https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5761-3500
![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Thailand appeared to be under a tide of youthful revolutionary change. In 2020, in a rare moment in Thai history, university and secondary school students, particularly female and LGBTQ + schoolchildren, took the lead in national protests against an autocratic government. It was a period during which the seemingly impossible, such as the reform of Thailand’s royal institutions, appeared possible. What were the historical origins of the country’s revolutionary youth movement? This article argues that the Thai youth movement emerged from youth activist networks fostered by post-coup political entrepreneurs. It describes the foundational moments of these networks and analyses their inside brokerage processes, i.e. how these political entrepreneurs cultivated friendships and ties among segregated young activists by creating unique spaces – campsites and activist houses. These underground spaces allowed activists to connect, learn, brainstorm, organize mobilization, and build cross-issue and cross-regional activist ties under an autocratic regime.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to colleagues who provided feedback on this article including Amalia Rossi, Amalinda Savirani, Edward Aspinall, Giuseppe Bolotta, Ki-young Shin, Manita Noosawat, Meredith Weiss, Sirada Khemanitthathai, Tyrell Haberkorn, and Viengrat Nethipo. I am also thankful to the discussants and participants at the 2022 American Political Science Association Workshop in Bangkok, the 2022 Summer School on Social Movements in Contemporary Southeast Asia in Venice, and the 2023 Association of Asian Studies conference in Boston. Special thanks go to Elvin Ong and Nhu Troung for their extraordinary efforts in editing. Lastly, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to Alisa Bindusa, Chonthicha Jangrew, Darika Bamrungchok, Kheetanat Wannaboworn, and Pimsiri Petchnamrob for their tremendous support during the fieldwork, and to Erik Kuhonta for his supervision.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Selway, “Who Prefers Future Forward?”
2 Communication with Mob Data, 15 December 2021.
3 When using the term “revolutionary,” this article refers to the demonstrations where youth expressed the will of the people as a sovereign against the historically dominant monarchy and military. Thompson and Cheng demonstrate how Thailand’s protests in 2020 ranged from reformist to revolutionary motives. See Thompson and Cheng, “Transgressing Taboos.”
4 For the conceptualization of “revolution” as “a rapid and fundamental domestic change in a society’s dominant myths and values”, see Huntington, Political Order, 264.
5 Hewison, “Thai Youth Protests.”
6 Lertchoosakul, Songkhramyen.
7 Lertchoosakul, “The May 2023 Elections.”
8 See a special issue in Critical Asian Studies, 53, no. 2 (April 3, 2021).
9 Davenport, State Repression; Gurr, Why Men Rebel.
10 Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, “5 Pi Khosocho.”
11 Sawasdee, “Electoral Integrity.”
12 Cheng, Lui, and Fu, “The Power of Digital Activism”; Sinpeng, “Hashtag Activism”; Sombatpoonsiri, “Thai 2021 Demonstrations.”
13 Bennett and Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action.
14 Sinpeng, “Hashtag Activism.”
15 Earl and Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change.
16 Interview with Witthaya, 21 March 2021; Patthapee, 14 March 2021.
17 I thank Tyrell Haberkorn for her thoughtful observation.
18 Gould, “Multiple Networks.”
19 Mateo, “All of Belarus”; Onuch, “EuroMaidan”; Wackenhut, “Revisiting the Egyptian Uprising.”
20 The original definition is from Goddard, “Brokering Change,” 4.
21 Capoccia, “Critical Junctures.”
22 Clarke, “Unexpected Brokers,” 383.
23 Burt, Brokerage and Closure.
24 Obstfeld, “Social Networks.”
25 For reviews on spaces and places, see Gieryn, “A Space for Place”; Logan, “Making a Place”; Small and Adler, “The Role of Space.”
26 Feld, “The Focused Organization,” 1016.
27 Simmel, Simmel on Culture.
28 Tobler, “A Computer Movie.”
29 Small, Unanticipated Gains.
30 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties.”
31 Bennett and Segerberg, The Logic of Connective Action.
32 Connors, “Article of Faith.”
33 Interview with Chaithawat Tulathon, 28 September 2021; Kittichai Ngamchaipisit, 28 September 2021; Rodjaraeg Wattanapanich, 24 January 2022.
