THE U.S. “WAR ON DRUGS” IN AFGHANISTAN

Abstract

Mainstream commentary suggests that the United States and NATO are conducting a war on drugs in Afghanistan in order to reduce drug consumption in the West and Afghanistan and weaken the Taliban. Interpreting U.S. foreign policy from a critical political economic perspective, this article presents an alternative analysis, arguing thatWashington and NATO are not pursuing a real war on drugs in Afghanistan. This point is demonstrated by examining a number of aspects of the so-called war on drugs: the Taliban's relatively small role in drug trafficking; U.S./NATO support for proxy forces involved in the drug trade; the focus on poppy cultivation over drug money; the chemical precursor trade; money laundering; Western support for tobacco and alcohol industries; and the emphasis on overseas operations and enforcement and neglect of drug treatment and prevention. In each case, U.S./NATO policies directly support or tolerate the drug trade—the opposite of what a real war on drugs would entail. It is therefore suggested that the so-called war on drugs is better seen as a rhetorical device used by the U.S. to facilitate overseas military intervention and the fight against insurgents opposed to U.S. policies in Afghanistan.

Acknowledgments:

The author would like to thank Jonathan Caulkins, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, David Mansfield, and Ethan Nadelmann for comments and discussions on this article.

Notes

^1. However, total opium production in 2010 is estimated at 3,600 metric tons, a 48 percent decrease from 2009, due in part to diseases that affected opium fields: Unodc 2010 (Survey), 7. Unodc 2010 (Report), 37. On the importance of narcotics to the Afghan economy, see Ward and Byrd 2004.

^2. U.S. Department of State 2010, 104. Unodc 2010 (Report), 41–42.

^3. On hashish in Afghanistan, see Clarke 2010; Mercille 2010; Unodc 2010 (Cannabis).

^4. Beers 2002; Braun 2009; Charles 2004; Davids 2002; Ehrenfeld 2005; Peters 2009 (Seeds); Peters 2009 (Taliban); U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations 2009.

^5. The hawala system is an informal financial transfer system used in Afghanistan in parallel with the formal banking sector. The hawala system handles financial transfers, currency exchange, and often, drug money. Under the Taliban regime (1996–2001), the hawala markets fully replaced the formal banking sector. See Thompson 2006.

^8. U.S. Department of State 2010, 99.

^6. Cited in U.S. Senate, Caucus on International Narcotics Control 2010, 23.

^7. Peters 2009 (Seeds), 22; and Peters 2009 (Taliban), 7.

^9. Draper 2011.

^10. Schweich 2008.

^11. Felbab-Brown 2010.

^12. Ibid., 9, 179.

^13. For example, Chien, Connors, and Fox 2000; Chomsky 1992; Chomsky 2000, 62–81; Reinerman and Levine, eds. 1997; Stokes 2005;

^14. On NSC-68, see Block 1980. On geopolitics, see Brzezinski 1988. On the need to maintain credibility, see McMahon 1991; and Chomsky 1989, chap. 3.

^15. McCoy 2004, 47–48. McCoy develops the same argument in a number of publications: McCoy 2003; McCoy 2000; McCoy 1992.

^16. McCoy 2003, 456, 387.

^17. Ibid. 459. For an argument similar to this article's on Nixon's drug war, see Kuzmarov 2009.

^18. Those secretive forces may even have been responsible for orchestrating events like 9/11, according to Scott, who writes: “As I shall argue, America's major foreign wars are typically preceded by deep events like the Tonkin Gulf incidents, 9/11, or the 2001 anthrax attacks. This suggests that what I call the war machine in Washington (including but not restricted to elements in the Pentagon and the CIA) may have been behind them.” Scott 2010 (War), 4; see also Scott 2003 (CIA); Scott 2010 (War); Scott 2007; Scott 2010 (Kyrgyzstan); Scott 2010 (Triumph); Scott 2009.

^19. Scott 2010 (War), 237, 232–33.

