Wind Power: Is There A “Planning Problem”?
Expanding Wind Power: A Problem of Planning, or of Perception?
The Problems Of Planning—A Developer's Perspective
Wind Farms: More Respectful and Open Debate Needed, Not Less
Planning: Problem “Carrier” or Problem “Source”?
“Innovative” Wind Power Planning

The last ten years have seen academic interest in wind power multiply as quickly as turbines on a Scottish mountain range. This has engaged scholars from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds, including not only engineering, energy analysts, economics and psychology but also, of course, planning. In terms of planning research at least, one can question how influential this work has been in altering the terms of the policy debates surrounding wind power. For this reason, between February 2008 and May 2009 a small multi-disciplinary group of academics ran a series of five ESRC-funded seminars,1 at which more than fifty papers were presented and which brought together researchers, developers, policy-makers and non-government organisation (NGO) representatives from the UK and internationally to discuss the varied perspectives on wind power deployment and, in particular, the future direction of the wind energy sector. The topics discussed at these events did not just focus on planning issues but included the financial mechanisms for supporting wind power, engagement with local communities and structural constraints facing the wind power sector. However, in all these seminars, time and time again the discussions came back to perceived problems with planning systems, with different stakeholders clearly having very different perceptions of what planning should be delivering in terms of wind power. Indeed, this seems to have been conflated into a multi-faceted “planning problem” that is played out in government policy and the popular media through a discourse of “planning barriers”. Yet, as often expressed at the seminars, this discourse is somewhat at odds with the emerging understanding of social acceptance and the role of planning systems being projected by researchers and some elements of the professional community. This therefore seems an ideal topic for an Interface exchange in the pages of this journal, for not only is wind power seen as critical for addressing climate change, it is also one in which there clearly has not been enough interaction between research and practitioner communities.

In many ways, the issues facing wind power are shared by other forms of contested development and bring into focus the varied normative assumptions attached to planning by the myriad of actors involved. Nevertheless, the lead paper in this Interface argues that the issue of planning for wind energy is worthy of special consideration by those concerned with academic–practitioner relations for two key reasons. Firstly, it is immensely revealing of wider conceptions of how government and other stakeholders view the function of spatial planning in regulating major infrastructure and dealing with “dissent”. Secondly, the experience of wind power development raises wider questions of the legitimate role of planning in negotiating transitions towards sustainable energy, with lessons of likely relevance to other renewable technologies.

To frame this debate within a broader context the lead paper is followed by four responses, each offering a very different perspective on how the relationship between planning and wind power should be conceptualised. The lead paper aims to provide an overview, from an academic point of view, of “the planning problem” and how the growing body of research in this field contributes a range of useful findings that cumulatively suggest that alternative policy approaches could more effectively deliver wind power in the UK.

The first response is provided by Richard Hadwin, a wind developer with extensive experience of guiding wind farm schemes through the planning system. For him, researchers and those involved in the policy and practice communities have failed to understand the real problems that arise when schemes are locally disputed and where councillors are expected to act in a quasi-judicial role. In a response that articulates a great sense of frustration with the current planning process he confronts the myths and contradictions faced in the local planning of such nationally important infrastructure and identifies specific failures with the current process. The second response comes from Paul Miner, from the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), often on the other side of local disputes over wind farm proposals. In his response, Miner highlights some of the power relationships involved in wind power planning and questions how we balance the costs and benefits of such development and indeed, asks how these are distributed through society. Like the previous contribution, Miner questions the effectiveness of current planning processes and calls for a more open political debate on the impacts of wind farm proposals.

The last two responses are provided by academic commentators, offering significantly different intellectual and geographic perspectives from those found among UK practitioners. The first of these is from Maarten Wolsink from the University of Amsterdam, who draws on an unrivalled experience of researching social acceptability of wind power schemes. From this, and his research on public attitudes to a range of facility siting problems across Europe, he agrees with the main line of argument set out in the lead paper, but suggests a particular way of understanding the role of planning in such cases. For him, planning should not be seen as the key problem facing wind power deployment, but as a process which channels a broader range of institutional and ideological factors that frustrate the delivery of wind power. Finally, Alain Nadai from the International Research Centre on Environment and Development in France contrasts the French experience with that of the UK, drawing on insights from science and technology studies, to suggest the need for more innovative relationships between planning, technologies, society and landscape.

All these responses provide fresh ways of looking at “the planning problem” and while they do not agree about the specific nature of this, they do share some perspectives, including identifying the need for a more overt political engagement with wind farm siting decisions, and suggesting that the planning system is not living up to the professionally promoted role as the mediator of spatial conflicts. These problems do, however, appear deep-seated, with the academic commentators pointing to the need for a more radical appreciation of how societies move to a low-carbon economy. Above all, the papers highlight the fact that for the most part, academics and practitioners do live in very different worlds, defined not just by their day-to-day activities and the resulting variation in problem-framing, but in the very basic ways in which they appreciate evidence, knowledge and the normative purpose of planning. This rehearses the long-standing debate on the tensions between research and practice, but given that we are now dealing with strategies that could guide us out of the potentially tumultuous consequences of climate change, isn't it time we all took notice?

Expanding Wind Power: A Problem of Planning, or of Perception?

Introduction

Readers of this journal will need no introduction to the enormity of the challenges posed by the entwined phenomena of energy security and climate change, and the role of spatial planning in adapting to future conditions and mitigating their most extreme effects. To date, government efforts have been primarily focused on supply-side solutions to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels as the main source of electricity, translated into ambitious targets for renewable energy. These have given rise to reformed systems of market support for renewable energy, leading to dramatic increases in wind energy developments across the EU. Although the UK witnessed a substantial rise in wind deployment, by 2008 only 4% of electricity came from renewable sources, which remained far short of what is required for a sustainable electricity generation system.

A persistent line of explanation for this implementation deficit is that planning is a “barrier” to the expansion of wind energy. The British Wind Energy Association (BWEA, 2008) notes that although the average rate of gaining permission for wind projects is 72%,1 for those taken through the town and country planning system the success rate is only 66% (12% at appeal), and it is as low as 51% (11% at appeal) in England. In contrast, the BWEA (2008) highlights the fact that all “major development” has an approval rate of 75%, significantly above that of wind farms. There are clearly many factors governing approval rates, including the quality of applications, the sites chosen, the clarity of policy, the nature and strength of opposition, the novelty of this type of application for many planning departments and the competence of the decision makers. Nevertheless, these statistics have strengthened a discourse around wind power that projects the planning system as a bottleneck to a more sustainable future. Thus, the UK Government's 2007 Energy White Paper reiterated earlier statements that identified the planning system as a key obstacle to the expansion of wind energy, noting how it can take too long, causes uncertainty, is costly and deters investment (DTI, 2007). In essence this has constructed planning as a “problem” in a way virtually unrecognisable compared to the vision of an inclusive, integrative and value-laden process for “mediating space and creating place” projected by the main professional institute (RTPI, 2003).

In this short paper we question this portrayal of the planning system and suggest that it is based on a superficial understanding of the social and policy dynamics surrounding wind developments, so that a greater integration of academic and practitioner perspectives on this issue will help manage the transition to a sustainable energy system upon which all our futures depend.

The Dimensions of “the Planning Problem”

The exact nature—and, indeed, the existence—of this “planning problem” (Cowell, 2007) is strongly contingent on one's viewpoint, and has a number of contributing strands. A dominant concern from the wind energy sector itself is with the efficiency of planning (BWEA, 2004; 2008), suggesting it is too slow in reaching decisions and too unreliable in awarding consent, thus frustrating not only developers but also nationally and internationally important climate change objectives. Significantly, in articulating its dissatisfaction with the process, the wind sector has found a sympathetic hearing in government, as this view aligns itself with broader attempts to reduce the burden of planning bureaucracy on the development industry. Many of these issues have been confronted in the broader modernising planning agenda (Cowell & Owens, 2006), the Barker Review (Barker, 2006) and recent legislation on speeding up the consent decisions for major facilities, including the establishment of the Infrastructure Planning Commission.

