Marriage and the Public Good

Abstract

In this article I seek to address some misunderstandings in arguments about same sex-marriage. I do this by evaluating several views on homosexuality and marriage. My central aim is to show that a rejection of same-sex marriage does not depend upon the view that homosexual acts are immoral or disordered. Rather, one must examine sexual acts in light of public goods that are at stake. I also argue that the Christian understanding of marriage and sexuality offers more than a set of prohibitions against certain sexual acts. Rather, it offers reasonable principles by which to evaluate the relationship between sexual acts and the public good.

Keywords:

• homosexuality
• marriage
• Catholic
• disorder
• same-sex
• public good

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent online article, L. Z. Granderson wrote that the city of Seattle will likely force its two professional basketball teams to move to other cities (2007). This was not a story about luxury boxes being paid for by the taxpayers of Seattle. Nor was it a story about the propensity of professional athletes to be involved in crime. No, it was a story about marriage. According to Granderson, it has come to light that the group that now owns the Seattle SuperSonics and the Seattle Storm includes two people who think marriage should be between a man and a woman. Specifically, they have spent a great deal of money supporting an organization by the name of Americans United to Preserve Marriage.

What I find significant in this story is that the author takes it for granted that the likely response of the city of Seattle to these revelations needs no justification: merely to lobby in favor of traditional marriage is held to be “beyond the pale.” There is not the least suggestion that the new owners have said or done anything to deny basic human rights to anyone. Rather, there is the implicit claim that not to support same-sex marriage is to deny basic human rights.

One does not expect a learned philosophical discussion in an online sports magazine. But the assumptions of the author reveal the obstacles to having a clear discussion about these matters. Marriage is a public good, and this is what makes it so important. To be opposed to same-sex marriage does not imply that one is in favor of criminalizing those who engage in homosexual acts. Indeed, as I shall argue, one can be opposed to same-sex marriage even if one is undecided on the moral status of homosexual activity. That is, there is not a necessary connection between opposition to same-sex marriage and opposition to homosexual acts.

The question of who can marry is a public question with public ramifications, and hence is more than a question about private behavior between consenting adults. The special status that the institution of marriage has had is due to its important role in society, especially the role of raising the next generation. So, the question of who can marry is far different from the question of whether consenting adults should be discouraged from engaging in certain types of sexual acts. Marriage is a social reality that resists attempts to privatize it. Nevertheless, an analysis of related private acts is essential to a full understanding of the challenges society faces. Later in the paper I shall take up this question.

It is unfortunate that the public discussion of marriage is frequently presented in terms of whether or not one is “against” same-sex marriage. Those who favor the model of opposite-sex marriage are taken to be opposed to equality and freedom. Moreover, such opposition is often presented as being the result of one of several irrational and backward religious worldviews. Is there any hope for fruitful dialogue? Can, for example, the Catholic understanding of the matter be presented in a way that is accessible and perhaps persuasive to persons of other faiths and to persons of no faith?

In the Catholic view, sexual intercourse is morally permissible only within marriage. Homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and are therefore never morally permissible. The Church teaches that such acts “are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved” ( Catechism, 1993). In this view, the complementarity between man and woman is morally significant. The fact of being equally human yet so very different opens each person to an otherness that has ultimate meaning; denial of this otherness can entail a denial of God. Homosexual orientation involves a disposition to be oriented toward oneself. This is not a condemnation of persons who have homosexual inclinations. The Church recognizes that the genesis of homosexuality “remains largely unexplained” ( Catechism, 1993). The orientation itself is not necessarily a matter of choice, and it can cause great suffering.

Catholic teaching on sexuality is far more than a list of prohibited acts. All human beings are meant to live chaste and stable lives. In marriage, chastity includes sexual acts that are open to procreation. These acts, by their nature, bring the couple into a deeper union with one another, a union that is meant to be “till death.” The goal of one's life is not simply to “avoid sin,” but to enjoy communion with one another and with God. This provides the basis for all the Church's teachings on marriage and sexuality. Moreover, the rejection of homosexual acts is grounded in Sacred Scripture, i.e., “divine revelation,” which the Church has no authority to change.

