Roger That: Russia’s Coup-Proofed Army and Its Combat Effectiveness, 2022–2023

ABSTRACT

Contrary to expectations, Russia failed to overrun the Ukrainian defense despite its apparent preparations for the 2022 invasion. This paper delves into the unexpected outcome, attributing it to the Russian army’s inadequate combat effectiveness. It, in turn, was triggered by President Vladimir Putin’s coup-proofing strategies, namely granting large payrolls and funding for the military; tolerating lucrative dealings and corruption; establishing military fiefdoms; counterbalancing; rotation and purges of politically disloyal officers; and micromanaging military campaigns. Cumulatively, these policies curtailed military autonomy, accelerated promotions of inept loyalists, limited interbranch cooperation, provoked high attrition rates, and spread norms of coercion toward military personnel, making the Russian army’s performance suboptimal during combat. Discussing the issue, the article advances four plausible explanations for why Putin resorted to coup-proofing.

KEYWORDS:

• Military effectiveness
• coup-proofing
• neopatrimonial dictatorship
• civil-military relations
• Russian army

Acknowledgment

The author is thankful to Professor Michael Coffey and two anonymous reviewers whose interest in and insightful comments on the manuscript helped significantly improve it.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)g.

Notes

¹ Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, ‘Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win In It’, The Economist, 3 November 2023, https://infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI_FULL_VERSION.pdf

² Avril Haines, ‘House Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats’, CQ Congressional Transcripts, 8 March 2022, https://www.cia.gov/static/ATA_HPSCI_Transcript_8-March-2022.pdf.

³ Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, ‘Operation Z. The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Special Report, 22 April 2022, https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf.

⁴ ‘Ukraine hits Russian shipyard in Crimea port, damages ship’, Reuters, 5 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-military-says-it-hit-zalyv-plant-port-city-kerch-crimea-2023-11-04/; Deborah Haynes, ‘British cruise missiles were used in significant Ukrainian attack on Russian submarine’, Sky News, 13 September 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-strikes-russian-submarine-and-landing-ship-in-audacious-assault-on-crimea-naval-base-12960336

⁵ Victoria Beaule, ‘Satellite Images Show Russia Moved Military Ships After Ukrainian Attacks’, ABC News, 6 October 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/International/satellite-images-show-russia-moved-military-ships-after/story?id=103776620

⁶ ‘Traffic Stopped on Crimean Bridge, Reports of Blasts’, Reuters, 17 July 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/traffic-stopped-crimean-bridge-due-emergency-russian-backed-governor-2023-07-17/; Robert Coalson, ‘From Logistics To Psychology, Effects Of Crimea Bridge Blast Will Linger,’ RFE/RL, 18 July 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimea-bridge-explosion-effects-logistics-psychology/32508853.html.

⁷ Isabel van Brugen, ‘Russian Missile Weapons Factory, Chemical Plant Targeted in Drone Strikes’, Newsweek, 14 November 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-drone-attack-moscow-russia-war-1843423; ‘Беспилотник второй раз за неделю атаковал крупнейший пороховой завод России’, The Moscow Times, 15 November 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/17030

⁸ ‘На территории воинской части у поселка Котлубань в Волгоградской области произошел пожар с детонацией боеприпасов’, The Moscow Times, 16 November 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/17054.

⁹ Matthew Bodner and Henry Austin, ‘Putin Claims ‘Terrorist Attack’ Near Ukrainian Border; Kyiv denies involvement’, NBC News, 2 March 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-claims-ukrainian-sabotage-bryansk-putin-terrorist-attack-rcna73034; Peter Dickinson, ‘Belgorod Raid Sparks Border Alarm for Russia Ahead of Ukrainian Offensive,’ Atlantic Council, 23 May 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/belgorod-raid-sparks-border-alarm-for-russia-ahead-of-ukrainian-offensive/.

¹⁰ David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine (New York: Harper, 2023).

¹¹ Тимофей Сергейцев, ‘Что Россия должна сделать с Украиной,’ RIA-Novosti, 3 April 2022, https://ria.ru/20220403/ukraina-1781469605.html, for an abstract in English and discussion see: Chris Brown, ‘A Kremlin Paper Justifies Erasing the Ukrainian Identity, as Russia is Accused of War Crimes’, CBC News, 5 April 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/kremlin-editorial-ukraine-identity-1.6407921.

¹² Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, and Tom Balmforth, ‘Russia Demands NATO Roll Back from East Europe and Stay Out of Ukraine’, Reuters, 17 December 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-unveils-security-guarantees-says-western-response-not-encouraging-2021-12-17/.

¹³ Volodymyr Kulyk, ‘National Identity in Time of War: Ukraine after the Russian Aggressions of 2014 and 2022’, Problems of Post-Communism (2023). DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2023.2224571; Erik Herron and Khrystyna Pelchar, ‘Undivided Ukraine: Evidence of Rallying Effects and an Emerging National Consensus’, Problems of Post-Communism (2023). DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2023.2224569.

¹⁴ Jo Inge Bekkevold, ‘NATO’s Remarkable Revival,’ Foreign Policy, 11 September 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/11/nato-alliance-us-europe-russia-geopolitics-china-military-deterrence/; Justine Luce, ‘The Invasion of Ukraine Revived NATO. Is It Enough?’, War Room, 5 October 2023, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/ukraine-revived-nato/.

¹⁵ Moira Fagan, Jacob Poushter, and Sneha Gubbala, ‘Large Shares See Russia and Putin in Negative Light, While Views of Zelenskyy More Mixed,’ Pew Research Center, 10 July 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/10/large-shares-see-russia-and-putin-in-negative-light-while-views-of-zelenskyy-more-mixed/.

¹⁶ Béatrice Giblin, ‘Russie-Ukraine: Nouvelle Géopolitique du Monde,’ Hérodote 190–191 (2023) p. 4.

¹⁷ As of December 2023, Putin has clearly adopted a waiting-out approach (cf. Dennis Soltys, ‘Vladimir Putin is still convinced he can outlast the West in Ukraine,’ Atlantic Council, 5 October 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putin-is-still-convinced-he-can-outlast-the-west-in-ukraine/); however, the determination to persevere does not necessarily mean a well-developed plan to achieve goals.

