Ambitions yet unrealized: Romania’s status and perceptions from the immediate eastern neighbourhood

ABSTRACT

As Romania has recurrently indicated in recent years that the main external objective is to consolidate the country’s profile in the region and, in particular, in its immediate eastern neighbourhood, this article explores Romania’s regional status and argues that, despite Romania’s aspirations of a higher status in its foreign outlook, externally, the country has so far only displayed a ‘small power’ behaviour. To study Romania’s status, the article investigates both internal and external perceptions of Romania’s capabilities underpinning status by building on data obtained from expert interviews, which were conducted in Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova.

KEYWORDS:

• Romania
• status
• Ukraine
• Moldova
• eastern neighbourhood

Introduction

The current tensions between the West and Russia have placed Romania on high alert. The latest National Defence Strategy (Presidential Administration 2020) has paid special attention to the threats stemming from the country’s eastern neighbourhood, while Romania’s political establishment has recurrently indicated that the main external objective is to consolidate the country’s regional posture. In fact, enhancing Romania’s status is the hallmark of the aforementioned strategic document, with the term ‘status’ (used interchangeably with ‘profile’ and ‘image’) featuring no less than 18 times (see also Ghincea 2021, 9). To this end, Romania’s self-representation has been that of a ‘regional stability pole’ particularly in its immediate eastern vicinity since most of its external land border is shared with Ukraine and Moldova (Romanian Government 2021). However, Romania’s status aspirations in the region have been brought into question, with few noticeable external political initiatives and results, while over the past decade, a disconnect has been observed between the official discourse, which shows constant regional ambitions, and the limited follow-up actions to address challenges existing in the neighbourhood. For instance, Joja (2019), looking at the 1990–2014 period, argues that Romania’s rigid strategic culture has, in some ways, remained constant even in the post-communist era. This has been the result of the highly isolationist foreign policy practised during the communist regime, which prevented the emergence of necessary preconditions to address status concerns even post-1989. In the same vein, Bechev (2009) holds that, in spite of the relevant regional posture claimed by the political elites, Romania’s capacity to shape the EU’s agenda concerning its immediate eastern neighbours in the first years of its membership has been constrained by an incomplete process of domestic change. Likewise, Ivan (2012) contends that Romania’s regional cooperation attempts in the two decades after the fall of the communist regime have not managed to stand out and gather momentum among the Western partners, including here the Black Sea Synergy (BSS),¹ which Bucharest sought to make the spearhead of the EU in the region. One reason for such results has been, according to Dungaciu and Dumitrescu (2019), the lack of strategic vision behind the proposed regional initiatives, which, in their view, is linked to limited strategic expertise at the national level. Last but not least, assessing the first ten years of membership in the EU, Nitoiu and Moga (2021) have observed that Romania has generally preferred to maintain a rather externally inactive stance, with limited initiatives in relation to the immediate eastern neighbourhood, despite these being a top priority for the Romanian diplomacy.

Against this backdrop, this article inquires how could Romania’s status in the region be classified, namely whether Romania belongs to the medium or small tier of states. By studying internal and external perceptions of the country’s available status-related capabilities, this article argues that despite its medium size and population, Romania displays a ‘small power’² profile.

Our interpretation based on the concept of ‘small power’ moves beyond the existing official arguments employed when discussing Romania’s status, which tend to assume a relevant country profile in the region and in relation to the eastern neighbourhood without making clear references to any status-related classification (namely, whether Romania belongs to the medium or small power group of states) (Romanian Government 2021; 141; Presidential Administration 2020, 22). Our analysis seeks to unpack this puzzle and show that a capabilities-expectations gap restrains Romania’s higher status aspirations. While based on its size, geographic location and population, Romania might feel entitled to medium status, the country’s ability to shape the regional environment, as displayed in this research, is more likely typical of a small power. Moreover, Romania appears to place a strong emphasis on its membership in NATO and the EU to consolidate its regional posture, reinforcing the argument that small powers’ participation in international organizations compensates for their external limitations.

The novelty of this study consists of the perceptual approach to measure Romania’s status since we aim to rank it by analysing internal and external perceptions of some of the most relevant attributes, which, in the literature, underpin a state’s international standing. While perceptions provide an up-to-date assessment, a discussion about Romania’s posture is critical both for understanding the country’s foreign outlook beyond the official discourse and for the resilience of the Western international organizations to which Romania belongs. Being located at the border of the Euro-Atlantic community has geopolitical implications for the respective state’s interests and the alliance’s external policies (Ojanen 2001, 1). The country is in a challenging geographical position, having the longest external land border of both NATO and the EU,³ most of it shared with its eastern neighbours, Ukraine and Moldova. With the growing volatility in the former Soviet space, Romania has been considered by its Western allies a bastion of stability at the eastern edge of the transatlantic community (U.S. Department of State 2021).

By learning what internal and external perceptions of Romania’s capabilities reveal about its status, contributions of our study include additional relevant information on the country’s image in the immediate eastern neighbourhood, which can be employed by decision-makers when reflecting upon ways of enhancing the country’s regional profile. We believe acting as a medium power would mean a stronger role for Romania in the stability and security of the region, better preparedness to dissuade threats, better support for the eastern neighbours and, ultimately, a consolidated and resilient south-eastern flank of the EU and NATO, which becomes especially critical in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If Romania can act as a medium power in the region, utilizing its geographical links with the countries in the region, it can have the potential to substantially bolster the stability in the region. Meanwhile, maintaining a small power status would only partially address these challenges.