Although these difficulties are predominantly framed as a procedural–performance problem for the consenting process, it should be acknowledged that a range of other issues can be seen to act as a limiting factor on wind power deployment and thus be constitutive of a broader, societal “planning problem”. There have been the perennial problems of designing an effective and affordable system of market support for renewable energy (Szarka, 2007). Then there are wider infrastructure issues of a strategic investment nature arising from the difficulties of coordinating wind power expansion with increased grid capacity in the kind of remote locations with the greatest wind resource, especially in Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Indeed, developers are in some cases facing severe connection delays in securing grid connection which make the impediments of the local planning system relatively insignificant (Macaskill, 2006). In addition to this there are hardware supply issues, as developers jostle to secure an adequate supply of wind turbines.

A further dimension of the “planning problem” is the way in which the participative and discursive opportunities in the planning system, often championed as its raison d'être can provide an arena for local interests to challenge specific development proposals. The openness of the planning process has exposed wind energy proposals to wider scrutiny, forcing them to confront a range of political, policy and technical debates and face up to local opposition (Cowell, 2007). The fact that wind developments are prone to such “discourses of objection” (Ellis, 2004) is often highlighted as perhaps the key element of the planning problem and calls into question the rhetoric of participation in planning, the meaning of procedural efficiency and what is seen as the ultimate function of the planning process. In so doing it raises deeper questions about knowledge, accountability and problem-framing which influence the way in which stakeholders such as local campaign groups, politicians and developers engage in the regulatory and policy process.

The final perspective of the “planning problem” concerns substantive issues of location and environmental trade-offs. Here, the physics of wind energy resources and the economics of their exploitation is seen as creating problems in that high energy sites tend to be in the landscapes society values the most, often with high cultural significance, important ecological niches and rare “wildness” qualities. This geography clearly requires a range of adjustments in attitudes to issues such as rurality and energy, and in the skills and procedures employed by planners and designers. As Hull (1995) noted, it is innately challenging for British planning, institutionally predicated on keeping urbanising development separate from the countryside, to manage developments like wind power which challenge these presumptions. There are also fundamental questions about society's willingness to trade off the exploitation of the UK's most productive wind resources against other environmental and aesthetic impacts. Such trade-offs are implicit and rarely considered in the determination of strategic energy policy, but they frequently emerge disruptively in the planning process.

We do not wish to deny the fact that all these issues may be symptomatic of difficulties related to the skills, resources, procedures and governance that influence (positively and negatively) the planning of wind power. However, we would like to take a step back from the “hard facts” of wind power disputes, to consider why certain conceptions of the “planning problem” have come to the fore and to establish the broader context in which the knowledge generated in universities and the day-to-day activities of policy makers and planners interact. Following Rydin (2007) and Sandercock (1998), we should recognise that there are multiple ways of knowing and claiming reality, which shape the way in which problems are understood. Furthermore, the use of knowledge is set within a context of social relations which in any given situation may confer priority on any particular type of knowledge or knowledge-holder. This therefore suggests that the way that wind power planning is viewed by various stakeholders is likely to give preference to certain forms of “knowledge” and particular perspectives of the “planning problem”. Some types of knowledge, such as the costs that developers attribute to regulatory delays, or the megawatts of capacity “held up” in the planning systems, are expressed in tangible quantities that are used in traditional cost/benefit calculation. These in turn are assimilated readily into well rehearsed “storylines” and normative frames of policy (Fischer, 2003) for which there seem to be “natural” responses; which chime with readily understood ideas of bureaucratic obstruction which governments appear to feel a compelling duty to “resolve”.

This gives rise to an understanding of the problem that downplays the quality of the final decision or the need for adequate stakeholder input, but emphasises streamlining planning decisions to make a decision in the fastest possible time. In terms of the categories of planning knowledge suggested by Rydin (2007, p. 60), this therefore sees the problem almost entirely as a process issue, rather than in terms of social interaction with the planning system. Thus, in various ways, planning across the UK has been restructured both to tighten the presumption in favour of development of on-shore wind and to identify zones where large wind farms may be acceptable. Conversely, the issues of limited manufacturing capacity for turbines, or how to incentivise grid investment, require responses that might lie beyond the accepted realm of government activity: a realm that favours interventions consistent with competitive markets and private sector providers.

For this reason we suggest that certain aspects of the “planning problem” have attracted more government attention than others, while those that may offer a greater challenge to the knowledge currency of government policy making, or would demand a more complex response, have tended to be neglected. In examining this issue a little further, we would like to review in more detail the different ways in which social acceptance of wind farms has been understood. Ironically, although this has attracted a burgeoning academic debate in recent years, it appears to be poorly understood in the practitioner world, exercising a marked lack of purchase on dominant constructions of the planning problem.

Understanding Social Acceptance of Wind Farms

The nature of local opposition to “facility siting” decisions has long preoccupied planning researchers. With the emergence of wind power as a viable technology within supportive policy frameworks, and the appearance of turbines as a contemporary feature of the landscape, the nature of local reaction has also become a major focus of research. In many ways the nature of opposition to wind farms can be interpreted using the same conceptual categories as other locally unwanted land uses (LULUs), being branded, for example, as disruptive elements to a stable domestic environment (Lake, 1993). Yet the wider context of climate change and energy security has provided a significantly different tone and urgency to this debate. Thus, while opposition to landfill sites or road building can be characterised as a straight fight between unsustainable and sustainable visions of the future, or technical versus social/political approaches to problem solving, disputes over wind farms are more difficult to interpret, appearing to be heavily contextualised and arising from a wide range of concerns. Indeed, some aspects of the conflict over wind farms have been described as being “green on green” (Warren et al., 2005), representing debates over what sort of sustainable future we want, rather than the “economy versus the environment” dichotomy previously typical of development controversies.

Despite these differences, much of the research aimed at understanding the nature of social acceptance of wind farms has adopted methodologies that have been unable to adequately capture the way in which the public perceive this issue. Such research has, nevertheless, been fed into the policy process. For example, many studies, often commissioned by government agencies (e.g. Braunholtz, 2003; SEI, 2003) have tried to capture the depth and extent of public attitudes to wind farms through a conventional opinion survey approach. These have offered some limited insights into social acceptance in a form easily disseminated through a variety of media, with apparently conclusive results—a typical contribution is specifying that x % of respondents agree with the need to expand wind power capacity. However, as Devine-Wright (2005) has highlighted, such research implies a rather static, deterministic causality of objectors' motives (e.g. proximity to a proposal) that underplays the depth and subtleties of the process of opinion formation at work. Such research approaches are open to the general criticisms aimed at conventional planning research that include issues of elitism and researcher bias (e.g. Fischer, 2003; Rydin, 2007; Sandercock, 1998). Specifically in relation to social acceptance of wind farms, such research has tended to highlight apparent contradictions in public opinion, which are then explained in terms of the irrationality of the research subjects. The oft-quoted example here is the so-called “attitude-behaviour gap” (Haggett, 2004) where surveys show a high level of support amongst the public for wind power, but also a reluctance to accept actual wind farms in their local area. In the absence of greater understanding of motivational drivers, such behaviour has typically been explained away as being symptomatic of “NIMBYism”. This concept has been comprehensively unpicked in academic circles (e.g. Wolsink, 2000; 2006), notably because of its “oversimplification of strongly held environmental, political and moral views of deceptively fecund breadth and depth” (Kemp, 1990, p. 1247) Despite this, it retains an uncritical presence in some academic work and is particularly alive in policy debates around wind farms and the planning process in general.2 This tends to have a very real impact on policy, with governments keen to be seen to act against what is presented as selfishness, leading to some predictable policy responses. In the case of the UK, it has resulted in the use of planning policy to assert the national interest over recalcitrant local opposition, rather than attempts at building local activism in support of wind power (Toke & Strachan, 2006).

