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ABSTRACT
Why is there sometimes limited mobilization against autocratization, particularly when it involves major human rights violations? Some scholars emphasize the loss of political space through repression as the major cause while others emphasize strategic considerations such as divisions and abandonment of moderate tactics. A third view stresses popular support for strongman rule. Viewed in this light, the weakness of pushback against Rodrigo Duterte, Philippine president from 2016 to 2022, presents a challenge to existing theories. Despite the bloody “war on drugs” during his presidency, there was no violent government crackdown on peaceful demonstrators, and centrists eventually coalesced with left-wing activists around moderate strategies. But public backing for Duterte does not explain how he was able to defuse popular outrage over drug war killings, particularly after the high-profile police murders of several minors. This paper offers a relational explanation utilizing competing framing analysis. This better elucidates how, with Catholic bishops and community organizations politically weakened and international organizations denounced for interfering in domestic politics, Duterte was able to tactically outmaneuver his opponents and "frame" human rights advocates as coddling criminals while he protected law-abiding Filipinos.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank the participants of the workshop, “Theorizing the Dynamics of Collective Action,” co-sponsored by the American Political Science Association, the Southeast Asia Research Center, the City University of Hong Kong (CUHK), and the CUHK Center for Public Affairs and Law, which was held at the City University of Hong Kong on August 21, 2023. We also wish to express our appreciation to Critical Asian Studies board members and reviewers for their comments and to editor Robert Shepherd for his careful edits and guidance.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Ekloff Citation2003; Aspinall Citation2005.
2 McCargo Citation2021; Kongkirati and Kanchoochat Citation2018.
3 Egreteau Citation2023; Head Citation2022.
4 EDSA is an acronym for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major highway in metro Manila.
5 Hedman Citation2006; Thompson Citation1995. The 1986 protests were also called “EDSA,” named after the Epifanio de los Santos highway where most of these demonstrations took place.
6 Hedman Citation2006; Landé Citation2001.
7 In 2005, wiretapped conversations between then-election commissioner Virgilio Garcillano and Arroyo discussing their attempt to rig the 2004 national election results (where the latter was seeking a full six-year presidential term) were leaked, causing widespread public outrage.
8 Hutchcroft Citation2008.
9 United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights Citation2020, 4–6; International Criminal Court Citation2021.
10 McCoy Citation2001.
11 Drogin Citation2023.
12 Claudio Citation2023; Agojo Citation2023 and Citation2024; Third World Studies Center Citation2023.
13 Iglesias Citation2023; Tanyalak Citation2023.
14 Dressel Citation2011; Teehankee and Calimbahin Citation2020.
15 Teehankee and Thompson Citation2016, 125.
16 Tomini et al Citation2023; Gamboa Citation2022 & Citation2017; Thompson Citation2021; Laebens and Lührmann Citation2021.
17 Laebens and Lührmann Citation2021.
18 Pahlke Citation2023; Kwong Citation2023.
19 Arugay and Basquisal Citation2023, 1.
20 Freedom House measurements suffer from what has been termed “benchmark liberalism,” which claims “a universal standard for one and all” disconnected from the complex history that produced it (Connors and Thompson Citation2023, 2). Nonetheless, Freedom House (Citation2023) offers a rough guide in comparative terms to understanding the relative degrees of political openness in the region. Freedom House categorizes the Philippines, along with Indonesia, as “partly free,” with only Timor Leste (categorized as “free”) ranked higher in the region. The Philippines was ranked as somewhat more open than Malaysia and Singapore and as considerably less repressive than Thailand and Myanmar.
21 For Thailand, see Amnesty International Citation2021. For Myanmar, see Human Rights Watch Citation2022.
22 Wahman Citation2013; see also Gamboa Citation2017 and Citation2022.
23 Thompson Citation1995.
24 Hedman Citation2006.
25 Gamboa Citation2017 & Citation2022; see also Tomini et al. Citation2023.
26 Gamboa Citation2017 and Citation2022.
27 Rogenhofer Citation2018.
28 Hutchcroft Citation2008.
29 Robles Citation2019; Tuyay Citation2022.
30 Fromm Citation1941; Adorno et al. Citation1950.
31 Pettigrew Citation2011.
32 Altemeyer Citation1998; Feldman Citation2003.
33 Feldman, et al. Citation2022.
34 Pernia Citation2021, 1; see also Pernia and Panao Citation2023.
35 Pernia Citation2021, 17.
36 Kasuya and Miwa Citation2023. Using list experiment surveys, they claim that Duterte’s popular support during the drug war was inflated through preference falsification caused by fear. Dulay, et al. Citation2022 question the study’s methodology while others have pointed to obvious indicators (e.g., the results all major opinion surveys and election results) of Duterte’s and the drug war’s generally high levels of popularity. As will be discussed more below, however, there was indeed considerable ambiguity among the general public about the drug war, although this is not evidence of direct preference falsification.
37 Cf. Curato Citation2016; Reyes Citation2016; Kusaka Citation2017; Thompson Citation2018; Arguelles Citation2019; Kenny and Holmes Citation2020; Jensen and Hapal 2023.
38 Kenny and Holmes Citation2020, 15.
39 Kenny and Holmes Citation2020, 16.
40 Regilme Citation2021.
41 Social Weather Stations 2019.
42 Talabong Citation2017a.
43 Cabato Citation2019.
44 It is worth recalling that opposition protests against Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. were sparked by the assassination of opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. in August 1983. Joseph Estrada was a popular president until a widely publicized gambling scandal tarnished his administration and led to a popular mobilization that toppled him. Large demonstrations Estrada’s previously popular vice-president, Arroyo, were triggered by her highly irregular ascension to the presidency and after revelations of electoral manipulation. Thus, it can be asked why the widespread shock at the killings of minors in the drug war did not trigger a similar large and sustained protest movement.