The article is organized into six sections. The first section of the article is theoretical and scrutinizes the main attributes of status, while the second section provides a methodological approach to studying Romania’s status based on internal and external perceptions of status-related attributes. The following sections are empirical and present our data. The third one presents the findings from the expert interviews conducted in Romania to understand how the country’s capabilities propelling status are seen domestically, while the fourth and the fifth sections show how Romania’s status-related attributes are perceived in the eastern neighbourhood, namely in Ukraine and Moldova. The final section then discusses Romania’s regional posture and presents conclusions in light of the data.

In search of a status-based classification of states

Status-seeking has been a constant preoccupation of states in the international milieu. In fact, status-seeking as a driver of state behaviour is a struggle for recognition by international peers (Duque 2018, 578; Murray 2019, 9). This means that a state may believe in its entitlement to a special status in the international arena, yet, if the other states do not acknowledge it, the respective state will not attain it (Hurrell 2006, 4). Renshon (2017, 32) believes that the ultimate goal of states is higher status in the international social hierarchy and to achieve this goal, states apply different status-seeking strategies, which shape a state’s external actions, foreign policy and the form of its alliances. In fact, the desire for enhanced status can be consequential in shaping a state’s foreign policy, leading states to pursue more active policies abroad, such as participating in regional conflict resolutions or promoting free trade agreements (Paul et al. 2014, 21). To this extent, foreign policy performance and active presence internationally are inherently linked to status dynamics whereby efficient foreign policy choices and the framing of clear external goals can lead to gaining recognition of higher status (Götz 2021).

According to Paul et al. (2014, 7), status is defined as collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking according to a set of valued attributes. These attributes are generally divided into two groups: the first consists of the traditional (quantifiable) components of status, such as size, population, economy and military (Carr 1964; Waltz 2010; Mearsheimer 2014). The second group looks at the so-called nonmaterial means which account for status in international interactions, namely, values, norms, diplomatic expertise, and participation in international organizations (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Checkel 2001; Risse 2001; Keohane and Nye 1977). Based on these attributes, states are categorized as either large, medium or small. Although there is no entirely fulfilling set of criteria of what constitutes status in international affairs,⁴ the ‘great-power club’ is somehow easier to identify as it is, by definition, an exclusive, hierarchically organized identity whose members have the authority to structure the norms and rules that guide the international order, which includes the ability to determine the composition of the major power club itself (Murray 2019, 15). Meanwhile, central to most definitions of ‘smallness’ is a shortage of resources and capabilities as well as the difficulty in influencing the global system, which increases dependency on international organizations to compensate for this set of limitations. Usually, the most common factor for defining state size is the population size, with most academic definitions ranking those with less than 10 or 15 million inhabitants as small (Thorhallsson and Steinsson 2017, 3). With much more resources at their disposal, medium powers are positioned in-between in the hierarchy of international relations, namely below the great power threshold, yet above the small states’ category. While recognized as stabilizers and legitimizers of the world order, middle powers typically adopt an activist style, whereby they interfere in global issues beyond their immediate vicinity or concern and seek to advance their national interests by setting the agenda inside international organizations or by forging coalitions with like-minded states. Generally, they tend to be part of the solution to problems at the global level (Jordaan 2003, 166–167).

Studying external and internal perceptions: a methodological account

Our research starts from the assumption that status recognition is a perceptual and social phenomenon (Renshon 2017). It comes into being only as an intersubjective process: it hinges on perceptions of a state’s ranking on a set of attributes, while this ranking in regional/international affairs is consistent with the value of these attributes (Murray 2019, 45). Thus, our assessment of status departs from the classical model developed by Väyrynen (1971, 93), who considers that status attribution is contingent both on the domestic (inside the country) and external (outside the country) perceptions of a country’s capabilities. These perceptions include the ones developed by the political elite, the expert community and/or the population. For instance, Robertson (2017) considers that the image of a country internationally is largely affected by the domestic discourse since this ultimately reflects and externally communicates the level of ambition in status attainment. In the same vein, external perceptions matter for the actions and role a state actor carries internationally (Jervis 2017, xviii; Wrange and Bengtsson 2019; 450; Elgström and Chaban 2015, 18). According to Wrange and Bengtsson (2019, 451), ‘perceptions are fundamental in international relations because they work as intervening variables between material/structural conditions and policy outcomes.’ Therefore, perceptions contribute to the formation of self-images and the images of others and often define an actor’s international behaviour and the way this external posture is constructed in terms of foreign policy performance and effective actorness (Wrange and Bengtsson 2019; Lucarelli 2014; Lucarelli and Jørgensen 2013; Elgström and Smith 2006; Thorhallsson 2006; Jervis 2017).

Against this background, we investigated both internal and external perceptions of Romania’s status-related attributes in relation to the eastern neighbourhood by building on data obtained from 40 expert interviews, which were conducted in Romania (12), Ukraine (15) and Moldova (13) between November 2019 and April 2020 (see Appendix including the list of the interviewees). As such, the assessment of Romania’s status had been based on the perceptions corresponding to the period and realities preceding the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic and, later on, the Russian-Ukrainian war. Expert interviews represent a comprehensive tool for assessing a state’s international standing, especially when the research seeks to explore perceptions (for more details, see Elgström and Chaban 2015, 25–26). The interviewed experts have been government officials, politicians (e.g., members of the European Parliament, members of political parties), and foreign policy and security experts in NGOs, think tanks and academia. The interviewees were selected based on their relevant expertise in Romania and the wider post-Soviet space. The interviews were structured upon a previously developed interview guide. This guide included open questions grouped into six sections, which were issue-specific and corresponded to six attributes which generally undergird status,⁵ namely: size (surface and population) and geographic location; economy; military; historical experience and culture; domestic institutions and expertise; and membership in international organizations (namely, in NATO and the EU). The interviews were conducted in Romanian in Romania and Moldova and in Ukrainian in Ukraine, were organized face-to-face and online (over Skype) and were recorded upon the respondents’ written informed consent. The anonymity of some respondents was kept upon their request. Respondents could have withdrawn at any time during or after the interview was completed. We offered no incentives for the interview. All the interviews were transcribed and analyzed according to each of the six attributes. To structure the data, we used Atlas.ti software.

