The Russian Military’s Use of History to Create a Post-Soviet Identity: The Development of Conceptual Understandings from the 1990s to the Mid-2000s

ABSTRACT

The current article aims to show the development of Russian perceptions of the use of military history as a tool for ideology in Russia from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. Russian military history has been instrumentalized following the example of authoritarian/totalitarian countries of the past to mobilize the population for war against the image of the enemy — the West. The role of the history of war was used in Russia for the patriotic education of the armed forces and Russian people. With Putin’s rise to power, the General Staff of the Russian army received spiritual and material support and from that time they became more involved in using military history as a tool of influence in shaping public opinion.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• military
• history
• post-Soviet identity
• conceptual
• understandings
• development

Disclosure statement

The authors of the article report there are no competing interests to declare.

Notes

¹ V. Putin, ‘The Real Lessons of the 75^th Anniversary of World War II’. The National Interest (18 June 2020) https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982; ‘Putin Publishes Essay on ‘Real Lessons’ of WWII’, The Moscow Times (18 June 2020) https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/18/putin-publishes-essay-on-real-lessons-of-wwii-a70623.

² A founding father of American neoconservatism, Irving Kristol initially helmed National Interest for several decades. Around 2005, The National Interest’s contributors and editors fractured, representing a wider split in American conservatism and foreign policy. Under Dimitri Simes, the journal and associated think tank would subsequently grow close ties to Russia.

³ S. Radchenko, ‘Vladimir Putin wants to rewrite the history of World War II’, Foreign Policy (21 January 2020) https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/21/vladimir-putin-wants-to-rewrite-the-history-of-world-war-ii/; L. Dubrovskaja, ‘Putin napugal Zapad svoimi zajavlenijami o pakte Molotova-Ribbentropa’, Moskovskij Komsomolec (7 November 2014) https://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/11/07/putin-napugal-zapad-svoimi-zayavleniyami-o-pakte-molotovaribbentropa.html.

⁴ See how Russia uses history as a tool of influence and tool of propaganda – V. Sazonov, S. Pakhomenko, and I. Kopõtin, ‘Between History and Propaganda: Estonia and Latvia in Russian Historical Narratives’, in H. Mölder, V, Sazonov, T. Kerikmäe, and A. Chochia (eds.) The Russian Federation in the Global Information Warfare. Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood (Cham: Springer 2021) pp. 397−423.

⁵ V. Putin, ‘The Real Lessons of the 75^th Anniversary of World War II’, The National Interest (18 June 2020) https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982; ‘Obrashhenie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 21 fevralja 2022 g.’, Kremlin.ru (21 February 2022) http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828.

⁶ https://rvio.histrf.ru/ (accessed 20 December 2023). In all likelihood, the RVIO was modeled on the Tsarist-era Imperial Russian Military History Society (IRVIO, in Russian ‘Imperatorskoe Rossijskoe voenno-istoricheskoe obshhestvo’). The IRVIO was established at the Russian General Staff Academy in 1907 to perform public propaganda and research. P. A. Zhilin, Russkaja voennaja mysl’. Konec XIX – nachalo XX v. (Moscow: Nauka 1982) p. 67.

⁷ See e.g. V. Sazonov, A. Saumets and H. Mölder (eds.) ‘The Crisis in Ukraine and Information Operations of the Russian Federation’, Estonian Journal of Military Studies 2 (2016); G. Ramsay and S. Robertshaw, Weaponising News: RT, Sputnik and Targeted Disinformation (London: King’s College London 2019); H. Mölder and V. Sazonov, ‘Information Warfare as the Hobbesian concept of Modern Times – Principles, Techniques and Tools of Russian Information Operations in Donbass’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31(3) (2018) pp. 308−328; J. Darczewska, The devil is in the details: Information warfare in the light of Russia’s military doctrine (Warsaw, Poland: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 2015); A. Jones, and G. L. Kovacich, Global information warfare: The new digital battlefield 2^nd ed. (CRC Press 2016); U. Franke, War by non-military means: Understanding Russian information warfare (Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut 2015).

⁸ See, e.g., M. Vázquez Liñán, ‘History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia’, Communist and PostCommunist Studies 43(2) (2010) pp. 167–178; S. Pakhomenko, K. Tryma, and J. Francis, ‘The Russian–Ukrainian war in Donbas: Historical memory as an instrument of information warfare’. In S. Sayapin, E. Tsybulenko (eds.), Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello, Jus Post Bellum, The use of force against Ukraine and International Law (Hague: Springer 2018) pp. 297–312.

