“Just Access”? Questions of Equity in Access and Funding for Assistive Technology

Abstract

Assistive technology has great potential to contribute to health, functioning, and quality of life. To date, as exemplified in the Canadian context, variations and inequities in access to assistive technology are evident; the development of legislation, policies, and programs has not kept up with the increasing use of assistive technology. In this article, we apply ;Daniels’s (2008) theory of just health to argue that equitable access to assistive technology funding and services is necessary for justice. In doing so, we offer theoretical guidance for the development of legislation, policies, and programs to guide such access in health and social services.

Keywords:

• equity
• assistive technology
• aging
• disability
• Norman Daniels

Acknowledgments

One of the authors is employed by March of Dimes Canada, a national charity organization that offers programs for assistive technology. March of Dimes Canada is a partner in this project and has provided in-kind support, though the organization does not have control over the research direction or findings.

Funding

We acknowledge AGE-WELL NCE for the generous funding that has enabled the development and completion of this article in addition to that of the overarching project in which this one is embedded. We thank March of Dimes Canada for their in-kind contribution and support with this project.

Notes

¹ Daniels importantly stipulated that the acknowledgement of pathology, and thus the departure from normal species functioning, is to be an objective observation; values are not attached to pathologies. Daniels recognized that values will inevitably guide the determination of what pathologies are considered to require treatment but that these normative claims are not to be included in the objective observation of pathology; rather they are to remain in the prioritization of pathologies and treatment.

² Although Daniels did not define what he meant by “harmful,” he does denote that a pathology is not merely an “unwanted” condition, which would be highly dependent on societal norms. See Daniels (2008, pp. 40–42) for more details.