In the research design, we looked initially at Romania’s self-perceptions of status-related capabilities (domestic perceptions) and then employed an interstate relational perspective by investigating how Romania’s capabilities are seen in Ukraine and Moldova (external perceptions). This approach has been selected for three reasons. First, we believe Romania’s eastern neighbourhood represents a litmus test for the country’s status aspirations, considering the challenges that inherently come from the region with the potential to inhibit Romania’s external interests and pressure both the EU’s and NATO’s south-eastern flank (namely, Russia’s aggressiveness in the region and the proximity of war). These challenges were present even before the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with direct implications for Romania’s stated commitment to act as a stability pillar in the region. Second, most states conduct much of their political contacts within regions rather than globally (Acharya 2007; Hurrell 2007). Thus, status is conferred through interaction with other states, typically within a group of states composed of neighbours (Wohlforth et al. 2018, 528). Since most of Romania’s external land border is shared with Ukraine and Moldova, we consider it important to examine how Romania’s status is perceived in the two countries, given that in the last couple of years, Romania’s foreign policy preoccupations with the two neighbours have been at the top of the external agenda aimed at strengthening the eastern edge of the transatlantic community (Romanian Government 2021).⁶ Moldova and Ukraine have largely been the focus of Romania’s external attention in the region,⁷ whereby Romania committed itself to support and advocate for their Westernization efforts (Romanian Government 2021).

Last but not least, we consider Romania an interesting case to study for its ambivalent posture in the international system, which, in our view, affects the country’s ability to define a clear external profile and agenda. According to Zbinden (1998, 216), Romania is a border case situated in-between medium and small power groups of states. While the size of Romania’s territory (148,129 sq. miles) and population (21.4 million) could make the country a candidate for the medium power tier of states, Romania’s economic weight in the region is rather limited. Despite its strong economic growth over the last three decades since the fall of the communist regime, Romania still lags behind other NATO and EU members in Central Eastern European countries in terms of GDP per capita (Eurostat 2021). This has also been reflected in the EU collective Official Development Assistance, where Romania had in 2021 one of the lowest contributions in the EU as a share of the Gross National Income (0.12%) (European Commission 2022). Romania currently spends roughly 2% of its GDP on defence-related matters, in line with NATO requirements; yet, its military capacity is underdeveloped, owing to internal economic constraints and a lack of investment in research and technology throughout the past decades (Lopes da Silva et al. 2022, 2).

Similarly, Romania’s soft power appeal has not been ranked high. According to the Global Soft Power Index 2022 (Finance 2022), studying the perceptions of 120 nation brands across the globe, Romania ranks 50, behind most of the other Central and Eastern European states. Meanwhile, at the domestic level, political and economic instability and the slow implementation of reforms, particularly in the judicial system and in fighting corruption, have been persistent challenges for the Romanian state. The harmonization of the Romanian institutional set-up in line with the NATO and the EU requirements has ultimately managed to strengthen the country’s administrative capacity and technical expertise (Nitoiu and Moga 2021; Moga et al. 2021).

Romania’s status attributes – internal perceptions

Concerning the perceptions about Romania’s size and population, the traditional (quantifiable) components of status, the majority of experts tend to converge to the opinion that Romania can be ascribed middle-power status (Expert [E]2, E3, E5, E12), while only some believe Romania belongs to the small power tier of states (E1, E7). In their views, positioning a country’s status in the hierarchy of states according to its size and geographical location hinges largely on the context and the reference system. For instance, Romania can be characterized within the EU as a medium-sized country, but in the global context, Romania more likely belongs to the category of small states. Iulian Fota believes that ‘at the European level (…), we are the smallest of the big countries and the biggest of the small countries.’ However, the country’s size (concerning quantifiable elements, such as area, population, and resources) does not necessarily translate into higher status. As such, Claudiu Degeratu holds that ‘Romania is a low-level actor. Most say that we have a medium size, and this would mean that we are a medium-sized actor. No, (…) we are in the group of small countries in the region, and, of course, this has consequences.’ Thus, a common impression persists that Romania has untapped potential to play a much more visible role in the region and that currently, it ‘punches below its weight’ (E3, E6, E7, E12).

Romanian experts generally do not perceive Romania’s economic profile to fare prominently in the region, while it generates only a limited impact on the eastern neighbourhood countries (E1, E10, E12). According to Petrișor Peiu, ‘Romanian investments in the neighbouring countries [Ukraine and Moldova] are very small.’ In fact, one of the challenges identified by the interviewees is the country’s lack of a wider regional strategy, whereby Romania’s economic activism lags behind other EU countries, such as Poland and Hungary, which managed to build a stronger economic presence in the post-Soviet Eastern European space (E1, E10).