Academic research may not be blameless in this situation, producing a rich array of descriptions of patterns of social acceptance, but providing little in terms of substantive explanation to inform new policy approaches in this area (Devine-Wright, 2005, p.136). This touches on the very role of academics in the wider arena of planning, and indeed, their broader contribution to the society that pays their wages. While we acknowledge the increasing limitations placed on academic research (Thomas, 2005), what should distinguish academic research from, for example, contracts undertaken by market research companies or planning consultancies, is an ability to theorise, experiment with different research approaches and even to “speak truth to power”, in order to produce quality peer-reviewed knowledge from a research culture that is not ivory-tower, but is still a step removed from the short-term pressure and bias of client-led research.

We believe that in the last five years a sophisticated body of knowledge has developed in respect to social acceptance of wind farms, becoming more theoretically informed and adopting a rich methodological diversity. In what follows, we highlight some of the key approaches adopted and then summarise what they are beginning to tell us about social acceptance of wind power.

Analysts have conducted quantitative research to analyse the influence of different factors on planning outcomes, including the relative influence of different stakeholders and of the actions undertaken (or not) by the developers (Toke, 2005). There is also a growing number of interesting local case studies of wind farm proposals (e.g. Aitken et al., 2008) and the impacts of planning policies (e.g. Cowell, 2007; Kerr, 2006), that are beginning to facilitate longitudinal perspectives. Cross-national comparative research (e.g. Toke et al., 2008, Jobert et al., 2007; Meyer, 2007) contributes to an understanding of the role of institutional and cultural factors in social acceptance issues. Different aspects of social acceptance have also been subject to study, including the influence of institutional context on opposition (Wolsink, 2000), the effectiveness of participative processes and comparison between onshore and offshore schemes (Haggett, 2008).

Similarly, a number of theoretical and methodological perspectives have been explored, including regulation theory (Parkhill, 2007), power (Aitken et al., 2008), choice-modelling (Alvarez-Farizo & Hanley, 2002), q-methodology (Ellis et al., 2007), place attachment (Manzo & Perkins, 2006), and how social context constrains the ability of developers to implement wind power schemes (Agterbosch, 2009). One particularly productive line of research has been the application of discourse analysis in understanding how conflicts are played out in formal decision-making arenas and the popular media (Devine-Wright & Devine-Wright, 2006; Barry et al., 2008).

Cumulatively, this research offers a wealth of insights into the social acceptance of wind farms, with a number of points of relevance to the policy and planning communities, as highlighted below.

Local opposition is just one of several aspects of the planning “obstacle course” faced by developers. Thus it appears that:

• The vast majority of wind developments do successfully gain planning consent and those that do not are rarely refused on the grounds of public opposition alone.

• While local opposition may create delays, it is not as influential on ultimate outcomes as is often portrayed. Indeed, some research has suggested that in fact wider institutional constraints and administrative frameworks (e.g. conservation designations) are more important than the gaining of social acceptance.

• Objectors have differential resources at different stages of the decision-making process—they exert influence unevenly.

Social acceptance is an issue that faces wind power deployment in a wide range of geographic contexts, irrespective of the detailed decision-making processes, but one can learn cross-nationally about the impact of different decision-making processes, both in narrow regulatory processes and in wider political contexts. This suggests that:

• Local discontent can be accentuated by poor project management and insensitive decision-making processes.

• Core concerns of objectors relate to fears over visual impact, which tends to be given low priority in making planning decisions.

• Issues over perceived or actual ownership of wind power schemes and the distribution of benefits are influential in shaping the level and nature of local opposition or acceptance.

• Conventional “wisdom”, media reports and developer promotions tend to portray local opposition as “wrong”, thus establishing an adversarial climate from the beginning of the decision-making process.

• Regulators are rarely perceived as neutral arbiters, but often as implicit supporters of wind power schemes.

• Developers face endemic difficulties in understanding the power geometries of local communities and tend not to make efforts in nurturing local pro-development alliances.

• Positive local support can compensate for a restrictive policy environment.

Disparities in knowledge may be less important in explaining antagonism between the parties to wind farm disputes than is commonly claimed, and providing “better information” may rarely generate greater consensus. Research has found that:

• Those objecting to wind power proposals do not have any less understanding of issues, such as climate change or the viability of wind power technology. Ignorance is rarely a source of opposition.

• Although wind farm debates may hinge on disagreements over empirical “facts”, at a deeper level the social acceptability of wind farms is inextricably linked to values, world views and the way localities are related to the wider global environment.

• Local opposition to wind farms appears to be dynamic, with objection peaking when projects are proposed and declining once they have been implemented. However, one must be careful in reading ex-post acceptance as evidence of ex-ante acceptability.

The wealth of cumulative research highlights the value of multi-method and interdisciplinary approaches to research. Thus:

• Disputes are best understood, not just in terms of the actions and inadequacies of objectors, but in terms of the dynamics of debates, including the actions and arguments of the supporters of the scheme.

• Research is needed that does not just capture a snap-shot of “opinions”, but should access the complex issues of value, perception and subjectivity in understanding local disputes, including how these are projected through a variety of media.

While it is recognised that this research is constantly evolving, its existence does demonstrate that a nuanced understanding of the issues of social acceptance has been developed which provides a critical perspective on current policy approaches. However, this raises questions about the ways in which the academy influences policy agendas, since they are rarely direct and immediate (Owens, 2005). This is not just because of the messages it conveys but also due to the “currency” of knowledge in which it trades—essentially, qualitative insights on values and perception. Furthermore, much research is based on local case studies from which it can be difficult to draw general conclusions.

The evidence base thus sits awkwardly with the more conventional approaches to policy research and highlights the failure to embrace the required “policy learning” in relation to wind power. Szarka (2006) notes that such learning needs to take place across three dimensions: first are measures to increase production capacity, including financial mechanisms such as the Renewables Obligation; the second relates to increasing institutional capacity such as technological innovation, ownership structures or regulatory processes; finally is the need to increase social capacity to accept modern wind power as a new form of energy production, without which the sector will continue to face deficits in “implementation capacity” (Agterbosch et al., 2009). It is clear that in the UK, government action has been almost entirely aimed at policy learning in the first two dimensions, which are more open to standard regulatory policy approaches and centred on delivering targets. Meanwhile, the research on social acceptance makes a strong case for merging this expert-led form of knowledge production with more deliberative processes to bring about the social learning that may ameliorate what the government see as the core of the “planning problem”.

Final Reflections

In this paper we have endeavoured to show that, although wind power development is arguably critical to the future sustainable development of the UK, it faces a number of challenges that have come to be encapsulated as the “planning problem”, with government action focusing on specific definitions of what this entails. This has tended to overlook the evolving research on social acceptance and has sought to streamline the decision-making process, rather than encouraging deliberative processes that might better support social learning around this technology. In reflecting on this situation we suggest that if the UK is to achieve its aspirational targets for wind power, then the palpable urgency needs to be combined with rapid policy learning in a number of dimensions, including that of increasing social acceptance. In addressing this particular issue, we point to the need for action in three discrete areas.

