Divine Design and the Creation-Evolution Debate as Questions for Christian-Muslim Dialogue

ABSTRACT

Inter-religious discussion on science and religion can help focus on neglected theological and metaphysical aspects. Here, I consider two examples of this: (1) the effect of models of divine action on design arguments, and (2) the effect of theological hermeneutics on the creation-evolution debate. Regarding design arguments, I analyze and respond to Shoaib A. Malik’s four Ashʿari criticisms of the design argument. Regarding theological hermeneutics, and building on Malik’s analysis, I use the debates over the Age of the Earth and the Flood as a test case of the differences between Christian and Muslim ways of interpretation.

KEYWORDS:

• Islam and evolution
• theology of evolution
• design argument
• science and religion
• creationism
• Shoaib A. Malik

Introduction

Shoaib A. Malik’s Islam and Evolution showcases the benefits of interreligious engagement for the field of science and religion.¹ The debates over creationism and Intelligent Design have commonly been highly polemical due to the high importance of origins questions for worldviews. ID proponent William A. Dembski, for example, argued that the debate over evolution is the “ground zero” of the U.S. culture wars, claiming that “ultimately, the problem is whether reality at its base is purposive and intelligent or mindless and material.”² Meanwhile, critics have pointed to ID as an attempt to bring back the clock to a supposed Medieval theocratic dark age, remodeling the sciences of origins to fit a religious conception.³ Against this background, Malik’s analysis is refreshingly non-polemical while also providing an interesting mirror for the Christian and secular discussion of the same topics.

Malik’s book is broad in scope, making it impossible to evaluate and respond to everything in the book. Nor would there be a need to do so—although critical comments can be made, Malik has competently mapped out the intellectual terrain. In this article, I will focus on two issues most relevant to my own research interests: (1) the effect of models of divine action on design arguments, and (2) the effect of theological hermeneutics on the creation-evolution debate.

Regarding divine action, I am in agreement with Malik’s emphasis on the compatibility of natural causes (including evolution) and God’s providence. In his own contribution to this special issue, Gijsbert van Den Brink helpfully calls attention to some places where Malik’s characterization of models of divine action might be clarified. My own focus here is on the relationship of design arguments and divine action models. In my view, despite theological criticisms against forms of creationism, there is ultimately no theological “silver bullet” that alone suffices to show us that evolution instead of an “interventionist” or miraculous design was God’s means of creation. All theological models are indeed not equally hospitable to all design arguments. For example, any model rejecting “miraculous” divine action within history would have to place design only at the start of the universe. Andfor those not open to the idea of evidence supporting religious belief, then this would make one wary of design arguments as well.⁴ However, an empirically and philosophically credible design argument would itself have to be dealt with by models of divine action. Thus an empirical and philosophical evaluation of the credibility of the premises of design arguments is essential. However, against some proponents of design arguments, I have also argued that the common opposition between natural causes and divine design is unnecessary—instead, evolution and design are compatible.⁵

Might similar conclusions also be compatible with an Islamic perspective? In the first part of this article, I evaluate Malik’s Ashʿari theological critique of the ID movement, and explore potential theological common ground in detecting signs of purpose in nature. While I agree with Malik’s critique against the unnecessary opposition of natural causes and divine action, his critique of the ID movement’s design arguments is of such broad scope that it would affect other forms of theistic arguments as well, and thus needs to be considered by non-ID proponents as well.

However, while I’ve argued that philosophical and empirical factors are important for evaluating design arguments, certainly theological reasons are also central for the creation-evolution debate, and Malik’s book provides a rich starting point for discussing them. In the second part of the article, I therefore also tackle the central issue of theological hermeneutics, a topic in which I think inter-religious dialogue could potentially provide great benefits by providing a second set of scriptures and another interpretative tradition as a point of comparison. I will begin, however, with Malik’s theological critique of some design arguments.

Part 1. Malik’s Theological Critique of Design Arguments

Malik divides his theological critique of the ID movement’s design arguments into four problems: (A) The localization problem, (B) the specification problem, (C) the tentative abduction problem, and (D) the contingency problem. I found that Malik’s critiques at each point are largely based on premises that Muslims and Christians can share, and were mostly issues that are already familiar from the Christian theological debate. There is thus grounds for discussing the extent to which similar responses might apply in the case of both religions.

A. The Localization Problem

Malik argues that ID’s design arguments improperly limit divine action merely to certain features, such as those that exhibit Dembski’s “specified complex information”⁶ or Behe’s “irreducible complexity.”⁷ This then leads to a problem that Malik identifies as follows:

Al-Ghazālī’s Ashʿarism prescribes an occasionalist outlook. This entails that regardless of whether entitles are complex, somewhat complex, or very simple (non-designed or rudimentary), they are all created and sustained by God. Therefore, limiting God to be responsible only for complex features while ignoring everything else is astoundingly inconsistent.⁸

Many Christian (typically non-occasionalist) critics of ID also see ID as making a “God of the gaps” argument, limiting divine action merely to “gaps” in nature.⁹ This is inaccurate, however, since ID proponents do not restrict God’s activity merely to such gaps.¹⁰ In my own reading of the literature, I have not seen the central ID proponents claim anywhere that God is only responsible for the features their argument identifies as designed. Instead, they claim the opposite. For example, Dembski states that “not only has God created the world, but also God upholds the world moment by moment.”¹¹ Yet he does not claim that his design argument would allow us to detect this moment by moment divine action. Dembski means his “explanatory filter” to only catch some acts of design that are detectable to humans, and grants that God (and even other designers) can also act in ways that are not detectable through these means. He writes, for example, that “when for whatever reason an intelligent cause fails to make its actions evident, we may miss it”¹² and that there is a “problem of false negatives” which “arises either when an intelligent agent has acted (whether consciously or unconsciously) to conceal its actions or when an intelligent agent, in trying to detect design, lacks knowledge essential for detecting it.”¹³

Thus a hypothetical occasionalist ID proponent might reason as follows: Even though God is responsible for everything in creation, God has graciously made some patterns stand out from the rest of God’s action in nature as special signs that we humans are able to recognize. These can (the ID proponent might argue) be identified through the design inferences that Dembski and other ID proponents defend, while still maintaining on other grounds that God is responsible for other things as well. Similarly, while God is responsible for creating all humans, and all human speech is dependent on God, not all human beings are divinely sent prophets whose words convey God’s special message to us. Thus the localization problem seems avoidable.