In their assessment of Romania’s military resources, the other component of status, the experts have acknowledged Romania’s recent efforts to strengthen and modernize its military and defence sectors. Moreover, Romania has assumed stronger convergence of the national security and defence policies with its Western partners ever since becoming a member of NATO. Nevertheless, the country’s defence capabilities are still relatively modest and, in this regard, the participation in NATO and the strategic partnership with the US are salient for Romania’s profile in the region (E1, E3, E4, E6, E8, E9, E12). Furthermore, the experts see no solid ground for recurrently labelling Romania in all official documents as ‘a security provider in the wider Black Sea region’ (see, for instance, the latest government’s programme – Romanian Government 2021) since Romania has not been an active security and foreign policy entrepreneur at the regional level, outside NATO’s boundaries. So far, Romania has neither managed to individually contribute to the settlement of any frozen conflict in the neighbourhood nor has been able to provide relevant security and defence initiative in the wider Black Sea area (E1, E6, E10). According to Claudiu Degeratu, ‘a provider of security and stability means having military and security initiatives in the neighbourhood, tangible results in security and defence cooperation with the respective states bilaterally and also being able to change significantly the security situation in our region.’

References to nonmaterial elements shaping status, historical experience and culture, are relevant merely in relation to Moldova. Otherwise, most of the interviewed experts have encountered challenges when seeking to assess Romania’s soft power vis-à-vis Ukraine according to the efficiency of the country’s cultural diplomacy or historical background. Some reasons for the limited appeal of these status-related attributes have been the involvement of a limited amount of resources the country has dedicated to cultivating its image externally and the inconsistency of the policies devoted to nation branding (E1, E3, E6, E8, E10, E11). In Armand Goșu’s view, ‘the Romanian soft power is limited to the Republic of Moldova. It is very little felt in Ukraine. It is a provincial behaviour that is [geographically] reduced only to the bordering territory.’

From the perspective of other nonmaterial components of status, domestic institutional capacity and expertise, interviewees believe Romania has managed to display a positive image for its eastern neighbours, considering the country’s experience of successful integration in the Euro-Atlantic organizations, democratization process and the fight against corruption (E3, E5, E6). Nevertheless, in the experts’ opinion, Bucharest is not making efficient use of its domestic institutional achievements in relation to the two countries from the post-Soviet space, where it could be more proactive in providing support, such as in the fields of justice reforms, cybersecurity or rural development (E1, E4, E9, E10, E11). Moreover, some of the interviewees signalled Romania’s insufficient knowledge and expertise vis-à-vis the former Soviet space, which has been caused by a shortage of specific language skills (namely, Russian and Ukrainian) at the level of the Romanian foreign policy establishment and by the limited channels of cooperation between academia, NGOs and the decision-makers (E3, E4, E6, E7, E10). According to Iulia Joja, ‘if we look at the existing experts in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Cotroceni [the official residence of the presidential administration] or in other governmental institutions, there is very little expertise on the eastern neighbourhood. The Romanian government has very few Russian or Ukrainian speakers.’

Finally, the experts have argued that Romania’s membership in the EU and NATO has consolidated the country’s international profile, and in this new role, Romania has managed to steer the focus of these organizations on the eastern neighbourhood (E1, E2, E7, E12). Eugen Tomac believes that ‘Romania’s profile is given, first of all, by its membership in NATO and this status also shows the key role we have at NATO’s eastern border. (…) Moreover, we play in the terms established by the mechanisms offered by the EU.’

Similarly, Claudiu Degeratu argues that ‘Romania managed to attract NATO and the USA to get more involved in the eastern proximity.’ However, while some interviewees think that Romania has an important intermediary role between these organizations and the two eastern neighbours (E2, E7), others have been sceptical about Romania’s capacity to efficiently represent the interests of NATO and the EU in the region, indicating instead the example of Poland, which acts as a real ‘middleman’ (E3, E8). Moreover, experts have noticed Romania’s limited initiatives in relation to the eastern vicinity and the fact that the country has frequently acted as an enforcer of the EU and NATO policies rather than trying to upload at the multilateral level policy initiatives by itself (E3, E6, E8, E9, E11, E12). Iulia Joja holds that ‘Romania has difficulty uploading its national interests to the multinational, EU and NATO level,’ while according to Ileana Racheru’s assessment, ‘Romania has no initiatives, it only puts in place what is given from Brussels; Romania just executes what it is told.’

Romania’s status attributes – external perceptions from Ukraine

In Ukraine, the overall perceptions of Romania’s status with reference to territorial size and geographic location have been split. Romania is referred to as ‘a medium state’ (E18), ‘neither very small, nor big’ (E15), ‘noticeable in the region’ (E27). According to Sergiy Gerasymchuk, ‘Romania by population and territory (…) is not small at all. And this factor plays its role, impacting Romania’s perception by its neighbours since in this part of the world [Eastern Europe] territory and population matter’. However, from this perspective, Ukraine’s potential is seen as much more relevant given Ukraine’s superior size and population (E13, E14, E15, E18, E19, E23, E25).

While recognizing Romania’s economic potential, the experts believe that Romania lags behind other Central Eastern European countries. Meanwhile, Romania is not regarded as a proactive economic actor in relation to Ukraine, considering the modest level of economic cooperation and trade exchanges between the two countries. In fact, most experts believe Romania has not yet reached an important level of economic development to underpin a visible regional profile nor to initiate regional economic initiatives (E13, E14, E16, E21, E22, E25). According to Serhii Bostan, ‘when Romania reaches a higher economic level and is able to compete at least with Poland, then we will be able to speak about some regional economic initiatives led by Romania.’

