Abstract
A survey on the postwar generation of Korea clearly reveals two facts. One is that the Korean War is becoming a “forgotten war” among Koreans, and the other is that the perception gaps regarding the issues of the war, homeland, national security, and unification among the generations are increasing. Both changes have been brought about by the lapse of a period of 60 years. It is natural that memories of the war fade away with the passage of two biological generations. Also, the generational gaps may be seen as inevitable in light of the condensed transformation of Korean society since 1945. Yet, the generations should be integrated at an optimal level if the wounds of the war are to be healed and a unified nation state is to be built and maintained. For such national imperatives, there should be a new understanding of the Korean War, especially on its characteristics and consequences, and a new cognitive paradigm shared by all generations in order to enhance awareness of war, national security, and unification. In order to fulfill these two overarching tasks, multifaceted efforts are needed to promote open communication among the generations and provide balanced knowledge and in-depth history education.
Notes
1. Concerning postwar generations, most researchers regard those born in/about 1940 or thereafter as postwar generations, focusing on first-hand experience of the hardships, or those born in/about 1950 or thereafter as postwar generations based on the outbreak of the war. A small number of researchers regard those born in 1960 or thereafter as such based on whether they experienced the hardships directly or indirectly caused by the war. This article regards those born after the outbreak of the war (June 1950) as postwar generations, focusing on the impact and memory of the experience of the war on the formation of individuals’ perspective. As of 2009, 85.1 percent of the entire Korean population are those born after 1951.
2. Carl Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923–1939, (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940), recited from Il-cheol Shin, “Historical Significance of the Korean War,” in Re-recognition of Division of the Korean Peninsula (1945–1950), ed. Yang Ho-min et al., (Seoul: Nanam Publishing, 1993), 415.
3. Of those aged 15–19 11.4 percent indicated that they did not know how the war was started. It is feared that the level of younger generation's basic knowledge about historic events is worsening.
4. In the GIA survey in 2006, 77.8 percent of the respondents said, “I take pride in being a Korean,” while 22.2 percent of them responded negatively; Government Information Agency, The Report on the Survey of the Consciousness and Values of Koreans 2006, (Seoul: GIA, 2006), 232.
5. In the GIA survey in 2006, 51.7 percent of the respondents indicated, “I am ready to sacrifice myself for national interests,” while 48.1 percent of them responded negatively. Ibid.
6. While this survey was carried out, a sense of insecurity was spreading among people amid the heightened tension between the two Koreas in connection with the sinking of the Cheonan. This inevitably had an impact on the result of the survey concerning people's view of the North.
7. Optional items given for the question were different between the two surveys. Thus, it is necessary to be careful in comparing the results of the two surveys. However, there is a clear difference between the percentage of those who selected the absolute necessity of unification. In the 1995 survey, 58 percent of the interviewees indicated that “Unification was a must,” compared to 34.3 percent who indicated that they would be happy to see the country unified, but that they did not think that unification was a must and 7.7 percent who responded that “It was desirable to maintain the current status.” Su-yeong Choi et. al, The Report on the Survey of the Consciousness of Unification 1995 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification): 71–2.
8. Su-yeong Eo analyzed the gap in the democratic values held by 20/30-somethings and those of 50/60-somethings; Su-yeong Eo, “Changes in Values and Solidification of Democracy: A Comparative Study Concerning Changes in the 1990–2001 Period,” Bulletin of the Korean Association of Party Studies 38, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 193–214. Won-taek Kang explained the difference in political ideologies between generations, particularly age groups; Won-taek Kang, “Ideological Characteristics of Korean Politics: With the Focus on Empirical Analysis of the Members of the National Assembly and People,” Bulletin of the Korean Association of Party Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 5–30.
9. Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. K. Mannheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952/1928), 283.
10. Here, the “generation” refers to people having similar characteristics based on their similar historical experiences, with the historical experience and epochal characteristics of birth cohorts reflected.
11. Dae-yeop Jo, “Social Movement Generation 386 in Korea,” Quarterly Sasang 54 (2002): 129.
12. Mun-jo Kim, “A Study for Deepening Discourses on Generations in Korea” (material presented to the autumnal seminar of the Korean Sociological Association Seoul, Dec. 12, 2003).
13. Jae-heung Park, “Generational Succession and Socio-cultural Changes,” in Changes in the Lives of Koreans (a collection of materials presented to a special symposium held by the Korean Sociological Association in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Korea, Gyeongsan, 4 Sept. 2008), 79–98.
14. Jae-heung Park, “A Study of Everyday Consciousness of New Generations and Subculture,” Korean Sociology 29 (Autumn 1995): 651–83.
15. Sang-min Hwang and Do-hwan Kim, “Koreans’ Lifestyle and Generations’ Psychological Identity: Psychological Model for Research on Generational Difference,” Bulletin of the Korean Psychological Association 17, no. 2 (2004): 31–47.
16. Professor Ho-gi Kim at Yonsei University proposed that the teenagers who played a lead role in the candlelit demonstrations in 2008 be called the 2.0 generation; Ho-gi Kim. “Bidirectional Communication with the 2.0 Generation,” The Hankyoreh Internet edition, May 14, 2008, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society-general/287480.html.
17. Sang-min Hwang and Jin-yeong Yang, “Psychological Check of Generational Groups in Korea: Analysis of Images of Generations Based on the Perspective of Transitional Coexistence,” Bulletin of the Korean Psychological Association 16, no. 3 (2002): 75–93
18. A very cautious attitude is required, as generational division, attachment of aliases or designation of characteristics like this may result in errors of excessive generalization, and cause or deepen generational conflicts. Nonetheless, here we can see the status of changes in the consciousness aligned with the dynamic changes in society.
19. In-hi Ham, “Toward Generational Coexistence,” Quarterly Sasang 44 (2000): 198.
20. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997)
21. Karl Mannheim, ‘‘The Problem of Generations’’ in Studying Aging and Social Change, ed. M. Hardy, (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 22–65.
22. In-hi Ham, ‘‘The Current State of Generational Divisions and Clashes,’’ in New Conflicts in Korean Society and National Integration, ed. Korean Political Science Association/ Korean Sociological Association (Seoul: Ingan Sarang Publishing, 2007), 265.
23. Dong-chun Kim, War and Society: What was the Korean War for Us? (Seoul: Dolbegae Publishing, 2006), 39.
24. Sang-in Jeon, ‘‘Sociology of the Korean War: Changes in the Society and Social Legacy,’’ in The KoreanWar and Search of Peace on the Korean Peninsula in the Twenty-first Century (a collection of materials presented to the international seminar held In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, Seoul, June 24, 2000), 14.