¹⁸ For examples, see David Singer, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States,1816-1985,’ International Interactions 14(2) (1987) pp. 115–132; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great PowerPolitics (New York: Norton 2001) pp. 55–80, and for a recent reappraisal Michael Beckley, ‘Economic Development and Military Effectiveness,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 33(1) (2010) pp. 43–79.

¹⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: Brassey’s 1990) pp. 105–106.

²⁰ Brig. Gen. Robert Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and Staff College Press 1994) p. 43.

²¹ John Mueller, ‘The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War,’ Security Studies 5(1) (1995) p. 9.

²² Patricia Sullivan, Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict (New York: Oxford Academic 2012), p. 81.

²³ Jasen Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2014).

²⁴ Stephen Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996); Jason Lyall, Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2020).

²⁵ Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 19(2) (1996) pp. 139–179.

²⁶ Patricia Sullivan, Who Wins? Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict (New York: Oxford Academic 2012).

²⁷ Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’ in Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010 [1988]) p. 2.

²⁸ Risa Brooks, ‘The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness’ in Creating Military Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2022 [2007]) p. 10. (Emphasis added).

²⁹ Rosella Cappella Zielinski, How States Pay for Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2016) p. 115.

³⁰ For this central notion of political sociology, see: Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, European Journal of Sociology 25(2) (1984) pp. 185–213; Hillel Soifer and Matthias vom Hau, ‘Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power,’ Studies in Comparative International Development 43(3-4) (2008) pp. 219–230.

³¹ A good example of a governmental policy going against an established military doctrine is the Russo-Japanese war. Throughout the 1870–1890s, the Imperial General Staff under Gen. Obruchev and Gen. Kuropatkin elaborated mobilization schedules and logistics to fight a war against Germany and Austria (David Alan Rich, The Tsar’s Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998), pp. 115–150. However, when Russia’s obtrusive policy in Manchuria and Korea provoked a Japanese attack, Russia’s military effectiveness was beyond the pale.

³² Filippo Andreatta, ‘The Complexity of Military Effectiveness’ in The Sword’s Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness (New York: Cambridge University Press 2017) p. 256.

³³ Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,’ American Political Science Review 64(4) (1970) pp. 1033–1105; Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts and Measurement (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2020).

³⁴ Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’ in Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010 [1988]) p. 3.

³⁵ Per-Idar Evensen, Marius Halsør, Ulf-Peter Hoppe, and Dan Helge Bentsen, ‘Measuring combat effectiveness’, FFI-RAPPORT 21/02310, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 25 January 2022, p. 43, https://ffi-publikasjoner.archive.knowledgearc.net/bitstream/handle/20.500.12242/2969/21-02310.pdf

³⁶ Kirstin Brathwaite, ‘Effective in Battle: Conceptualizing Soldiers’ Combat Effectiveness’, Defence Studies 18(1) (2018) p. 3.

³⁷ This idea has been amply explored by Russell Weigley, The Age of Battles. The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991) and, more recently, Cathal Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (New York: Oxford University Press 2017).

³⁸ William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982) pp. 269–299.

³⁹ John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) pp. 111–166; Roger Ford, The Grim Reaper: The Machine-Gun and Machine-Gunners (London: Sidgwick and Jackson 1996).

⁴⁰ A.J. Smithers, Rude Mechanicals: An Account of Tank Maturity during the Second World War (London: Leo Cooper (1987) Chapters 6–9; Alaric Searle, Genesis, Employment, Aftermath: First World War Tanks and the New Warfare, 1900-1945 (Solihull, West Midlands: Helion and Company Limited 2015), Chapters 8–9; Spencer Tucker, Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO 2004) pp. 138–168; 189–198.

⁴¹ Raymond O’Mara, Rise of the War Machines: The Birth of Precision Bombing in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2022), pp. 177–242; Anthony Thornborough, Sky Spies: Three Decades of Airborne Reconnaissance (London: Arms and Armour 1993) pp. 102–154; Leo Marriott, Jets at Sea: Naval Aviation in Transition 1945-55 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword 2008) Chapters 5–7.

⁴² Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004) p. 30.

⁴³ Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004) p. 190.

⁴⁴ Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2015) pp. 13–14.

⁴⁵ Henk Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, ‘Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders,’ Journal of Peace Research 46(2) (2009) p. 275. The second biggest threat, rebellions, provoked only 1.83 percent of exits thus being five times less threatening.

⁴⁶ See Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Harvard: Belknap Press 1957); Stephen Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder: Westview 1988); Edward Luttwak, Coup d’état (London: Penguin 1968).

⁴⁷ Richard Li and William Thompson, ‘The ‘Coup Contagion’ Hypothesis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 19(1) (1975) pp. 63–84; Rosemary O’Kane, The Likelihood of Coups (Aldeshot: Avebury 1987); Augustine Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins ‘The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957–1984’, American Journal of Sociology 99(1) (1993) pp. 126–163; Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999); Alexander Geletovic and Ricardo Sanhueza, ‘Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups d’état’, Economics and Politics 12(2) (2000) pp. 183–204; Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, ‘Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(5) (2003) pp. 594–620; Patrick McGowan, ‘African Military Coups d’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3) (2003) pp. 339–370; Jonathan Powell, ‘Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6) (2012) pp. 1017–1040; Fabrice Lehoucq and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, ‘Breaking Out of the Coup Trap: Political Competition and Military Coups in Latin America,’ Comparative Political Studies 47(8) (2013) pp. 1105–1129; Martin Gassebner, Jerg Gutmann, and Stefan Voigt, ‘When to Expect a Coup dʼEtat? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants’, Public Choice 169 (2016) pp. 293–313; Andrew Little, ‘Coordination, Learning, and Coups’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(1) (2017) pp. 204–234.