First, as academics, we cannot resist a call for further research into the factors that influence social acceptance of wind power. In this respect there is a need to bring together the existing multi-disciplinary research to produce longitudinal analyses that synthesise and collate the insights from the numerous robust case studies of local wind farm disputes. There are also a number of issues that require a stronger evidence base upon which new policy approaches could be developed. These include the likely impact of community payments by wind farm developers and whether the proposed streamlined planning processes will affect permission rates and decision times or whether, as a result, those interests denied an effective voice in the process then resort to alternative tactics (e.g. direct action) and further frustrate the deployment process. There is also a need to understand the values and processes that would allow a greater convergence of local and national concerns, and to explore how planning can better function as the medium of handling “multiple knowledges” (Rydin, 2007, p. 55), by bringing together expert and lay knowledges surrounding renewable energy.

The second area that needs consideration is the broader mechanisms for academic–practitioner interaction and cross-learning. This paper and the responses that follow it have emerged from a welcome, but rather isolated, series of ESRC-funded seminars that have brought together a range of researchers and other stakeholders to debate the challenges and future direction of wind power. Practitioners at these seminars have expressed surprise about the level of academic activity in the field, while academics have had to refine their ideas in the light of experience of regulators and developers. This is, however, rather a small-scale initiative, and while the RTPI have made some attempt to connect researchers with proactive local communities (e.g. through the establishment of its Planning Education and Research Network (PERN),1 there is clearly a deficit in the way publicly funded research is on the one hand disseminated and on the other, received and assimilated by the practitioner and policy communities.

Finally, we add our voices to the existing concerns over the way that the concept of sustainability has been used over the last decade to justify pro-market solutions through the planning system (Cowell & Owens, 2006; Raco, 2005). This appears to be as true of wind power, as a totem of sustainable development, as of other forms of development, where such debates tend to over-emphasise planning as an obstacle to the investment-led deployment of renewable energy, and fail to appreciate its potential role as practically the only mechanism for mediating environmental disputes in a democratic arena. Seen in this context, and drawing on the emerging understanding of local disputes, planning for wind energy could then become a critical arena of policy learning for wider debates on social acceptance, through which democratic legitimacy and public understanding are nurtured as part of a more sustainable future.

GERAINT ELLIS

RICHARD COWELL

CHARLES WARREN

PETER STRACHAN

JOSEPH SZARKA

School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering, Queen's University, Belfast

Department of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, UK

School of Geography and Geosciences, University of St Andrews, UK

Alberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, UK

Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, Bath University, UK

The Problems Of Planning—A Developer's Perspective

Academics and Government have totally misunderstood the wind farm “planning problem” in the UK. Years of research have gone into analyzing the social acceptability of wind farms, as the list of references in the lead paper testifies. But the “problem” is not about understanding or even changing the level of social acceptance. The fundamental problem is ensuring that social acceptance of wind farms is properly reflected through the planning process.

The experience of my company suggests that the planning process fails to mediate between the developer and the public to evolve a project that accommodates both interests. Most critically, planning applications are determined with a prejudicial and inaccurate representation of the social acceptance of a scheme. Indeed, there is no provision within the planning system for effectively incorporating the views of the public into the development of a wind farm. This is left entirely up to the developer of the scheme; some developers may do this well, some will do it badly, or not at all. There is no requirement of public consultation, standards, or any oversight by the planning system in this process, leaving poor-quality developers to continue to operate.

Furthermore, the process actually discourages public representation in the development of wind farms, as councils fear that an engagement process may expose them to legal challenge on the basis of bias when the project finally makes it to a planning committee. As a result, planning authorities advise their councillors not to get involved in the public consultation phase of any wind energy scheme, so that councils refuse to put public consultation materials in their libraries, they decline invitations to attend public meetings and councillors are instructed not to correspond with, meet with or take part in any events organized by the developer. Similarly, councillors are not allowed to represent the views of local opposition groups, as this would also exclude them from the planning committee. The opportunity for the council or any councillor to act as an interface or mediator between public and the developer to address community concerns about a wind farm is actively discouraged by the planning system.

As a consequence, both the developer and objectors are left without formal representation, so the debate takes place outside the planning system. The planning system deals with the environmental, technical and policy acceptability of a wind farm proposal in a structured and thorough manner, but the social acceptance of a particular scheme is left to a random, uncontrolled and chaotic external process. The lack of any formal process for dealing with social acceptance is not only a huge gap in the proper development of a scheme, it creates a void from which a biased and misrepresentative view of public opinion emerges—often shaped by those people who express their view the strongest. This causes many schemes that do have popular support to be refused permission because the planning committee only gets to hear a distorted view of what the community thinks of a scheme.

It is the motivated who get their views heard, not the unmotivated. If you are against a wind farm proposal then you are motivated to represent your views; a proposal is being made to which you disagree and no one else is representing your position, so you do. However, if you support a wind farm, the case for the wind farm is already being made by the developer, so there is no motivation to engage. This is why all public campaigns are against wind farms, despite repeated surveys showing general support amongst the public. There is real distortion of the views of the thousands of people who are ambivalent and do not hold any strong view, either for or against a project; this is the position held by the vast majority of the public. Why should they express an opinion? Who is going to write into their local authority to express that “they can see both the pros and the cons, but don't really hold a strong view either way”? This fact is absolutely fundamental in appreciating the social acceptance of a wind farm, but this is not recognized in the planning process and therefore ignored in the planning decision.

In two recent public consultations for wind farms being developed by our company, we wrote to 10,000 and 14,000 households; in the first case we had just 27 replies and in the other, only 50. The replies received were split equally in favour and against, but the biggest and most important conclusion was that 99.5% of people contacted were not sufficiently motivated to even express a view. Even when companies try to engage like this, such exercises are inevitably tarred by the accusation of self-interest, no matter how thoroughly or fairly conducted, and hence given very little credence within the planning system. Yet planning authorities tend not to conduct independent consultation to establish such important statistics on social acceptance and planning officers' reports often have one or two paragraphs dealing with this issue, amongst reams of analysis of the environmental qualities of a project. This may report the total number of public representations received and summarizes the nature of these. Inevitably these are overwhelmingly opposed for the reasons of motivation of expression explained above and there is no attempt by planning officers to explain the materiality of the number of responses in the context of the large public awareness of the wind farm project. We think councillors are left entirely without direction to interpret public opinion.

Substantial effort and resources go into assessing the environmental impact of a wind farm and how well it relates to a range of policies, but at the planning committee this is often ignored as the overriding concern of public opinion comes into play. This is the primary concern of the councillors (understandably so—they are elected representatives) who want to express the views of their constituents. In the absence of any professional assessment or advice on the degree of social acceptance of a scheme, councillors must use their own judgement. In the committee meeting, four or five core members of an anti-campaign may have taken time off work to speak, while the views of thousands of people who are not motivated to attend are ignored. The strength of feeling of a handful of people dominates the committee meeting. For months the councillors may have read letters in the local newspaper by the same small, but industrious group of objectors—for the local paper the wind farm proposal is heaven sent, as such controversies help sell local newspapers. The local anti-campaign is overt, with posters, websites and adverts in the local press. There is not a single campaign message from the public in favour of the wind farm, a point the anti-group often capitalize on. This means that there is an impression that everyone is against the project even though this is only held by a tiny minority of the local population. This is clearly a distorted circumstantial view. Lacking any systematic analysis of the distribution and quantity of public opinion, councillors are completely misled on the social acceptance of a proposal.

This happens time and time again, often resulting in a refusal as the environmental merits of the scheme are overlooked in favour of the unsubstantiated views of public opinion. This usually gets rectified a year later at a planning enquiry when technical arguments dominate, but even then the true social acceptance picture is not truly researched or presented.