⁹ Leaving aside for the moment the academic role and significance of the discipline of military history in Russian military science and theory.

¹⁰ ‘Voennaja mysl’. Voenno-teoreticheskij zhurnal. Organ ministerstva oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (1918- …). ISSN 0236-2058.

¹¹ M. A. Gareev, Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008); M. A. Gareev, ‘Velikaja Pobeda i sovremennye interesy mezhdunarodnoj bezopasnosti’, Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal 9 (2014) pp. 30–34; V. Slipchenko and M. A. Gareev, Budushhaja vojna (Moscow: Ob’edinennoe gumanitarnoe izdatel’tvo 2005); M. A. Gareev, If war comes tomorrow: The contours of future armed conflict. Cass Series on Soviet Military Theory and Practice. (London: Routledge 1998), M. A. Gareev, M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist (London, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s 1988).

¹² M. S. Barabanov (ed.) Novaja armija Rossii (Moscow: Centr analiza strategij i tehnologij 2010); V. Baranec, ‘Chto zhdjot rossijskuju armiju posle voennoj reformy’, Komsomol’skaja Pravda (2 December 2008); A. Golts, ‘Military Reform in Russia and the Global War Against Terrorism’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17(1) (2004) pp. 29–41.

¹³ The new doctrine was published in 2010, when Dmitry Medvedev was already president (2008-2012) and Putin was prime minister – cf Voennaja doktrina Rossijskoj Federacii (5 February 2010) http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/461.

¹⁴ R. Person, ‘Balance of threat: The domestic insecurity of Vladimir Putin’, Journal of Eurasian Studies 8(1) (2017) pp. 44–59; M. McFaul and K. Stoner-Weiss, ‘The myth of the authoritarian model – How Putin’s Crackdown holds Russia back’, Foreign Affairs 87 (2008) pp. 68–84.

¹⁵ See studies also on the earlier period (Soviet era). C. W. Reddel (ed.), Transformation in Russian and Soviet Military History Proceedings of the Twelfth Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 1-3 October 1986 (Washington, D.C: USAF Department of History United States Air Force Academy 1990), https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/28/2001330228/-1/-1/0/AFD-101028-004.pdf; See on Russian army and its troubles – P. K. Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, SAGE Publications Ltd. 1996); S. J. Main, ‘You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders’: The Continuing Importance of Studying Soviet Military History – G. S. Isserson and Russia’s Current Geo-Political Stance’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29(1) (2016) pp. 48–72.

¹⁶ The dilemma of Russian military scientists after 1991 was the following: for them, there was no way to go with the democrats, no way to go with Marxism-Leninism, because this ideology has exhausted itself. In their opinion, it remains to choose a third way — a way of building a national ideology.

¹⁷ Discussion about whether military theory and especially military education should focus on the military technical (tactical) side or look at war more broadly (strategically) dates to the time of Nicholas General Staff Academy in the Russian tradition. For more see: J. W. Steinberg, All the Tsar’s Men. Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898–1914 (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press 2010) p. 190. This was not a unique problem for Russia, but is relevant for all countries and begins with a Clausewitzian dilemma, whether war is art or handwork. In Russia and Germany, this question was traditionally addressed after every cataclysm or revolution. See more: D. Bald, G. Bald-Gerlich and E. Ambros (eds.), Tradition und Reform im militärischen Bildungswesen. Von preußischen Allgemeinen Kriegsschule zur Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr. Eine Dokumentation 1810-1985 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1985).

¹⁸ M. Gareev (1923–2019) was a General of the Army and a well-known author of several books on the military history of the Second World War. Gareev was also Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. He was also president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences for a long time, until he died in 2019.

¹⁹ V. V. Solov’ev and A. A. Dremkov, ‘Eshhe raz o predmete i strukture voennoj nauki’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (1994) pp. 34–40; M. A. Borchev, ‘O teorii voennogo iskusstva’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (1994) p. 41. Gareev’s opponents, in his own view, relied on Stalin’s conception of military science and the art of war, according to which the science of war had to consider war in its political and economic aspects. Gareeev believed that the science of war should focus solely on warfare. See, e.g., M. A. Gareev, ‘Metodologicheskie problemy voennyh nauk’, in M.A. Gareev, Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008), pp. 99–107.