⁴⁸ Christian von Soest, ‘What Neopatrimonialism Is – Six Questions to the Concept’, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Background Paper (2010) p. 6; cf. the argument that democracies can exhibit neopatrimonial features on either national or subnational level: Olexandr Fisun, ‘Ukrainian Constitutional Politics: Neopatrimonialism, Rent-seeking, and Regime Change’, in Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on

Advancing Reform in Ukraine (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2016); Edward Gibson, ‘Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries,’ World Politics 58(1) (2005) pp. 101–132; Julian Durrazo Herrmann, ‘Neo-Patrimonialism and Subnational Authoritarianism in Mexico. The Case of Oaxaca’, Journal of Politics in Latin America 2(2) (2010) pp. 85–112.

⁴⁹ Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered,’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45(1) (2007) p. 105; Alexander Baturo and Johan Elkink, ‘Dynamics of Regime Personalization and Patron-Client Networks in Russia, 1999–2014’, Post-Soviet Affairs 32 (2016) pp. 75–98.

⁵⁰ Oscar Oszlak, ‘Public Policy and Political Regimes in Latin America,’ International Social Science Journal, 38(2) (1986) p. 229.

⁵¹ Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics In Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015).

⁵² Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,’ Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007) pp. 1279–1301; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius, ‘Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective’, Contemporary Politics 19(1) (2013) pp. 19–34; Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press 2012), Chapter 3.

⁵³ James Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, International Security 24(2) (1999) pp. 131–165; Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, ‘Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict’, Security Studies 14(1) (2005), pp. 140–177; Philippe Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,’ World Politics 63(2) (2011) pp. 300–346; Jun Koga Sudduth, ‘Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival,’ Journal of Peace Research 54(1) (2017) pp. 3–15; Abel Escriba-Folch, Tobias Böhmelt, and Ulrich Pilster, ‘Authoritarian Regimes and Civil-Military Relations: Explaining Counterbalancing in Autocracies’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 37(5) (2020), pp. 559–579; Wonjun Song, ‘Dictators, Personalized Security Forces, and Coups,’ International Interactions 48(2) (2022) pp. 204–232.

⁵⁴ Contrary to previous focus on ethnic identities and army composition, I concur with a recent observation that ‘the identities on which autocrats’ draw when stacking may also be economically and socially rooted […] Leaders may try and recruit based on the ideological leanings of officers and their membership in party or other organizations,’ Nathaniel Allen and Risa Brooks, ‘Unpacking ‘Stacking’: Researching Political Identity and Regime Security in Armed Forces,’ Armed Forces and Society 49(1) (2023) p. 212.

⁵⁵ Michael Makara, ‘Coup-proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,’ Democracy and Security 9(4) (2013) p. 337.

⁵⁶ For lack of space, in this study I will focus on materialistic incentivization and deterrence as two empirically detectable variables that impact incentives and abilities thus offering a stereoscopic picture. Identity manipulation occurs under Putin but it would require ethnographic data to be properly assessed.

⁵⁷ Peter Feaver, Armed Servants Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2003) p. 86.

⁵⁸ Peter Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Relations,’ Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999) p. 226.

⁵⁹ Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt, ‘Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(4) (2011) p. 347.

⁶⁰ Andrew Bausch, ‘Coup-Proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment’, International Interactions 44 (1) (2018) p. 16. (Percentage quotes from p. 14.)

⁶¹ Vipin Narang and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War: Tests Using New Data’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(7) (2018) p. 1387.

⁶² Sarah Whitmore, ‘Parliamentary Oversight in Putin’s Neo-patrimonial State,’ Europe-Asia Studies 62(6) (2010) pp. 999–1025; Henry Hale, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Russia’s Political System’ in Developments in Russian Politics 9 (London: Springer Nature Limited (2019) pp. 315–332; Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson, Putin v. the People: The Perilous Politics of a Divided Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press 2019) esp. pp. 7–13 and 229–231; Allen Lynch, ‘Vladimir Putin: Russia’s neo-patrimonial façade democracy’ in Dictators and Autocrats: Securing Power across Global Politics (London: Routledge 2022), pp. 157–173; Timothy Frye, Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2021) esp. p.37; Vladimir Gel’man, The Politics of Bad Governance in Contemporary Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2022) pp. 51–54 and 142–147.

⁶³ Paul Goode, ‘Redefining Russia: Hybrid Regimes, Fieldwork, and Russian Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 8(4) (2010) p. 1068.

⁶⁴ Matthew Funaiole, Joseph Bermudez Jr., Heather Conley, and Cyrus Newlin, ‘Unpacking the Russian Troop Buildup along Ukraine’s Border,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22 April 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russian-troop-buildup-along-ukraines-border.

⁶⁵ Dmytro Kuleba, ‘Donbass: Paris peut convaincre Poutine de conclure un accord,’ Le Figaro, 26 March 2021, https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/donbass-paris-peut-convaincre-poutine-de-conclure-un-accord-20210326.

⁶⁶ Владимир Путин, ‘Об историческом единстве русских и украинцев,’ Official webpage of President of Russian Federation, 12 July 2021, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181.

⁶⁷ Елена Новоселова, ’Нарышкин: Россия исторически принадлежит к числу великих научных держав’, Российская газета, 14 December 2021, https://rg.ru/2021/11/12/naryshkin-imperiia-imper14ii-rozn-a-rossijskij-sluchaj-unikalnyj.html.

⁶⁸ State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus. ‘На защите интересов Союзного государства’, KGB RB Official webpage. 3 June 2021. http://www.kgb.by/ru/news-ru/view/na-zaschite-interesov-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-197/.

⁶⁹ Julian Borger and Dan Sabbagh, ‘US warns of ‘distinct possibility’ Russia will invade Ukraine within days’, The Guardian, 11 February 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/11/biden-ukraine-us-russian-invasion-winter-olympics.

⁷⁰ Naveed Jamali, David Brennan, and Tom O’Connor, ‘Exclusive: U.S. Expects Kyiv to Fall in Days as Ukraine Source Warns of Encirclement’, Newsweek, 24 February 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/us-expects-kyiv-fall-days-ukraine-source-warns-encirclement-1682326.