B. The Specification Problem

The second problem pointed out by Malik is that ID thinkers do not think the design argument by itself suffices to identify the designer as God:

Given ID and what can be determined from the argument, the best that can be determined is that all entities that exhibit complexity have a designer of some sorts. By extension, as the sophistication of such entities increases, so does the designer’s intellectual requirements and capabilities. This does not, however, logically land us to God, who is omniscient and omnipotent. One would need extra premises or arguments to show how the designer is God rather than someone or something else.¹⁴

This, argues Malik, greatly limits the usefulness of ID for religious belief. If the biological design argument is equally compatible with atheism, while evolution is equally compatible with theism, it is not clear what benefit religious believers get from choosing ID over evolution. He calls this the “specification problem” for ID.

I agree with Malik that evolution is compatible with theism (and even design arguments, I would add). But existing literature provides many potential ways of gaining some sort of theological benefit from design arguments, which seem to respond to the specification problem.

First, it seems that natural theological arguments do not generally have to prove all properties of God in order to be interesting.¹⁵ In contemporary discussion, proponents of cumulative case approaches argue that individual theistic arguments only need to raise the probability of God’s existence relative to naturalism.¹⁶ The logical compatibility of design arguments with other views does not yet mean that they could not probabilistically support theism over naturalism, for example if an ordered and life-permitting cosmos is more likely on theism than on naturalism. This is so even if an ordered and life-permitting cosmos might also be explained by the idea of a limited designer.

Another approach is the religious natural theology of thinkers like Alister McGrath.¹⁷ In this approach, there is no need for the natural theologian to begin from supposedly neutral presuppositions. Rather, one can start from the existence of God as understood in one’s theological tradition and then study what sort of correlations, resonance and corroboration between religious belief and nature there might be, without need for proving God. The orderliness of the cosmos and life might certainly be an example of a resonance between religious belief and empirical evidence, even if the order of nature is insufficient to prove God’s attributes as such.

Second (2), ID proponents¹⁸ and many critics of ID¹⁹ claim that the design argument leads quite naturally to further questions that then lead to discussion of God. For instance, answering the question “who created the designer” should (or at least plausibly could) lead to a stopping point with an uncreated designed—thus leading to religious implications, which according to critics should prevent the teaching of ID in public schools. One might also claim that even without other supporting arguments, our cultural context may already be sufficient to make naturalism and theism the most credible alternatives for explaining the order of nature.²⁰ In practice seeing the designer as Thor, for example, is simply not a live option for most people, having already been rejected historically.

Third (3), it might be argued that design arguments could already be valuable in providing corroboration for an aspect of the historical theistic doctrine of creation, namely that nature has a purposeful and intentionally created order.²¹ In religious apologetics, both Christians and Muslims commonly present arguments that can corroborate at most aspects of their doctrines. For example, Christians commonly quote the historian’s consensus (and the associated evidence) that Jesus was crucified, and Muslims are happy to refer to historians’ findings on Medieval Islamic science to show that Islam is not inherently anti-scientific.²² In such cases, the arguments aim at a more limited conclusion than demonstrating God’s existence or even the truth of a religion—the arguments are even compatible with atheism. Yet this does not mean such partial confirmation or corroboration is not interesting from a religious standpoint. There is indeed a great (even infinite) metaphysical difference between a limited Creator and an omnipotent one. But this does not show that the logical and practical step between belief in some kind of Creator and belief in the Creator is as great.²³ In practice an atheist believing that a powerful and wise being purposefully created the universe and life would already be affirming claims that are part of traditional theism—would this really not bring their position or attitudes at all closer to religious believers?

Fourth (4), if the specification problem were a serious problem for design arguments, then more needs to be said on why it is not also a similar problem for many other arguments. For instance, is not the cosmological argument (the contingency argument), favored by Malik, itself also limited? Classical versions of the cosmological argument do end up affirming a robust understanding of God—but this will still not be everything that the theist would want to say about God.²⁴ Many defenders admit there is need to combine cosmological arguments with other reasons, such as the design argument, to affirm that the First Cause or necessary being responsible for the cosmos has awareness and acted intentionally.²⁵ But even this is not yet sufficient for identifying the God of the cosmological argument with a particular religion. So it seems the specification problem might apply here as well; but why then is it especially a problem for design arguments?

Application of the specification problem to the Muslim argument from the inimitability of the Qur’an (Sura 2:23) is another example. This argument for the divine origins of the Qur’an is based on the idea that the Qur’anic text cannot be imitated by humans, and that this points to its divine origins. The claim is denied by non-Muslim critics, who argue that (1) there are many works which match or exceed the Qur’an’s quality, (2) that eloquence or uniqueness are not reliable criterions of truth or divine origins, there being many works which have a unique style, and even (3) that the Qur’an itself imitates and repeats previous stories, or is otherwise not that unique.²⁶ But another common critique is based on the specification problem, similarly to Malik’s critique of design arguments. Supposing that n number of people are unable to match the quality of a work of art or literature on some criteria, this would not show that humanity as a whole is unable to do so or that an omnipotent, omniscient divine cause must be responsible, paralleling the specification problem. As an analogy, the inimitability of Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, despite many attempts by contemporary authors of fantasy fiction, does not prove that Tolkien’s book is divinely inspired.

I have to admit that I do not see the inimitability argument as salvageable or credible at all. My point is simply that for those Muslims who do see this argument as having value despite the specification problem, probably it would then be inconsistent to regard the problem as refuting design arguments. For example, perhaps the inimitability argument might be constructed as an abductive inference providing merely evidential support for divine origins, part of a broader case for Islam. But then it would be no problem if the design argument also has limits.

C. The Tentative Abduction Problem

Malik argues that probabilistic design arguments are problematic because they can be refuted by future evidence:

Unless this has been categorically ruled out, which it hasn’t, this makes ID as some kind of an argument for God tentative. This would be extremely problematic within an Ashʿarite paradigm. Al-Ghazālī would never place God in a provisional position that could one day be undermined in light of new scientific evidence (no matter how improbable) since God and natural explanations can never compete.²⁷

Malik seems to be arguing here that (1) all arguments regarding divine action with empirical premises are tentative in character, (2) tentative arguments regarding divine action would place God in a provisional position that could one day be undermined, (3) this is theologically problematic, (4) the design argument depends on empirical evidence and is thus tentative, and thus (5) design arguments are theologically problematic.

But why should presenting an abductive argument for God place God in a provisional position (premise 2)? I believe what Malik is saying is not that abduction places God in a provisional position in a metaphysical sense (an impossibility), but that such arguments make human knowledge of God provisional. There is need for clarification here, as I am not sure why it would be a problem for our religious epistemology to allow for adjustment based on new evidence. But it seems to me that proponents of abductive and empirically based natural theology (not restricted to design arguments) have further replies available.

First, it seems that contingency-based cosmological arguments, favored by Malik, are also tentative in the sense of being open to refutation. Cosmological arguments are indeed not typically presented in abductive form, but rather as deductive series of premises culminating in a conclusion. However, our evaluation of the reliability and formulation of these premises can change over time, and indeed has developed historically as religious believers have also disagreed about matters like the impossibility of an infinite series of events.²⁸ Thus the deductive form is no guarantee of an argument not being tentative.

Malik could respond by arguing that cosmological arguments are based on premises that, if correct, would be true in all possible worlds. If nothing contingent can exist without a necessary ground of being, then this would have to be necessarily true, not merely contingently true in our world. In contrast, not all possible worlds need contain God-given evidence of design. However, this metaphysical difference makes little difference from the epistemic standpoint. From the point of view of human knowledge of the premises, both arguments could in principle be equally open to refutation. The metaphysical necessity of a truth does not yet make knowledge of that truth necessary.

Scientific testability is another potential difference between the arguments. The premises about contingency and necessity are philosophical, and not dependent on any scientific details—although some modern cosmological arguments utilize scientific evidence as additional support for the premises.²⁹ However, a premise being empirically rather philosophically supported does not necessarily make it less certain. There are also scientific claims that we can be very certain about, and tentatively held philosophical ideas.

So, perhaps the problem could be that ID-style design arguments have contentious or weakly supported scientific premises. This would then make them much more likely to be overturned by future science than cosmological arguments. But Malik does not seem to be arguing just from the relative uncertainty of ID arguments, but appears to see a fundamental difference in tentativeness, even if we granted that the best currently available evidence supports ID.

Second, many other religious arguments also have premises that are tentative in the sense of being dependent on empirical findings. Again, in cumulative natural theology the force of each line of argument can be adjusted with additional evidence.³⁰ A Catholic Christian might defend the reality of many miracle claims attested by the Vatican’s miracle commission, and might say that evidence of such miracles is religiously valuable, but they would hardly think the truthfulness of the Catholic faith depends on it.³¹ And popular Muslim arguments also have empirical and contentious premises, such as with the perfect preservation of the Qur’an.³² So many would have reason to deny that empirical dependence is theologically problematic. Similarly, could not design arguments also have some payoff that makes the possibility of being wrong worth it?

I agree with the general idea that faith in the Creator does not and should not depend on an opposition between natural explanations and creation. This just does not seem to necessarily prevent any type of design argument.

D. The Contingency Problem

According to Malik, the issue of contingency “may be the most contentious issue al-Ghazālī might have with ID.”³³ The problem is that in light of divine freedom,

God can easily create worlds that are equally complex/designed as this world, more complex/designed than this world (i.e. more finely tuned or more improbable scenarios), and even less complex/designed than this world. [… } The key point is that contingency is much more foundational than design in the Ashʿarite paradigm. Given this, al-Ghazālī’s framework would have no problem accepting any kind of scientific theory that has chance elements or lack of design in it.³⁴

Divine freedom in creation (a premise shared by historical Christian theology) does not seem to make design arguments impossible, however, since this still allows God to freely (rather than necessarily) give humanity signs of God. One might similarly argue that God was under no obligation or necessity to give prophets or to become incarnate. Yet Muslims and Christians would agree that this does not prevent recognition of the prophets and revelation God did send. But then why should contingency prevent the recognition of signs of design in nature, if God did choose to grant such signs? Divine freedom would allow God even to choose another way of creation besides evolution, although such is not required by all design arguments.

The implications of the contingency problem for design arguments need further investigation especially since, as Malik admits, “one can identify design-like arguments in [al-Ghazālī’s] theological works.”³⁵ Given that cosmological arguments are more fundamental for him, what then were his own grounds for utilizing design arguments?

Overall, Malik’s theological analysis of ID understandably focuses on the question of what sort of belief is obligatory for Muslims, and his argument is that theology leaves us free to follow the scientific evidence on evolution and does not make belief in any kind of design argument obligatory. This is a valuable conclusion. However, it still leaves room for further discussion regarding the question of what beliefs about design might be salutary, harmful, probable or improbable. Even though it is not theologically obligatory to follow a particular line of evidence for God’s existence, such evidence might nevertheless be of interest to believers for other reasons. Perhaps a philosophical analysis of design might help defend the rationality of religious beliefs on the purposiveness of nature. At the same time, Malik’s mapping of potential theological pitfalls should be welcomed by proponents of design arguments.

Part 2. Improving Dialogue on Theological Hermeneutics

Malik’s comparison Christian and Muslim views on creation and evolution is one of his book’s refreshing contributions to the science and religion literature. All too often, discussions of these issues take into account only one religious perspective. Malik provides a good overview of many scriptural statements and doctrines that are important in both religious traditions. However, some important underlying issues in theological hermeneutics would deserve more attention. In other words, theological hermeneutics is not only about understanding certain texts, but also about understanding historically developed ways of reading these texts and relating these texts to experience.

The interpretation of Holy Scripture does not depend merely on individual texts, but also on overall issues like different understandings of what it means for Scriptures to be “God’s revelation,” how the genre of the book of Genesis (“mytho-history” or literal history) influences interpretation, whether the ancient context should be taken into account, the relationship between the interpretation of Scripture and the “Book of nature,” and the weight that should be accorded to tradition in guiding interpretation. For instance, in the Christian context, the resolution of the Copernican controversy (though often distorted through mythic retellings) continues to be seen by many Christians as a validation of the Augustinian approach that the Bible’s intent is not to communicate on scientific matters.³⁶ The development of biblical hermeneutics in response to the historical-critical study of the Bible also seems to create differences between the Christian and Muslim discussions, as Gijsbert van Den Brink notes in his contribution to this special issue.

Might similar historical developments also be discerned in the interpretation of the Qur’an, and what sort of similarities and differences would Malik see between Christianity and Islam on these issues? Many Christians would not, for example, find it problematic for God to accommodate ancient science in communicating a theological message, although other Christians do emphasize that the Bible avoids affirming any scientific errors.³⁷ Are there similarly varying views among Muslims regarding accommodation in the Qur’an and the authority of the tradition, and are varying attitudes on historical-critical study of the Qur’an possible?

Religious polemics complicates dialogue on these topics, because attempting to expose scientific errors in the other side’s scriptures has been a recurring theme in Christian-Muslim debates. Such polemics can violate intellectual integrity by applying much stricter criteria of error to the other side’s scriptures. This is not to claim that the Bible and/or the Qur’an/Hadith cannot have real scientific errors, or that some harmonizations of claimed scientific errors may not be more implausible than others. Many cases are unique to their respective tradition, such as calculating the number of pi based on the rounded measurements in the Bible (1. Kings 7:23), or the hadith claim that Adam was originally 30 meters tall, and human height has been decreasing ever since.³⁸ Critical discussion of scripture should remain possible, and our standards should not make it impossible to ever detect scientific errors in religious texts, but such criteria should be applied fairly across traditions. Thus scholars could clarify issues like the varying models of the purpose and character of inspired scriptures, the difference between exegesis and eisegesis, and so on.

In this section, I will focus on how the creation-evolution discussion might benefit from such analysis. I will begin by noting the effect of polemical apologetics, enormously influential in the background of Muslim science and religion discussion, and go on to discuss theological hermeneutics.

A. Science and Inter-Religious Polemics

A popular Muslim critique of the Bible has been based on its alleged errors on the age of the Earth and the global nature of the Flood. The general tenor of this polemic probably traces back to the Muslim reception of the nineteenth century conflict thesis—John William Draper’s negative portrayal of Christianity’s relationship with science, and his positive claims regarding Islam soon found apologetic use among Muslims.³⁹ However, the popularity of the critique owes much to the highly influential work of Maurice Bucaille (1920–1998). Bucaille, once a physician to the Saudi royal family, is famous for his 1976 book The Bible, The Qur’an and Science, presenting alleged scientific miracles in the Qur’an.⁴⁰ The impact of his work, together with the Saudi-sponsored “International Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur’an and the Sunnah,” continues to this day, with pamphlets and videos on YouTube by popular Muslim apologists continuing the exposition of alleged scientific miracles in the Qur’an. Dr. Malik is laudably one of the new generation of Muslim scholars who have recognized the problematic nature of such arguments.⁴¹

But Bucaille also claimed that the Qur’anic text is superior to the Bible in not teaching a global flood or a young Earth. He writes that the Qur’anic creation “days” should be read as six “periods” of creation, although “modern science has not permitted man to establish the fact that the complicated stages in the process leading to the formation of the Universe numbered six.”⁴² The Qur’anic flood accounts, he states, only speak of a local judgment rather than a global one. This strategy of using scientific errors as proof of the Bible’s corruptions is a central part of Bucaille’s argumentation, and has been adopted even by the prominent Muslim creationists such as Harun Yahua.⁴³

An isolated comment on creationism in Malik’s Islam and Evolution might be interpreted as supporting the understanding that the Qur’an is indeed more easily harmonizable with science than the Bible. Here, Malik seems to explain the lack of popularity of Muslim YEC views by reference to scriptural factors:

The Qurʾān does contain verses which mention that the heavens and the earth were created in six days. While these could be interpreted as six 24-hour days, the word for days (yawm) is semantically flexible. It entails any span of time. For this reason, Islamic scripture doesn’t have any tension with an old age of the universe/earth, and it is probably why there is no YEC in the Muslim world (although this has to be stated tentatively).⁴⁴

Similarly, regarding Noah’s flood, Malik writes that:

There contains no definitive statement about this issue in Islamic scripture. Undoubtedly, there are different opinions on the matter. Some suggest a local flood, while others argue for a global one […] Given this ambiguity, Islamic scripture is compatible with either opinion.⁴⁵

There are some Muslims who reject deep time. In Britain, for example, Muslim belief in a young Earth is at 12%. This is lower than Pentecostals (21.2%) and independent Evangelicals (22.4%) but higher than Anglicans (3%) and Catholics (4.6%).⁴⁶ Since Malik is aware of such data, he is probably referring to the lack of Muslim YEC scholars and organizations. Malik’s implied explanation for this seems to be that the Qur’an and the Hadith have less tension with the old age of the universe/Earth than the Bible. However, arguing this would require a more detailed comparison than Malik does in his book.

In arguing that Islam has no definitive position on YEC or the flood, Malik simply points to the existence of alternative explanations for the relevant Islamic texts. However, as Malik acknowledges elsewhere, there are also alternative ways of reading Genesis, many tracing back to the early history of Christian theology.⁴⁷ For example, just as Muslims refer to the indeterminacy of the Qur’anic yawn (day), Christians have utilized the indeterminacy of the biblical yom in arguing that the Genesis days of creation need not be literal. The Qur’an states that “a day with your Lord is like a thousand years” (Sura 22:47), but this is predated by similar Biblical statements (2. Peter 3:8, Psalm 90:4). If a possible harmonization of the text with science is sufficient for showing that there is no definitive Islamic teaching on deep time or the global flood, then by the same criterion the Bible does not definitively teach these things either. But then merely the textual differences would not be sufficient for explaining the popularity of Young-Earth interpretations.

However, scriptural differences having some effect does not require them to be the sole explanation, and an interpretation that is not “definitive” could still be more or less probable. Thus one could try to argue that creationist interpretations have better grounds in one set of scriptures even if alternative readings are possible in both. But justifying this would require a detailed comparison of the relevant texts and hermeneutics across traditions. To help evaluate the issue, in the following part of this section, I will formulate a brief comparative analysis. This requires constructing some possible scriptural arguments for a Muslim YEC interpretation, and then comparing those (and the responses) with Christian ones.⁴⁸

B. A Muslim YEC Thought Experiment

Young Earth interpretations of the Bible are not concerned merely with particular scriptural passages, but also rely on hermeneutical principles like the clarity of scripture. Based on the idea that God’s communication in the Bible must have been meant to be clearly understandable by everyone, Christian Young Earthers argue, for example, that the Genesis “days” should be understood according to ordinary, everyday meaning—a regular 24 h day.⁴⁹ A hypothetical Muslim YEC might similarly argue that the Qur’an being meant to be a “clear book” (e.g. Sura 27:1) means that the everyday meaning of the word “day” should be the default reading. The answer in both religions would be to point to the historically recognized limits of principles of clarity—perhaps, for example, clarity is related to the main theological or moral message, and the intent of the divine communication should not be understood to be scientific. But the point here is that there are Islamic analogues to the kind of hermeneutical principles used by Christian YEC’s.

Another Young Earth argument is that old Earth-compatible readings of scriptures are not based on the texts themselves, but on a forced accommodation of these texts to science, since literal interpretations were common in pre-scientific times. A hypothetical Muslim YEC would similarly argue the case for literalism based on the special significance of how the first few generations of Muslims, starting from the authoritative “best generation,”⁵⁰ interpreted the days of creation, the order of creation and the globality of the Flood. Early Muslim historian Al-Tabari (838–923) argues that:

There is (also) a sound tradition from the Messenger of God told us by Hannad b. al-Sari, who also said that he read all of the hadith (to Abu Bakr) […] The Jews came to the Prophet and asked him about the creation of the heavens and the earth. He said: God created the earth on Sunday and Monday. He created the mountains and the uses they possess on Tuesday. On Wednesday, He created trees, water, cities and the cultivated and barren land. These are four (days). […] On Thursday, He created heaven. On Friday, He created the stars, the sun, the moon, and the angels, until three hours remained. In the first of these three hours, He created the terms (of human life), who would live and who would die. In the second, He cast harm upon everything that is useful for mankind. And in the third, (He created) Adam and had him dwell in Paradise.⁵¹

The hadith quoted by al-Tabari here is not part of the collections generally regarded as authoritative by Muslims, although it is a version of a hadith from Imam Muslim’s (815–875) authoritative collection that Malik also quotes.⁵² The influential Ibn Kathir (1300–1373) similarly argues that the six days of creation in Qur’an 7:54 are Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.⁵³ The Muslim YEC would argue that it makes little sense to name long periods of time by the name of weekdays.

One counterargument Malik points out is that there is variance in different hadiths on what happened on each day.⁵⁴ However, these are the kind of details that would be more difficult to remember than the general idea of identifying the days of creation with regular weekdays. Al-Tabari does state that some think God’s days of creation were a thousand years each—but that is fixed period of a definite duration nonetheless.⁵⁵ Al-Tabari saw the young age of the world as the consensus views of scholars of his time, noting that scholars estimated the total extent of time as being between 6000 and 7000 years.⁵⁶ His particular calculation could not be accepted by modern Muslims, since it depended on hadith stating that the end of the world would happen only 500 years after the death of Mohammed.⁵⁷ But al-Tabari does point to other still relevant hadith, such as the claim (on Mohammed’s authority) that there were only “ten centuries” (or “generations”) between Adam and Noah.⁵⁸ This is repeated in several less known collections, many also including the statement that there were ten centuries (or generations) from Noah to Abraham. Jalajel argues that “this addition still does not help much in determining the time period” because the length of a generation is ambiguous.⁵⁹ Our hypothetical Muslim YEC would see this as a weak reply, since a generation time of even an unrealistic thousand years would still lead to a young age for humanity, assuming that Adam was the first human being.⁶⁰

The issue of the Qur’anic order of creation would be another core issue. This Muslim Young Earther argument would directly parallel Christian claims that the order of creation in Genesis does not match Big Bang cosmology.⁶¹ As Malik discusses, Sura 41:9–12, taken at face value, teaches that the Earth was created before the heavens.⁶² This seems to have been the dominant interpretation early on. Al-Tabari states forcefully that “on the authority of the Messenger of God and those who mentioned them on his authority, have made it clear that God created the heavens and the earth before he created time, day and night, the sun and the moon. God knows best!”⁶³ Similarly, Ibn Kathir states as the scholar’s near-unanimous view that the Earth was created before the sky: “Allah says that He created the earth first, because it is the foundation, and the foundation should be built first, then the roof.”⁶⁴

Malik and Jalajel argue that the connective “then” (thumma) in the Qur’anic passage could also be understood as non-chronological—indicating merely that “the heavens are grander than the earth”—and are able to quote one classical scholar in support.⁶⁵ A Muslim YEC might contend that hermeneutically it is more credible to interpret “then” according to its normal, common chronological meaning in a narrative text, and that doing otherwise threatens the principle of the clarity of scripture. But what is more intriguing is that Malik’s and Jalajel’s response parallels Augustine, who argued that the days of Genesis 1 are not to be understood as a temporal, but a logical sequence, and recent Christian interpreters who see the days as analogical.⁶⁶

Regarding the case of the Flood, there are also parallels. Christian creationists argue that the instruction for Noah to take all kinds of animals (Genesis 7:2) into the Ark makes sense only if the Flood was global. Similarly, in the Qur’an Noah is instructed to “take into the Ark a pair from every species along with your family” (Surah 11:40). Why, the Muslim global flood advocate could ask, would this be instructed if the Flood was local? Would not “every species” be naturally understood as including all species? In Sura 71, the text presents Noah’s son attempting to climb a mountain to save himself from the flood. However, he is drowned, the ark sailing “amid waves like mountains” (71:42). Noah prays for God not to “leave a single disbeliever on earth” (71:26), and the YEC argument would be that this prayer is implied to be fulfilled, leaving only Noah’s descendants who were on the Ark as survivors (Sura 37:77). Because even mountains were not safe places, surely (the argument goes) nobody could have survived outside the Ark. Thus, “Noah’s people” (Sura 7:59) must have included all living human beings.

Muslim local flood proponents appeal, among other factors, to the indeterminacy of the Qur’anic word “kull” (every, all) about “every species” going on Noah’s ark (Sura 11:40), and the indeterminacy of the “earth” gushing forth water in the same verse.⁶⁷ Similarly, Christian local flood proponents appeal to the indeterminacy of the Biblical “kol” (all) and “eretz” (earth, land).⁶⁸ There are more repetitions of “every” and “all” in the biblical narrative than in the Qur’an, but arguably this just means more applications of the same logic. The term “all the earth” is even used in a limited sense elsewhere in the Bible (e.g. Genesis 41:57). Perhaps Noah could not move to another area since he was fulfilling his task as a “preacher of righteousness” (2. Peter 2:5). Covering the mountains or hills (har) in Genesis might mean, for example, simply that the local landmark hills were covered while the “high mountain ranges surrounding the Mesopotamian region and the Persian Gulf would lie beyond Noah’s line of sight.”⁶⁹ This seems no less credible than the Muslim local flood interpretation.

The ideas of early interpreters are again important to address. Ibn Kathir states that

the face of the earth became gushing water springs. This continued until the water gushed forth from the Tananir, which are places of fire. Therefore, water even gushed from the places where fire normally would be. This is the opinion of the majority of the Salaf (predecessors) and the scholars of the Khalaf (later generations).⁷⁰

Al-Tabari states that the flood covered the entire earth, even the highest mountains, and that the present oceans are from the waters left over.⁷¹ Both portray the worldwide scope of Noah’s Flood as the majority view or even consensus of the scholars of their time. Even today, many Muslims argue that the flood was global.⁷²

Both Christians and Muslims are not necessarily bound by all points of tradition. But these are also interesting as evidence of what earliest interpreters believed. For example, later disagreement regarding the authenticity of widely spread hadith does not yet mean these hadith are not, historically speaking, our best evidence of what early Muslims believed. Many in the early audience of the Qur’anic stories would have likely also understood the Qur’anic narratives as referring to well-known biblical and extra-biblical stories. Supposing that the Qur’an had been instead been meant to correct the biblical flood narrative or the days of creation, we would expect such a correction would be included explicitly in the text—the author knowing that the Qur’an would otherwise be understood according to the culturally common meaning. Instead, the Qur’an typically speaks of the Torah in a very respectful manner (e.g. Sura 5:46; 32:23). Had a correction been intended, then the communication failed to accomplish this, since the idea of the worldwide flood became the dominant interpretation among Muslims. If the Genesis days of creation were not interpreted literally either, this argument loses much of its force—but in that case the scriptural differences would again fail to explain the differences in current beliefs.

I do not mean to argue that the YEC interpretation is necessary or the most credible for the Qur’an or the Bible. There are alternative interpretations, many with roots in early theological history. My point has been simply to evaluate whether scriptural differences might help explain the relative popularity of YEC views. It seems, however, that the arguments for a Young Earth available to the Muslim are at many points similar in strength to Christian ones, and there is also substantial similarity in possible responses. Perhaps the Christian has somewhat more explanatory work to do due to the more detailed nature of the Biblical narratives, but on the other hand, Genesis’ ancient context allows for arguments on Genesis’ genre, and argument for literalism based on early interpreters may be stronger in the case of the Qur’an.

The current obscurity of many relevant hadith—and the possibility of rejecting their authority altogether—is a difference between the Christian and Muslim contexts. The hadith are not read as widely and are not equally authoritative as the Qur’an, as important as they are for grounding central Islamic practices. Hadith which scholars regard as debatable or unimportant will not necessarily even be known by the majority of Muslims. In contrast, the creation narratives and genealogies of Genesis are part of Sacred Scripture and as such would be impossible to remove from commonly known body of evidence. But Christians can also question the precise numbers in the Genesis genealogies (since these differ somewhat among versions of the text) and whether these genealogies are meant to provide materials for a chronology at all.⁷³

Thus, explaining the popularity of creationism would also require other factors, such as (at least) the historical development and popularity of certain ways of interpretation, theological reasons (such as the understanding of the Fall),⁷⁴ and socio-historical factors.⁷⁵

C. Explaining Creationism

Whatever the merits of the scriptural case, the rise of the Christian YEC movement was a historically complex and contingent matter.⁷⁶ During the rise of modern geology, which was generally positively influenced by biblical considerations, educated Christians generally came to believe that there is no conflict between the Genesis account and an old Earth.⁷⁷ Later, even many early fundamentalists accepted an old Earth. In the seminal Fundamentals-series, Presbyterian theologian James Orr wrote that the long ages of geology merely enhance our awe at the Creator, rather than contradicting Genesis.⁷⁸ The early nineteenth and twentieth century protests against evolution were similarly led by old Earth creationists. Thus, if that was the end of the story, we might be asking here why there are so few Christian YEC’s in the world today.

As it happened, Christian YEC views in the sense analyzed by Malik only became part of the mainstream (in the U.S.) following the 1961 book The Genesis Flood by John Whitcomb and Henry Morris (which Malik does discuss).⁷⁹ YEC views spread mostly in the English-speaking world and among Protestant denominations. The emergence of creationism also perceiving the interpretation as being theologically vital, motivating the desire to defend Genesis through empirical arguments. The clarity of scripture, the understanding of the Fall, the polarization of culture and popularization of the conflict myth were important here.

Deep time was received by Muslims as part of Western science, and the general trend of educated Muslims of the colonial era was to harmonize the Qur’an and Muslim tradition with science, even to the point of writing scientific tafsir reading the Qur’an through the lens of modern science—evolution being the main exception to this trend.⁸⁰ Such trends would have left little incentive to pit Islam and modern geology against each other. The advent of the scientific polemic against the Bible (as propagated by Bucaille, for example) probably helped further steer Muslims away from Christian YEC views.

As noted, there are Muslims who believe in a young Earth, but no modern YEC movement exists in the Muslim-majority world. However, it is interesting to ask whether incomplete ingredients of YEC might be found at least in Salafi thought. The popular Salafi website IslamQA, for example, has published a Fatwa asserting that scientific estimates of the age of the cosmos are mere conjecture that Muslims should not bother with, and identifies specific weekdays on which God’s six day creation happened.⁸¹ This is an example of Muslim science skepticism regarding the historical sciences, related to historical Muslim views about only God knowing the “unseen” realm.⁸² However, other central intellectual conditions for developing YEC views are missing from the article: it displays no interest in the science and does not portray the issue as theologically central. I would be curious to hear what Malik would see as the necessary intellectual and cultural conditions for the emergence of creationism, and whether he sees any similarities here between the Christian and Muslim contexts.

Conclusion

Christian and Muslim debates surrounding evolution and design, chance and providence, creation and contingency seem to have great deal of interesting commonalities, and I believe considering these issues as they appear in the context of a different religion can provide an interesting mirror to reflect on the ground of one’s own views.

Although I believe Malik’s general thrust of argument for the compatibility of Islam and evolution is plausible, his analysis also reveals points at which inter-religious dialogue may help illuminate longstanding controversies in science and religion. Seeing how some theological issue (like the purposiveness or contingency of evolution) is treated in a different religious framework might help us in understanding what really is theologically central for our own position.

Inter-religious dialogue can also help correct popular-level polemics and clarify our ways of reading sacred scripture. But it should also be of interest to scholars regardless of their own religious beliefs: as one example, perhaps further inter-religious comparison of the development of theological hermeneutics and the associated social conditions might help more finally identify the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for the emergence of creationist views—this would certainly be valuable for science and religion research.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

E. V. R. Kojonen

E. V. R. Kojonen is University Lecturer in Systematic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, University of Helsinki.

Notes

1 Shoaib Malik, Islam and Evolution. Al-Ghazālī and the Modern Evolutionary Paradigm (London: Routledge, 2021).

2 In the introduction to Benjamin Wiker, Moral Darwinism: How We Became Hedonists (Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP, 2002), 11.

3 E.g. Niall Shanks, God, the Devil and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 244.

4 E. V. R. Kojonen, The Intelligent Design Debate and the Temptation of Scientism (London: Routledge, 2016); Kojonen, “Natural Theology in Evolution: A Review of Critiques and Changes,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (2017), 83–117.

5 Kojonen, The Compatibility of Evolution and Design (London: Palgrave, 2021).

6 William A. Dembski, No Free Lunch. Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased Without Intelligence (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

7 Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box. The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996).

8 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 225.

9 See Kojonen, “The God of the Gaps, Intelligent Design and Natural Theology,” The Journal of Analytic Theology 4 (2016), 291–316.

10 Kojonen, The Intelligent Design Debate, 103.

11 William A. Dembski, “Introduction: Mere Creation,” in Mere Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design, ed. William A. Dembski (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 14.

12 Dembski, No Free Lunch, 24.

13 William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design (Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP, 2004), 95.

14 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 226.

15 Kojonen, “Natural Theology in Evolution.”

16 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Rodney Holder, Ramified Natural Theology in Science and Religion: Moving Forward from Natural Theology (London: Routledge, 2022).

17 E.g. Alister McGrath, Re-Imagining Nature: The Promise of a Christian Natural Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016).

18 Robert J. Russell, “Intelligent Design is Not Science and Does Not Qualify to be Taught in Public School Science Classes,” Theology and Science 3:2 (2005), 131–132; Elliott Sober, “Intelligent Design and the Supernatural: The ‘God of the Extraterrestrials’ Reply,” Faith and Philosophy 24:1 (2007), 72–82.

19 Russell, “Intelligent Design is Not Science”; Sober, “Intelligent Design and the Supernatural.”

20 Thus James F. Sennett, “Hume’s Stopper and the Natural Theology Project,” in In Defence of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment, ed. James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 82–104.

21 Kojonen, The Intelligent Design Debate, 96.

22 Muzaffar Iqbal, Islam and Science (Farnham: Ashgate, 2002), chapter 4.

23 For examples on how to argue this, see e.g. Swinburne, The Existence of God; Ted Poston, “The Intrinsic Probability of Grand Explanatory Theories,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 37:4 (2020), 401–420.

24 E.g. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2017).

25 This approach is taken, for example, by Andrew Loke, The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

26 See e.g. Gabriel Said Reynolds, The Qur’an and the Bible: Text and Commentary (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018); Kevin van Bladel, “The Alexander Legend in the Qur’an 18:83–102,” in The Qur’an in Its Historical Context, ed. Gabriel Said Reynolds (London: Routledge, 2008).

27 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 228.

28 See e.g. John Rasmussen, “Cosmological Arguments from Contingency,” Philosophy Compass 5:9 (2010), 806–819. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00321.x.

29 Such as the Big Bang theory as supporting a beginning of time; thus Loke, The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited.

30 Swinburne, The Existence of God.

31 See Jacalyn Duffin, Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints and Healing in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

32 E.g. Stephen J. Shoemaker, Creating the Qur’an: A Historical-Critical Study (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2022).

33 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 228–229.

34 Ibid., 228–229.

35 Ibid., 232.

36 Edward B. Davis and Elizabeth Chmielewski, “Galileo and the Garden of Eden: Historical Reflections on Creationist Hermeneutics,” in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions: 1700–present, ed. Jitse M. van der Meer and Scott Mandelbrote (Leiden: Brill), 449–476.

37 Denis Lamoureux, The Bible and Ancient Science: Principles of Interpretation (Tullahoma, TN: McGahan Publishing House, 2020); Andrew Loke, “Does the Bible Affirm Scientific Errors? A Reply to Denis Lamoureux,” Science and Christian Belief 30 (2018), 116–133. See further also C. John Collins, Reading Genesis Well: Navigating History, Poetry, Science and Truth in Genesis 1–11 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018); Gregg Davidson and Keith J. Turner, The Manifold Beauty of Genesis One: A Multi-Layered Approach (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2021).

38 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 324–325; Muntasir Zaman, The Height of Prophet Adam: At the Crossroads of Science and Scripture (London: Beacon Books, 2022).

39 Salman Hameed, “Evolution and Creationism in the Islamic World,” in Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor and Stephen Pumfrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133–152, 143.

40 Maurice Bucaille, The Bible, The Qur’an and Science: The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge, trans. Alastair D. Pannell and The Author (Chicago, IL: Kazi Publications); on the influence of the book see Iqbal, Islam and Science, 286.

41 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 155–173; Iqbal, Islam and Science, 289–290.

42 Bucaille, The Bible, the Qur’an and Science, 92.

43 Ümit Sayin and Aykut Kence, “Islamic Scientific Creationism,” Reports of the National Center for Science Education 19:6 (1999). https://ncse.ngo/islamic-scientific-creationism.

44 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 100.

45 Ibid., 101.

46 Amy Unsworth and David Voas, “Attitudes to Evolution among Christians, Muslims and the Non-Religious in Britain: Differential Effects of Religious and Educational Factors,” Public Understanding of Science, 27:1 (2018), 76–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662517735430.

47 On such, see e.g. Collins, Reading Genesis Well; Davidson and Turner, The Manifold Beauty of Genesis One.

48 In addition to Malik’s work, I will be relying on David Solomon Jalajel’s work “Islam and Biological Evolution: Exploring Classical Sources and Methodologies” (Master’s thesis, Western Cape: University of the Western Cape, 2009) for some further Muslim arguments.

49 Jonathan Sarfati, The Genesis Account: A Theological, Historical and Scientific Commentary on Genesis 1-11. 2nd ed. (Powder Springs, GA: Creation Book Publishers, 2015), 58.

50 Bukhari 6429, https://sunnah.com/bukhari:6429.

51 Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari. Vol. 1: General Introduction and From the Creation to the Flood, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 19–21.

52 Sahih Muslim 2789, https://sunnah.com/muslim:2789. Hadith in Sunan Abu Dawud (1046 and 1047) also affirm the detail that Adam was created on a Friday, claiming this to be a direct saying of Mohammed. Sunan Abu Dawud 1046 and 1047, https://sunnah.com/abudawud:1046, https://sunnah.com/abudawud:1047.

53 Tafsir Ibn-Kathir, Sura 7:54, https://www.alim.org/quran/tafsir/ibn-kathir/surah/7/54/.

54 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 91; referring to Jalajel, Islam and Biological Evolution, 38–42.

55 Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari, 23–24, 57–58.

56 Ibid., 8–9.

57 Ibid., 15.

58 Ibid., 184. The same is stated also by Ibn Kathir, Stories of the Prophets, Noah.

59 Jalajel, Islam and Biological Evolution, 56.

60 The assumption is questioned by e.g. Joshua Swamidass, The Genealogical Adam & Eve: The Surprising Science of Universal Ancestry (Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2019).

61 E.g. Sarfati, The Genesis Account, 86–88.

62 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 90.

63 Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari, 24.

64 Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Sura 41:9. https://www.alim.org/quran/tafsir/ibn-kathir/surah/41/9/.

65 Malik, Islam and Evolution, 90; Jalajel, Islam and Biological Evolution, 39.

66 Augustine, De Genesi Ad Litteram, 4.56; Collins, Reading Genesis Well. On Augustine see further Ernan McMullin, “The Origin of Terrestrial Life: A Christian Perspective,” in Exploring the Origin, Extent, and Future of Life: Philosophical, Ethical, and Theological Perspectives, ed. Constance M. Bertka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 80–95.

67 Jalajel, Islam and Biological Evolution, chapter 5.

68 E.g. Hugh Ross, Navigating Genesis: A Scientist’s Journey through Genesis 1-11 (Covina, CA: Reasons to Believe, 2014).

69 Ibid., 177.

70 Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Sura 11:40, https://www.alim.org/quran/tafsir/ibn-kathir/surah/11/40/.

71 Al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari, 362–363.

72 E.g. IslamQA, “Did Everyone on Earth Drown at the Great Flood at the Time of Nooh (pbuh)?” December 29, 2013. https://islamqa.info/en/answers/130293/did-everyone-on-earth-drown-at-the-great-flood-at-the-time-of-nooh-peace-be-upon-him.

73 E.g. Ben Stanhope, (Mis)Interpreting Genesis: How the Creation Museum Misunderstands the Ancient Near Eastern Context of the Bible (Sterling Junction: Scarab Press, 2009), chapter 10; Collins, Reading Genesis Well.

74 The interpretation on the Fall’s massive cosmic effects became popular only after the Reformation. On this see Jon Garvey, God’s Good Earth: The Case for an Unfallen Creation (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019); Stanley P. Rosenberg, “Can Nature Be ‘Red in Tooth and Claw’ in the Thought of Augustine?,” in Finding Ourselves after Darwin: Conversations on the Image of God, Original Sin, and the Problem of Evil, ed. Stanley P. Rosenberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018), 226–243.

75 It might also be fruitful to compare the reasons for and against a YEC interpretation with cases like geocentrism, which continues to have some supporters among both Christians and Muslims, being even defended as obligatory by a recent Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. See Davis and Chmielewski, Galileo and the Garden of Eden; Daniel Varisco, “Darwin and Dunya: Muslim Responses to Darwinian Evolution,” Journal of International and Global Studies 9:2 (2018), 25, 32.

76 Ronald Numbers, The Creationists: From Scientific Creationism to Intelligent Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

77 Michael Roberts, “Genesis Chapter 1 and Geological Time from Hugo Grotius and Marin Mersenne to William Conybeare and Thomas Chalmers (1620–1825),” in Myth and Geology, ed. L. Piccardi and W. B. Masse (London: Geological Society, 2007); Rudwick, Earth Deep History: How It Was Discovered and Why It Matters (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 99.

78 James Orr, “Science and the Christian Faith,” in The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth. Volume 4 (Chicago, IL: Testimony Publishing Company, 1915).

79 John C. Whitcomb and Henry M. Morris, The Genesis Flood. The Biblical Record and Its Scientific Implications (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1961). See Numbers, The Creationists.

80 Iqbal, Islam and Science, 279–292; Hameed, “Evolution and Creationism in the Islamic World.”

81 IslamQA, “Are There Any Texts That State the Age of the Earth?” July 6, 2016. https://islamqa.info/en/answers/145806/are-there-any-texts-that-state-the-age-of-the-earth.

82 Jalajel, Islam and Biological Evolution, 15–18.