The concern of this paper is not primarily with a direct exposition of the Catholic understanding of marriage or with legal theory. I intend to contribute to the discussion regarding the nature of marriage and the nature of sexual acts. I will do this not to defend laws that criminalize certain forms of sexual behavior, but to evaluate the underlying assumption that homosexual acts can be marital acts. My claim is that the most fruitful way to get to the heart of the philosophical question is by way of a metaphysical analysis. This is because the central questions have to do with nature: the nature of sexual acts and the nature of human beings.

In my view, very significant reasons would have to be given if we are no longer even to discourage acts that have traditionally been held to be unhealthy or immoral. Still further very significant reasons would have to be given for a public stance that in any way promotes or encourages such behavior. And finally, very substantial reasons would have to be given for the state to regard relationships defined by such acts as equivalent to marriage. The stakes are very high. Any attempt to privatize these important questions will be unsuccessful. As I will argue, very significant social, moral, and spiritual goods are at stake. Consistency of principle is important on issues of life and on matters of great social concern such as the institution of marriage.

Social dynamics are such that some so-called “private choices” necessarily have a great impact on all members of society. And when the state takes a position of neutrality on questions that many persons consider fundamental to human life and human flourishing, then laws take on an arbitrary quality that undermines the meaning of the rule of law itself. The reasoning that underlies all laws must be of a consistency and stability that is capable of grounding the idea that laws are binding for objective reasons, for reasons distinct from the fact that the state will use power to enforce them.

There is great concern today for human rights. Whether it be immigration law, the minimum wage, healthcare, religious freedom, or capital punishment, the view that all persons should be treated with equal respect and fairness is quite powerful. However, with such an emphasis on “rights” and “equality” one can easily neglect a more substantial, and necessary, discussion of human nature. What is it that justifies the principle of equality? Why do persons have rights? At the most basic level, are these principles grounded in a social contract, or is there something “in the nature of things” that grounds them?

If one is to have a right to marry, such a right must be in service of some further good. For example, the right to education is rooted in the good of having members of society who are educated. Either society recognizes a good that is essential to human beings or it has decided that there is something very important for society that such a right supports. In other words, if the right is to have any standing in the public square, there must be publicly articulated reasons for it; otherwise why should the state be concerned about making laws about it? Marriage and sexual behavior get confused in the current intellectual climate. On the one hand, they involve private decisions; on the other, there are a great number of laws that regulate sexual activities and marriage contracts. The Catholic view, generally, is that this confusion is due in part to the separation between sexual intercourse and procreation, a separation that has resulted from the embrace of a “contraceptive mentality.” Since the advent of widely available and (somewhat) reliable contraceptive methods, it has become easier to separate the act of sexual intercourse from the beginning of a new life.

In the past forty years we have witnessed a tremendous increase in sexual behavior outside of marriage, unwanted children, abortion, and divorce. During the same period of time, contraceptives have become widely accepted and widely used. Indeed, the vast majority of Catholics in the United States do not agree with the Church's view that the use of contraceptives, even in marriage, is immoral. My point here is not necessarily to link contraceptive use to all the bad things listed above (although I do think there is a link); rather, it is to highlight that the cultural climate has so drastically changed that it would be surprising if there were not advocates of same-sex marriage today. In other words, the argument against same-sex marriage relies upon arguments against moves that society has already made and accepted. There has been an implicit redefinition of marital acts that has occurred as a result of the almost universal acceptance of contraceptives. Hence, extending the institution of marriage (as redefined) to same-sex couples makes some logical sense. In light of this, it is striking that a majority of states have passed laws that uphold the view that a marriage can only be contracted between a man and a woman. Despite the fact that sexual practices seem to point to a radical redefinition of the meaning of sexual activity and of what can be a marital act, society is not yet ready to ratify the implicit changes. This resistance points to a truth about marriage and sexual behavior and this is why it is important to return again and again to the question of what it is that makes a sexual act be a marital act.

