Abstract
Outer space has become a vital part of international security. Since Sputnik, space has been gradually militarized, if not yet weaponized. During the Cold War, fierce competition between the two superpowers extended to space. In the post-Cold War period, new powers have joined the military competition in outer space, most notably China, India, and the European Union. Other middle-sized nations have also shown strong interest and made significant efforts in this area. Yet compared to the abundant literature on the space policy of major powers, there has been little study of the space policy of middle-sized states. To fill the gap, this article focuses on the evolution of South Korea's space policy as it relates to its national security: how Seoul's space policy will enhance, and has been enhancing, South Korea's military capability. After briefly outlining the development of security-related space policy in general, including South Korea's neighbors, Seoul's space policy is examined, including its current policies on space capability development, and the paper concluded by providing policy recommendations for Seoul's space policy.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on a paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans, Louisiana, on February 18, 2010.
Notes
1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Space Operations,” January 16, 2009, II-1, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dodjp3-14.pdf.
2. Jin-Man Lee, “South Korea Launches First Rocket into Space,” Associated Press, August 25, 2009. South Korea's second attempt in June 2010 also failed. The rocket exploded in the sky a few minutes after the launch.
3. It is estimated that the international aerospace market, currently worth about US$150 billion, will reach $450 billion by 2015. Hyung-Ki Park, “Global Aerospace Market to Reach $450 Billion by 2015,” Korea Times, April 8, 2008.
4. Space here is defined as “the area beginning at roughly 60 miles (about 100 km) above the Earth's surface,” because the Earth's atmosphere starts allowing orbital flight above this altitude. James C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 12, fn 5.
5. This is a highly contentious issue. See Michael O'Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Militarization of space is defined as “the use of assets based in space to enhance the military effectiveness of conventional forces or the use of space assets for military purposes.” Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 3. Weaponization of space is defined as “either weapons based in space or weapons based on the ground with their intended targets being located in space.” Ibid.
6. Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 2.
7. Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London: Routledge, 2007), 104–6; O'Hanlon, Neither Space Wars Nor Sanctuary; Matthew Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space; Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 23–40; Roger Handsberg, Seeking New World Vistas: The Militarization of Space (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000); Michael Krepon, “Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (May/June 2001): 2–8; Bruce DeBlois, Richard Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy Marwell, “Space Weapons: Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,” International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 50–84 ; and Joan Johnson-Freese, Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate Space (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
8. Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 172.
9. O'Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary, 13; Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 261–2; and Krepon, “Lost in Space.”
10. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 94. Not surprisingly, after becoming the Secretary of Defense under President Bush, Rumsfeld organized the U.S. Space Command and energetically promoted policies to maintain U.S. space dominance. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin, 2009), 120
11. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 94.
12. White House, “U.S. National Security Policy” (October 2006) quoted from Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 296. The Obama administration's approach to space security is not dramatically different, but encourages more international cooperation. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stipulates that the Pentagon “will explore opportunities to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure.” U.S. Department of Defense, “The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,” 33, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, At the National Space Symposium in April 2010, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III also acknowledged the vital importance of space in military operations as well as the fact that “space has become congested, competitive, and contested.” He advocated engaging in more international cooperation while firmly protecting U.S. space assets. Jim Garamore, “Lynn Details Defense Department's Space Strategy,” American Forces Press Service, April 14, 2010.
13. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 117.
14. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 110, 114.
15. A nation's space power is defined as “the ability of a nation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation.” David Lampton, On Space Power: A Space Power Doctrine (Montgomery: Maxwell Air Force Base, 1998), 4.
16. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Space Operations,” January 6, 2009, II-1-II-10, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_14.pdf.
17. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Space Operations,” January 6, 2009, I-1. “Force multipliers” means “military systems that significantly increase the effectiveness of combat forces.” Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 14.
18. U.S. Air Force, “Space Operations,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, November 27, 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2.pdf.
19. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, chapter 10; Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, chapter 4.
20. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 161.
21. Mowthorpe, The Militarization and Weaponization of Space, 179.
22. U.S. Department of Defense, “2009 Annual Report to Congress: the Military Power of the PRC,”13, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_2009.pdf.
23. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 275–6.
24. Sheehan, The International Politics of Space, 164–7. See also The U.S. Department of Defense, “2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the PRC,” 27–8, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.
25. Stephen Clark, “China Launches New Spy Satellite,” Spaceflight Now, August 10, 2010, http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/china-launches-new-spy-satellite/100810.html.
26. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, 296–300; Carin Zissis, “China's Anti-Satellite Test,” Background of Council for Foreign Relations, February 22, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12684/chinas_antisatellite_test.html. The United States responded to the Chinese test with its own anti-satellite operation in February 2008 destroying a malfunctioning spy satellite, which caused tremendous controversy in the United States and abroad regarding space weaponization and arms races. Paul Reynolds, “U.S. Missile Strike Divides Opinion,” BBC, February 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/725653I.stm; and Charles Hanley, “Satellite Strike Struck Diplomacy, Too,” Associated Press, February 24, 2008.