²⁰ S.A. Tjushkevich, ‘Aktual’nye problemy razvitija voennoj nauki’, Voennaja mysl’ 4 (1996) p. 66. See more about the search for a national idea in Russian military theory: W. Pintner, ‘Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov’, in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (New Jersey: Princeton University Press) pp. 354–375.

²¹ P.A. Zhilin, Russkaja voennaja mysl’. Konec XIX – nachalo XX v. (Moscow: Nauka 1982) pp. 4–6.

²² M.N. Shakhov, ‘Mirovozzrencheskie i metodologicheskie orientiry razvitija voenno-nauchnogo znanija’, Voennaja mysl’ 1 (1996) p. 45. See about patriotism – A. Bikov, ‘Patriotizm kak javlenie social’noj teorii i praktiki v istorii Rossii’, in A. Bikov and V. Lutovinov (eds), Rossiskij patriotizm—Istoki, soderzhanie, vospitanie v sovremenniyh uslovijah (Planeta 2010) pp. 9–55.

²³ M. Y. Zelenkov, ‘Ob ideologicheskih osnovah moral’no-psihologicheskogo obespechenija Vooruzhennyh Sil’, Voennaja mysl’ 4 (2001) pp. 47–53.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Also known as the Battle of Lake Peipus which took place on 5 April 1242.

²⁶ A very good example of the instrumentalization of historical events and narratives is the establishment of National Unity Day in Russia in honor of the liberation of Moscow from Polish invaders in 1612. This event is used from an ideological and propagandistic aspect to influence primarily Russia’s domestic audience.

²⁷ In the theory of the confrontation of Russian civilization, one can recognize the philosophical ideas of Nikolai Danilevski. See more N. Danilevski, Venemaa ja Euroopa (Tartu: Ilmamaa 2013).

²⁸ S.A. Tjushkevich, ‘Voennaja ideologija: voprosy formirovanija’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (2004) pp. 36–45.

²⁹ V.V. Serebrjannikov, ‘Voennaja ideologija gosudarstva’, Voennaja mysl’ 12 (2004) pp. 2–3.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 2–3. It is similar to Fuller, who developed Arnold Toynbee’s and Herbert Spencer’s arguments about human nature and violence. He referred to the instinctive nature of man and the various impulses that drove man to act. He divided the surrounding environment into in-group and out-group, which allowed the soldier to unleash his anger in war against all who did not belong to his tribe, group, party or nation (J. F. C. Fuller, Die entartete Kunst Krieg zu führen (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1964) pp. 34–36, 38–43).

³¹ Serebrjannikov, p. 5.

³² M. Weber, Võimu ja religiooni sotsioloogiast (Tallinn: Vagabund 2002) pp. 97–98. S. P. Huntington, Sõdur ja riik. Tsiviil-militaarsuhete teooria ja poliitika (Tallinn: Riigikaitse raamatukogu 2013) pp. 92–93.

³³ V.V. Serebrjannikov, ‘Voennaja ideologija gosudarstva’, Voennaja mysl’ 12 (2004) p. 11.

³⁴ Ibid. Sun Tzu, 544-496 BCE, was a Chinese general, strategist and philosopher.

³⁵ See, e.g., N. A. Berdjaev, ‘Russkaja ideja: osnovnye problemy russkoj mysli XIX veka i nachala XX veka’, (Parizh: YMCA-Press 1946).

³⁶ Ivan Ilyin (1883–1954) was a Russian philosopher, a White Russian émigré, close to the Slavophiles, and a White Guard ideologue in emigration. He was also known as an active anti-communist and for his far-right views.

³⁷ M. A. Gareev, ‘Metodologicheskie problemy voennoj i voenno-istoricheskoj nauki’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 9.

³⁸ M.A. Gareev, ‘K kakim ugrozam i vojnam dolzhna byt’ gotova Rossija’, Otechestvennye zapiski 3(12) (2003) https://strana-oz.ru/2003/3/k-kakim-ugrozam-i-voynam-dolzhna-byt-gotova-rossiya). Gareev concluded at that time that in modern warfare the entire armed struggle is intertwined with information warfare (Ibid.).

³⁹ S.A. Bogdanov, ‘Verojatnyj oblik vooruzhennoj bor’by budushhego’, Voennaja mysl’ 12 (2003) pp. 2–7.

⁴⁰ See on Russian understandings of information warfare Keir Giles who highlighted: ‘In the Russian construct, information warfare is not an activity limited to wartime. It is not even limited to the ‘initial phase of conflict’ before hostilities begin, which includes information preparation for the battle space. Instead, it is an ongoing activity regardless of the state of relations with the opponent; ‘in contrast to other forms and methods of opposition, information confrontation is waged constantly in peacetime’. The entry for ‘information war’ (informatsionnaya voyna) in a glossary of key information security terms produced by the Military Academy of the General Staff makes a clear distinction between the Russian definition – broad, and not limited to wartime – and the Western one – which it describes as limited, tactical information operations carried out during hostilities. … Ongoing information warfare is ‘a regular feature of the country’s news and current affairs coverage.’ (K. Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare (Rome: NATO Defense College 2016) p. 4), see also Slovar’ terminov i oboznachenij v oblasti informacionnoi bezopastnosti (Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba, 2^nd ed., Moscow: Voyeninform, 2008).

⁴¹ M.A. Gareev, ‘K kakim ugrozam i vojnam dolzhna byt’ gotova Rossija’, Otechestvennye zapiski 3(12) (2003) https://strana-oz.ru/2003/3/k-kakim-ugrozam-i-voynam-dolzhna-byt-gotova-rossiya).

⁴² P.S. Kazarin, ‘Harakter vojny kak kategorija voennoj nauki’, Voennaja mysl’ 6 (2002) pp. 17–18.

⁴³ See about ‘Gerasimov doctrine’M. Galeotti, ‘I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’, Foreign Policy (5 March 2018) https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. M. Galeotti, ‘The mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and the language of threat’, Critical Studies on Security 7(2) (2018) pp. 157–161; M. McKew, ‘The Gerasimov Doctrine. It’s Russia’s new chaos theory of political warfare. And it’s probably being used on you’, Politico (September-October 2017) https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538.

⁴⁴ V. Gerasimov, ‘Cennost’ nauki v predvidenii. Novye vyzovy trebujut pereosmyslit’ formy I sposoby vedenija boevyh dejstvij’, Voenno-promyshlennyj ku’’er (26 February 2013) https://vpk.name/news/85159_cennost_nauki_v_predvidenii.html.

⁴⁵ Here, psychological and informational warfare between different parties, using mass communication tools (in addition to special operators), is meant in particular. The term ‘informacionnoe protivoborstvo’ as officially used by the Russian Federation, could be translated literally as ‘informational acceptance’.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ This term is often used in Russia with propagandistic purposes. See V. Shevchenko, ‘Osobyj put’ razvitija Rossii: mif ili real’nost?’ Problemy civilizacionnogo razvitija 2 (2022).

⁴⁸ V.V. Cheban, ‘Duhovnyj faktor v vojnah budushhego: problemy formirovanija’, Voennaja mysl’ 7 (2003) pp. 34–37.

⁴⁹ G.A. Avanesova, ‘Voennaja dejatel’nost’: kul’turologicheskij analiz’, Voennaja mysl’ 4 (2006) pp. 54–61.

⁵⁰ M.A. Gareev, ‘K kakim ugrozam i vojnam dolzhna byt’ gotova Rossija’, Otechestvennye zapiski 3 (12) (2003) https://strana-oz.ru/2003/3/k-kakim-ugrozam-i-voynam-dolzhna-byt-gotova-rossiya.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² L. Narsisjan, ‘Mahmut Gareev: Vazhno gotovit’ ves’ narod k zashhite Otechestva i vozrodit’ ideju Otechestva’ Regnum (6 February 2015) https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1895775.html.

⁵³ See on term soft power – ‘Soft power’, Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press), https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?q=soft+power&tl=true; J. S. Nye. ‘Soft power: the evolution of a concept’, Journal of Political Power 14(1) (2021) pp. 196–208.

⁵⁴ M. A. Gareev, ‘Vojna bez sroka davnosti. Opyt Velikoj Otechestvennoj pomog v vozvrashhenii Kryma‘, Voenno-promyshlennyj kur’er (12 May 2015) https://vpk-news.ru/articles/25172.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ V. Slipchenko, Voiny shestogo pokoleniya. Oruzhie i voennoe iskusstvo budushshego (Moscow: Veche 2002) pp. 11, 209.

