a relatively safe area among the 34 provinces in Afghanistan.
32. The United States gave the appearance of being considerate, perhaps taking into account the fact that Koreans had suffered a psychological shock with 23 Korean missionaries held hostage by the Taliban in Afghanistan in summer 2007. And it left the matter entirely up to the ROK government, just expressing its wish to see a continued role assumed by the ROK.