27. Not surprisingly, the Pentagon's latest report on China's military paid great attention to the Chinese space programs and technological development, which would have significant implications for its anti-access/area-denial capability. U.S. Department of Defense, “2009 Annual Report to Congress,” 13–4, 18–9, 25–7, 52.
28. Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 172. In response to Pyongyang's test, Japan's Air Space Self Defense conducted missile-defense tests at a civilian space center. Ibid., 242, no. 88.
29. Masako Toki, “Missile Defense in Japan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2009.
30. Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 40.
31. Victor Cha, “Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Stability: A Case for ‘Sober Optimism’,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features , ed. Muthia Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 488.
32. Setsuko Aoki, “Japan Enters a New Space Age,” Asia Times, July 3, 2009.
33. “Japan Uses DPRK as Excuse for Space Plan,” China Daily, May 13, 2009.
34. “Japan Launches Fifth Spy Satellite,” Japan Today, November 28, 2009.
35. “Japan Uses DPRK as Excuse for Space Plan.”
36. As Daniel Pinkston argues, “(South Korea)'s alliance with the United States has both driven and constrained its space program.” In Pinkston, “Space Cadets: The Korean Peninsula's Rocket Competition,” Jane's Intelligence Review (September 2009): 9.
37. Dr. Sang-Hoe Koo, head of Seoul's missile development, had to visit Washington and give assurances that the Korean government had no intention of violating the Missile Note. Sang-Hoe Koo, “A Retrospect of Dr. Sang-Hoe Koo: A Live Witness of the South Korean Missile Development” (in Korean), Shindonga, April 1999, 453.
38. Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003), 94.
39. These efforts provided the crucial experiences for future development of space technology. Tong-Hyung Kim, “Rocket Launch Marks First Test for Korean Space Ambitions,” Korea Times, October 20, 2008. See also Daniel Pinkston, “North and South Korea Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict,” Astropolitics 4, no. 2 (2006): 212. Yet these efforts were promoted by the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), a civilian agency under the Ministry of Science and Technology, not by the Ministry of National Defense (MND).
40. Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation, 92–3. However, the goal was not achieved.
41. Yong-Sup Han, “South Korea's Perception and Attitude Toward TMD,” (research paper at RAND, January 2000), 9. See also James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited NMD (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), 135.
42. Korea Herald, April 28, 1999, cited from Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation, 95. On this issue, South Korean officials would not accept inspections they perceived would violate Korea's sovereign rights to a space project. In “U.S., ROK to Meet on Extending ROK Missile Range,” Yonhap, September 17, 1998, cited from Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation, 224, fn. 23.
43. Alex Wagner, “South Korea, U.S. Agree on Missile Guidelines, MTCR Membership,” Arms Control Today, March 2001.
44. Gormley, Missile Contagion, 44; and “A Precious Step Forward,” Korea Herald, January 19, 2001.
45. Pinkston, “North and South Korea Space Development,” 211.
46. Pinkston, “North and South Korea Space Development,” 214–8.
47. Sang-Beom Kim, The Step toward the Aerospace Force in the 21st Century (in Korean) (Seoul: Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Press, 2003), 179.
48. Pinkston, “North and South Korea Space Development,” 213.
49. Tong-Hyung Kim, “Rocket Launch Marks First Test for Korean Space Ambitions.”
50. Calvin Sims, “South Korea Plans to Begin Rocket Program,” New York Times, January 15, 2000.
51. Jin-Seo Cho, “Yi Plays Prelude to Korea's Rocket Projects,” Korea Times, April 14, 2008.
52. Doo Hwan Kim, “Korea's Space Development Programme: Policy and Law,” Space Policy 22, no. 2 (May 2006): 110–17; and Chin Young Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea: History, Current Programs, and Future Plans,” Space Policy 22, no. 3 (August 2006): 194–9.
53. Hyong-Ki Park, “Global Aerospace Market to Reach $450 Billion by 2015.”
54. Jin-Seo Cho, “Korea Starts to Localize Space Rocket,” Korea Times, April 3, 2008.
55. “South Korea Completes Work on Naro Space Center,” Korea Times, June 10, 2009.
56. Joon-Seung Lee, “South Korea to Independently Build Next Space Rocket: Official,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, June 10, 2009.
57. Jin-Seo Cho, “Yi Plays Prelude to Korea's Rocket Project.” Yet the plan has been delayed. The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology announced plans in November 2009 to complete the KSLV-II by 2019 and launch a multipurpose satellite by 2020. South Korea's moon exploration project is likely delayed as well. Kyung-Ae Ahn, “KSLV-II to be Launched in 2020” (in Korean), Digital Times, November 30, 2009. The delay is caused by technological and budgetary difficulties. Hye-Jung Lim, “Naro-2 (KSLV-II) Cannot Be Developed in 10 Years” (in Korean), inews, October 7, 2009.