According to the interviewees, Romania’s status based on the available military resources has been perceived as strongly dependent on its NATO membership (E13, E15, E24, E27). Outside NATO’s framework, the experts consider Romania can exercise only a modest impact on regional security matters. As Yevhen Mahda puts it, ‘considering its NATO membership, I think Romania can be a contributor to security in the region only if it acts together with other NATO states in the region. Individually, I think, it is not capable yet.’ Likewise, Serhii Bostan believes that ‘for the time being, Romania is not a country that, in military terms, could be a leader in the region, not even an agenda-maker. (…) Romania plays a role, but again within NATO’. Such an assessment could be explained by the fact that throughout the past years, ‘Romania’s military expenditures have not been significant; although the military budget has increased over recent years, it still remains small enough to influence anything’ (Mykola Kapitonenko). Against this background, defence cooperation between Romania and Ukraine has been scarce and mainly intermediated by NATO rather than bilaterally (Serhii Feduniak).

Status-related attributes, such as historical experience and culture, have had little impact on Ukraine. According to the experts, Romania is generally ‘terra incognita’ for Ukrainians. Bilateral cooperation in the cultural field has been modest, whereby Romania’s cultural diplomacy has mostly focused on the borderlands where most of the Romanian minority is located, without addressing the Ukrainian society as a whole (E13, E14, E15, E16, E19, E26). Moreover, Tetiana Filevska argues that ‘compared to Poland, cultural cooperation is a completely, radically different experience. In Polish-Ukrainian cultural relations, cooperation is established; there are ongoing institutional links, while interest from both sides exists. And this is constantly increasing (…). With regard to Romania, links are very sporadic, very irregular, there is no sustainable cooperation, and in general, we know very little about each other’s culture.’ Historically, territorial issues (E13, E14, E16, E17, E19, E23, E24, E27) and the rights of the Romanian minority living in Ukraine (E13, E14, E15, E16, E17, E19, E20, E21, E23, E24, E25, E27) have been perceived as most challenging for an improved bilateral dialogue.

In the assessment of domestic institutions and expertise, the other status-related attributes, Romania has been rated positively by the respondents, who indicated Romania’s experience in reducing corruption as the country’s most inspirational achievement for Ukraine’s own institutional efforts (E13, E14, E15, E16, E17, E18, E19, E20, E21, E23, E25, E27). Moreover, most experts have underlined the quality of the Romanian diplomatic service (E13, E16, E17, E18, E21, E27). As indicated by Yaroslav Matiichyk, ‘among [Ukraine’s] neighbouring countries Romania is defined by professional diplomacy. The Romanian diplomatic school has always been at a very high level.’

When evaluating Romania’s participation in the EU and NATO, the general view is that Romania has so far insufficiently capitalized on this component of status. There are two main reasons for this, according to the experts. First, Romania has not been very visible in relation to the eastern neighbourhood, including vis-à-vis Ukraine, while other state actors have overshadowed Romania’s initiatives (for instance, Poland in the eastern neighbourhood). According to Sergiy Gerasymchuk, ‘it is clear that Romania has the ambition to play a role in this region, although Poland is the engine there.’ Second, Romania’s resources to generate stronger activism are still modest. ‘Romania does not yet have sufficient military, social and economic weight (…). Only with the support of the EU, mainly Germany and France, and NATO (the USA) could Romania play a bigger role,’ argues Yaroslav Matiichyk. Overall, Romania’s membership in the EU and NATO is perceived as the main pillar underpinning the country’s regional posture (E13, E15, E16, E18, E19, E21, E22, E25).

Romania’s status attributes – external perceptions from Moldova

When looking at Romania’s size and population, in Moldova, experts believe their neighbour qualifies for a medium-power regional status (E29, E34, E40). Yet, in spite of the relevant size, available natural resources and population, these assets are only partially exploited. According to Igor Munteanu, ‘Romania is a medium-sized country in which there are many unexplored, untapped and unexploited advantages.’ Similarly, Octavian Țîcu holds that ‘Romania has capabilities, especially resources, geographic location, although these assets are not adequately exploited.’ Meanwhile, the region in which the country is located has been perceived as problematic from the security perspective, with Russia and Turkey as the main actors influencing regional developments (E30, E31, E34). Against this backdrop, Romania’s involvement appears only of secondary importance, whereby its actorness hinges on its diplomatic ability to interact with these two states.

The Moldovan experts have acknowledged Romania’s enhanced economic profile in the region, which has also positively impacted the bilateral relationship with Moldova. Nevertheless, Romania has so far shown a rather limited capacity to play a visible economic role in the Moldovan market. Despite the strong trade exchanges between the two countries, Romania has not been perceived as sufficiently able to capitalize on this economic leverage. The small number of foreign direct investments in the Moldovan market made by Romanian companies (particularly in strategic fields such as insurance, finances, postal, telecommunication services or energy) appear to indicate, in fact, a limited role played by Romania in the Moldovan economy (E28, E29, E32, E34). According to Igor Munteanu, ‘Romania is rather idle in terms of investments in the Republic of Moldova and is, generally, missing from the Moldovan economic landscape.’

Overall, experts consider Romania a relevant security and military actor in the region, whose NATO membership augmented the country’s regional standing. In fact, experts point out that in defence- and security-related matters, Romania depends entirely on NATO’s capabilities and on its partnership with the US (E30, E31, E38, E39). According to Ion Șișcanu, ‘Romania’s enormous advantage is the NATO membership and the strategic partnership with the USA.’ Similarly, Anatol Țăranu considers ‘in case this alliance [NATO] did not exist, Romania would have been much more vulnerable.’ Anatol Șalaru believes that Romania’s participation in NATO has positive implications also for the Moldovan – Romanian relations since Romania’s military modernization serves as a good model of reforms for the Moldovan defence sector. Meanwhile, other experts believe that Romania is, in fact, a ‘security-consumer’ rather than a ‘security-provider’ in the region. As such, Romania’s NATO membership has generated a backlash from Russia, which heightened security risks at the regional level. ‘Currently, I believe Romania is not a security-provider but rather a security-consumer. The missile-defence shield and the NATO membership represent a factor of stability for Romania; I do not see it relevant for the Republic of Moldova’ (Octavian Țîcu).

History and culture represent important dimensions which undergird Romania’s posture vis-à-vis Moldova. In spite of the generous support provided by Romania (such as the rehabilitation of cultural site monuments, schools and kindergartens, and annual scholarships to Moldovan students to study in Romania), the expert community considers that Romania has not been fully able to capitalize on these status-related attributes and achieve greater visibility in Moldova (E29, E30, E31, E34, E35, E39). Viorel Chivriga argues that ‘the kindergarten project is a good example of soft power, but often Romania’s actions are not promoted, the information is not disseminated. Romania’s behaviour is characterized by “overmodesty.”’ Moreover, Romanian investments in other areas (namely, in bookstores and libraries, in branches of Romanian universities in Moldova, and in Moldovan mass media, both in the TV and online segments) have been limited, while Romania lacks a well-thought strategy to effectively reach out to all segments of the Moldovan population (E30, E35, E36, E39).

Romania’s image based on its domestic institutional capacity has been generally rated positively by Moldovan experts, who consider Romania a good model for reforms. However, Romania has not managed to capitalize sufficiently at the regional level on the acquired know-how and expertise as an EU/NATO member and make better use of its institutional experience when framing its relations with the immediate eastern neighbourhood, namely, by transferring know-how and EU/ANTO-related expertise to the neighbours that seek closer cooperation with the West. Moreover, according to some interviewees, Romania possesses insufficient expertise in the post-Soviet space since most of the country’s efforts have been devoted to learning the ropes of the Euro-Atlantic organizations. This came at the expense of policies focusing on the eastern neighbourhood (E37, E31, E40). In Octavian Țîcu’s view, ‘Romania does not have a proactive diplomacy towards the east. The first big handicap is the language (…). The lack of an institute specialized in the eastern vicinity is a huge problem for Romania.’ In the same vein, Iulian Fruntașu considers that, ‘to formulate policies, it is important to have experience [and] the necessary knowledge. And unfortunately, Romania does not have that much. There are [only a] few experts in Romania specializing in the post-Soviet space who know Russian and Ukrainian languages.’

At the EU and NATO level, the experts have recognized Romania’s constant preoccupation with keeping the eastern neighbourhood (Moldova, in particular) on the political agenda of the two organizations. However, according to some interviewees, Romania has been less proactive in uploading its own priorities at the organizational level, preferring instead to follow the cues of other Western allies (E28, E35, E39). When assessing Romania’s contribution to the two organizations concerning the region, experts believe that Romania’s input to NATO is much more consistent than the one provided to the EU. In fact, Romania’s impact on the policy-making process in the EU has been perceived as only marginal. According to Octavian Țîcu, ‘Romania does not have the capacity to influence the regional context. Romania does not even have a very well-consolidated position vis-à-vis Ukraine. Romania hid behind the EU and NATO discourse. (…) Romania is under-represented in the EU and has not risen to the capabilities it has. I would have liked Romania to be like Poland, for instance.’

Discussion and conclusions

The article examined Romania’s status based on a set of six valued attributes as perceived both internally (in Romania) and externally (in Ukraine and Moldova). Since status is contingent on social recognition, we have studied internal and external perceptions at the level of the expert communities in the three countries. This has enabled us to compare perceptions in the countries and identify potential external-domestic perception gaps. Overall, most national and foreign experts tend to converge to a similar assessment, namely that Romania’s regional standing is mostly typical of small power (see below Table 1 for a summary of the experts’ assessment).

Table 1. Romania’s status-related attributes – internal and external perceptions.

	Internal perceptions	External perceptions
Attribute	Romania	Ukraine	Moldova
Size (surface and population) and geographic location	Medium	Medium	Medium
Economy	Low	Low	Low
Military	Low	Low	Medium
Historical experience and culture	Low	Low	Medium
Domestic institutions and expertise	Low	Medium	Low
Membership in international organizations (namely, in NATO and the EU)	Low	Low	Low

This finding has multiple explanations. Romania displays strong dependence on the institutional frameworks provided by NATO and the EU. Although, to a certain extent, such external behaviour is natural for a member of a multilateral organization of this kind, the limited number of foreign policy initiatives uploaded at the supranational institutional level, the reduced activism and visibility in the immediate neighbourhood do not undergird medium status aspirations. As long as policy-taking rather than policy-making seems to remain the general blueprint for conducting international affairs, Romania’s status is likely to persist in the ‘small power’ category of states. Critics may challenge this label by drawing on traditional status-related elements to justify Romania’s inclusion in the group of middle powers. Accordingly, the size of its territory and population make the country a potential candidate for the medium power tier of states. Yet, this explanation would be, first, incomplete since currently Romania’s economic and military resources – the other traditional elements underpinning status – are limited. Second, such an explanation would only amount to a narrow structural definition of status, which depends primarily on traditional (quantifiable) status-related resources. Whilst these resources are necessary, they are insufficient to constitute middle power status on their own. A medium power with a frontline state position at the eastern border of the Euro-Atlantic community would be expected to develop an effective presence in the region, constantly initiate and forge policies, ensure follow-up, and have a stronger say in international organizations. So far, Romania appears to have largely focused on being system-supporting, seeking to strengthen the EU’s and NATO’s posture in the eastern neighbourhood. This external behaviour has been labelled by Moga et al. (2021, 619) as the ‘good and reliable member state.’ Be that as it may, according to our research, such a label is insufficient to support Romania’s aspirations for a higher status. On the contrary, Romania appears to be gripped by a certain degree of ambiguity in the enactment of its assumed role of ‘stability provider’ in the region since this role looks, in fact, narrower in geographic scope, limited to its national territory rather than a regional endeavour.

Another explanation for Romania’s ‘small power’ behaviour vis-a-vis its eastern vicinity might lie in ‘hiding and biding’ strategy, whereby some states (usually ‘small’) choose to ‘stay out of trouble by staying out of sight’ (hiding), preferring instead to prevent risks from unfolding by participating in rule-based international organizations and alliances (biding) (Wivel 2010, 16). Accordingly, a small power would prefer to rally behind the agenda set by bigger powers in the alliances rather than advance its own strategic goals. Romania’s discreet regional profile might be justified by the vulnerability of the geopolitical environment. Romania is cognizant of the security risks which stem from its region, at the edge of the Euro-Atlantic community, in the vicinity of Russia. Here, Bucharest appears to follow a Realist approach (Walt 1987, 18) by, first, avoiding being visibly dragged into the quarrels of the great powers and, second, by tending to use its membership in the Euro-Atlantic organizations to balance against threats posed by the volatile region in which it finds itself. The current regional turmoil has faced Romania with a radically different context marked by a revival of security concerns and Cold War-type geopolitical rivalries, which made Bucharest act cautiously in the eastern neighbourhood.

Likewise, Romania’s external behaviour might be explained by looking at the ‘autonomy/influence dilemma,’ whereby a state chooses either to outsource initiative at the supra-institutional level, thus increasing dependency, or assume independent actions on its own, thus risking alienating from others (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010, 9). Our analysis showed that in external matters dealing with the volatile eastern neighbourhood, Romania preferred the former, mainly to contribute to consolidating a common position of the West in the eastern neighbourhood. All these explanations present challenges for Romania’s regional aspirations and reinforce the importance of membership in NATO and the EU for any status-seeking endeavour the country wishes to undertake.

A couple of limitations of this study should be considered. Theoretically, the analytical framework presented in this study, built upon a set of six status-related attributes, does not claim to provide a fully conclusive and exhaustive account of all possible resources that constitute status. Since in the literature there are no satisfying criteria of what shapes status, future studies might consider other taxonomies, which could include additional status-related attributes, such as technology and innovation or nation branding (see, for instance, Brooks and Wohlforth 2015; Dinnie 2015). Moreover, clear-cut distinctions between small and medium powers are not always easy to draw as countries considered small can sometimes have clout in specific issues (for example, a policy and/or an external dossier) where it is able to achieve middle power quality while lagging behind in other domains. Similarly, a state can lose its middle status as soon as its ability to contribute to a given issue in international affairs reduces or becomes irrelevant. From this perspective, status is fluid and temporary (for more details, see Chapnick 1999).

Here, a caveat should be considered. Since the analysis of Romania’s status accounts only for domestic and external perceptions recorded before the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and the 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine, we are aware that the assessment of the status-related attributes might have changed over time. Thus, replications of this kind of study are welcomed since perceptions are influenced by events (e.g. regional or international crises, national elections). For instance, the support provided to Moldova to combat the Covid-19 pandemic or the humanitarian aid measures to help Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion might have altered some of the perceptions of the expert community in the three countries. Empirically, this analysis has limited itself to the expert perceptions in the countries from Romania’s immediate eastern proximity (in Ukraine and Moldova) since the post-Soviet space bordering Romania has constantly been indicated as a top foreign policy preoccupation. Future studies could also look at the expert perceptions in other neighbouring countries around the Black Sea basin or even at the wider European/international level to provide a comprehensive analysis of Romania’s status. Such endeavour could have important implications for understanding the distribution of state power and influence in the region, particularly now against the backdrop of the war between Russia and Ukraine. In addition to the observations made by the experts, another promising avenue for research could entail surveying societal perceptions in the neighbouring countries, which might provide broader information about the factors propelling or limiting the country’s regional standing. Sometimes societal perceptions might provide a blunter assessment of the country’s resources which could also be valuable when thinking of ways of enhancing status. Finally, in case the impression that Romania underperforms in the region in spite of its available resources persists, future analyses might consider doing causal-process tracing and looking at the chain of events and political decisions which have brought about the country’s current image. Likewise, future studies may still challenge the ‘small power’ label and provide arguments for the inclusion of Romania in the middle-power group of states. Either research endeavours are equally welcomed.

The study of Romania’s status is an informative case for assessing a country’s current status, which may provide feedback in the domestic decision-making process and bring about more strategic clarity about Romania’s regional ambitions. We believe acting as a medium power, that is, increasing the country’s activism in the region, displaying stronger political will and devoting additional resources to achieve this status, has many potential positive implications for the future security and stability of the wider region and for the resilience of south-eastern flank of the EU and NATO structures. For instance, enhanced defence and military cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, or stronger support for the two neighbours to tackle domestic challenges, such as the ones related to the rule of law, democracy promotion, good governance and justice reform could ultimately elevate Romania’s regional profile. As it stands, under the current status, questions remain on whether Romania truly desires to play a stronger and much more visible regional role or, perhaps, caution and restraint constitute a deliberate foreign policy choice (i.e. the main rationale behind the country’s conduct of external affairs). It is, thus, hoped that this article provides at the academic and policy-making levels at least some basis for thinking about ways of enhancing Romania’s standing in a potentially transformed geopolitical configuration of the region, given the volatile security environment generated by the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian Ministry of Research and Innovation, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2016-0073, within PNCDI III. Authors are thankful to Romanian Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, within Program 1 – Development of the national RD system, Subprogram 1.2 – Institutional Performance – RDI excellence funding projects, Contract no.11PFE/30.12.2021, for financial support.

Notes on contributors

Teodor Lucian Moga

Teodor Lucian Moga is lecturer in IR and European studies at the Centre for European Studies, Faculty of Law, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi (UAIC). He previously pursued a PhD in Economics and International Relations at UAIC and a MA in Political Science at the University of Manchester, UK. In the past he worked for the European Commission, British Embassy (Bucharest, Romania) and held appointments at the at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (Paris, France), the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany) and the Romanian Academy of Science. His research interests include the EU foreign affairs, NATO, EU-Russia relations, ENP, EaP, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania’s foreign policy.

Nadiia Bureiko

Nadiia Bureiko is ‘Ukraine Abroad’ Programme Director at the Foreign Policy Council ‘Ukrainian Prism’. Nadiia completed her post-doctoral research at the University of St. Gallen and a research fellowship at the New Europe College. Prior to this, Nadiia Bureiko obtained her MA in International Relations and PhD in Political Science at Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University where she also worked as an assistant at the Department of International Relations. Her research interests include the Europeanization process, Ukraine’s foreign policy, national identity.

Notes

1. Launched in 2007, BSS aimed at encouraging regional development and address economic and political challenges existing in the countries surrounding the Black Sea. Romania has been a vocal supporter – together with Bulgaria and Greece – of the creation of BSS (European External Action Service 2021).

2. The authors are aware of the conceptual challenges to define a ‘small power’ (see, for instance, Toje 2008, 200–203). Yet, we use ‘small power’ status, first, to clearly distinguish this category from ‘micro-states’ (e.g., Lichtenstein, Monaco, San Marino) and, second, to indicate in particular a state unable to project much power externally.

3. At the time being, this is the longest external land border (roughly 1840 km) belonging to a country, which is both a NATO and a EU member.

4. For further discussion see, for instance, Götz (2021).

5. Decision about which attributes to select to operationalize the concept of status is driven, first, by some of the most frequently identified factors in the literature and, second, by the specific regional context in relation to which Romania’s profile is analyzed (namely, vis-à-vis the immediate eastern neighbourhood).

6. References to Moldova and Ukraine figure most in the 2020 Romania’s National Defence Strategy.

7. Moldova was in 2020 the main recipient of Romania’s official assistance with 70.92% (roughly 47 million Euro) of the assistance provided at the bilateral level, while Ukraine received only 3.43% (around 2.3 million Euro) (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021).

8. All the affiliations indicated in Annexe 1–3 correspond to the date when the interview was conducted. All the opinions expressed in this study are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institutions the interviewed experts are affiliated with.

Appendix

List of experts interviewed between November 2019 and April 2020⁸:

Romania

Expert 1. Claudiu Degeratu, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, the Romanian Academy

Expert 2. Iulian Fota, Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy

Expert 3. Armand Goșu, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest

Expert 4. Angela Grămadă, Experts for Security and Global Affairs Association

Expert 5. Ana Guțu, Department for the Relations with the Republic of Moldova, Government of Romania

Expert 6. Iulia Joja, Frontier Europe Initiative, Middle East Institute, Georgetown University

Expert 7. Radu Magdin, Smartlink Communications

Expert 8. Hari Bucur Marcu, Săliște Association for the Romanian Europeanism

Expert 9. Siegfried Mureșan, European Parliament, Group of the European People’s Party

Expert 10. Petrișor Peiu, Department of Economic Analysis, the Black Sea University Foundation

Expert 11. Ileana Racheru, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest

Expert 12. Eugen Tomac, European Parliament, Group of the European People’s Party

Ukraine

Expert 13. Serhii Bostan, Institute for Political and Geopolitical Researches

Expert 14. Serhii Hakman, Euroregion ‘Upper Prut’ Working Committee on Interregional and International Relations, Local Self Governance and Mass Media

Expert 15. Yevhen Mahda, Institute for World Politics

Expert 16. Sergiy Gerasymchuk, Foreign Policy Council ’Ukrainian Prism’

Expert 17. Andrii Veselovskyi, Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Expert 18. Mykola Kapitonenko, Institute of International Relations Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Expert 19. Policy maker, name remained anonymous, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Expert 20. Nataliia Belitser, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy

Expert 21. Yaroslav Matiichyk, MFA Public Council, Group for Strategic and Security Studies

Expert 22. Policy maker, name and affiliation remained anonymous

Expert 23. Policy maker, name and affiliation remained anonymous

Expert 24. Oleksii Poltorakov, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Expert 25. Expert, name remained anonymous, Ukrainian Institute for International Politics

Expert 26. Tetiana Filevska, Ukrainian institute

Expert 27. Serhii Feduniak, Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University

Moldova

Expert 28. Ilian Cașu, ‘Our Party’ Political Party

Expert 29. Viorel Chivriga, IDIS Viitorul

Expert 30. Iulian Groza, Institute for European Policies and Reforms

Expert 31. Iulian Fruntașu, TVRM

Expert 32. Veaceslav Ioniță, IDIS Viitorul

Expert 33. Daniela Morari, Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union

Expert 34. Igor Munteanu, Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, ACUM Political Party, DA Platform

Expert 35. Iurie Reniță, Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, ACUM Political Party, DA Platform

Expert 36. Natalia Stercul, Foreign Policy Association of Moldova

Expert 37. Anatol Șalaru, National Unity Party

Expert 38. Ion Șișcanu, Institute of History, Academic of Science of Moldova

Expert 39. Anatol Țăranu, Centre for Strategic Research and Political Consultancy (POLITICON)

Expert 40. Octavian Țîcu, Institute of History, Academic of Science of Moldova