^20. Scott 2003 (Drugs), 28, 33. See also similar comments in Scott 2010 (War), 237, 232–33. Michel Chossudovsky argues a similar point. See Chossudovsky 2004.

^21. Scott 2003 (Drugs), 43.

^22. For an influential analysis of the importance of Eurasia predating 9/11, see Brzezinski 1998; see also Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006, chap. 7; Klare 2008.

^23. McCoy 2010; Macdonald 2007, 84; Chouvy 2009, 151.

^24. Unodc 2010 (Survey).

^25. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 113–14.

^26. Ibid. 3, 113.

^27. Ibid., 102.

^28. Peters 2009 (Taliban), 19.

^29. Interview by the author, 2 November 2009.

^30. For an excellent account of the structure of the Afghan drug industry, see Shaw 2006.

^31. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 3.

^32. Peters 2009 (Seeds), 133–34.

^33. Mansfield 2010, 22–23.

^34. There are, obviously, other domestic and local factors, but nevertheless,Western intervention has acted as an important stimulus.

^35. Chandra 2006, 64–92; Corti and Swain 2009; Rashid 2008; Rubin 2004.

^36. Cockburn and St. Clair 1998; McCoy 2003; Scott and Marshall 1998.

^37. U.S. Senate 2009; GAO 2010.

^38. Peters 2009 (Seeds), 202; embassy official quoted on p. 193.

^39. Rashid 2008, 328; IRIN 2010.

^40. Risen 2007. See also Pennington 2007; Rubin 2009.

^41. Filkins, Mazzetti, and Risen 2009; Risen 2008.

^42. Sherman and DiDomenico 2009; Aikins 2005; Wilder 2005.

^43. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 106.

^44. Unodc 2010 (Cannabis), 36.

^45. Rubin 2007.

^46. See for instance Unodc 2009 (Addiction).

^47. Ibid.75; see also U.S. Department of State 2010, 79, which reaches similar conclusions.

^48. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 70; Unodc 2008, 156.

^49. INCB 2010, 17.

^50. Author's calculations from data reported in Unodc 2009 (Addiction).

^51. Peters 2009 (Seeds), 231.

^52. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 7; Reuters 2009; Unodc 2009 (Report), 3 (emphasis in original). See also Reuter and Truman 2004.

^53. Morley 1989.

^54. Quoted in Beaty et al. 1991; see also Cooley 2002, 90–94; Scott and Marshall 1998, xv–xvii.

^55. Unodc 2009 (Addiction), 9.

^56. WHO 2002; WHO 2008; WHO 2009; WHO n.d.

^57. WHO n.d.

^58. Shaffer, Brenner, and Houston 2005, 14: ii19–ii25, ii24; the Philip Morris quote is from the text of a discussion document used at a top management meeting, 29 March 1985, quoted on p. ii23. See also McKee 2009; Zeigler 2006, 25.

^59. Gilmore, Fooks, and McKee 2009.

^60. Smith et al. 2010.

^61. “Thai–EU FTA talks stuck over alcohol, tobacco,” The Nation (Bangkok), 16 September 2010; Arunmas 2010.

^62. Rydell and Everingham 1994.

^63. Babor et al. 2010, 255, 254. Nevertheless some good accounts illustrate what drug control in Afghanistan could look like. See, for example Caulkins, Kleiman, and Kulick 2010; Jelsma and Kramer 2009; Mansfield and Pain 2008.

^64. Hedrich, Pirona, and Wiessing 2008, 506–7.

^65. Reuter and Stevens 2008, 467, 470.

^66. For more on the war on drugs as a form of social control, see, for example, footnote 13.

^67. U.S. Senate 2009, 1 (emphasis added). See also Risen 2009.

^68. Braun 2009, 3–5; U.S. Senate 2010, 2.

^69. U.S. Senate 2010, 39.

^70. U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General 2009, 22.

^71. McGirk 2003; Risen 2006, 154; Meyer 2006; Rubin 2004.

^72. Felbab-Brown 2010, 147, 150.