34 Phuaphansawat, “My Eyes Are Open.”
35 Interview with Wilasinee, 1 February 2022.
36 Wongseesa, “Krabuankan.”
37 Ibid.
38 Nethipo, “Thailand’s Divided Civil Society.”
39 Nostitz, “Thailand’s Political Convulsions.”
40 Amnesty International, “Thailand.”
41 Interview with Kittipong, 20 September 2021.
42 Haberkorn, Revolution Interrupted, 89–90.
43 Interview with Orapan, 4 December 2021; Sae-Jang, “Rupbaep Khai.”
44 On the political economy approach in Thai social movements, see Phatharathananunth, Civil Society and Democratization.
45 Interview with Papob, 29 November 2021; Orapan.
46 On the conceptualization of “weak” or “strong” ties, see Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties.”
47 Interview with Orapan.
48 Ibid.
49 Interview with Kittichai; Orapan; Papob.
50 Teerakowitkajorn, “Thailand’s New Left-Wing.”
51 Setthawilai, “Chak Dao Din.”
52 The Isaan Record, “Poet Tua.”
53 TVS’s programs that particularly created political and party activists include “Young Leadership for Social Change” and “Volunteer Human Rights Lawyer.” See Kuankajorn, “Asasamak,” 209.
54 Interview with Wilasinee.
55 Ibid.
56 The term was mentioned in my interviews with Chaithawat and Kittichai.
57 Baker, “The 2014 Thai Coup.”
58 See Prachatai’s entries on TSCD: https://prachatai.com/english/category/thai-student-center-for-democracy-tscd.
59 Interview with Charanya, 12 March 2021.
60 Interview with Nithoon, 21 September 2021; Pipob, 6 March 2021; Mekhla, 21 September 2021.
61 Interview with Kittipong, 20 September 2021. On pilgrimage as a social process, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, Chapter 4.
62 Interview with Kittipong.
63 Interview with Nakarin, 11 and 13 June 2021; Charanya.
64 The polarity between organizational institutionalization and networked or “organic” model of mobilization was one of the most contentious issues within the Thai youth movement, particularly after November 2020. See Tarrow, Power in Movement, Chapter 6.
65 Interview with Nakarin.
66 The name “Cobra Gold” came from a joint-military exercise between the U.S. and Thailand. Nakarin picked the name randomly from the news he was watching and used it to title the initiative.
67 Interview with Charanya; Nakarin.
68 Interview with Charanya.
69 Haberkorn, “A Budding Democracy Movement.”
70 McCargo, Alexander, and Desatova, “Ordering Peace.”
71 Interview with Charanya; Nakarin; Nithoon; Pipob.
72 Interview with Chaithawat.
73 Civicus, “We Are an Activist Group.”
74 Interview with Charanya; Nakarin.
75 Bermeo, “Democracy.”
76 Charanya provided the author with copies of her personal notebooks and materials from the trainings she attended. The author could partially trace how she as a DRG co-founder accumulated her mobilization repertoires.
77 Interviews with DRG camp designers including; Ditt, 21 August 2021; Kittipong; Sunanda, 21 September 2021 and 2 March 2021; Surat, 27 September 2021.
78 Interview with Nontawat, 31 March 2021 and 15 October 2021; Porntip, 21 September 2021; Wila, 21 May 2021.
79 Interview with Charanya; Kittichai; Orapan.
80 Nakarin picked the name randomly from the room number of their inaugural meeting.
81 Interview with Sunanda.
82 For example, see Move Forward Party’s Awaken Land camps, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWir_OznBP8
83 Participatory observation, Phatthalung, Songkhla, and Trang provinces, 1–4 October 2020.
84 Interview with Paween; Sunanda.
85 Interview with Piam, 1 October 2020.
86 Dekpred means disobedient children.
87 Manager Online, 19 October 2020.
88 Interview with Paween; Porntip; Sunanda.
89 Massa, “Guardians of the Internet.”
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Akanit Horatanakun
Akanit Horatanakun is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at McGill University. His research focuses on the interrelations between social movements and political parties and how they lead to varied human rights consequences over time.