⁷¹ For Western estimations, see: James Risen and Ken Klippenstein, ‘The CIA Thought Putin Would Quickly Conquer Ukraine. Why Did They Get It So Wrong?’, The Intercept, 5 October 2022, https://theintercept.com/2022/10/05/russia-ukraine-putin-cia/. The authors suggest that the CIA used ‘high-tech satellites and surveillance systems [which] allowed the US to track the deployment of Russian troops, tanks, and planes, and to eavesdrop on Russian military officials’, which was not enough.

⁷² The seminal article by Kryshtanovskaya and White estimated that siloviki in 2002 constituted 25 percent of political elites (Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, ‘Putin’s Militocracy’, Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4) (2003) p. 303; a later recalculation decreased their share to 13.9 percent (David Rivera and Sharon Werning Rivera, ‘Is Russia a Militocracy? Conceptual Issues and Extant Findings Regarding Elite Militarization’, Post-Soviet Affairs 30(1) (2014) p. 229), and a recent study estimates that siloviki are currently constituting 29–39 percent of ruling elites (Maria Snegovaya and Kirill Petrov, ‘Long Soviet Shadows: The Nomenklatura Ties of Putin Elites’, Post-Soviet Affairs 38(4) (2022) p. 338), which suggests that under Putin’s regime, siloviki accrued power growing from a junior to major partner within the winning coalition (cf. Andrei Yakovlev, ‘Composition of the ruling elite, incentives for

productive usage of rents, and prospects for Russia’s limited access order,’ Post-Soviet Affairs 37(5) (2021) p. 422).

⁷³ See Edwin Bacon, Bettina Renz, and Julian Cooper, Securitising Russia: the domestic politics of Vladimir Putin (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2007) p. 43; Brian Taylor, ‘The Russian Siloviki and Political Change’, Daedalus 146(2) (2017) pp. 53–63.

⁷⁴ Three events were of particular significance: (1) the 2000 Kursk submarine disaster which the top brass tried to cover up publicly humiliating the president; (2) constant insubordination of Head of General Staff Gen. Kvashnin; and (3) and the army’s failure to contain Chechen insurgents in the early 2000s. (Cf. Robert Brannon, Russian Civil-Military Relations (Burlington: Ashgate 2009) pp. 169–171; Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making (New York: Routledge 2009) pp. 140–141; Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012) pp. 232–233).

⁷⁵ Brian Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia Policing and Coercion after Communism (New York: Cambridge University Press 2011) p. 286.

⁷⁶ Алексей Суконин, ‘‘Аллигатор’ принят на вооружение’, Progress Primoriya, 8 December 2011, https://progressprim.ru/news/book/2011-12-08-01563.htm

⁷⁷ ‘Аистёнок,’ Вооружение.рф: Каталог военной техники, https://вооружение.рф/armament/aistyonok/

⁷⁸ Михаил Тимошенко, ‘Танки-дроны и экзоскелеты: чем будут формироваться роты боевых роботов в российской армии’, Zvezda, 17 December 2014, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/201412171941-x4ie.htm

⁷⁹ ‘Главком ВКС России раскрыл секрет гиперзвуковой ракеты ‘Кинжал’, Russkoye Oruzhiye, 5 March 2018, https://rg.ru/2018/03/01/glavkom-vks-rossii-raskryl-sekret-giperzvukovoj-rakety-kinzhal.html

⁸⁰ Сергей Птичкин, ‘В войска началась поставка системы дистанционного минирования ‘Земледелие’,’ Russkoye Oruzhiye, 24 December 2020, https://rg.ru/2020/12/24/v-vojska-nachalas-postavka-sistemy-distancionnogo-minirovaniia-zemledelie.html

⁸¹ MoD of the Russian Federation, ‘The Russian Defense Minister spoke at a meeting of the Federation Council’, Official Web Page, 25 March 2020, https://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12283769@egNews

⁸² See Timothy Besley and James Robinson, ‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control over the Military’, Journal of the European Economic Association 8(2–3) (2010), pp. 655–663; Gabriel Leon, ‘Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups dʼEtat,’ Public Choice 159 (2014) pp. 363–383.

⁸³ Анна Ивушкина, ‘Модальные дали: самая распространенная зарплата в РФ – 23,5 тысячи’, Izvestiya, 23 July 2019, https://iz.ru/901816/anna-ivushkina/modalnye-dali-samaia-rasprostranennaia-zarplata-v-rf-235-tysiachi

⁸⁴ Руслан Шаведдинов и Сергей Ежов, ‘Как зам Шойгу украл 5 миллиардов’, Навальный LIVE, 25 August 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xvLU4Dl3ZUandab_channel=%D0%9D%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9LIVE.

⁸⁵ ‘Экс-глава «Калашникова» стал самым богатым сотрудником Минобороны’, RBK, 23 May 2019, https://www.rbc.ru/society/23/05/2019/5ce6b67a9a7947229f09a8aa.

⁸⁶ Татьяна Ломская, ‘Богатейшие силовики России — 2021’, Forbes, 8 July 2021, https://www.forbes.ru/obshchestvo-photogallery/434199-bogateyshie-siloviki-rossii-2021.

⁸⁷ ‘Федеральный закон ‘О государственном материальном резерве’ от 29.12.1994 г. № 79-ФЗ’, Official webpage of President of Russian Federation, 17 January 1995, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/7385.

⁸⁸ Федеральное казначейство, ‘Отчетность по исполнению бюджетов’, Official webpage of the Federal Treasury, 18 July 2023, https://roskazna.gov.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/.

⁸⁹ Сергей Титов и Михаил Маглов, ‘Нетрудовые резервы’, Proyekt, 23 January 2023, https://www.proekt.media/investigation/rosrezerv/.

⁹⁰ Олег Ролдугин, ‘Оружейные бароны: Кто в России наживается на продаже смертельных вооружений’, Sobesednik, 10 June 2020, https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20200608-oruzhejnye-barony.

⁹¹ Владимир Путин, ‘Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 17.11.2022 г. № 830’, Official webpage of President of Russian Federation, 17 November 2022, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48531.