II. SOCIETY'S INTEREST IN MARRIAGE

So the question is not “Why can't persons of the same sex legally marry one another?” Rather, it is “Why does the state care who marries whom?” And can it make rationally defensible distinctions in this regard? Marriage is a privilege accorded to certain couples who have taken on a duty. The duty is not essentially a matter of sexual desire and strong emotions. It is a duty that involves a willingness to be responsible for human beings who result, naturally, from acts of sexual intercourse.

The underlying assumption of the thinkers whose writings I shall consider is that there is such a thing as “marriage.” It is recognized as an institution that is important to individuals and to society and as something that on some level needs public support. That is, it can be threatened. An important question is whether it is best to view the institution of marriage as something that is discovered or as something that is created, say, by custom or social contract.

Natural Law theory entails that human beings, because of their nature, tend to flourish in certain types of environments and within certain social structures. They tend not to flourish in other types of environments and social structures. In addition, there are virtues, habits of behavior, that a person needs to acquire if he or she is to be fulfilled as a human being. In short, a person's nature is not entirely malleable; because of his or her nature, some contexts of life and some actions are better than others if one is to become fully human. To become fully human involves being truly free, for freedom is an aspect of human life that distinguishes it from other kinds of life present in the world. Like the rosebush, some things will cause the human animal to flourish and some things will cause it to “wither.” Neither rosebush nor human have the luxury of deciding what causes a healthy nature. But the human is able to choose according to what he or she thinks will cause health. Using this power well is a source of happiness, as when one chooses to stand by a friend “through thick and thin.” In this view, choosing to do the good for the right reasons and with the right disposition is to be truly free, to be “more fully human.”

That the union-effecting nature of heterosexual marital intercourse is essential to the meaning of marriage has wide support. Many arguments for same-sex marriage depend upon the presupposition that sexual activity in general is in some sense union-effecting. As I will argue, this presupposition is unwarranted and depends upon an acceptance and transference of the union-effecting meaning that pertains only to heterosexual intercourse and not necessarily to other kinds of sexual acts.

III. THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY AND THE QUESTION OF MARRIAGE

John Finnis is among the thinkers who maintain that homosexual acts cannot be marital acts. He argues that the union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really unites the two persons biologically and that this simply cannot occur in homosexual acts. He writes:

… the common good of friends who are not and cannot be married … has nothing to do with their having children by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot make them a biological (and therefore personal) unit. So their sexual acts cannot do what they may hope and imagine. (1997a, p. 34)

It may well be that Finnis is correct about these claims. But he is up against counterclaims by same-sex couples whose reflections on their own relationships have led them to accept with conviction that their sexual acts do indeed make them biological and personal units.

Since homosexual activity cannot actualize a marital good, Finnis writes, “it can do no more than provide each partner with individual gratification” (1997a, p. 34). “In short, sexual acts are not unitive in their significance unless they are marital … and … they are not marital unless they have … also the procreative significance … ” (p. 35). Finnis tries to show that, in addition to not being capable of being marital, homosexual conduct actually does damage to one's “self-integration.” This point is peripheral to the topic at hand, but it is related to the question of whether such conduct should ever be encouraged.

IV. ADVOCATES OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Crucial to Finnis's conclusion that homosexual acts cannot be marital is the claim that it is in the nature of marital intercourse that, by engaging in it, the spouses become “one flesh.” This view is reflected in his claim that in marital intercourse the husband and wife “become a biological unit” and that this cannot happen through homosexual acts. Proponents of same-sex marriage rely upon the view that sexual activity is unitive, but that the only justification for this claim comes from the nature of heterosexual intercourse. That is, what Finnis does not adequately defend, namely, that in sexual intercourse a man and a woman can become a “biological unit,” is actually essential but unavailable to arguments for same-sex marriage. Proponents of same-sex marriage claim (1) that they promote sexual habits that should reduce health problems, and (2) that they mimic traditional views of marriage and family life. In neither case, however, is there something in the nature of homosexual acts that provides justification for such claims.