The solution is not to bypass the local democratic process, but to shine a light on the facts of public opinion. This requires a proper, thorough, pro-active assessment of social acceptability to be included in every planning report. Bring public debate out of the underground where vitriol and falsehood dominate, out from the letters page of the local rag and let it be thoroughly and fairly evaluated within the planning process. Bring the objectors into the system, let councillors represent them, give them access to proper resources so the valuable arguments can be filtered from the nonsense and let them be heard. This will bring parties together toward understanding and consensus, rather than pushing them apart. It will also give confidence to councillors that opposition views have been properly addressed through the planning process and free them to make a decision on the officer's recommendation before them, rather than ignore it.

The lead paper concludes by saying that the current policy debate “fails to appreciate the planning system's potential role as practically the only mechanism for mediating environmental disputes in a democratic arena.” It is tempting to abandon an obviously failing system. However, the alternative is to fix the current system and this is what is really needed. The solution is simple: incorporate assessment of social acceptance of every wind farm project properly into the decision-making process. This addresses the root cause of the problem: the misrepresentation of social acceptance in planning decisions.

Central government does not need to take power away from local decision makers to achieve its international objectives. It just needs to repair the system, so the local decision makers can execute their responsibilities unhindered by the lack of a crucial piece of information.

RICHARD HADWIN

Renewable Energy Partnerships Ltd, Overmoor, Neston, Corsham, Swindon, UK

Wind Farms: More Respectful and Open Debate Needed, Not Less

Introduction

At the time of writing, the first national carbon budgets under the Climate Change Act 2008 have been published whilst National Policy Statements (NPSs) to guide renewable energy development through the planning process are expected imminently. The consideration of wind energy development is therefore one of the most prominent in current debates on planning policy and practice.

The Campaign for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) has been deeply involved in the planning process at all levels since its formation in 1926. The CPRE has sought to defend the intrinsic beauty and tranquillity of the countryside in the face of threats from ill-considered proposals for change, such as ribbon development or advertising billboards. We agree strongly with the central contention of the lead paper that the planning system should be seen as “a critical arena of policy learning” on the development of wind energy schemes and as a means of mediating surrounding environmental disputes, rather than purely as a barrier or an obstacle to getting such schemes approved. As this response will show, this is because:

• Wind energy developments often raise key issues of conflict between increasing renewable energy generation to help mitigate climate change on the one hand, and protecting nationally important landscapes from intrusive development on the other;

• Reforms to the planning process for wind energy development are based on questionable evidence as to “delays” caused by planning processes; and

• The issue of “community goodwill payments” shows a need for more planning, not less, in order to secure proper public involvement in wind energy development and maximise progress towards meeting renewable energy generation targets.

CPRE's Interest in Wind Energy

CPRE is deeply concerned about the major threat that climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions poses to both the global environment and to the character and quality of England's countryside. We therefore recognise the need to obtain more of our electricity from renewable sources and the important contribution that wind energy can play in this. We have publicly supported government policy for 15% of all electricity generation to come from renewable sources by 2020, as well as calls for £4.7 billion of new investment in the capacity of the National Grid to connect new offshore wind farms. We will also seek to support new onshore wind energy development where it is appropriately sited.

Wind farms, particularly when located onshore, have a significant impact on the appearance of the landscape. Despite current government planning policy stating that issues relating to the technical merits of a proposed wind farm should not be debated through the planning system, there is growing public concern about the actual output of wind farms in comparison to their advertised capacity (Norris & Bucknall, 2009).

As a result, wind farms attract vigorous public debate, and often opposition. Research suggests that often wind energy developers enter the planning process with a dismissive mindset towards public concerns, seeking to disparage arguments against new development as emotional rather than well-reasoned.1 It is perhaps not surprising therefore that approval rates for new wind farms have been lower than other forms of major development.2

CPRE's position has always been that we are likely to oppose proposals for wind turbines that have an unacceptable impact on nationally designated areas of landscape value such as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty or National Parks.

A Mistaken View?

The Planning Act 2008 will lead to fundamental changes in procedures by which wind energy schemes with a generating capacity greater than 50 megawatts (MW) are approved, with the aim of making decision making quicker. CPRE has had grave concerns about how these new procedures will work, in particular how they will facilitate the democratic debate that is such an important feature of the planning process.

Decisions on the need for new wind farms are expected to be taken in a suite of new National Policy Statements (NPSs). In principle, CPRE welcomes NPSs as a means to guide major infrastructure development such as large wind farms. However, greater clarity is needed regarding how the public will be able to meaningfully debate different policy options in the NPS process. The new Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) set up as the body to take decisions on major applications is untried, expensive and its decision-making processes will not be democratically accountable. There is also provision for the Secretary of State to direct schemes below 50 MW to this new procedure.

The Government's own estimates state that the IPC will cost ten times more than current planning procedures (DCLG, 2007a). The IPC will also be able to prevent the most meaningful forms of public involvement in the development of major infrastructure schemes, namely the abilities to cross-examine the developer at a public inquiry and to debate the need for a particular scheme in a particular location. But key recent court cases, from the Greenpeace challenge over nuclear policy to St Albans District Council's recent High Court action against the East of England Regional Spatial Strategy, have shown that an attempt to stifle public debate on different policy options before making a decision can in fact lead to longer delays.

Conversely, when the planning process is used to facilitate thorough debate, it can lead to developers fostering public support and politicians making decisions more quickly. Evidence provided by the Planning Inspectorate of several recent major infrastructure cases, including a number of large wind energy developments, has shown that the average inquiry period is now only 13 weeks rather than the 19 claimed by the Government in the 2007 Planning White Paper.3 Pre-application discussions are made mandatory in the Act for nationally significant infrastructure projects. Such discussions can play an important role, provided they are coupled with rights for local communities to bring wind energy developers to account at inquiries if necessary. This is a clear incentive for developers to get their applications right.

A Lack of Planning Rather than too Much?

CPRE has also compiled a large body of evidence that suggests a cavalier approach by wind energy developers to the planning system (CPRE, 2008), which is challenging the integrity of planning and suggests that policy opportunities are being missed. We could use planning policies to better promote a variety of low carbon technologies that could be less damaging to our landscapes than wind and more effective in meeting renewable generation targets.

A growing number of rural communities are being offered “goodwill payments” by wind energy developers, particularly the large multinationals such as E.ON and npower. These payments could easily be seen as akin to “buying” planning permission. The practice threatens to bring the planning system into disrepute.

The companies involved are making large sums of money from wind energy development. Much of this is from renewables obligation certificates (ROC), subsidies provided by the public as electricity consumers. Government and the industry have, however, rejected calls to make wind energy development liable for the proposed community infrastructure levy (CIL).

CPRE believes that, if community funds from wind energy development are channelled through CIL (another part of the Planning Act 2008 which we support) and the development plan process, developers are likely to offer local communities significantly more than the current average offer of £1,000 per MW of generating capacity. Goodwill payments are usually offered to community “stakeholders” selected by the developer rather than to the relevant local authority. Local authorities that use more formal processes of negotiation with developers, such as Argyll & Bute and Highland Councils in Scotland, are typically securing at least £2,000 per MW of installed capacity in their respective areas.

Government policy calls on local planning authorities to promote and encourage renewable energy generation (DCLG, 2007b). Most encouragingly, this has been reinforced by a further statement in the final UK Renewable Energy Strategy. This explicitly echoes CPRE's calls for community benefits from wind energy developments to be consistent with national, regional and local planning policies (DECC, 2009).

In CPRE's view this shift in government policy, if used locally to its full potential, should result in contributions from wind energy developers being greater than they currently are, benefits being more closely related to the development in question, and directly assisting local authority efforts to increase renewable energy development. Currently payments are often used for purposes unrelated to wind energy development or tackling climate change, such as senior citizens' lunches and youth clubs. Contributions should ideally be used to promote energy efficiency and/or a range of low carbon technologies, such as community combined heat and power. By taking these actions, developers could address public concerns about the effectiveness of wind power developments in meeting renewable energy targets.