⁵⁷ M. van Creveld, Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (New York-London-Toronto-Sidney: The Free Press 1991).

⁵⁸ V. Slipchenko, Voiny shestogo pokoleniya. Oruzhie i voennoe iskusstvo budushshego (Moscow: Veche 2002) p. 26..

⁵⁹ M. A. Gareev, ‘Metodologicheskie problemy voennoj i voenno-istoricheskoj nauki’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008), p. 15.

⁶⁰ M. A. Gareev, ‘Ob aktual’nyh problemah voennoj istorii’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 62.

⁶¹ M. A. Gareev, ‘Metodologicheskie problemy voennoj i voenno-istoricheskoj nauki’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 17.

⁶² M.A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob'ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 21–22.

⁶³ M.A. Gareev, ‘Ob ob’ektivnom osveshhenii voennoj istorii Rossii’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 75–77.

⁶⁴ M.A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 73–74.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 79. For the victory narrative in Gareev’s sense, see M.A. Gareev, ‘Velikaja pobeda i sovremennye interesy mezhdunarodnoj bezopasnosti’, Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal 9 (2014) pp. 30–34.

⁶⁶ M.A. Gareev, ‘Ob aktual’nyh problemah voennoj istorii Rossii’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan, 2008) p. 30.

⁶⁷ Gareev, pp. 70–71.

⁶⁸ See e.g., A. Dugin, Filosofija vojny (Moscow: Veche 2004); A. Dugin, Chetvjortaja politicheskaja teorija (Moscow: Amfora 2009); A. Dugin, Evrazijskij revansh Rossii (Moscow: Algoritm 2014)..

⁶⁹ M. A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 38.

⁷⁰ M. A. Gareev, ‘Metodologicheskie problemy voennoj i voenno-istoricheskoj nauki’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 105–106.

⁷¹ M. A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 57.

⁷² ‘Stalin – velikij menedzher, ili uchebnik istorii MGU’, RIA Novosti (8 September 2010) https://ria.ru/20100908/273522924.html.

⁷³ M.A. Gareev, ‘Ob aktual’nyh problemah voennoj istorii Rossii’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 62.

⁷⁴ Gareev has also raised the issue of falsification of history by Western historians. For example, M. Gareev has argued ‘The leadership of our country should first of all raise the question, including for the politicians of other states: ‘Is it good or bad that we defeated fascism in Second World War?’ In addition, a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War should be created, which would provide a guide for textbook authors and researchers. It is also necessary to step up veteran and other associations of citizens so that they take the correct and principled position on these issues’’. (F. Velikovskij, ‘7 voprosov Mahmutu Gareevu, generalu armii’, Russkij reportjor 17 (47) (8 May 2008), https://web.archive.org/web/20080512234713/http://www.expert.ru/printissues/russian_reporter/2008/17/interview_gareev/. M. Gareev dealt with historical questions and issues of the Great Patriotic War and actively participated in several discussions in Russia on historical issues focusing on the ‘falsification of history of war’. According to his views, the Western historical society is trying to dispute the victory of the USSR over fascism and that this is part of a large Western propaganda campaign against Russia (M.A. Gareev, ‘Velikaja Pobeda i sovremennye interesy mezhdunarodnoj bezopasnosti’, Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal 9 (2014) p. 38).

⁷⁵ Read more about it here: M.A. Gareev, ‘Pravda i lozh’ o nachale vojny. Gotovil li Sovetskij Sojuz preventivnyj udar?’ in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 416–447. In this article, Gareev discusses in depth whether the Soviet Union was preparing a pre-emptive strike against Germany. He mainly rejects V. Suvorov and M. Solonin’s arguments. Gareev and other authors who fight against this thesis try to prove that the Red Army was neither prepared to defend nor to attack (this thesis is shared by Glantz), that the masses of troops were concentrated on the frontiers only to counter-attack the German troops concentrated on the frontiers in the event of German aggression, but in no case to conquer Germany. The attempt was to prove that the Soviet Union had no aggressive plans against its neighbors. The discussions will include officers of the former East German armed forces. – K. Harms, ‘O voennoj doktrine Krasnoj armii nakanune Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny: mify i fakty’, Voennaja mysl’ 6 (2004) pp. 73–80.