⁹² Юрий Сенаторов, ‘Военпреда лишили звания в рамках соглашения’, Kommerstant, 1 June 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6014942. Lobuzko played a central role both as the scheme’s mastermind and the case’s witness. He lobbied installation of 9 Voronezh early-warning radar system expected to be instrumental in the NDMC defense strategy but currently suspected to be ineffective.

⁹³ Ксения Жукова, ‘Ужасная ошибка Шойгу?’, Kompromat, 7 December 2017, https://kompromat1.press/articles/77237-uzhacnaja_oshibka_shojgu.

⁹⁴ ‘Генерал Распил. Как Суровикин зарабатывает на войне’, Navalny, 10 November 2022, https://navalny.com/p/6629//.

⁹⁵ Сергей Ежов, ‘Окопы детишек Шойгу за 500 000 000’, Populiarnaya Politika, 21 April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8b-ZK30DP-Iandab_channel=%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0.

⁹⁶ ‘На радиостанциях сэкономили миллиарды: генерал раскрыл схему хищения в Минобороны’, Pasmi, 4 March 2021, https://pasmi.ru/archive/302826/.

⁹⁷ ‘Суд приговорил генерала Оглоблина к 4,5 года колонии и штрафу за хищения’, BFM, 14 February 2022, https://www.bfm.ru/news/492897.

⁹⁸ ‘Глава секретного НИИ Минобороны арестован за хищение 14 миллионов’, Pasmi, 2 March 2019, https://pasmi.ru/archive/229461/.

⁹⁹ ‘В Сибирском отделении РАН силовики подвергли преследованиям 16 человек’, MK, 16 May 2023, https://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/2023/05/16/v-sibirskom-otdelenii-ran-siloviki-podvergli-presledovaniyam-16-chelovek.html.

¹⁰⁰ ‘В 2018 году ущерб от коррупции военнослужащих в России вырос до 7 млрд рублей,’ TASS, 21 March 2019, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6242472. In 2011, the corruption cost was estimated at 3 billion rubles ($120 million in ruble 2011 value), and the lack of tangible changes signals about the limits on Military Procuracy capacity to detect crimes rather than some immutable level of corruption.

¹⁰¹ During the 2022 personal meeting with Putin, Zolotov boasted that ‘we met MoD officials to settle some issues […] for our tasks are pretty similar’, see ‘Встреча с директором Федеральной службы войск национальной гвардии Виктором Золотовым’, Official webpage of President of Russian Federation, 30 August 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69230.

¹⁰² ‘Армия Золотова: зачем и каким образом создается Национальная гвардия,’ RBK, 5 April 2016, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2016/5703ed1d9a794798356bbca1.

¹⁰³ Владимир Путин, ‘Выступление перед подразделениями Минобороны, Росгвардии, ФСБ, МВД, ФСО, обеспечившими порядок и законность во время мятежа’, Official webpage of President of Russian Federation, 27 June 2023, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71533.

¹⁰⁴ ‘Росгвардия получит тяжелые вооружения и танки’, RIA Novosti, 27 June 2023, https://ria.ru/20230627/rosgvardiya-1880695476.html.

¹⁰⁵ Brian Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia Policing and Coercion after Communism (New York: Cambridge University Press 2011) p. 130.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Командующий ТОФ Авакянц находится в отпуске с последующим увольнением в запас’, TASS, 20 April 2023, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/17568603.

¹⁰⁷ Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick Kagan, ‘Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment’, Institute for the Study of War, 28 April 2023, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2023

¹⁰⁸ ‘Тихоокеанский флот вновь признали лучшим в ВМФ России за учебный год’, TASS, 6 December 2022, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/16509965.

¹⁰⁹ See ‘За что сняли командующего Тихоокеанским флотом РФ’, Volya Telegram Channel, 22 April 2023, https://t.me/volyamedia/626.

¹¹⁰ ‘Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 07.12.2022 № 890 ‘О присвоении воинских званий высших офицеров, специальных званий высшего начальствующего состава и высших специальных званий’, Официальное опубликование правовых актов, 7 December 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202212070003

¹¹¹ Thomas Grove, ‘Russia Detained Several Senior Military Officers in Wake of Wagner Mutiny’, Wall Street Journal, 13 July 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-detained-several-senior-military-officers-in-wake-of-wagner-mutiny-35a696e4.

¹¹² Michael Weiss, ‘Russia’s Spies Say Putin Faces More Coups,’ The Insider, 20 July 2023, https://theins.ru/en/politics/263596.

¹¹³ ‘Обращение командующего 58-й общевойсковой армией Южного военного округа ВС России генерал-майора Ивана Попова к своим воинам’, MP Gurulev’s Telegram Channel, 12 July 2023, https://t.me/agurulev/3424.

¹¹⁴ ‘Источник ВЧК-ОГПУ рассказал о том, что, несмотря на изоляцию Суровикина, ‘война’ внутри Минобороны продолжается’, VChK-OGPU Telegram Channel, 11 July 2023, https://t.me/vchkogpu/39871.

¹¹⁵ ‘Шойгу продолжает вести ‘боевые действия’ внутри Минобороны’, VChK-OGPU Telegram Channel, 15 July 2023, https://t.me/vchkogpu/39958.

¹¹⁶ For a detailed account of Pugachev’s role see: Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (London: William Collins 2020), esp. Chapters 5–6.

¹¹⁷ ‘Пугачев: Путин во все лезет. Я очень часто ездил с ним в машине, и он все время говорил водителю: ‘Не гони! Давай побыстрее! Так не поедем – поедем вот так’, Gordon, 13 September 2022, https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/pugachev-putin-vo-vse-lezet-ya-ochen-chasto-ezdil-s-nim-v-mashine-i-on-vse-vremya-govoril-voditelyu-ne-goni-davay-pobystree-tak-ne-poedem-poedem-vot-tak-eto-ne-lechitsya-1625974.html.

¹¹⁸ ‘Путин рассказал, как он узнает о ситуации в зоне спецоперации’, Argumenty i fakty, 29 July 2023, https://aif.ru/society/army/putin_zayavil_chto_znaet_o_situacii_v_zone_specoperacii.