45 Chong and Druckman Citation2007.
46 Mounk Citation2018; Kirsch and Welzel Citation2019.
47 Ciurel Citation2018.
48 Kuypers Citation2009, 182.
49 Chong and Druckman Citation2007.
50 Ciurel Citation2018.
51 Benford Citation1987, 75; see also Chong and Druckman Citation2013 and Benford and Snow Citation2000.
52 Waller and Conaway Citation2011.
53 Noakes Citation2005.
54 Kuznetsova Citation2018
55 Benford and Snow Citation2000, 616-617.
56 Brewer Citation2003; Brewer & Gross Citation2005.
57 Nelson Citation2004.
58 Wise and Brewer Citation2010.
59 Johnston and Noakes Citation2005, 11.
60 Johnston and Noakes Citation2005.
61 Mudde Citation2004; Laclau Citation2005; Wodak Citation2015.
62 Calimbahin, Kasuya, and Miwa (Citation2023) make a somewhat similar argument about the opposition’s framing of the drug war, using the notion of justice and evoking the terrible injustices of arbitrary killings. They argue that while useful, the opposition’s framing could have been strengthened by using more personal framing, i.e., focusing on concrete cases of killings during the war on drugs. As we discuss below, the opposition attempted to do so, particularly after the police killing of Kian delos Santos. But this personalized justice framing was still effectively countered by Duterte.
63 Duterte Citation2016a.
64 Duterte Citation2016b.
65 Lozada Citation2021; Muhs Citation2022.
66 Quimpo Citation2017.
67 Reuters Citation2017b.
68 De Castro and Marshall, Citation2017; Fonbuena Citation2017.
69 Talabong Citation2017c.
70 Bagayas Citation2018; Salamat Citation2018.
71 de Guzman Citation2017. In November 2018, police officers Arnel Oares, Jeremias Pereda, and Jerwin Cruz were convicted by the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court of killing delos Santos. They were sentenced to least thirty years without eligibility of parole. However, Roberto Fajardo, who was chief of the Northern Police District when the murder took place, escaped punishment and promoted to chief of the Philippine National Police Highway Patrol Group in June 2018.
72 Ranada Citation2017.
73 Iglesias Citation2022.
74 Duterte Citation2018.
75 Lozada Citation2021.
76 Thompson Citation2023.
77 Palatino Citation2017.
78 Al Jazeera 2017.
79 Baldwin and Serapio Citation2016.
80 Rufo 2013; Gutierrez 2018.
81 Dañguilan Citation2018.
82 Esmaquel II Citation2017. Duterte served as mayor of Davao City from 1988 to 1998, 2001 to 2010, and 2013 until 2016.
83 Lorch Citation2021.
84 Juliano Citation2015.
85 Lorch Citation2021.
86 Juego Citation2017; Teehankee Citation2016; Claudio and Abinales 2017.
87 Lorch Citation2021.
88 Ropero Citation2019.
89 Lalu Citation2019.
90 International Criminal Court Citation2021.
91 Lozada Citation2021.
92 ABS-CBN Citation2019; also ABS-CBN Citation2021.
93 Simangan Citation2018, 1.
94 Reuters Citation2017a. As of this writing the ICC investigation is still ongoing, covering 2016, when Duterte became president, to mid-2019, when he withdrew the Philippines from the court.
95 Gayle Citation2016.
96 Gayle Citation2016.
97 Quimpo Citation2008; Teehankee Citation2016.
98 Duterte Citation2016a.
99 Thompson Citation2023.
100 Corrales Citation2016.
101 Duterte Citation2016b
102 Quimpo Citation2017; Thompson Citation2023.
103 Maxwell Citation2019.
104 Lozada Citation2021; Muhs Citation2022.
105 The uprising began in May 2017 after the Philippine state security forces launched an operation in Marawi City to capture Isnilon Hapilon, leader of the Islamic State (IS)-affiliated Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. A clash between government forces and IS militants prompted Duterte to declare martial law in Mindanao. The conflict, which became known as the “Siege of Marawi,” went on for five months.
106 Muhs Citation2022.
107 Duterte Citation2016c
108 Cabañes and Cornelio Citation2017; Dreisbach Citation2018; Combinido Citation2019; Ong Tapsell and Curato Citation2019; Combinido and Curato Citation2020.
109 David Citation2016.
110 Ong, Tintiangko, and Fallorina, 2021,14.
111 Combinido and Curato 2021, 19.
112 Allcott and Gentzkow Citation2017.
113 Pepinsky Citation2017; Lozada Citation2021.
114 Reyes Citation2016, 129.
115 Coronel 2019, 38.
116 Bautista Citation2017, 4.
117 Reyes Citation2016.
118 Domingo Citation2019; Rauhala Citation2017.
119 International Criminal Court Citation2021.
120 Cited in Pernia and Panao Citation2023, figure 3, 365.
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Notes on contributors
Mark Thompson
Mark R. Thompson is a visiting research fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and Chair Professor of Politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs as well as Director of the Southeast Asia Research Center at the City University of Hong Kong.
Kevin Agojo
Kevin Nielsen Agojo is a PhD student in the Department of Public and International Affairs at the City University of Hong Kong and was recently a visiting researcher at the La Salle Institute of Governance and assistant professorial lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Development Studies of De La Salle University, Philippines.
Joyce Li Liang
Joyce Li Liang is a research associate at the Southeast Asia Research Center, City University of Hong Kong. She received a PhD in Politics from Exeter University in 2022.