⁷⁶ M.A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 73–74.

⁷⁷ O.B. Rahmanin, ‘O mezhdunarodnyh aspektah srazhenija na Kurskoj duge’, Voennaja mysl’ 7 (2003) p. 47.

⁷⁸ A.S. Orlov, ‘Vtoroj front: koalicionnaja strategija’, Voennaja mysl’ 5 (2004) pp. 29–35.

⁷⁹ M.A. Gareev, ‘Ob ob’ektivnom osveshhenii voennoj istorii Rossii’, in M.A. Gareev (ed.), Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) pp. 75–77.

⁸⁰ M.A. Gareev. ‘Velikaja pobeda i sovremennye interesy mezhdunarodnoj bezopasnosti’, Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal 9 (2014) p. 32.

⁸¹ M.A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev, Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 55. For comparison, a new book by Oleg Airapetov can be cited which is tendentious in its content. The MRP is shown as a forced political step by the Soviet Union because the Western Allies had not been able to agree with the Soviet Union and Stalin needed to buy time. Airapetov calls cooperation with the Western Allies pointless in 1941 because of the Munich Conference – О. O. Airapetov, Vneshnjaja politika Sovetskoj Rossii i SSSR v 1920-1939 godah i istoki Vtoroj mirovoj vojny (Moscow: Rodina, 2020) pp. 499–511. Among other things, Airapetov repeats the Soviet-era cliché that the Soviet Union was surrounded by hostile countries, including the Baltic States. He justifies Soviet aggression by evoking the country’s defense interests, that is, the division of Poland and the aggression against the Baltic states and Finland were necessary to improve the strategic situation of the Soviet Union and reunite the peoples of Ukraine and Belarus – Ibid., pp. 561–563. This last statement seems directly transferred from Soviet propaganda.

⁸² M.A. Gareev, ‘Voenno-istoricheskaja nauka: ob’ekt i predmet ee issledovanija i poznanija’, in M.A. Gareev, Srazhenija na voenno-istoricheskom fronte (Moscow: Insan 2008) p. 40.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 79–83.

⁸⁴ M.A. Gareev, ‘Velikaja pobeda i sovremennye interesy mezhdunarodnoj bezopasnosti’, Voenno-istoricheskij zhurnal 9 (2014) p. 34.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 30–34.

⁸⁷ A. Y. Golubev, ‘K voprosu o patrioticheskom vospitanii v Rossii i ee Vooruzhennyh Silah’, Voennaja mysl’ 2 (2007) pp. 47–56.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 54–56.

⁸⁹ V.A. Zolotaryov, ‘Voennaja istorija v sovremennoj Rossii’, Voennaja mysl’ 10 (2004) pp. 28, 36.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹¹ S.A. Tjushkevich, ‘Voennaja ideologija: voprosy formirovanija’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (2004) pp. 25–36.

⁹² E.A. Kiselev and M.V. Shimanovskij, ‘Duhovno-nravstvennoe obespechenie stroitel’stva Vooruzhjonnyh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii: problemy i puti ih reshenija’, Voennaja mysl’ 1 (2005) pp. 37–40.

⁹³ V.V Kirillov, ‘Voennaja moshh’ gosudarstva: sushhnost’, struktura, problemy’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (2005) pp. 5 2–12.

⁹⁴ The issue of opposing the moral factor to military technology has been a typical fundamental problem of Russian military thought over the past 150 years. It comes from the Russian military theorist and warlord General Mikhail Dragomirov, who interpreted the thoughts of Alexander Suvorov. This is how the principle of education of the Russian army arose, based on the fortitude of their soldiers and disregard for enemy fire in battle. Given the constant problems of Russian military technology lagging behind the West, the moral factor is constantly preferred in the Russian military theory, - B. W. Menning, ‘Train Hard, Fight Easy: the Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His ‘Art of Victory’’, Air University Review 38(1) (1986) p. 83, 86; S. S. Judin, General M.I. Dragomirov (1830–1905): voennyj myslitel’ i praktik, Dissertacija na soiskanie uchenoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskih nauk (Moscow: Moskovskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet 2020) pp. 19, 302–303.

⁹⁵ V. V. Kirillov, ‘Chelovecheskij faktor kak osnovopolagajushhij jelement voennoj moshhi gosudarstva’, Voennaja mysl’, 4 (2006) p. 17–24.

⁹⁶ A. Svechin, ‘Izuchenie voennoi istorii’ [The study of military history], Voina i revolutsiia 4 (April 1927) p. 66. Cited via J. W. Kipp, ‘General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory’, in K. D. Lee (Ed.) Aleksandr A. Svechin. Strategy (Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications) p. 35.

⁹⁷ M.A. Gareev, ‘Struktura i osnovnoe soderzhanie novoj voennoj doktriny Rossii’, Voennaja mysl’ 3 (2007) p. 8.

⁹⁸ A.I. Borisenko, ‘Moral’no-psihologicheskoe obespechenie boevyh dejstvij: istorija i sovremennost’’, Voennaja mysl’ 8 (2006) pp. 64–75.

⁹⁹ O.B. Rahmanin, ‘O mezhdunarodnyh aspektah srazhenija na Kurskoj duge’, Voennaja mysl’ 7 (2003) pp. 53–54.

¹⁰⁰ V.M. Korotkov, ‘Armija i cerkov’: opyt sotrudnichestva’, Voennaja mysl’ 9 (2005) pp. 37–41.

¹⁰¹ A. Y. Golubev, ‘K voprosu o patrioticheskom vospitanii v Rossii i ee Vooruzhennyh Silah’, Voennaja mysl’ 1 (2007) pp. 47–56.

¹⁰² N. Danilevski, Venemaa ja Euroopa (Tartu: Ilmamaa 2013). To a large extent, one can recognize in the minds of Russian generals and senior officers the reflections of the influential 19th-century Russian philosopher and Slavophile Nikolai Danilevsky on the opposition between Russian and Western civilization.

¹⁰³ P. Simunovic, ‘The Russian military in Chechnya — A case study of morale in war’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11(1) (1998) pp. 63–95.

¹⁰⁴ For comparison, it can be highlighted that in the U. S. and the U.K., military history is primarily studied as a subject within military education. It is acknowledged, however, that military history may be susceptible to abuse for propaganda and ideological purposes, including the development of patriotism. Examples of the abuse of military history were cited in the U.S. Army’s manual on military history, particularly in the context of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and communist states during the Cold War. R. W. Coakley and J. Jessup, A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. Washington (Washington DC: Centre of Military History, United States Army 1988), pp. 16, 27. Additionally, the military aims for the practical value of the discipline, which is challenging to achieve. Despite this, military history is acknowledged as a guide to the military profession. M. Howard, ‘The Use and Abuse of Military’, Parameters 11(1) (1981) pp. 9–14. In the Federal Republic of Germany, military history is utilized for the education of soldiers as citizens in military uniforms for inculcating democratic values in a military organization. (Innere Führung). Jörg Echternkamp, ‘Which Past for the Soldier? Military History, Historical Education, and the Ethics of Democracy in Germany Today’, Estonian Yearbook of Military History 11 (2021) pp. 171–185.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Estonian Military Academy [R-019 Strategic communication in the context of the war in Ukraine: lessons learned for Estonia]; Estonian Military Academy [S-001 (KVA-0.7-1.1/21/5619)] ‘Estonian military thought from 1920 to 1940’]; Estonian Research Council [PRG1716 Relational analysis of strategic history narratives]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs [SHVUS23368 Russia and China’s influence in Central Asia: Europe’s prospects, concerns and search for balance].

Notes on contributors

Igor Kopõtin

Igor Kopõtin is a leading researcher at the Estonian Military Academy (since 2022). Previously he worked at the Estonian Military Academy as a lecturer of military history and later as head of the chair of military strategy and innovation. From 2022–2023, he was a visiting researcher at the Centre for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr. His research fields are the military history of the Baltic region and the history of military theory.

Vladimir Sazonov

Vladimir Sazonov is a leading researcher at the Estonian Military Academy and associate professor at the University of Tartu. From 2011–2022, he was at the Estonian Military Academy as an associate professor, researcher, and senior researcher and at the Baltic Defense College as a lecturer (2016–2017), and 2010-2020 also at the University of Tartu as a researcher and senior researcher. His research fields are Middle Eastern state ideology, religion and propaganda, Russian state ideology, and information war. Email address: [email protected]