58. Pinkston, “Space Cadets,” 11.
59. Gormley, Missile Contagion, 45.
60. Jung-Hoon Lee, “A Secret Story of the Korean Space Launch Vehicles, KSLV-1,” (in Korean) Shindonga, August, 2008.
61. “U.S. Limits South's Rocket Development: Naro Head,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 22, 2009.
62. Gormley summarizes this tendency: “Long gone, it seems, are the days when Washington could employ its security guarantee or promise of technology as leverage to restrain South Korea's missile ambitions.” In Gormley, Missile Contagion, 45. Yet Seoul remains cooperative with Washington, based on the security treaty between them, thus developing space capability within the bounds of the treaty.
63. ROKAF, “Building Aerospace Force” (in Korean), at www.airforce.mil.kr/main.html.
64. Sang-Beom Kim, Step toward the Aerospace Force in the 21 st Century, 178.
65. “Interview with the ROKAF Chief, General Han-Ho Lee,” (in Korean) Shindonga 533, February 2004, 355.
66. Jae-Dong Choi, “Devoting Myself to Build the Aerospace Force” (in Korean), Gukbang Ilbo [National Defense Daily], January 25, 2008.
67. Jong-Won Kim, “The Aerospace Force Moving One Step Forward” (in Korean), Kookmin Ilbo, December 19, 2006.
68. Il-Hyun Chang, “Launch of ROK Aerospace Force” (in Korean), Chosun Ilbo, August 20, 2008.
69. “ROKAF, Selecting ‘Astronaut’ Candidate from 2010,” (in Korean) ROKAF News Data, October 26, 2009, http://www.airforce.mil.kr:7778/index.html.
70. Sang-Beom Kim, Step toward the Aerospace Force in the 21st Century, 9.
71. Personal Interviews with senior Air Force officers conducted in Seoul, July 2009.
72. Telephone interview with a retired Air Force officer in August 2010.
73. Arie Egozi, “El-Op Delivers South Korean Spy Camera,” Flight International, January 11, 2005.
74. Development of Komsat 1, South Korea's first multi-purpose satellite, was begun in 1995 to provide independent surveillance capability. It was launched in 1999. Young-Il Park, “The Role of Government to Improve Space Intelligence,” (in Korean) in Aerospace Intelligence Power and Military's Creative Management, ed. Yonsei University Air Power Program (Seoul, Korea: Oruem 2009), 59. Seoul puts its main efforts into developing satellites, spending more than half its space development funds (293.4 billion Won) on satellites. Yoon-Mi Kim, “Korea Invests in Space Program,” Korea Herald, February 28, 2007. Yet ROKAF is not leading management and maintenance of these satellites.
75. Interviews with senior Air Force officers in July 2009; and ROKAF, “Building Air & Space Force” (in Korean), at www.airforce.mil.kr/main.html.
76. Hyun-Sook Song, “Training 6–8 Astronauts by 2020,” (in Korean) ROKAF News Data, June 25, 2009, http://www.airforce.mil.kr:7778/index.html.
77. Interview with a senior Air Force officer in January 2010.
78. Personal Interviews with a senior Air Force officer and a senior researcher at KIDA conducted in Seoul, July 2009. Policymakers are not enthusiastic either. For example, Park Jin, an influential member of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee from the Grand National Party, expressed concern and reluctance about development of Seoul's own military satellite. Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development,” 216.
79. Kwi-Keun Kim, “Space Budget, Japan's 7.3 %” (in Korean), Yonhap, September 23, 2008.
80. Kwi-Keun Kim, “National Defense Budget 29 Trillion 600 Billion Won” (in Korean), Yonhap, September 28, 2009.
81. The entire budget for Space Force establishment was cut in 2008. Soo-Geun Kwak, “China Is Space Force, but Our Air Force Is?” (in Korean) Chosun Ilbo, June 26, 2010.
82. Personal Interviews with a retired senior Air Force officer and a current senior Air Force officer conducted in Seoul January 2010.
83. So-Hyun Kim, “Seoul Lags North Korea in Rocket Technology,” Korea Herald, April 7, 2009.
84. USFK, “Space Operations,” 2.
85. The Revision of Defense Reform 2020, which was announced in June 2009, plans to independently conduct surveillance over North Korea by using multi-purpose satellites. Sung-Hoon Jin, “Independent 24 Hour Surveillance of North Korea Using Arirang Satellites,” (in Korean) Hankook Ilbo, June 27, 2009.
86. James Rendleman and J. Walter Faulconer, “Improving International Space Cooperation: Considerations for the USA,” Space Policy 26, no. 3 (August 2010): 144–8.
87. Mischa Hansel, “The USA and Arms Control in Space: An IR Analysis,” Space Policy 26, no. 2 (May 2010): 98.