An Unwarranted Claim: Sexual Activity “Unites” People

Andrew Koppelman argues that a relationship between two homosexual persons is analogous to a relationship between two people of opposite sex who are unable to conceive a child. As with the heterosexual couple, the homosexual couple need not value the pleasurable experience of sexual relations as something unrelated to the rest of their lives. They may experience their sexual activity as an important part of the communion they feel with one another. As is the case with opposite-sex couples who are unable to have children, they may feel the need to formalize this desire for communion by getting married. He writes: “the activity of pleasuring each other sexually may have the real and intended effect of constituting a relationship that is different and better—more intense, more committed, closer, and more enduring—than it would be if the partners substituted, say, conversation” (1997, p. 46). Koppelman quotes Sidney Callahan, who writes that “chaste friendships and general charity cannot produce the same intense intimacy, bodily confirmation, mutual sanctification, and fulfilling happiness that comes from making love with a faithful partner” (Callahan, 1994, p. 7).

Koppelman suggests that for at least some same-sex couples, “sexual intercourse is valued not merely as a pleasurable experience unintegrated with the rest of one's life, but as an activity that is an important constituent of one of the primary relationships in one's life, exactly as it is the case with many heterosexual couples” (1997, p. 46). Koppelman here makes the assumption that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples can engage in “sexual intercourse.” This assumption is unwarranted. Same-sex couples can engage in a variety of activities that involve sexual stimulation, as can groups of persons. Whatever people call these activities and whatever they feel about them, they do not constitute reproductive-type behavior. Moreover, they do not constitute types of behavior that society clearly has any stake in promoting. By this I mean that the justification for society's support for marriage would seem to have something to do with the fact that marriage is or has been the normal context for the raising of successive generations. The argument for same-sex marriage entails that reproductive activity and reproductive-type activity are not essential to marriage. Proponents of same-sex marriage then must focus upon society's stake in fostering intimate friendships. But it is not clear why society should single out for very special support specifically those intimate friendships that include sexual activity.

John Finnis argues that it is somewhat careless of Koppelman to use a quotation about “mutual sanctification” being “produced” by sexual acts, since Koppelman has claimed that the universe is disenchanted (1997b, pp. 129–130). But more importantly, Finnis asks, what is the basis for the claim that the effects caused by sexual acts are dependent upon faithfulness? That is, there is nothing in the nature of the acts performed that makes them best performed with only one partner. Indeed, Andrew Sullivan has argued that same-sex couples can teach opposite-sex couples that sexual fidelity is not that big a deal. In Virtually Normal, he wrote that “there is likely to be greater understanding of the need for extramarital outlets between two men than between a man and a woman; and again, the lack of children gives gay couples greater freedom. Their failures entail fewer consequences for others” (1996, p. 202). A hug is not cheapened by the fact that it can be a sign of affection used with more that just one friend. Why should sexual acts be any different?

If homosexual acts were to be considered marital, such meaning would have to be found in what the two persons feel for one another and not in the symbolism of the acts. Proponents of same-sex marriage say that marital acts need not be essentially reproductive since most sex acts of opposite-sex married couples are not reproductive. Hence, in their view, whatever union-effecting aspect there is in a sexual act cannot be something that is intrinsic to the act itself. Same-sex marriage advocates that I have studied do not even attempt to describe sexual acts as intrinsically unitive but rely on the assumption that homosexual acts can indeed be unitive. And this is why the question of interpersonal union, what it means, what its connection is to sexual activity, is so important to the question of what kinds of acts can be marital. It is important, that is, if sexual activity is to remain in some sense central to what it means to be married.

There is something in the nature of sexual intercourse that is uniquely capable of symbolizing and fostering interpersonal union. This is something that is present even when one or both parties consciously wish it not to be. This objective presence, or nature, I argue, is what is at the heart of reasons behind various sexual prohibitions, e.g., against incest and casual sexual intercourse.

