Abstract
Since the preceding Roh Moo-hyun government, the move toward a new peace regime has become more evident. However, the question of the Korean War civilian abductees remains noticeably absent from any talks or agreement. In as much as the North Korean authorities deny any large-scale abduction of civilians, this research aims to prove North Korea's complicity in these abductions and also explain their purpose. Accordingly, this study analyzes the trends of the abductions by examining the number of abductees by region, the timing of the abductions, the abduction agents, the process of the abductions, the occupations of the abductees, and the expected value of the abductees. As a result, it can be proven that the civilian abductions were undertaken as an important and integral part of the North Korean war policy. Furthermore, this research points out the mistakes in policy and bargaining tactics committed by the UN side during the armistice talks. Finally, when considering the non-observance of the existing agreements, the key to resolving the issue of South Korean civilian abductions would seem to be political negotiation and an approach in line with other pending issues in inter-Korean relations.
Notes
1. Except for several personal names, the system of Romanizing the Korean alphabet is consistent with the July 7, 2000 notice of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Korea. Korean names in this article are all written with the family name first, followed by the given name. These five lists are: 1) List of Seoul Area Victims, Office of Public Information (OPI), December 1, 1950; 2) List of Korean War Abductees, Korean War Abductees Family Association (KWAFA), 1951; 3) List of Korean War Abductees, ROK government, March 1952, 4) List of Abductees, National Police Headquarters, 1954; 5) Registration List of Displaced Persons, Korean National Red Cross (KNRC), 1956.
2. The South Korean National Assembly adopted on March 2, 2010 a “Bill for the Examination of the Circumstances Surrounding Abductions During the Korean War and Redeeming the Impaired Reputations of the Victims,” which came into effect in September 2010.
3. This number also includes abductees who were taken as prisoners of war by the UN forces and then interned in the Geoje POW camps for a certain period of time before being released and returned, as they had been assigned to the North Korean forces, either as combatants or noncombatants, and placed on the frontline after being abducted. With the help of the author's assistants, who went through the comparative analysis, the results of which were confirmed by KWARI, the author was able to arrive at the fact that 413 persons out of 96,013 wartime abductees were released from the Geoje POW camp. However, there were quite a few cases that involved identical names leaving doubts as to whether they were different people with the same names or really the same person listed twice. The author has, however, decided to stick to the number 96,013 in order to reflect the types and scale of the abductions by the North, as while those released after being abducted influence the number interned in North Korea, it does not change the total number of abductees.
4. Yi, Mi-il (ed.), Collection of Historical Documents on Korean War Abductions 1 (in Korean) (Seoul: KWARI, September 2006), 1118.
5. Lt. Col. Jeon, Jeong-sun, the Republic of Korea Army College (KAC) Faculty, The mystery of the North Korean army's three-day delay in Seoul (in Korean), http://cafe.naver.com/nuke928/77061, accessed April 20, 2008.
6. Lt. Col. Jeon, Jeong-sun, the Republic of Korea Army College (KAC) Faculty, The mystery of the North Korean army's three-day delay in Seoul (in Korean), http://cafe.naver.com/nuke928/77061, accessed April 20, 2008.
7. Kim Il-sung, at the Byeolo-ri Meeting (December 21–23, 1950), pointed out that, while the key to victory in a war lies in the annihilation of the enemy resources, the enemy was given time to disperse, escape and rebuild its units.
8. Jo, Cheol, Deadly Times (in Korean) (Seongbonggak, 1964), 41–2.
9. Heo Man-ho, “Les prisonniers de guerre sud-coréens retenus en Corée du Nord, Les hommes dans l'historie,” in La Corée, le peuple et ses valeurs culturelles: d'hier à ajourd'hui, ed. Yim Sung-sook, (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2000), 36.
10. Heo Man-ho, “Les prisonniers de guerre sud-coréens retenus en Corée du Nord, Les hommes dans l'historie,” in La Corée, le peuple et ses valeurs culturelles: d'hier à ajourd'hui, ed. Yim Sung-sook, (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2000), 36.
11. Abductees of Gyeongbuk Origin under Protection at the Pusan Camp (in Korean) Daegu Maeil, May 1, 1951.
12. For the concept of “Bogus Coalition,” the second phase of the three-phased formation of a pro-Soviet government (“baggage-train government”) in Soviet Russian occupied countries after the Second World War, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1961).
13. Library of Congress, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: An Emerging New Context For U.S. Diplomacy, Study Prepared by the Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1979), 521–2.
14. Heo, Man-ho, “The Characteristics of North Korean Negotiating Behavior: A theoretical deviation or Pseudo-negotiation?” Korea and World Affairs 22, no.3 (Fall 1998): 416.
15. Heo, Man-ho, “The Characteristics of North Korean Negotiating Behavior: A theoretical deviation or Pseudo-negotiation?” Korea and World Affairs 22, no.3 (Fall 1998): 416.
16. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 303–5.
17. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 307–8.
18. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 308.
19. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 303.
20. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 331–2.
21. National Institute of Korean History (NIKH), Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations (in Korean), Book 5, Transcript of Proceedings, Military Armistice Conferences Vol. 5: Agenda Item 4 on 1st–71st Comte Mraning meetings, 332.
22. Christopher Dupont and Guy-Olivier Faure, “The Negotiation Process,” in International Negotiation, ed. Victor A. Kremenyuk (Oxford: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), 46.
23. Adm. Libby stated: “contrary to your apparent belief, the essence and the whole basis of our proposal is not a one-for-one exchange ... It is an all-for-all exchange conditioned only by the voluntary consideration.” NIKH, Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations, 411.
24. Adm. Libby stated: “contrary to your apparent belief, the essence and the whole basis of our proposal is not a one-for-one exchange ... It is an all-for-all exchange conditioned only by the voluntary consideration.” NIKH, Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations, 410.
25. Adm. Libby stated: “contrary to your apparent belief, the essence and the whole basis of our proposal is not a one-for-one exchange ... It is an all-for-all exchange conditioned only by the voluntary consideration.” NIKH, Collection of Historical Documents on Inter-Korean Relations, January 10, 1952 meeting, 491–2.
26. Heo Man-ho, “The Characteristics of North Korean Negotiating Behavior,” 401–2.
27. See Telegram sent to Cincunc Advance by U.S. Ambassador Muccio on January 4, 1952, in Collection of Historical Documents on Korean War Abductions 2 ed. Yi, Mi-il, (Seoul: KWARI, September 2009), 984.