¹¹⁹ Joe Barnes and Dominic Nicholls, ‘Vladimir Putin takes personal control of Russia’s faltering Donbas offensive’, Telegraph, 17 May 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/05/17/vladimir-putin-takes-personal-control-russias-faltering-donbas/.

¹²⁰ ‘Из подчинения военных округов выведут четыре флота ВМФ России’, TASS, 24 April 2023, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/17589595.

¹²¹ Putin may have briefly served in the Soviet military as a young man, before his studies at Leningrad State University and subsequent service in the KBG. See ‘Soldier, spy: more details of Vladimir Putin’s past revealed’, by Marc Bennetts in The Guardian, dated 8 January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/08/soldier-spy-more-details-of-vladimir-putins-past-revealed.

¹²² Zoltan Barany, ‘Armies and Autocrats: Why Putin’s Military Failed,’ Journal of Democracy 34 (1) (2023) p. 80.

¹²³ ‘Last Intelligence Updates’, UK Ministry of Defence, official X account, 28 October 2023, https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1718173562190659694.

¹²⁴ ‘Шойгу второй раз терпит поражение из-за отказа слушать своего генерала’, The Moscow Times, 14 August 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/15020.

¹²⁵ ‘Что происходит на фронтах. Сводка событий с 1 по 30 января 2023 года’, Volya Telegram Channel, 30 January, 2023, https://telegra.ph/CHto-proishodit-na-frontah-Svodka-sobytij-s-1-po-30-yanvarya-2023-goda-01-30.

¹²⁶ Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, ‘Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Special Report, 19 May 2023, p. 24.

¹²⁷ Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack Watling. ‘The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Special Report, 7 November 2022, p. 24.

¹²⁸ ‘Как воюет «Шторм»’, Volya Telegram Channel, 25 July 2023, https://t.me/volyamedia/732.

¹²⁹ ‘Поступают приказы обнулять своих же’, Liudi Baikala, 2 July 2023, https://baikal-journal.ru/2023/07/02/postupayut-prikazy-obnulyat-svoih-zhe-u-kogo-poehala-krysha-ili-prosto-nazhralsya-i-stal-strelyat-bez-razbora/.

¹³⁰ Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, ‘Getting to Know the Russian Battalion Tactical Group’, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Commentary, 14 April 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/getting-know-russian-battalion-tactical-group.

¹³¹ Tim Lister, ‘As Russia’s military stalls, ‘Putin’s chef’ serves up his Wagner shock troops to rescue Ukraine campaign’, CNN, 11 January 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/11/europe/prigozhin-wagner-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html.

¹³² ‘Wagner group addresses Chief of Staff Gerasimov’, SOTA, 26 December 2022, https://t.me/sotaproject/51557

¹³³ ‘В сети появилось видео, где якобы наемники ‘Вагнера’ расстреливают портреты Герасимова и Лапина’, Obozrevatel, 18 February 2023, https://news.obozrevatel.com/tv/v-seti-poyavilos-video-gde-yakobyi-naemniki-vagnera-rasstrelivayut-portretyi-gerasimova-i-lapina.htm.

¹³⁴ ‘Шойгу! Герасимов! Где боеприпасы? Посмотрите на них, суки’, BBC News, 5 May 2023, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-65501087.

¹³⁵ ‘Потери России в войне с Украиной,’ Mediazona, 17 November 2023, https://zona.media/casualties.

¹³⁶ 165480718bbeaa231424d6a752a0fa8b8aeff5fb538d2146dd650c2e132b1692 [anonymized hashtag for a group of authors who decided not to disclose their names for security reasons], ‘A Joint Investigation by Meduza and Mediazona Reveals the True Number of Russian Soldiers Killed So Far in the Invasion of Ukraine’, Meduza, 10 July 2023, https://meduza.io/feature/2023/07/10/47-tysyach-pogibshih-rossiyskih-soldat.

¹³⁷ https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html.

¹³⁸ https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1715968466501472576.

¹³⁹ General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, ‘Enemy’s Total Losses’, MoD Official Webpage, 13 July 2023, https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2023/07/13/za-dobu-sili-oboroni-znishhili-510-rosijskih-zagarbnikiv-zbili-26-bpla-voroga-zagalni-vtrati-rf-stanovlyat-ponad-236-tis-osib-%E2%80%93-genshtab-zsu/.

¹⁴⁰ ‘Майор Томов Юрий Анатольевич’, Nikolayevskiy Vanek, 13 August 2023, https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/16973.

¹⁴¹ ‘Сводка на 8 августа,’ Volya Telegram Channel, 8 August 2023, https://t.me/volyamedia/740.

¹⁴² ‘Zaporizhzhia counter-offensive equipment loss numbers’, Naalsio OSINT X account, 21 July 2023, https://twitter.com/naalsio26/status/1682498900572119041.

¹⁴³ Data from a notebook recovered on a dead Russian officer who tallied the personnel losses, made public by Defence of Ukraine, 14 March 2023, https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1635610726734626816.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Top Russian General Dismissed After Vuhledar Defeat’, The Moscow Times, 3 April, 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/03/top-russian-general-dismissed-after-vuhledar-defeat-a80690.

¹⁴⁵ ‘Лучше бы я попал в плен или не вернулся.’ Под Угледаром разгромили 155-ю бригаду приморских морпехов’, 7x7: Gorizontalnaya Rossiya, 13 February 2023, https://semnasem.org/news/2023/02/13/luchshe-by-ya-popal-v-plen-ili-ne-vernulsya-pod-ugledarom-razgromili-155-yu-brigadu-primorskih-morpehov.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Russia disregards losses, presses on in Ukraine’s Avdiivka’, Reuters, 25 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-disregards-losses-presses-ukraines-avdiivka-2023-10-25/.

¹⁴⁷ ‘Покалічене русняве гарматне м’ясо на ростовському аеродромі цілий лень під пекучим сонцем, з ганьбою і без води’, Tsaplienko Telegram Channel, 10 August 2023, https://t.me/Tsaplienko/37282.

¹⁴⁸ Michael Lynch, The Chinese Civil War, 1945-49 (New York: Osprey Publishing 2022) pp. 26–28.