Greater use of s.106 agreements (i.e. planning gain) supporting renewable energy policies in development plans could be the solution, as it would have the advantage of ensuring that community funds were tested against established criteria such as relevance to planning and a proven direct relationship to the proposed development (ODPM, 2005). If this happens then it will be particularly important to ensure that the proceeds of such agreements are re-invested in a timely fashion by local planning authorities, in order to address recently reported concerns about s.106 revenue being under-spent (Daubney, 2009).

Conclusion

As the lead paper notes, problems concerning the expansion of wind power are widely presented as a problem of planning, due to comparatively low approval rates for wind energy development and delays in decision making—yet such proposals will often arouse controversy, particularly if proposals are poorly located. The available evidence does not support the claim that planning causes undue delays in relation to major wind energy schemes. Rather, planning should be seen as an essential part of the democratic process—which needs time if it is to work effectively. Indeed, as Susan Owens argues, it is democratic debate rather than “quasi-technical” methods that has allowed planning to make a real difference in policy learning and policy change.4

Where developers are required to work with communities and local planning authorities, they could improve relations by approaching them in a respectful and open-minded manner. Pre-application discussions provide an important opportunity for this. But CPRE believes that it will be no less important to offer community benefits in accordance with established procedures and policy tests. Planners can also do more to address the issue of who benefits from wind energy developments and, in so doing, take bold steps towards fulfilling their new priorities of tackling climate change.

PAUL MINER

Campaign to Protect Rural England, London

Available from www.cpre.org.uk/filegrab/1goodwill-payments.pdf?ref = 3660 (accessed 30 August 2009)

Planning: Problem “Carrier” or Problem “Source”?

Introduction

In 2006, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Jan Peter Balkenende, his counterpart in the Netherlands, made a remarkable address to their colleagues in the EU, stating that it was time to seriously address climate change, noting that there was “a once in a generation opportunity for Europe to mobilise the political will and resources to transform and modernise our energy system” (Balkenende & Blair, 2006). This was not remarkable for the timing, as Blair desperately needed issues that could deflect attention from the unpopular UK involvement in Iraq and the prime minister of the Netherlands was soon facing election on the back of a poor record of action on climate change. The remarkable thing about this address was the irony around their suggestion that it was time that the stragglers in renewable deployment caught up with the front runners. In terms of implementation of renewables and innovating energy systems, the British have a serious problem and to a slightly lesser degree, so do the Dutch.

Indeed, both had largely failed in deploying wind energy compared to other European countries such as Denmark, Germany and Spain. This was not due to limited wind resources, particularly not in the UK, but to the failure to deal with the institutional change needed for energy innovation (Toke et al., 2008). So why has the UK such low implementation rates? As in many countries, from the early 1970s onwards any delays faced by wind energy developers have been blamed on local resistance, ignorance and selfishness. But are these delays really due to public attitudes or are they because of the planning process itself? Let's start with a short elaboration on attitudes.

The Components of Attitudes

The clear pattern in most countries is that there is generally high acceptance of wind power, but there are very strong contrasts in attitudes. A firm majority favours wind power, but although most people do not dislike wind turbines, those who do, actually hate them.

In attitude theory, a conceptual distinction is made between cognitions on the one hand, and on the other, evaluations, both of which inform intentions and behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Attitudes are based on perceptions of so-called “attributes” of the attitude object. As Ellis et al. (2007) noted, the discourses of objection are strikingly influential in decision making on wind power schemes. Why is that? In the development of attitudes to wind power schemes, cognitions are not prominent, but the emotional and value components are exceptionally strong, relative to other local issues. In fact, all the conclusions made in the lead paper by Ellis et al. derive from this phenomenon and the patterns they recognise in the UK are seen in many other countries. For example, the lead paper notes that “disparities in knowledge may be not so relevant in explaining the strong antagonism” which is very much an understatement, as the cognitive element in people's attitudes to wind farms is rather small compared to the emotional and value-based elements. This is why international research suggests that there is no positive relation between knowledge and attitudes: more in-depth knowledge does not necessarily mean more positive attitudes to wind schemes. There is no doubt that “informing the public by providing ‘better information’ does not help to settle local conflict on wind farm siting” (as noted in the lead paper).

The evaluative element in negative attitudes towards wind farms dominates the cognitive element for three reasons:

1. The inescapable visibility of wind turbines means that the question of whether turbines fit into the landscape at the proposed site is always a key issue in any wind power scheme. The first social acceptance studies in the 1980s recognised the dominance of landscape issues in decisions on wind turbine siting. Research that has applied the conceptual distinctions in attitude theory described above has shown that the attributes with the highest influence on attitude formation are the evaluative elements related to the visual impact of turbines on landscapes (Wolsink, 1989).

2. As landscape impact is the main factor in evaluation of wind turbines, it is primarily influenced by the qualities of the landscape in which the turbines are proposed. The consequence of this is that the most relevant attitudes are not those related to “wind power” in general, but those related to a specific wind scheme, as these are shaped by attributes concerning the landscape quality of the site instead of attributes related to “the energy system”.

3. The perception and the valuation of all aspects of landscape quality are strongly connected to historically and culturally rooted factors, which vary widely in significance amongst individuals. Attitudes to wind power are therefore very subjective and complex, but nevertheless contain strong elements of identity: cultural identity and identity of place.

Planning and the Evaluative Component

These factors should be taken into account in the planning process for wind power schemes, yet while planning regimes differ in every country, they all seem to ignore such factors and tend to be “designed to fail” in relation to wind power. The provision of “better information” could be a positive way to address social acceptance if attitudes were shaped by cognitions and if such information were provided by trusted actors. Neither condition tends to apply in practice. Thus, mostly, it is the developers, authorities or hired experts who present the information to the local population through the planning system. Furthermore, it is often the opposite that is needed: developers and their associates urgently need to be informed about the strong influence of landscape factors because they appear to have limited understanding of how to address the subjective nature of landscape perception.

In most cases, planners or developers try to address problems of social acceptance in a rather counterproductive way, often by developing “objective” data on visual and landscape impacts or providing supporting testimonies from “landscape experts”. Such strategies are more likely to contribute to the failure of planning than facilitating successful proposals. Two significant examples of this include attempts to develop a viewshed analysis in the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound (Massachusetts, US; Phadke, forthcoming) and the expert choice by the National Architect of the final alternative of the Inter-Provinciale Windenergiecentrale Afsluitdijk, which is a large wind farm in the Wadden Sea in the Netherlands (Wolsink, 2010). In both cases the main opposition issue was the iconic nature of the landscape/seascape surrounding the wind farm proposals. The nature of how civil society values these landscapes/seascapes and the strength of the sentiments attached to them were both misinterpreted and underestimated in the planning process. The planning process has problems incorporating landscape values because of their subjectivity and the variations in such subjectivity. Viewshed analysis and other “objective” visual impact assessments do not help, as the value experienced by objectors is based on landscape identity, including community and cultural identity. The “knowledge” about landscape valuation is in “the eye of the beholder” (Lothian, 1999), so it can only be those communities who identify with such landscapes that can truly understand their cultural value.

Planning processes are seldom designed to handle knowledge in this form. In fact, they are often designed to avoid it. As a result, the attempts by governments to adapt planning systems to address the obstacles faced by developers, as described in the lead paper, tend to reinforce this core problem. Several political science theories offer an explanation for this. The Advocacy Coalition Framework perspective (Sabatier, 1998) suggests that planning regimes tend to assist dominant advocacy coalitions in furthering their core policy beliefs within the relevant policy domain. In the case of wind power, these domains are energy policy, spatial planning and environmental policy (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007). From this point of view it can even be questioned whether delays to the deployment of wind power can really be seen as a planning problem. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to ask whether wind power fits with the core beliefs of dominant advocacy coalitions, thus raising questions over what is meant by broad social acceptance. To put it bluntly, the planning process may expend too much effort in trying to determine how and where communities should accept wind power schemes in their surroundings, leading to the Dutch concept of bestuurlijke drukte—which can be literally translated as “crowded governance”; a situation in which all agencies, authorities and stakeholders contribute to the debate over who needs to do what, how they do it, where they must do it, and even why they should do it.

