Western Narratives and Russian Disinformation, Three Years into Great-Power Conflict

ABSTRACT

This special issue here marks the third year of the Russia-Ukraine War. The included essays discuss Western narratives that explain pre-war perspectives of a potential conflict as well ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns. The introduction argues that expectations about a quick Russian victory, while proven wrong, had considerable reasoning, and that current expectations of Russian defeat are premature. Disinformation that targets Ukraine, the wider West, and even domestic Russian audiences, is discussed extensively in these pages. This information warfare is seen as an enduring and serious threat. Papers in this issue look at active-measures campaigns tied to both nuclear and biological weapons. Other pieces look to understand the poor military performance of the Russian military by explaining Moscow’s coup-proofing strategies; another approach looks to the shortcomings of military indoctrination and ideology since the 1990s.

Western Narratives

We are into the third year of the Russia-Ukraine War. During the preceding two years expert military analytical narratives of the conflict have swung between two pendulums: a pre-war view that expected a quick and decisive Russian victory; and an early 2023 expectation that Ukraine’s counteroffensive was impelled toward reclaiming much of the territory annexed since 2014.

At first, many gave weight to the modernization the Russian military had undergone over the past 15 years or so. The New Look (Новый облик) program that reorganized the force structure, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s reforms that brought needed rightsizing to headquarters and professional units, and the procurement of modernized platforms—even if those platforms did not match the most modern technology in the US arsenal—meant that the Soviet military had reformed into a capable Russian one.¹ Backed by immense state wealth and industry, this was a conventional force (as late as February 2022) that exceeded the capabilities of any of its western or southern neighbors and which was only outmatched by the other great military powers of the 21st century, analysts argued.

Importantly, this analysis was not the result of just looking at new weapon systems. The conscript force at the end of the Cold War had indeed transformed to more heavily rely on contract soldiers, which meant more of the force was serving willingly and could learn and retain the skills needed for modern combat. The ‘furniture salesman’ reformer Serdyukov cut the number of generals and raised the number of qualified special purpose personnel.^2,3 Organizational changes like the implementation of joint strategic commands, or OSKs, rationalized the control of the armed forces. Other intangibles, such as morale, mattered, but they were (and are) harder to measure meaningfully in closed environments. (We can certainly measure incidents or types of abuse, but how does this translate to a measure of morale, the willingness to fight?⁴)

New weapon systems—observable, countable, and marketed for export—did play a role in this analysis, it is true. Military units were receiving modernized equipment on a regular basis. This did not mean that every unit had cutting-edge systems, but gradual replacements and upgrades were occurring across the board thanks to massive funding of the armed services.⁵ Domestic self-sufficiency in many areas of production further increased the purchasing power of the Russian state.⁶

Tanks such as the T-72 were upgraded to the T-72B3, with reactive armor and automatic loaders, while production continued on modern T-90s and T-14s. Newer, smaller surface ships were being constructed with improved firepower, including Kalibr guided-missile capabilities and other anti-ship weapons, to maintain naval superiority in local sea zones.⁷ This includes Krivak V frigates and various classes of corvettes (such as the Buyan, Stergeushchiy).

The Su-35 multi-role fighter and S-400 surface-to-air missile system demonstrated that Russian air and air defense capabilities continued to modernize and pose a threat to Western forces, even if produced in quantities far short of political promises. Russian air defenses and electronic warfare will remain a significant conventional threat for the foreseeable future, regardless the outcome of this war. (However, precisely because these are high-value targets, the Ukrainian military expends its own long-range capabilities attacking these systems.⁸)

Meanwhile, Russia maintains an emphasis on artillery and rocket forces that gives it a quantitative edge on a battlefield that is increasingly stretched along fixed lines at the end of year two.⁹ The Tornado-type multiple rocket launcher (MRL) now includes satellite guidance. Older weapons like the 2S19 self-propelled howitzer and BM-21 multiple rocket launcher still, in large quantities, posed a significant challenge to the Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2023. Only gradually is this area of dominance being upended, with Western contributions of even longer ranged strike capabilities—HIMARS from the US, Storm Shadow/SCALP air-launched cruise missiles from the UK and France, and Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled artillery from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. ATACMS could continue to rebalance this Russian artillery and rocket advantage.

