Late transition to parenthood in high-income and low-fertility East Asian societies

ABSTRACT

Late transition to parenthood is no longer a phenomenon only observed in Europe; rather, it is even more prominent in high-income and low-fertility East Asian societies. Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature about the trends, causes and consequences of late child bearing in Asian societies. Underpinning the ultra-low fertility rates in high-income East Asian societies including Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan is the significant delay in transitioning to parenthood. The median age at first birth in these societies is now the oldest among all high-income societies globally, and more than 20 per cent of all first births occurred to women aged 35 and above. Taking a life course perspective to investigate the shifting age norm for parenthood and the causes of late parenthood would provide a more insightful understanding of the phenomenon. In addition, the consequences of late parenthood observed in Western countries are also likely to manifest in these societies, with intergenerational consequences deserving special attention within the Asian context.

KEYWORDS:

• Fertility
• East Asia
• late transition to parenthood
• first birth
• life course

Late transition to parenthood in Europe has received increasing attention from family demographers and sociologists in recent years. In contrast, the trends, causes and consequences of late childbearing in Asian societies have been under-explored. According to national population reports, in 2022, total fertility rates (TFR) in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea plummeted to 0.70, 0.78, and 0.87 respectively. These figures were lower than France’s TFR (1.8 children per woman) in 2022 by about one child and nearly half of the average TFR in the European Union (approx. 1.5 children per woman) that year (OECD Family Database, 2023). Even in Singapore, where the government has implemented various family policies over the past two decades, the TFR dropped to 0.97 in 2023, hitting a record low. Low fertility in these East Asian societies is very distinct from the Western experience in terms of the rapidity of fertility decline, the rarity of non-marital births, and the lack of a rebound in period TFR (Hyun Yoo, 2023). Even more striking is the significant delay in the age of first childbearing in these ultra-low fertility societies. The median age at first birth in Hong Kong and South Korea¹ rose to 32.7 and 32.8 respectively in 2022, marking the highest age at first birth among all high-income societies in the world. A simple estimation based on the Demographic Statistics Database from UN² shows that during 2021 and 2022, about 21 per cent of all first births occurred to women aged 35+ in Singapore and Japan; these figures were even higher in South Korea (27 per cent), Hong Kong (28 per cent) and Taiwan (25 per cent). Compared to levels (less than 5 per cent) in 1990, this represents a tremendous increase. These figures are also remarkable when compared to present levels in many European countries like Austria (16 per cent), Netherlands (14 per cent), and Sweden (15 per cent). Additionally, around 5 per cent of all first births occurred among women aged 40+ in these Asian societies in 2021/2022, exhibiting a ten to twentyfold increase from levels of 0.2 per cent to 0.7 per cent in 1990. Therefore, late transition to parenthood is becoming highly prominent in the high-income and low-fertility East Asian societies. Given its prevalence and potential consequence on population dynamics and health of mothers and children, late transition to parenthood in these societies deserves more attention.

On the one hand, the transition to parenthood is influenced by the ‘biological clock’. Research has shown an accelerating decline in fecundability from age 35, dropping by about 60 per cent at age 44, compared to at age 30 (Leridon & Slama, 2008; Steiner & Jukic, 2016). On the other hand, the timing for parenthood is also constrained by the ‘social clock’—an age range that is socially perceived as appropriate for becoming parents. Previous studies have revealed that age norms of parenthood vary across sub-groups and countries (Billari et al., 2011; Liefbroer et al., 2014). Although improvements in assisted reproductive technology (ART) have extended biological and social deadlines to some extent (Billari et al., 2011; Habbema et al., 2015), its contribution to TFR in many Western countries remains modest (Lazzari et al., 2021).

Most studies on late transition to parenthood have focused solely on factors related to the single event of becoming parents whilst failing to consider its connection with other key life events such as school-leaving, home-leaving, and partnership formation. According to life course theory, individuals construct their life course through their choices and actions within the constraints of social institutions and cultures (Elder et al., 2003). Their earlier life transitions would shape later transitions. Moreover, social norms create normative timetables and structure social pathways of education, work and family. Thus, the age norm for parenthood is actually embedded in a normative timetable that reflects social expectations of sequence, timing and age for this important life transition. As normative timetables evolve over time, so do the sequence, timing and age for parenthood. For example, in the 1980s, having a first child at age 28 or older would have been seen as ‘late’ (Roosa, 1988), whereas nowadays, ages 35, 40, or even 45 are more commonly used as thresholds for defining ‘late parents’ (Sobotka & Beaujouan, 2018). In traditional Chinese societies, starting a family typically preceded starting a career; in contrast, people nowadays often wait until they have secured a stable job before starting a family. Up to now, there has been no large-scale and representative survey conducted in high-income East Asian societies that would enable scholars to examine contemporary normative timetables of key life events. European Social Surveys (ESS) conducted in 2006 and 2018 have already included a special module on the timing of life covering the actual timing, ideal age, upper and lower age deadlines of various life events. National social surveys or cross-country surveys like the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and East Asian Social Survey should include a similar module in the future. This would provide valuable insights into the shifting age norms for parenthood from a life course perspective, while facilitating regional and East–West comparisons. In terms of individual childbearing decision-making, previous research has frequently attributed late parenthood to increased school years, increased stability in jobs and partnerships, usually investigating these factors separately. In reality, these factors work together in creating synthetic pathways to parenthood. From a life course perspective, the timing of first childbearing is very likely to be affected by individuals’ life histories of education, employment, and partnership. Surprisingly, there is a lack of research on pre-parenthood life trajectories. To the best of the author's knowledge, no study has been conducted on the discrepancy between actual and normative timetables.

Finally, numerous studies in Western societies have examined the consequences of late transition to parenthood, including the reduction of family size, adverse pregnancy and childhood outcomes, and the surging health care spending on ART. While many of these consequences may also manifest in East Asian societies, special attention should be given to the intergenerational consequence within the Asian context. Late transition to parenthood is likely to result in the third generation having either no grandparents or very old grandparents, and possibly even experiencing the loss of parents before reaching adulthood. In all these high-income East Asian societies, grandparents often play a significant role in helping their adult children with childcare and household tasks, while adult children are primarily responsible for elderly care. Therefore, the rise of late transition to parenthood is expected to reshape the reciprocal intergenerational support system and reduce downward support transfer. The decreased overlapping lifespan of generations would affect kinship structures as well as intergenerational solidarity, especially in East Asia where multigenerational families are traditionally highly valued. Moreover, since family remains the default choice for childcare and elder care provision in these societies, late parenthood is likely to intensify the conflict between work and family for the sandwiched generation, as they would be faced with the dual demands of caring for young children and older parents. In sum, the phenomenon of late transition to parenthood in Asian high-income and low-fertility societies is a pressing concern with complex consequences, underscoring the need for more research to deepen our understanding of it.

Acknowledgements

This commentary is based on a DFF Inge LehmannResearch Project (No.122986).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond [grant number 122986].

Notes

1 For South Korea, the number refers to the mean age for mothers at first birth.

2 The data can be retrieved from https://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3A58.