Social Acceptance of Renewable Energy Innovation

When one looks at the outcome of the British planning approach to wind power, combined with the overview provided in the lead paper, one would conclude that it is a fairly ineffective process. A key reason for this is the ideologically driven policy choices that heavily impede similar progressive deployment of wind power as has been achieved in, for example, Germany, Denmark and Spain. Analysis of factors that explain national differences (see Toke et al., 2008) suggests that a number of institutional factors help explain the performance differences in this area, including:

• The choice of a financial procurement system that is rooted in an ineffective concept of market thinking. The creation of “markets” for green certificates (such as the UK's renewable obligation certificates) has proved less successful than systems that guarantee payments to all renewable energy producers, because the latter offers full grid access to a wider range of producers (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Krewitt & Nitsch, 2003). Thus, despite the strong market ideology behind ROCs (representing “core beliefs” in terms of the ACF), feed-in systems create better market incentives.

• The focus on resistance rather than support within society. The lead paper notes that “certain aspects of the ‘planning problem’ have attracted more government attention than others”. Indeed, it is not necessarily the right aspects that have had the attention, reflecting a tragic misunderstanding amongst policy makers and practitioners, at least the kind of practitioners that are prominent in the UK.

Because of the institutional and policy frames, there is much national variation in the actors involved in investing and planning wind development. The mix of actors in Germany is very different from in the UK as they have evolved to take advantage of almost two decades of full access to the grid for anyone interested in investing in wind power (including many community initiatives). Similarly, those proposing wind power developments in Germany tend not to focus on issues of local resistance, but more on matters of local involvement and identity (Wolsink & Breukers, 2009).

The focus on resistance to a scheme often means the factors concerning why a scheme should go ahead in the first place are not questioned. Yet a critical appreciation of social acceptance should include an examination of the arguments both for and against a scheme. Indeed, both supporters and objectors to wind power schemes are located at all levels of governance and all may have what they believe is a sound argument. This can be better understood in terms of three dimensions of social acceptance (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007):

• Socio-political acceptance (of technologies and of supporting policies) by key stakeholders, the public and policy makers;

• Community acceptance (of facilities, of the investors, owners, and managers) by local residents, local authorities and local stakeholders;

• Market acceptance (of investments in facilities, of prices or tariffs) by consumers, investors and firms.

Hence, the discourses of objection are not isolated to specific siting decisions. In the countries that are less successful in wind power deployment, major problems with social acceptance lie not with local communities but also amongst, for example, the policy makers who refuse to invest in effective support systems, or even potential investors such as energy companies. This does not mean that there are no planning issues in wind power developments, but it does suggest that planning is not the real problem. In other words, in using an appropriate energy metaphor, planning is not the energy “source”; it is only an energy “carrier”.

MAARTEN WOLSINK

Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

20 October 2006. Available from http://www.scienceguide.nl/article.asp?articleid = 102097 (accessed 5 September 2009)

“Innovative” Wind Power Planning

Most of the conclusions reached by the authors of the lead paper are applicable to the situation in France, where there is also a down-playing of the qualitative understanding of wind power planning processes, coupled with an emphasis on procedural efficiency and overcoming the barriers arising from the planning process. Planning is thus seen as a problem in France too, rather than as a positive force in realizing the potential of wind power. As the authors of the lead paper suggest, the underlying issue is considered to be social interaction with the planning system, and this is largely constructed by discourse coalitions. Wind power lobbies have played a particular role in structuring this perspective by attributing delays in project development exclusively to permitting procedures, even when there were other important tensions, such as bottlenecks in the turbine supply chain.

However, in this response I would like to suggest that there is value in reversing the perspective suggested in the lead paper. Thus, while the “planning problem” does result from a widely shared perspective of procedural efficiency, the way in which the latter is often framed is through the perspective of “technological potential”. This is defined as the potential that could be achieved in the absence of social obstacles to the deployment of wind power. It therefore indicates the potential of an asocial technology, in the sense of a technology, which when deployed, leaves the social unchanged since it produces no friction or social re-composition whatsoever. In short, it represents a technological nirvana. But the problem is that we now know from the developments in science and technology studies (STS) that technologies only exist by being embedded into the social (e.g., Callon & Law, 1992), so no technology could exist in such a technological nirvana.

Reversing the “planning problem” by looking at the innovative dimension of planning processes is a way of using the concept of “technological potential” to acknowledge that social processes are at work during the planning process, and more generally during the implementation of wind power policies. These processes create the effective wind power potential.

In the rest of the paper I will elaborate this argument and contextualize it by drawing on recent academic research on wind power policies. I will then turn to the French case in order to illustrate the value of focusing on the innovative dimension of planning.

Reading the “Problem” Upside Down

A change in the “technological regime” is often seen as necessary to enable radically new technologies to flourish. The technological regime has been defined as the social, institutional and economic arrangements and infrastructures that support existing patterns of technological use. The process of changing a technological regime has been described as a transition (or transformation). How this transition should, or could occur, forms a recent and distinct academic discipline. Transition management (e.g. Geels & Schot, 2007) is about transformative change in societal systems through a process of searching, learning and experimenting that relies on modern types of governance. This suggests that national government should play an important role in inducing necessary changes, but also recognizes that individuals and communities have an important role, as state activity is embedded within the wider networks of civil society and relies on non-state actors in the formulation and implementation of public policy. Based on what is learned from the transition experiments, the vision, agenda, and pathways are adjusted, if needed. Successful experiments are continued and can be scaled up; failed experiments can be abandoned.

The academic research on wind power has highlighted important dimensions of this process, such as the role of institutional capacity in policy development (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007), or the role of civil society and social networks during the implementation phase (Szarka, 2006). The “implementation capacity” has been defined as the capacity of private actors to deal with the prevailing institutional structures through social conditions and networks “so as to implement wind turbines” (Agterbosch et al., 2009). Yet, what this terminology and these analyses do not make clear enough is that implementation goes beyond (merely) applying a pre-given and stable framework. Implementation implies making sense of a given framework. As Waterton (2003) has shown, even implementing a mere botanical classification entails performance and innovation. In other words, implementation leads to social innovation in the sense of a transformation of existing norms and institutions (see for example Klein & Harrisson, 2006). Social innovations are part of technology development because technologies are part of distributed agencies and heterogeneous networks (e.g. Akrich et al., 1988; Callon & Law, 1992). This is one important reason why the change in technological regime is not a linear process, why there are surprises until the very last stages of technology deployment, and why institutional reflexivity is required along the way (Shove, 1998).

One consequence of this is that the authoritative notion of “technological potential”, defined as the potential associated with a generic technology, has limitations. For the sake of clarity, I distinguish between a generic technology (such as “wind power” or “solar energy”, i.e. in abstract terms) and the situated technology, as embedded within heterogeneous networks (e.g. a “wind farm” or a “solar farm”).