Aside from new weapons and organizational reforms, real-world application of the modern Russian military demonstrated capabilities and competence in a variety of situations, all of which supported the pre-war analysis. In 2014, Russian forces rapidly seized control of military and government facilities across Crimea. Ukrainian navy personnel defected, and other military and police surrendered without shots being fired. In one instance, a rammed gate was sufficient to compel the surrender of a base in Novo-Ozyorne.¹⁰ Critics will note that Ukrainian forces were leaderless and unprepared, but this was still only achieved because Russian troops were organized, disciplined, and well-led in a thoroughly planned operation. Weapons and kit were beside the point in this situation.

In Kazakhstan in the winter of 2021, it appeared as if unrest was going to topple President Tokayev. In a matter of days, Russian airborne forces deployed thousands of miles to stiffen regime resolve.¹¹ Russian air transport also brought along Collective Security Treaty Organization contingents from Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The demonstration of power encouraged Kazakh forces to crush the protests. In this case, the symbolism of the deployment was the key to a successful operation. The political ends—propping up a treaty ally, demonstrating Russian capability to respond to a crisis, and lending credibility to an alliance that, heretofore, had not conducted a military operation—were accomplished in quick order (and only undone by the failure of subsequent political decisions).

Finally, in Syria, Russia deployed and sustained forces abroad to support the allied regime of President Bashar al-Asad. This involved coordinating multiple ground forces—Russian special purpose units, mercenary groups, Hizbollah, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Syrian government forces—and providing targeting information for frontline and other air assets, as well as naval strikes from the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas.¹² One could note that this was not an operation against a middle power but the operations required continuous logistics and deployments, and the integration of communications with multiple forces. The Syria issue had also frustrated Western policymakers for years, as well. Yet, again, Russian military power accomplished Kremlin political objectives. It was this context that influenced expectations about Moscow’s quick victory over Kyiv.

However, as Ukraine launched its own counteroffensive in 2023, analysis of the conflict swung the other way, with those who had been more blasé about Russian capabilities predicting ultimate Ukrainian victory.¹³ Russia’s haphazard mobilization, including penal colony battalions and human-wave attacks, contrasted sharply with the growing professionalization of the Ukrainian military, analysts argued.¹⁴ Kyiv was showing, time and again, that it could incorporate new materiel and train capable personnel in a way that would safeguard its scarcer resources in a grinding war of attrition. Morale on the battlefield demonstrated that its troops could indeed do more with less, effectively employing: varied drone capabilities—over land and on water; newly provided tanks and infantry fighting vehicles like the Leopard 2 and Bradley, respectively; and long-range weapons even in the small quantities supplied by Western allies. Those scarcer resources meant that lessons were indeed learned and tactics adjusted quickly.¹⁵, ¹⁶

So, by the summer of 2023, experts were predicting the long-term transformation of the Ukrainian military into the premier fighting force in Europe—professional, modern, and well-equipped.¹⁷ A total collapse of the Russian military became an increasingly commonplace prediction, especially as Wagner marched on Moscow and competent generals began to disappear.¹⁸, ¹⁹ Of course, what this elides is that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny came from the right, exposing the dissatisfaction among Russian factions that wanted to change strategy to win the war—not end it. Yet, as the weather got colder in eastern Ukraine, in early winter, the Ukrainian primary offensive salient was only about 5 miles deep, with Robotyne in Ukrainian hands and Ukrainian forces nearing Verbove.²⁰ So, both narratives about military victory—Moscow’s quick drive to Kyiv and Kyiv inevitably finding success in the east once it deploys a NATO-trained and -equipped force—have unraveled.

It is noted that Ukraine has been conducting operations that will facilitate future offensives, using long-range strike capabilities to hit supply lines and depots, airfields and aircraft, that support frontline forces. In early ATACMS salvos, several S-400s and helicopters were hit.²¹ But the consequences of those strikes will not be realized until later in 2024 or 2025. Freezing weather in winter may provide an opportunity for Ukraine to continue its methodical infantry-led offensive,²² but movement is slow. For now, both sides still show the ability to amass resources—men and munitions—to strengthen defensive lines and supply offensive operations.²³ As Frederick Kagan notes, a stalemate indicates that no side, despite its best efforts, can change the front lines.²⁴ So, we have not reached that point. The Russians, at great cost, are pushing toward Avdiivka;²⁵ meanwhile, the Black Sea Fleet has been pushed out of Sevastopol and relocated to Novorossiysk.²⁶

Still, we don’t know what the lines of demarcation will look like at the end of this war. Despite rapid thrusts that we saw in the early stages of the Russian invasion, and then later with Ukraine’s counterattack around Kharkiv, operations have become increasingly difficult across mined, targeted, and observed lines of trenches and fortifications. Movements are now much more methodical and small-scale. Winter may bring some breaks and pauses in the ground campaign as well, though we can expect Russia to increase attacks targeting energy infrastructure in the cold months. The slower pace of change to frontlines will frustrate impatient policymakers and war-weary publics but this slow-down is perhaps inevitable without air supremacy, and with the ubiquity of drones and other ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities in the field. Looking ahead into 2024, Ukraine’s offensive may push the frontlines a few miles further east, mirroring much of the summer of 2023, unless new fronts can be opened up.

Indeed, the slow pace of change gives both sides reasons to continue the fight—Kyiv because it is making some progress and Moscow because it will still believe it can outlast Western support. More dramatic (though less likely) in 2024–25, Russian forces could be pushed out of large parts of Ukraine it seized in 2014 and 2022—Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts, for example—and simply refuse to sign a peace treaty formally ending the conflict. A ceasefire carries significant downsides, especially for Ukraine, as well. Looking to internal politics, it is unlikely that subsequent Russian presidents, liberal, nationalist, or fascist, will accept ceding back Crimea (regardless what transpires in the annexed oblasts of eastern Ukraine), thereby providing another path to prolonged conflict as Kyiv works to cut off the peninsula.²⁷

So, likely and unlikely outcomes for changing frontlines this year both augur prolonged conflict. Ukrainian political leadership and Russian resources suggest that this war will continue another couple years (during which time, notably, Presidents Joe Biden, Vladimir Putin,²⁸ and Volodymyr Zelensky, will all have to face general elections). For Ukraine to consider a halt to fighting, it would also need a reliable partner for peace and to perceive consequences that outweighed a continued struggle for independence—neither of which exist. And because NATO is unlikely to admit a new member with an ongoing war against Russia,²⁹, ³⁰ we can anticipate that Putin will consider throwing state resources at continued war, even without territorial advances. Western “fatigue” for supporting Ukraine, support that it should be noted mostly entails sending funds and exporting and donating arms (whose sole purpose was to deter a Russian threat³¹), reinforces the Kremlin’s belief that despite setbacks, it will prevail.³²

Indeed, as a great power, Russian leadership can continue to make multiple simultaneous mistakes (or “mistakes”—many top Russian officers are relatively unconcerned about the loss of soldiers dragooned for combat), including wasting resources in men and money, sidelining competent generals, and abusing soldiers and citizens—and still prosecute the war. It can also complicate the war with the help of auxiliaries and allies. As a middling power, dependent on outside support, Kyiv cannot afford such missteps. Questions about pending democratic elections and recruitment office corruption highlight this tightrope act.³³ So, it is reasonable to expect the active war will grind on several more years, and nothing short of military collapse (with Russia the more likely candidate, though Ukraine faces its own manpower problems³⁴) will bring about a genuine peace sooner. This suggests a war that eventually degrades to either low-level fighting or an outsized frozen conflict, which scholars have pointed out are rarely frozen.³⁵, ³⁶

Partly as a consequence of this imperial war, an academic discourse has emerged about the decolonization of both Russia and Russian studies.³⁷ Regarding the decolonization of Russia, I would suggest that anticolonialists will be just as disappointed by their visions for the future as neoliberals became in their desire to remake Russia in their free-market image.³⁸ The same hubris that motivated neoliberalism in the 1990s animates similar perspectives today that speak of the literal decolonization, or fragmentation, of the Russian Federation.³⁹ Bashkortostan, Tuva, and Yakutiya are not about to claim independence from the center. (In some coincidence, as this issue was going to press, protests arose in Baymak over the sentencing of Bashkir activist Fail Alsynov; Russian corruption and elite thieving, environmental destruction, rigged courts, all certainly drive calls for greater autonomy—but these demands could likely for foreclosed with a simple return to the federalism of the 2000s, or perhaps just less crooked local courts and governments.⁴⁰) These nations would not bite off this freedom in its entirety—paraphrasing Boris Yeltsin—even if it were proffered.⁴¹ These regions are ultimately net beneficiaries of the federal budget and the population looks to the center as a source of jobs and prosperity. Complaints emanating from the periphery are about promises unfulfilled by bad boyars—not the tsar himself.⁴²

While the decolonization of Russia is highly unlikely, decolonizing Russian studies is certainly worthwhile. And that decolonized—and perhaps, here, it would be more accurate to say decentered—approach is something that this journal has long prided itself on and which it will continue to do, incorporating various European and global perspectives on military studies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. To that end, our special issue concentrates on privileging eastern European voices. These researchers are attempting, amid a war that is engulfing their country (and that of their neighbors), to continue quality analysis of military and security problems that pose a daily threat to their lives.

The Articles

Many of the voices collected here are informed by a shared a generation-long (and imperfect) attempt at transforming societies toward liberal, free-market democracies, where critical questioning is always a norm. The goal of accurate and critical analysis is routinely challenged by Russian information warfare and many of the authors in this issue perceive the Russian attack on information as posing nearly as much of a threat as the artillery, tanks, and missiles of the current invading force. Taken together, the essays in this issue look at Russian disinformation as part of Moscow’s campaign against the ‘near abroad’ and the wider West. They talk about how nuclear and biological weapons serve to deter the West and weaken support for Ukraine. The authors also address disinformation as it serves to dehumanize Ukrainians in this current military campaign. Though the tenor of much of the disinformation from these campaigns aligns with Soviet-era practices, alternative information mediums, technological capabilities, and uncertainty about liberalism’s durability have given modern Russia’s active measures new relevance.

One of the great American foreign policy successes in the early post-Cold War years was the denuclearization of the former Soviet republics. The non-nuclear principle was a key issue emphasized in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. With this understanding, the US, Russia, and the UK guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty with the promise of assistance, while themselves refraining from military force or economic coercion against Kyiv. In return, Ukraine committed to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty accession (and returning its nuclear capabilities to Russia as the USSR successor state). This was so important because the world was rapidly changing and the enormous Soviet nuclear complex meant that weapons-related equipment, personnel, and facilities were all at real risk of proliferating through informal and illegal channels.⁴³ Of course, when treaty signatories ignore their obligations, as Moscow did when it invaded Ukraine, this highlights the importance of Washington’s credibility on the international stage. Many would argue that Washington is indeed fulfilling its commitments to Kyiv, inherited in the 1990s, but some would suggest this has happened in a halting fashion because of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal and Western fears about direct confrontation.

Polina Sinovets and Daniel Shultz pick up this important thread here on nuclear escalation in their article, “Russia’s Nuclear Propaganda: From the Cold War to Ukraine.” Throughout the current war, nuclear coercion has necessarily played a key role in various actors’ perceptions. From Kyiv’s perspective, the invasion upended promises that were fundamental to Ukraine turning over its nuclear warheads, intercontinental missiles, and highly enriched uranium. Yet, Sinovets and Shultz argue that much of the Russian rhetoric surrounding nuclear weapons is propaganda, which should be kept separate and different from policy considerations (and doctrine) about when Moscow might escalate. The authors posit that even as political leaders and stalking horses (like a slightly unhinged former president, Dmitry Medvedev) suggest that nuclear escalation risks are increasing, nuclear training and exercises remain largely unchanged and military leaders suggest little to suspect preparation for, say, tactical nuclear use.

The authors look to historical examples from the Cold War to bolster their argument that nuclear coercion is significantly detached from doctrine. For example, they look to Vasily Sokolovsky’s writing in Military Strategy and Pavel Rotmistrov’s in Military Thought to draw out the use of nuclear weapons as tools of influence, rather than strategic-level weapons. But, because Russia is a belligerent in this war, Washington policymakers have chosen to carefully consider and stagger their military support for Kyiv. A negligible chance of nuclear conflict is not the same as a zero chance of one. The authors here, however, argue that this hesitancy is rooted in a misunderstanding Russian political strategy and nuclear doctrine, with a resultant cost for Ukrainian defense.

A nuclear threat is not the only threat that Russian disinformation hypes. Norman Cigar covers the propaganda aspect of another weapon-type of mass destruction in “The Russian Military’s Biological Warfare Disinformation Campaign and the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Interestingly, Cigar argues that in this biological campaign, Russian military leaders play a prominent propagandistic role, which is at odds with what Sinovets and Shultz find in their work on nuclear propaganda, where military leaders take a backseat to civilian and media propagandists. Though, like those authors, Cigar finds that much of the campaigning about bio-weapons is carried over from Cold War-era disinformation efforts. These efforts include ‘reports’ and ‘evidence’ about US secret biological weapons programs in Ukraine, testing on human subjects, the development of ethnicity-targeting weapons, and even the intentional proliferation of deadly pathogens.

Not surprisingly, many of these disinformation efforts fall short of influencing Ukrainians who have little experience with non-existent US bio-weapon programs in Ukraine, but considerable experience with the actuality of an invading army, making this the more pressing concern. Some “useful idiots” in the West will of course parrot Russian propaganda messages; the overriding political goal though is softening public support rather than convincing elites and policymakers (that, for example, a scandal is underfoot, which only Russian sources uncovered).⁴⁴ If Western politicians do happen to pick up and regurgitate a story—as happened with Ukrainian bioweapons—this marks a win for the Russian firehose of falsehood abroad, even if a government foreign policy is not immediately changed. Cigar also notes that repetition of these messages consolidates Russian domestic support for war aims. In this respect, convincing Russians of the veracity of these claims, or simply convincing the population to view all governments as equally dishonest and corrupt, marks internal success for this particular disinformation effort.

Igor Kopõtin and Vladimir Sazonov’s article on “The Russian Military’s Use of History to Create a Post-Soviet Identity: The Development of Conceptual Understandings from the 1990s to the Mid-2000s” shows in part why the proponents of decolonization of Russian borders in the 2020s are likely to be as disappointed as neoliberals were in the remaking of the Russian political economy in the 1990s, as mentioned above. Even as the Russian state abandoned Marxism-Leninsm, Russian military thinkers determined that a new, or renewed, Russian national idea was necessary to establish a military ideological foundation. This meant finding an ideological grounding that would support Russian great power status and its unique role across a continent that was neither solely European nor Asian. Yet, many of the various ideas were seen as alien or historical and insufficient to drive military patriotism in the modern era, the authors argue. Notably, critical theory comes in for attack as falsifying history and weakening the state, in the 1990s especially. Military theorists will instead suggest consolidating and approving an accepted history under official auspices, according to Sazonov and Kopõtin.

General-Major Stepan Tyushkevich and General-Lieutenant Vladimir Serebryannikov saw the 1990s as a period of ideological wilderness. The military was drawing haphazardly from a variety of conflicting sources, including liberal and conservative ideas, borrowing ideological constructs from the modern United States, tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Union, while instrumentalizing both the Orthodox Church and White Russian émigrés. Yet, Putin’s authoritarianism had only begun to subordinate society to the interests of the state, and the military, when attacks on Ukraine started. Now confronted with military losses, and battlefield conditions that demand a reconceptualization of the conditions of victory, the failure to coalesce around a new vision will prove problematic and not something easily made up on the fly, the authors suggest. The prevalence of texts and media reinforcing the Russian narrative of history, legitimizing imperialism, will continue to mold domestic public views, the authors posit.

It is clear, Sazonov and Kopõtin argue, that this information confrontation failed during the initial stages of invasion, coming up short in altering Ukrainian perspectives about the inevitability of a Russian military victory. Instead, an independent Ukrainian national identity has been significantly strengthened the past few years. Meanwhile, a Russian public is increasingly exposed to neo-nationalist ideas in the media that attempt to distinguish Russia from the liberal West, the ultimate consequences of which remain indeterminate, but which to some scholars increasingly resemble fascist ideas under late Putinism.⁴⁵

In the summer of 2023, the Wagner private military company mutiny gripped global attention, in both the West and Russia, as it initially appeared that the power vertical in Russia was suddenly crumbling. Ivan Gomza helps explain, in part, why this didn’t happen in “Roger That: Russia’s Coup-Proofed Army and Its Combat Effectiveness, 2022–2023.” After initial views that Wagner would topple Putin, numerous analysts came to recognize that ‘Putin’s chef’ Yevgeny Prigozhin really did want the ouster of incompetent leadership in the defense minister and chief of the general staff, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov.⁴⁶ Placing himself atop the power vertical was not the goal. Gomza explains why much of the military did not support a coup or a mutiny (but also did little to put down the mutiny of what had essentially become a private army).

Typically, neopatrimonial leaders will pursue incentivization, identity manipulation, or deterrence to ward off military ousters. Gomza analyzes how personalist rulers, in the process of coup-proofing, damage military effectiveness and preference loyalty rather than competent generals. The removal of generals such as Sergei Surovikin, Mikhail Teplinsky, Ivan Popov, and Vladimir Seliverstov are some cases in point. As is the enduring presence of Gerasimov and Shoigu, who, from a strategic perspective, have pushed for more of the same and for pleasing the boss. Often, this means relentless human-wave attacks that, without sufficient training and combined arms, accomplish little in terms of moving the lines of contact.⁴⁷

Finally, one upside of the war, to use that unfortunate phrasing, is the burgeoning scholarship about Ukraine that is getting the wider attention it deserves. The reviews here look at some of those new works, while continuing the issue’s theme of looking at Russian propaganda and disinformation as part of its broader war effort. Active measures target Ukraine and the West in a number of ways, the authors in this issue have argued, to weaken US resolve, encourage domestic support, and further the invasion; in conquered territories, this disinformation becomes the “news.” Meanwhile, well-known scholars like Serhii Plokhy have taken up a vigorous defense of their country’s right to exist.

In his review of Plokhy’s The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History, Evan McGilvray expounds on the author’s ability to demolish Russian propaganda about identity and nationality that are used, repeatedly and in different forms, for justification by Russian leaders speaking about the war. These are claims—such as the absence of a Ukrainian identity independent from a Russian one—made up and down the Russian leadership hierarchy, including Putin and Medvedev. At the same time, he conveys Plokhy’s sensitivity to the fact that this is a war that is happening across his homeland. Plokhy’s narrative, according to McGilvray, adeptly moves across history and is a timely reminder for the reader—the Western reader especially—that expectations about liberalism’s inevitable triumph remain premature.

Following that concern about liberalism and ideology, I review From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right. In this text, Michael Colborne warns that there can be no neutrality in discussing the far right. A failure to confront far-right or fascist ideology threatens liberalism wherever it is found, according to Colborne. Yet, despite an introduction that verges on the polemical, I would suggest that Colborne is unfailingly balanced in his research about the far right in Ukraine. In the end, it seems the author is right to raise concerns, but those worries are mostly tied to elements of the Ukrainian military, which is ultimately outside Colborne’s scope. His research also points, indirectly, to what others have already said about Russia—the state, today, exhibits a sustained turn toward fascism.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Dr. Heather Rellihan for providing feedback on this essay and for her publishing advice along the way, as this issue was compiled.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael S. Coffey

Michael S. Coffey is an assistant professor of history and political science at the College of Southern Maryland. His research interests include Eurasian states’ relations with a focus on Russian foreign policy and Central Asian defense and security. He previously served as a senior intelligence analyst for the Defense Department on political-military issues.

Notes

¹ Aleksei Ramm, ‘The Russian Army: Organization and Modernization,’ Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), October 2019, https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/10/IOP-2019-U-021801-Final.pdf, IOP-2019-U-021801-Final.

² Charles K. Bartles, ‘Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 24:1, 55-80, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2011.549038.

³ Serdyukov gained this moniker because of his background reforming the Federal Tax Service and for his previous involvement running various furniture companies in St. Petersburg.

⁴ Michael S. Coffey, ‘The Dedovshchina Abides: How Discipline Problems Endure Despite Years of Military Reform,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 35:3-4, 283-299, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2022.2156080.

⁵ Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya To Ukraine (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2022) pp. 231-35.

⁶ Kathryn Stoner, Russia Resurrected: Its Power And Purpose In A New Global Order (New York: Oxford University Press 2021) pp. 190-92.

⁷ Benoit Gorgemans, ‘The Caspian Flotilla: Russia’s Offensive Reinvention,’ Proceedings vol. 147/8/1,422, August 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/caspian-flotilla-russias-offensive-reinvention.

⁸ Alia Shoaib, ‘Ukraine Likely Destroyed 3 of Russia’s Prized S-400 Missile Systems Worth $1.5 billion, Weakening Its Air Defenses, Says UK Intel,’ Business Insider, 4 November 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-likely-destroyed-3-russian-s-400-missile-systems-2023-11.

⁹ Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, ‘Not Built For Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-fated Force Design,’ War on the Rocks, 2 June 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/.

¹⁰ ‘Crimea Crisis: Pro-Russians Seize Ukrainian Naval Bases,’ BBC News, 19 March 2014, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26643141.

¹¹ Olzhas Auyezov, ‘Russia Sends Troops to Put Down Kazakhstan Uprising as Fresh Violence Erupts,’ Reuters, 6 January 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/troops-protesters-clash-almaty-main-square-kazakhstan-shots-heard-2022-01-06/.

¹² Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, ‘What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?’ Military Review, Army University Press, 24 January 2018, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Russia-in-Syria/.

¹³ Phillips P Obrien, ‘The Ukrainian Offensive has Barely Started: And Its Only Been a Short Time Since Feb 2022,’ Phillips’s Newsletter on Substack, 22 June 2023 https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/the-ukrainian-offensive-has-barely.

¹⁴ Deborah Sanders, ‘Ukraine’s Third Wave of military Reform 2016–2022 – Building a Military Able to Defend Ukraine Against the Russian invasion,’ Defense & Security Analysis 39:3, 312-328, DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017, pp. 312-13.

¹⁵ Brendan Cole, ‘Ukraine Gets Bradleys Boost After Losing Multiple Armored Vehicles,’ Newsweek, 13 June 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/bradley-tanks-ukraine-kyiv-1806229.

¹⁶ Olena Roshchina, ‘Things Didn’t Go According to Plan, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Had To Change Tactics – WP on Counteroffensive,’ Ukrainska Pravda, 4 December 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/4/7431595/#.

¹⁷ Ellie Cook, ‘Is Ukraine’s Army Now the Best in the World? Major Countries Compared,’ Newsweek, 1 April 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-army-best-world-compared-russia-us-military-china-1791441.

¹⁸ Anatoly Kurmanaev, ‘Wagner’s Mutiny Has Century-Old Echoes of Another Russian Debacle,’ The New York Times, 28 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/28/world/europe/russia-rebellion-prigozhin-1917-kornilov.html.

¹⁹ ‘Another Russian General Reportedly Fired In Latest Military Shake-Up Post-Mutiny,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 16 July 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-general-fired-latest-shakeup-post-mutiny/32505576.html.

²⁰ Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine as of October 29, 2023, 3:00 pm ET, Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, by the Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375.

²¹ David Axe, ‘Nine Days After Wrecking 21 Russian Helicopters, Ukraine’s M39 Missiles Are Dealing the Same Damage To Russian Air-Defenses,’ Forbes, 26 October 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/10/26/nine-days-after-wrecking-21-russian-helicopters-ukraines-m39-missiles-are-dealing-the-same-damage-to-russian-air-defenses/?sh=31453bae861c.

²² ‘Explained: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive and the Problem of ‘Fighting Weather’,’ Kyiv Post, 11 September 2023, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/21489.

²³ Phillips P Obrien, ‘Weekend Update #52: Avdiivka, ATACMS, Mike Johnson Avdiivka; ATACMS–Where was the detailed follow up?; Mike Johnson and Ukraine,’ Phillips’s Newsletter on Substack, 29 October 2023, https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-52-avdiivka-atacms.

²⁴ Frederick W. Kagan, ‘What Stalemate Means in Ukraine and Why it Matters,’ ISW, 22 March 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/what-stalemate-means-ukraine-and-why-it-matters.

²⁵ Elena Goncharova, ‘ISW: Russian Forces Continue Offensive Operations Near Avdiivka,’ Kyiv Independent,

4 November 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/isw-russian-forces-continue-offensive-operations-near-avdiivka/.

²⁶ Veronika Melkozerova, ‘Ukrainian Attacks Force Russia to Relocate Black Sea Fleet,’ Politico, 6 October 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-attack-crimea-russia-ships-relocate/.

²⁷ Isabel van Brugen, ‘Ukraine’s Crimea Operation Is Going to Plan,’ Newsweek, 14 September 2023, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-crimea-operation-explosions-black-sea-fleet-kerch-bridge-1827002.

²⁸ It is understood that the sham election is a foregone conclusion but this does not eliminate concerns about domestic unrest that Putin will confront as the wartime economy shortchanges funds that would normally be used to prop up popular support for the regime.

²⁹ Lili Bayer, ‘Ukraine Likely to Get NATO Support Message, Not Full Invite, US Ambassador Says,’ Politico, 9 June 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-nato-support-message-not-full-invite-us-ambassador-julianne-smith/.

³⁰ ‘Zelenskyy Accepts Ukraine Cannot Become a NATO Member Until the War Ends,’ NPR Weekend Edition with Scott Simon, 3 June 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/06/03/1179979756/zelenskyy-accepts-ukraine-cannot-become-a-nato-member-until-the-war-ends.

³¹ Luke Coffey, ‘Ten Myths About US Aid to Ukraine,’ Hudson Institute, 20 October 2022, https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/ten-myths-us-aid-ukraine-luke-coffey.

³² ‘Kremlin Sees U.S. Budget Setback for Ukraine as Harbinger of Western War Fatigue,’ Reuters, 2 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-sees-us-budget-setback-ukraine-harbinger-western-war-fatigue-2023-10-02/.

³³ ‘Corruption Concerns Involving Ukraine Are Revived as the War With Russia Drags On,’ 20 July 2022, The Associated Press via NPR, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/1112414884/corruption-concerns-involving-ukraine-are-revived-as-the-war-with-russia-drags-o.

³⁴ Alexander Vindman, ‘Ukraine’s Sovereignty Prospects Dim in 2024: A Candid Assessment of the War, Part 1,’ Why It Matters on Substack, 11 December 2023, https://alexandervindman.substack.com/p/ukraines-sovereignty-prospects-dim?r=laqg2&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web.

³⁵ ‘East: Frozen Conflicts Not So ‘Frozen’ After All,’ 10 November 2006, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/1072643.html.

³⁶ S. Neil MacFarlane, Thomas de Waal, James Coyle, among many others, have noted that these conflicts are not necessarily frozen, and that there is also little to prevent a ‘thaw’ that can turn up violence fairly quickly.

³⁷ Artem Shaipov and Yuliia Shaipova, ‘It’s High Time to Decolonize Western Russia Studies,’ Foreign Policy, 11 February 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/11/russia-studies-war-ukraine-decolonize-imperialism-western-academics-soviet-empire-eurasia-eastern-europe-university/.

³⁸ Peter Rutland, ‘Neoliberalism and the Russian Transition,’ Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2013): 332–62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42003296, pp. 332-333.

³⁹ Casey Michel, ‘Decolonize Russia: To Avoid More Senseless Bloodshed, the Kremlin Must Lose What Empire it Still Retains,’ The Atlantic, 27 May 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/russia-putin-colonization-ukraine-chechnya/639428/.

⁴⁰ Anatoly Kurmanaev, ‘Protests in Russia Put Spotlight on Wartime Ethnic Grievances”, The New York Times, 18 January 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/18/world/europe/protests-russia-bashkortostan.html.

⁴¹ Борис Ельцин, ‘Берите столько суверенитета, сколько сможете проглотить,’ 6 August 2015, Ельцин Центр, speech in Kazan, Russia, 6 August 1990, https://yeltsin.ru/news/boris-elcin-berite-stolko-suverineteta-skolko-smozhete-proglotit/.

⁴² Andrei Kolesnikov, Alexei Levinson, Denis Volkov, ‘How Proponents and Opponents of Political Change See Russia’s Future,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 January 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/14/how-proponents-and-opponents-of-political-change-see-russia-s-future-pub-83607.

⁴³ Heather Wilson, ‘Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation,’ The National Interest, no. 34 (1993): 26–36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42894908, p. 26.

⁴⁴ Some of these stories would be laughable if the stakes were not so serious: In one narrative, the US created and then infiltrated COVID into China in order to subsequently blame Beijing for creating and spreading the global pandemic.

⁴⁵ Michael McFaul, ‘Vladimir Putin Does Not Think Like We Do,’ The Washington Post, 26 January 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/26/vladimir-putin-does-not-think-like-we-do/.

⁴⁶ Prigozhin gained this moniker for his ownership of catering companies that received considerable government contracts.

⁴⁷ Olivia Yanchik, ‘Human Wave Tactics are Demoralizing the Russian Army in Ukraine,’ UkraineAlert at the Atlantic Council, 8 April 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/human-wave-tactics-are-demoralizing-the-russian-army-in-ukraine/.