¹⁴⁹ Joanne Richards, ‘Forced, coerced and voluntary: recruitment into rebel and militia groups in the Democratic

Republic of Congo’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 52(2) (2014) pp. 301–326.

¹⁵⁰ Scott Gates, ‘Membership matters,’ Journal of Peace Research 54(5) (2017) pp. 674–686; Jason Lyall, Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2020) pp. 405–409; Chapter Suparna Chaudhry, Sabrina Karim, and Matt Scroggs, ‘How Leaders’ Experiences and Rebellion Shape Military Recruitment During Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 58(5) (2021) pp. 917–918.

¹⁵¹ James Pattison, ‘The Legitimacy of the Military, Private Military and Security Companies, and Just War Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory 11(2) (2012) pp. 131–154.

¹⁵² ‘Первое видео из нелегального подвала для российских отказников в Зайцево (https://t.me/astrapress/16327) Луганской области,’ ASTRA, 20 June 2023, https://t.me/astrapress/30259.

¹⁵³ ‘100 приговоров в неделю: в России начались массовые суды над бегущими из частей военными и мобилизованными’, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2023, https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/07/19/100-prigovorov-v-nedelyu-v-rossii-nachalis-massovie-sudi-nad-beguschimi-iz-chastei-voennimi-i-mobilizovannimi-a49286.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel Capurro, ‘Putin’s ‘barrier troops’ are straight out of Stalin’s playbook’, The Telegraph, 22 November 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/04/putins-barrier-troops-straight-stalins-playbook/; Pjotr Sauer, ‘Russian soldiers say commanders used ‘barrier troops’ to stop them retreating’, The Guardian, 27 March 2023; Laura Gozzi, ‘Ukraine war: Russia executing own retreating soldiers, US says’, BBC, 26 October 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67234144.

¹⁵⁵ Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, National Economic Council Director Lael Brainard, and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby, 20 October 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/26/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-national-economic-council-director-lael-brainard-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby/.

¹⁵⁶ See the video aired by ChrisO_wiki at: https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1690093747650842624.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Обращение командующего 58-й общевойсковой армией Южного военного округа ВС России генерал-майора Ивана Попова к своим воинам’, MP Gurulev’s Telegram Channel, 12 July 2023, https://t.me/agurulev/3424.

¹⁵⁸ ‘Вызывают, как минимум, недоумение, кадровые назначения (перестановки) в Воздушно-десантных войсках’, Voyenkor Kotenok Telegram Channel, 21 January 2023, https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/44615.

¹⁵⁹ ‘По информации наших источников, военнослужащие 7 дшд ВДВ записали аудиообращение к Минобороны’, Moskovskaya Prachechnaya Telegram Channel, 15 July 2023, https://t.me/moscow_laundry/14640.

¹⁶⁰ ‘Замкомандующего объединенной группировкой в зоне СВО Теплинский остается командующим ВДВ’, Interfaks, 18 April 2023, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/896533.

¹⁶¹ ‘В России сменился командующий группировкой «Днепр» в зоне СВО,’ TASS, 30 October 2023, https://lenta.ru/news/2023/10/30/v-rossii-smenilsya-komanduyuschiy-gruppirovki-dnepr-na-svo/.

¹⁶² ‘Заступничество десантников за командующего ВДВ Михаила Теплинского не прошло бесследно’, Vremennoye Pravitelsto Telegram Channel, 21 July 2023, https://t.me/oreshkins/13344.

¹⁶³ Николай Сергеев и Сергей Машкин, ‘Украина внезапно напала на Россию’, Kommersant, 11 August, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6150045.

¹⁶⁴ Zoltan Barany, ‘Armies and Autocrats: Why Putin’s Military Failed’, Journal of Democracy 34(1) (2023) p. 82.

¹⁶⁵ Oleh Koriakin, ‘Появились кадры, как генерал Лапин командует бойцами в ходе КТО на Белгородчине’, Russkoye Oruzhiye, 23 May 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/05/23/poiavilis-kadry-kak-general-lapin-komanduet-bojcami-v-hode-kto-na-belgorodchine.html.

¹⁶⁶ ‘Генерал Лапин возглавил главный штаб Сухопутных войск’, RBK, 10 January 2023, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/01/2023/63bd09389a794708391c3120.

¹⁶⁷ ‘Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 17.02.2023 № 99 ‘О присвоении воинских званий высших офицеров и специальных званий высшего начальствующего состава’, Official webpage, 17 February 2023, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170069?index=1&rangeSize=1.

¹⁶⁸ ‘Металлургический комбинат в Мариуполе оказался под контролем Кадырова’, The Moscow Times, 11 August 2023, https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/14954.

¹⁶⁹ Michael Drummondm ‘Why is Bakhmut so Important to Russia and a ‘Thorn in the Side of Putin’?’, Sky News, 22 May 2023, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-is-bakhmut-so-important-to-russia-and-a-thorn-in-the-side-of-putin-12779619.

¹⁷⁰ Евгений Пригожин, ‘Публикуем запрос от редакции финской газеты Helsingin Sanomat и ответ’, Press-Sluzhba Prigozhina Telegram Channel, 17 April 2023, https://t.me/concordgroup_official/776.

¹⁷¹ Марат Хайрулин, ‘Украина - территория символов’, PolitWera, 2 April 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ir1qS45_mKU&ab_channel=PolitWera.

¹⁷² ‘Пленный боевик ВСУ рассказал о неработающих американских пулеметах,’ Izvestiya, 29 June 2023, https://iz.ru/1536543/2023-06-29/plennyi-boevik-vsu-rasskazal-o-nerabotaiushchikh-amerikanskikh-pulemetakh.

¹⁷³ Erich von Falkenhayn, ‘Um die Jahreswende 1915/16’ in Die Oberste Heeresleitung 1915-1916 in ihren wichtigsten Entschließungen (Berlin: Ersnt Siegfried Mittler und Sohn 1920) pp. 183–184. (Emphasis added)

¹⁷⁴ Vincent Arbaretier, ‘Verdun vu par le Haut-commandement allemand ou l’échec de la stratégie d’usure (Ermattungsstrategie)’, Revue Historique des Armées 285 (2016) pp. 20–21.