V. TOWARD A RESOLUTION

The most significant problem with the arguments for same-sex marriage that I have considered is that such arguments imply a new understanding of marriage that cannot withstand the challenges that will be brought against it. Stephen Macedo claims that thinkers like Finnis fail to appreciate the fact that homosexual relationships are about “more” than sex. But even if they do fail to appreciate this fact, Macedo must still explain just what the “more” is and what the connection is between this “more” and the sexual acts in which same sex couples engage. Then, further, he must show how this “more” is marital. If he cannot show this, then two persons of the same sex who engage in sexual acts can be no more married to each other than can two persons of the same sex who do not engage in sexual acts with each other.

The Biology of Sexual Acts

The kinds of sexual acts in which same-sex couples can engage are acts that opposite-sex couples can engage in as well. So, the “natural meaning” associated with these acts is something in which opposite-sex couples can also participate. What is the meaning? Well, one must look at the specifics of the acts, including the biology of the acts. By this I mean that there is something in the nature of an act itself, prior to and independent of any meaning given to it by one's intention. The nature of an act is a result of the fact that human beings and human bodies are what they are.

This description does not in itself entail the immorality of particular acts. But it does help to show that to lump all sex acts into the category of “having sex” is to miss the fact that some-sex acts are very different from others. The key question, of course, is whether these biological facts have moral significance. They do in the sense that they show the similarity between all acts that are not acts of sexual intercourse. Those who reject the idea that heterosexual intercourse is normative for marriage would have to explain what makes some sexual acts marital and some not, and what makes some acts morally acceptable and some not morally acceptable. In other words, the biological facts do very little work at this point. Yet, there remains a morally and spiritually significant difference between sexual intercourse and all other types of sexual acts. Proponents of same-sex marriage note this difference but they claim that it is not maritally (or morally) decisive. Once they have made this move, however, then distinctions between marital and nonmarital acts, and between moral and nonmoral acts, become rather vague and confused.

Proponents of same-sex marriage necessarily eliminate the principle of biological complementarity from the definition of marriage. This eliminates for them also the sense that a sexual act can be understood as one act. That is, sexual acts that are not acts of sexual intercourse are more aptly described biologically by reference to what is happening within each individual as distinct from what is happening in both together. Since, for the proponents of same-sex marriage, reproductive meaning is not necessary for a sexual act to be morally acceptable, it is unclear what makes any sexual act morally wrong. Indeed, the question is often reduced to consent; as long as the persons are of age and give their consent, the act is morally permissible. But once sexual complementarity and reproductive significance are set aside, then arguments against virtually all acts that involve consent lose their force and become simply matters of personal preference. In other words, sexual taboos that are taken for granted even by proponents of same-sex marriage are dependent upon principles that these same proponents do not accept. If consent is all that is at stake then there is no reason to rule out incest, promiscuity, group sex, and so forth, among consenting adults.

Note that my argument here is not a positive one. That is, I do not claim to have defended the view that only acts of a reproductive kind are uniquely marital. Rather, I suggest that those who deny this view and who claim that other kinds of sexual acts can also be marital, face quite a few challenges if they intend to retain the view that some sexual acts are always morally unacceptable. This highlights a way in which the proponents of same-sex marriage seem to undermine their own arguments. They argue that homosexual acts can be marital. Hence they are arguing for something that has to do with human bodies, with biology. But by evaluating specifically the biology of acts in which persons of the same sex might engage, one can see that there is no connection between what is said to happen in the relationship and what is happening in the acts in which they are attempting to find marital significance. The bodily acts that they think can be central to marriage are entirely dependent for their meaning on the disposition of the persons who engage in such acts. Since there is no marital meaning contained in the acts themselves, there would seem to be no reason to consider such acts anything but accidental to married life.

The idea of marriage, by this understanding, would not connote any biologically distinct act. “Marriage” would become a mental construct, without any specification of the nature of the physical relationship between those who are married. Hence, far from raising intimate same-sex relationships to a more stable arena, this line of reasoning would inevitably lead to the erosion of marriage itself. This is because “marriage” could only mean a mind-based connection between a close friendship and some type of physical intimacy. There would be no clear and objective way in which the physical acts of the partners could be said to represent or to instantiate the friendship.

An acceptance of same-sex marriage would entail a change in the meaning of marriage. The term “marriage” would no longer have the capacity for the kind of depth of meaning that made it so protected and encouraged in the first place. This is not because homosexual persons are bad or because they are more promiscuous than heterosexuals. Rather, it is because the internal logic of the revised stance regarding biological facts would entail a primarily subjective connection between sexual activity and what the parties intend through their sexual activity.

Proponents of same-sex marriage must excise both the unitive and procreative dimensions of the biology of sexual intercourse to define same-sex sexual behavior to be “just as marital” as sexual intercourse. In the wake of this alteration, it becomes unclear why sexual activity should be limited to marriage at all, since it has become unclear how the nature of marriage is connected to the nature of “sexual activity,” understood as it must be in such a general and ambiguous way.

The “bond” of marriage for same-sex partners would have no biological referent comparable to the “referent” that opposite-sex couples have of the reproductive nature of sexual intercourse. In other words, a shift to allow same-sex couples to participate in the institution of marriage would require a shift in how sexual activity is viewed in general. Without a connection with reproduction, there would be no principle by which some sexual acts are held to be marital and some are not.

To make the claim that same-sex couples can be married, proponents have had to suggest that such couples are capable of participating in whatever values Finnis describes as marital. They have argued for this claim by making the analogy between infertile sexual intercourse and homosexual acts. But once the proponents of same-sex marriage have made this move, they are not justified in claiming that any sexual act is by nature marital but only that some acts of sexual intercourse may not be marital. This is why I say that, by their reasoning, sexual activity itself no longer has a central place within their understanding of marriage. For example, some couples may find that sharing a good meal is the way that they participate in the marital values articulated by Finnis or by the proponents of same-sex marriage. If one accepts the shift in understanding required by an acceptance of same-sex marriage, it is unclear what principled reasons could be given for suggesting that sharing a meal is less marital than, say, engaging in oral sex. I am not saying that there are no such principled reasons, only that they cannot be presumed.

Note that I am not saying that sharing a meal could never constitute in some way a participation in the good of marriage. Rather, I am suggesting that sexual acts, as understood by proponents of same-sex marriage, are not clearly more fitting to be called marital than is the act of sharing a meal. My own view is that the problem goes back to the question of whether sexual intercourse is intrinsically unitive in a way that other kinds of sexual acts cannot be. And I think that Finnis is correct in his claim that it is. It is not the burden of this paper to prove this claim, but rather to point out problems that arise when it is denied or poorly defended.

VI. THE “PROCREATIVE DIMENSION” AND METAPHYSICS

It is true that the good of procreation cannot literally be the good pursued by the infertile heterosexual couple. So either the couple would be aiming at something that cannot happen or they would be aiming at values that are embedded in the word “procreative.” Stephen Macedo claims that same-sex couples can do likewise. So his point is not that same-sex partners can be physically open to procreation, but that they can be open to whatever goods Finnis might be indicating by the phrase “procreative value,” since procreation itself is not available to the infertile heterosexual couple. The sexual acts of the same-sex couple, just like those of the infertile opposite-sex couple, Macedo claims, can be open to such goods as “friendship, mutual care, and so on” (2001, p. 39). He thinks it is simply mistaken for Finnis to suggest that the essence of infertile heterosexual intercourse is defined by something that the couple cannot attain. Rather, Macedo claims, what makes such sexual activity valuable is the goods that the couple can attain and share.

For Finnis, the “procreative value” is an essential part of the basic good of marriage. As part of a basic good, this value is not argued for by Finnis. Moreover, it would seem to depend upon our grasping of values that transcend human actions. For how can two people “participate” in something that is not there in any physical sense? Macedo argues that there is no procreation if there is no resulting child. If having a child is impossible, he adds, then being procreative is impossible. So whatever Finnis really means by “procreative value,” Macedo claims, is something in which same-sex couples can also participate.

Without a connection to sexual union, Macedo's “good” of marriage becomes practically indistinguishable from the good of friendship. In other words, there would be no reason to limit the good of marriage only to those who engage in sexual acts together. Paradoxically, then, the argument for same-sex marriage turns sexual activity into something that is not essential to marriage. This is not to say that in my view the meaning of marriage can be reduced to sexual intercourse. Rather, if sexual intercourse is not essential to the meaning of marriage, then sexual activity itself is not essential to marriage. To be sure, a marital relationship should involve enduring intimacy, mutual commitment, and shared goods, but these are not, I would argue, by themselves sufficient to turn a relationship into marriage.

A robust understanding of marriage cannot be sustained if one embraces the changes in principles that are required to defend the view that same-sex relationships can be marital. Too much of the more substantial understanding of marriage is dependent upon foundations that same-sex marriage advocates reject. Moreover, if the institution is emptied of what were once considered essential elements, it would no longer be something for which society has clear reason to provide special status.

VII. THE COMMON GOOD: CONSENSUS or METAPHYSICAL TRUTH?

The essential point that a successful natural law argument must make is that there are metaphysical truths at stake, that there is a truth about the complex unity which is a human being. And if this unity is not fully recognized, if human beings are not treated in such a way that this unity is respected and reverenced, then they are diminished. Furthermore, if some human beings are diminished within a particular society, then the society itself suffers in ways that may not be immediately obvious.

The force of Finnis's argument rests on the notion of a “common good that could be realized.” It is here that Koppelman and others have their strongest argument. It may perhaps be paraphrased in this way: “We agree that sexual acts ought to have a common good that is achieved through them. We think that some homosexual relationships involve sexual acts that lead to the experience and actualization of common goods. Moreover, we think these common goods are at least analogous to the actualized and experienced common goods that arise from sexual acts within infertile heterosexual relationships. You give us no sound reasons for accepting your position that the two cases are not morally equivalent.” The reason for this, I would argue, is because Finnis's “common good” would only be fully understood through a rich metaphysical understanding of the human person. Uses of concepts such as “metaphysically inseparable parts” of human persons and an emphasis on biological truths to support moral claims constitute attempts on the part of Finnis to address this weakness in the theory. In my view, these attempts are not sufficient.

The point of the proponents of same-sex marriage is that two persons of the same sex can experience a union with one another that is more like marital friendship than like any other type of friendship. And since they describe such relationships in terms that are very much like those used by opposite-sex married couples, it is difficult to make a counterargument that is persuasive. My argument is that however such relationships are defined, sexual acts seem not to be essential to them, and that this is of the greatest significance. Is it possible to make a positive argument for the view that sexual intercourse is unique in its “union-effecting” qualities? In our culture such an argument is particularly difficult to make. This is why I have focused in this paper upon the problems with suggesting that other types of sexual acts can be marital and not upon what it is that makes acts of sexual intercourse themselves be marital.

God designed human beings with a profound power that has been profoundly misunderstood. The tremendous beauty of the Catholic understanding of the relationship between man and woman has been covered over by cheap and unfulfilling alternatives. Because the sexual drive is so strong and so insistent, once it loses its proper marital context, a destructive chaos ensues. It requires a willful blindness not to see this chaos throughout our culture. Furthermore, it is irrational to oppose the model of Catholic marriage and family life described at the beginning of this article. That model of sexual fidelity within lifelong marriage is something from which everyone benefits: men, women, and children. In this article, I have shown that it is unreasonable to consider homosexual acts to be marital acts. In doing so, I have attempted to uphold an understanding of marriage that will be the foundation of a healthy society.