An example of where the “technological potential” has been applied is the approach to climate change mitigation and energy policy effectiveness at the international level (e.g. IPCC, 2001). Within these international arenas, assessment of the “technological potential” makes it possible to quantify targets and negotiate commitments. It thus contributes to the emergence of visions of the future, which are necessary to steer and manage the transition (e.g. Geels & Schot, 2007; Smith et al., 2005). However, when translated into national policy objectives, this approach considers only the intrinsic attributes of the generic technology, rather than the attributes of situated technologies (namely, embedded within heterogeneous networks) which could emerge from successful forms of social innovation. In other words, the “intrinsic attribute” approach overlooks the challenge of social innovation and the need to construct the effective potential. It naturalizes it (in the anthropological sense) and treats social processes as if they were barriers to its (natural) achievement. Planning processes are treated as one of these processes and they are stigmatized for their lack of fluidity and poor efficiency. In contrast, the “heterogeneous network” approach acknowledges the hybrid nature of this potential and affirms the need for constructing it. Planning becomes part of this construction as a social—and potentially innovative—process. It is part of the challenge that one could expect on the way to innovation.

One of the most convincing examples of this approach comes from the analyses of the German process of wind power development (e.g. Bolinger, 2005; Breukers & Wolsink 2007), where official development targets have been repeatedly surpassed. This success has been based on a number of factors which include financial incentives, planning measures and research and development policy. Such an approach was facilitated by the capacity of German institutions to learn in time from a heterogeneous community (e.g. industry, environmental movements, planning authorities, energy policy community), because the policy process was opened to these stakeholders and contributed to bringing them into the network. In consequence, the perception of “the social” as a stable entity and of planning as the “problem” for wind power expansion constitutes a misrepresentation of the issue. Social re-composition is inherent to wind power deployment. While we should recognize that there is certainly room for improving planning processes, academic research should also develop its methodologies in order to identify more effectively the social innovation (or re-composition) which is at the core of these processes.

Innovative Planning and the Development of French Wind Power

The relatively late take-off of French wind power has been blamed on factors that include the complexity of the planning procedures and the techno-institutional commitment to nuclear energy (Szarka, 2007). The adoption of fixed tariffs in 2000 marked the emergence of a French wind power policy and while the official national targets have been regularly revised upwards from 7 GW in 20101 to 23 GW (onshore) in 2020,2 the policy framework has not effectively supported the translation of these objectives into the local arena. In essence, responsibility for achieving the targets has been passed on to the local level without genuinely delegating it.

The first genuine planning framework, based on the concept of “wind power development zones” (WPDZ), was formulated in 2005 and implemented in 2007 seven years after the adoption of feed-in tariffs. These zones are better understood as offering energy supply contracts rather than as planning instruments, since wind farms are eligible for feed-in tariffs if located inside a WPDZ. Zones have to be proposed by local authorities and approved by the Prefect of the Department. Wind power zones constitute a political compromise which mirrors the centralization of French energy policy in that they delegate policy implementation to the administrative level of the department, whilst not taking it completely out of the hands of the central state (Nadaï, 2007).

As of June 2009, installed wind power capacity in France was 3.5 GW, only one seventh of the 2020 objective. Complex administrative procedures and complications arising from problems of local acceptance have been blamed for this performance—particularly by the wind power lobby and the EU Commission—in much the same way and with the same shortcomings as outlined in the lead paper. Almost every planning application is challenged in the administrative courts, either by opponents (if accepted) or by developers (if refused), but the majority of applications reaching final submission are accepted. Developers work closely with the regulatory authorities from an early stage, but permitting procedures still tend to follow the DAD approach (Decide, Announce, Defend), rather than involving opposition groups and wider civil society in the decision-making process.3

Such a situation can easily be portrayed as a result of the “planning problem”, with the planning system being blamed for failure to reach the national target of 23 GW. An important shortcoming is notably the lack of public involvement at the early stages of both planning and project development. However, current experience invites us to read developments “upside down”, namely to emphasize the innovative role of local planning processes in such a difficult context. Between 2000 and 2007 local authorities were faced with applications from private wind power developers in the absence of any planning framework. Often departments and regions reacted by devising their own local planning schemes, many of which took the form of standard sieve mapping exercises, although a significant proportion took more innovative approaches. The most common approach was to use standard zoning instruments which have the narrow aim of reducing the visual impact of turbines on existing landscapes (a major issue with wind power in France). This approach seems to fail because the visual impact is unprecedentedly far-reaching (turbines are visible up to tens of kilometers away). Recent research has explored case studies of such measures from the perspective of landscape impact (Nadaï & Labussière, 2008, 2009; forthcoming). They have highlighted how some authorities have succeeded in overcoming the problems of regulatory zoning or landscape classifications by addressing landscape issues in a more radical way and by tackling the question of how to integrate turbines into the landscape. A key finding is that successful processes involve social innovation in the sense that they create new social networks, establish devices and social processes for the production of new aesthetic codes (e.g. a photographic observatory), and generate new landscape classifications or representations (e.g. new landscape categories and new graphic codes in planning documents). These processes also encourage direct links with community networks, as they try to go beyond existing institutions or norms in order to explore the local realm and invent new compatibilities. This allows them to establish a new and unexpected potential for wind power deployment.

A survey by the author of the 22 regional environmental administrations conducted during the autumn of 2006 revealed that the few gigawatts in the pipeline4 were already starting to saturate non-protected landscapes. This proves, if proof be needed, that if France is to achieve its official 23 GW target, “effective” implementation of existing norms is not enough. Innovative planning has to be adopted in order to support the emergence of new representations of landscape.

ALAIN NADAÏ

CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement, Campus du Jardin Tropical, Nogent-sur-Marne, France

Notes

1. Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (2002). Programmation pluriannuelle des investissements de production électrique. Période 2000-2010, 8 p.

2. Ministère de l'Ecologie, de l'Energie, du Développement Durable et de l'Aménagement du Territoire (2007). « Lutter contre le changement climatique et maitriser l'énergie »: rapport de synthèse du Groupe 1.

3. A survey undertaken by the author of the 22 regional environmental administrations (in late 2006), showed that only one of them willingly agreed to meetings with anti-wind groups during the process of project development. One major argument for this distance was ‘administrative objectivity’. For a detailed analysis of permitting procedures and the construction of ‘administrative objectivity’ in relation to wind power, see Nadaï & Labussière, 2008.

4. About 8 mGW according to RTE, 2007.

1. See the “Beyond Nimbyism” study of ten renewable energy projects by Manchester University (May 2009). This found that “When opposition [to a proposed development] occurred this was characterised in particular by developers as emotionally based and outside of what they saw as ‘rational’ planning concerns”. Accessed from www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/beyond_nimbyism/deliverables/reports_Project_summary_Final.pdf on 16 June 2009.

2. See the British Wind Energy Association figures quoted on Planning Portal News, “Major wind farms win go-ahead”, 6 March 2008, accessed from www.planningportal.gov.uk/england/professionals/en/1115315518905.html on 29 June 2009.

3. The figure on the time taken by Ministers to make decisions after an inspector's report is taken from analysis of information presented by the Planning Inspectorate to the CBI Major Infrastructure Projects Conference, London 30 October 2007, relating to 74 inquiries since 1999 into nationally significant infrastructure projects.

4. Based on the author's notes of Susan Owens' speech to the plenary session ‘Planning: a Changing Environmental Climate’, RTPI Planning Convention Thursday 18 June 2009.

1. This includes larger schemes consented through the Electricity Acts of the UK.

2. For example, NIMBYs are blamed for delays in the planning process by Scottish Power in their response to the Barker review (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/scottish_power.pdf), while the Final Report of the review (Barker, 2006, Table 3), reproduces evidence from the annual ‘NIMBY survey’ carried out by Saints Consulting (see http://tscg.co.uk/survey/summary.html).

3. See http://www.rtpi.org.uk/item/1931/23/5/3

1. This seminar series has been coordinated by the editors of this Interface and the authors of the lead paper, representing researchers from planning, geography, business management and international studies. The seminar series, “Where Next for Wind?” was primarily funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (RES-451-26-0386), with contributions from other organisations, including Scottish and Southern Energy and the authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided.