Measuring influence: an analysis of Australian gambling industry political donations and policy decisions

Abstract

Purpose

Existing Australian (and global) gambling harm prevention and minimization measures are overwhelmingly based on self-regulation, using largely ineffective measures focused on individual behavior change. This is substantially attributable to resistance to effective policy change, driven by a well-organized and significantly resourced gambling industry. It is evident that the gambling industry (like tobacco, alcohol and the processed foods industry) has actively sought political engagement as a mechanism to resist policy change. However, unlike tobacco and alcohol, little research has been undertaken to examine gambling industry influence on policymaking. This study aims to describe and analyze the pattern of disclosed financial donations received by Australian politicians and political parties from major gambling industry actors during the period 1998–2018. Further, it examines apparent temporal relationships between donations and gambling legislation or policy positions.

Material and methods

Donation data were sourced for the period 1998–2018 from the Australian Electoral Commission website. All data were classified according to donor and recipient and analyzed to provide descriptive statistics. Donations earmarked for specific campaigns, politicians’ electorates or events were also identified.

Results

The findings demonstrate that members of the gambling industry are consistent and substantial donors to both major parties in Australia. Furthermore, the pattern of donations provides evidence of temporal relationships between donations and federal and state gambling policy decisions and positions.

Conclusions

Close examination of industry corporate political activities like political donations supports a greater understanding of the factors that influence the gambling policy environment and, as with tobacco, will contribute to more effective regulation to prevent and address harm.

Keywords:

• Gambling
• policy
• corporate political activity

Disclosure statement

MJ is the recipient of an Australian Government Research Training Program Stipend Scholarship from the Commonwealth government. She received some funding support from the Alliance for Gambling Reform to undertake this analysis. She has not received any funding from gambling, alcohol or tobacco industries, or organizations acting on their behalf.

CL has received funding from the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, the (former) Victorian Gambling Research Panel, and the South Australian Independent Gambling Authority (the funds for which were derived from hypothecation of gambling tax revenue to research purposes), from the Australian and New Zealand School of Government and the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, and from non-government organizations for research into multiple aspects of poker machine gambling, including regulatory reform, existing harm minimization practices, and technical characteristics of gambling forms. He has received travel and co-operation grants from the Alberta Problem Gambling Research Institute, the Finnish Institute for Public Health, the Finnish Alcohol Research Foundation, the Ontario Problem Gambling Research Committee, and the Problem Gambling Foundation of New Zealand. He was a Chief Investigator on an Australian Research Council funded project researching mechanisms of influence on government by the tobacco, alcohol and gambling industries. He has undertaken consultancy research for local governments and non-government organizations in Australia and the UK seeking to restrict or reduce the concentration of poker machines and gambling impacts, and was a member of the Australian government’s Ministerial Expert Advisory Group on Gambling in 2010–2011. He has not received any funding from gambling, alcohol or tobacco industries, or organizations acting on their behalf.