¹⁷⁵ Володимир Зеленський, ‘Схід тримається’, Zelensky’s Facebook Page, 20 December 2022, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=896699061453246.

¹⁷⁶ Arguably, the fallacy to substitute a strategic necessity to deplete the French of manpower with a short-sighted desire to achieve a tactical victory at Verdun bloomed after Falkenhayn’s replacement with a duo of tacticians Hindenburg-Ludendorff. Cf. Benoist Bihan, ‘Verdun, la Bataille qui a tué la Stratégie’, Revue Défense Nationale 787(2) (2016) p. 57.

¹⁷⁷ Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London: Penguin Books 1962) pp. 306–307.

¹⁷⁸ ‘Навіщо Росії Бахмут ‘за будь-яку ціну’ і чому Україна вирішила утримувати місто’, RBK-Ukraine, 13 March 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/navishcho-rosiyi-bahmut-za-bud-yaku-tsinu-1678642137.html.

¹⁷⁹ Robert Bruce, ‘To the Last Limits of Their Strength the French Army and the Logistics of Attrition at the Battle of Verdun 21 February – 18 December 1916’, Army History 45 (1998) p. 15.

¹⁸⁰ Heather Ashby and Mary Glantz, ‘What Does the Wagner Mutiny Mean for Putin and His War on Ukraine?’, United States Institute for Peace, 27 June 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/what-does-wagner-mutiny-mean-putin-and-his-war-ukraine; Simon Saradzhyan, ‘Mutiny in Russia: What Happened, What’s Next and What To Be Thankful For’, Russia Matters, 29 June 2023, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/mutiny-russia-what-happened-whats-next-and-what-be-thankful; Sam Greene, ‘Evgeny Prigozhin and Other Things Going Bump in the Night,’ Center for European Policy Analysis, 25 June 2023, https://cepa.org/article/evgeny-prigozhin-and-other-things-going-bump-in-the-night/.

¹⁸¹ Reportedly, Russia lost 20,000 soldiers dead and another 80,000 wounded: Ellen Mitchell, ‘White House Estimates 20K Russians Killed in Ukraine War Since December’, The Hill. 1 May 2023, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3982129-white-house-russians-killed-ukraine-bakhmut/.

¹⁸² Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2015), pp. 18–19.

¹⁸³ Anthony Marcum and Jonathan Brown, ‘Overthrowing the ‘‘Loyalty Norm’’: The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(2) (2016) pp. 256–282; Jonathan Powel, ‘Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’Etat’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6) (2012), pp. 1017–1040; Rollin Tusalem, ‘Bringing the Military Back in: The Politicisation of the Military and its Effect on Democratic Consolidation,’ International Political Science Review 35(4) (2014) pp. 482–501; Martin Gassebner, Jerg Gutmann, and Stefan Voigt, ‘When to Expect a Coup d’e´tat? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants’, Public Choice 169 (2016) pp. 293–313.

¹⁸⁴ Cf: Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012) Chapter 7.

¹⁸⁵ Maria Snegovaya and Kirill Petrov, ‘Long Soviet Shadows: The Nomenklatura Ties of Putin Elites’, Post-Soviet Affairs 38(4) (2022), pp. 329–348

¹⁸⁶ Mark Kramer, ‘The Soviet Legacy in Russian Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly 134(4) (2019–2020), p. 590.

¹⁸⁷ Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, ‘The Sovietization of Russian Politics’, Post-Soviet Affairs 25(4) (2009), pp. 283–309.

¹⁸⁸ Dina Khapaeva, ‘Triumphant Memory of the Perpetrators: Putin’s Politics of Re-Stalinization’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49(1) (2016), pp. 61–73.

¹⁸⁹ See Richard Snyder, ‘Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships’, Comparative Politics 24(4) (1992), pp. 379–399; Terence Lee, ‘The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia’, Comparative Political Studies 42(5) (2009), pp. 640–669.

¹⁹⁰ Erica De Bruin, ‘Preventing Coups d’etat: How Counterbalancing Works’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(7) (2018), p. 1434.

¹⁹¹ Pavel Luzin, ‘The Russian Army in 2023’, Riddle, 18 January 2023, https://ridl.io/the-russian-army-in-2023/.

¹⁹² For such an option see: Cameron Brown, Christopher Fariss, and Blake McMahon, ‘Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution’, International Interactions 42(1) (2016) p. 25.

¹⁹³ Сергей Караганов, ‘Выбора не остается: России придется нанести ядерный удар по Европе’, RIA-Novosti, 25 June 2023, https://ria.ru/20230625/yao-1880235742.html?fbclid=IwAR0gxsPzEp5n69kJTjYO7g1yOlxcE7ZU-tP17tj-SRf8iaSCCXMeZKJzK4I.

¹⁹⁴ Дмитрий Кисельов, ‘Нет никакого способа остановить этот подводный дрон’, Personal Telegram Channel, 1 May 2022, https://t.me/dimsmirnov175/32994.

¹⁹⁵ Дмитрий Медведев, ‘Завтра на натовской базе Рамштайн’, Personal Telegram Channel, 19 January 2023, https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/252.

¹⁹⁶ Andrew McWard and Hohyun Yoon, ‘Preventing Coups and Seeking Allies: The Demand and Supply of Alliances for Coup-Proofing Regimes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2023), pp. 17–18.

¹⁹⁷ This is the German phrase for Germany’s Supreme Army Command during WWI; it is sometimes abbreviated as OHL.

¹⁹⁸ On Germany, see Peter Wilson, Iron and Blood: A Military History of the German-Speaking Peoples since 1500 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2023) esp. pp. 685–690 and Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2022) pp. 27-87. On Putin’s reluctance of fuller mobilization, see ‘Putin Turns to Ruble and Ballot to Shore Up Shaken Authority’, Bloomberg News, 20 August 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-20/putin-turns-to-ruble-and-ballot-to-shore-up-shaken-authority.

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Ivan Gomza

Ivan Gomza Public Policy Department, Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine.